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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 2199

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987 FOR THE ARMED FORCES PROCUREMENT, FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, FOR OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, AND FOR WORKING CAPITAL FUNDS, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

PART 2

UNIFIED COMMANDS

MARCH 11, 12, 1986

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987

TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDS

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Barry Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Wilson, Denton, Nunn, Hart, Exon, Levin, Bingaman, and Dixon.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Patrick A. Tucker, general counsel; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; John J. Hamre, Drew A. Harker, George K. Johnson, Jr., David S. Lyles, Carl M. Smith, and Patricia L. Watson, professional staff members; and Mary J. Kampo, staff assistant.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Dale F. Gerry, assistant to Senator Cohen; Christopher Mellon, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; William S. Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman GOLDWATER. The meeting will come to order.

This morning, we are very privileged to have Gen. John Galvin, Commander in Chief of the Southern Command, and Gen. Fred Mahaffey, Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command.

Gentlemen, we welcome you.

The committee meets this morning to continue its review of the fiscal year 1987 Department of Defense authorization bill.

This morning's hearing is the first in a series of three at which we will receive testimony from the Unified commanders.

The Unified commanders have the responsibility of controlling operations whenever U.S. military forces are employed.

Despite this awesome responsibility, the committee found during its recent review of the organization of the Department of Defense that the unified commanders, or CINCs, as they are commonly called, often have too little influence over critical decisions affecting their command's readiness and force posture.

The committee has sought to redress this imbalance by increasing the authority and influence of the unified commanders in the Department of Defense reorganization bill, on which the committee just completed markup.

The committee is very pleased this morning to welcome two unified commanders, whom I have already recognized and mentioned.

This afternoon, at 2 p.m., we will hear from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command and the Commander in Chief of the Central Command.

On Wednesday, we will hear from the Commander in Chief of the European Command and the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command.

Both of our witnesses this morning are distinguished and highly respected officers. Although both are well known to the committee, I believe that this is the first time that we will hear from them in their present capacities.

At this point, I will defer to Senator Nunn for any opening statement that he might have, and I would propose that, after that, we first hear from General Galvin and then General Mahaffey before turning to questions.

Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I am delighted to join you in welcoming General Galvin and General Mahaffey.

I think it is most timely and appropriate this morning, Mr. Chairman, after we have gone through the long and tedious, but I think important, task of facing up to our reorganization bill and responsibilities of the Congress for oversight of the Department of Defense, that we hear from two of our unified commanders. We have concluded during our deliberations that the unified commands needed strengthening, and these are the people who bear the responsibility of joint operations. These are the people who are on the frontline of any activity or action. These are the people for whom the services provide training, logistics, and other very important service functions, because these are the operational commanders.

So I welcome both of our witnesses this morning.

I would like for my opening statement to be put into the record, if you would.

We look forward to hearing from the witnesses this morning.

Chairman GOLDWATER. That will be done.

[The prepared statement of Senator Nunn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming General Galvin and General Mahaffey to this first hearing featuring the testimony of the Commanders of the Unified Commands.

Mr. Chairman, these are the first hearings we hold as full committee following the mark up and reporting of our Defense Reorganization bill. I think that is most appropriate. One of the key goals of the DOD Reorganization effort is to strengthen the unified commanders. During our extensive inquiry into the subject, the committee concluded that too much in the past we have had unified commanders, but divided commands. I believe our bill will help to solve this long-standing weakness.

Our committee also has a goal of changing the way Congress provides oversight of Defense programs. Congress needs to reinforce the reforms we seek in DOD by strengthening the focus on joint operations, on missions, on outputs instead of inputs. That is the perspective we have as we start these hearings.

We look to these distinguished commanders as some of the most important people in the entire Defense Department. We need to hear from you, understand your problems, share your insights. I look forward to your testimony.

Senator NUNN. We also look forward to hearing from our other witnesses this morning. They will similarly be very important.

So this is a most appropriate beginning.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you.

Senator Alan Dixon has a prepared statement which we will enter into the record at this point.

[Prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN DIXON

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here to hear the testimony of the Commanders of the Unified Command.

Just last week, this committee strengthened the authority and powers of the unified commanders of our combined Armed Forces, when it passed the Defense Department reorganization bill. This committee has given each unified commander complete operational control over those forces assigned to his command.

We Americans depend on these unified commanders to defend our homeland and our allies, and to protect the lives of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines under their command. I am glad that this committee has rectified the shortcomings of the unified commanders authority that exists under present circumstances. I look forward to hearing from these outstanding commanders.

Chairman GOLDWATER. General Galvin, we will start with you.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

General GALVIN. Mr. Chairman, Senator Nunn, it's a pleasure to appear before the committee this morning.

I have a prepared statement which I will submit. I would like to summarize that statement very briefly this morning in three of its important parts.

I would like to comment about the situation in the area in which I have my responsibilities, Latin America. I would like also to comment on the strategy which I am executing, and then, third, I would like to make a few comments of an operational nature, with reference to some of the countries that are most interesting to us at this moment.

I was stationed in Latin America, in fact, in Colombia, about 30 years ago, and I have been very interested in the area ever since.

I worked as an adviser in the Ranger School in Melgar, Colombia. At that time, Colombia, as well as several of the other countries of Latin America, were facing insurgencies and subversive efforts of one kind or another. But those insurgencies were smoldering along. They lacked resources, they lacked goals, and they lacked a sense of organization.

I would say that the main difference that I see three decades later in the area is that in the 19 nations which fall into the area of responsibility of the Southern Command, at least nine of those countries are experiencing insurgencies at this time—Honduras; El Salvador; Guatemala; to some extent Costa Rica, where there are seven different Communist parties and some of the elements there are armed, the Mora Cañas brigade is operating in support of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua; Colombia; Peru; Ecuador; Bolivia; and Chile. In total, these are nine countries in which there is a serious problem of insurgency.

These insurgencies are not smoldering today. They are different from what they were 30 years ago. They have a sense of goals, of objectives, and overall umbrella organizations which have been provided by Fidel Castro. Castro has trained probably 15,000 citizens of these 19 countries in Cuba, and then sent them back into their countries for destabilization efforts, which we see today.

The impact of this effort over 20 years and more is very evident.

There are also new resources. More resources come into Latin America to support insurgencies than before. A great deal of that, of course, is self-generated within these countries because of the drug trade, the illicit drug trade.

So, I see a great danger, much greater than it was 30 years ago, and I think it is something to which we need to pay a lot of attention.

Since that is the problem, what is the solution? The solution, of course, is allied to our strategy.

That strategy is threefold.

From our point of view, in the United States in a peacetime strategy, we are looking for stability of our south flank, so that if there are East-West problems or anywhere else in the world, we are able to operate from a stable and secure base in our own hemisphere. We achieve that stability and security through cooperative efforts with our allies in the region, much of this supported through security assistance and other aid to these nations.

We also have, as a second part of the strategy, obviously, contingencies we have to look at in certain situations in terms of our membership in the Rio Treaty and our other responsibilities to our allies.

The third part of the strategy is what it would be necessary to do in an all-out war that would encompass the whole world in a confrontation between East and West. That involves maritime strategies in the South Atlantic, et cetera, for which I share responsibilities with the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command.

That, in brief, is the strategy. I would like to make some comments of an operational nature on certain key countries.

The most important, key country in Central America to me at this time is Nicaragua, where we have UNO and the democratic resistance facing the Sandinistas. I realize that this question is in front of the Congress now.

If we are unable to support UNO in its efforts, it is going to have very strong ramifications throughout Central America. I believe that it is going to cause what I would call "accommodation" in countries that are the Sandinista's neighbors, because they will be

faced with a threat which they cannot face alone, and they will have to seek some kind of arrangement.

I also feel, on the other hand, that support for UNO would mean that we would continue the pressure on the Sandinistas to move toward the goals that we want to see achieved, which are to leave their neighbors alone, to get the Cubans out, to get the iron out of the country—meaning all of the heavy equipment, such as tanks and the great, large size of their armed forces—and, of course, to allow political space or democratic pluralism within the country.

I think, sir, that those things can be achieved through support for UNO.

The second most important place in Central America is El Salvador, where the war has been going well. We have continued to maintain a level of no more than 55 trainers there. We have continued with the strategy that this is the Salvadoran Armed Forces' war and that we will provide assistance in every way we can, but we will not fight the war for them.

This has strengthened, not weakened, the Salvadoran Armed Forces. It has strengthened the Government, and our efforts there have met with a great deal of success, although we still have a long way to go.

In the other countries of Central America, we have assisted Costa Rica in providing some kind of security for its northern border. We have not responded well in terms of security assistance for Guatemala, in which, not only have the military achieved a transition to civil government, but they have achieved it over 1 year of carefully planned and organized moves. The military's transition plan worked so well that at the time President Cerezo took over, the infrastructure throughout the country had already become civilianized and had been in that form for several months.

At the present time, I do not see much military aid going to Guatemala, and I think this may be a mistake because I feel that the military, which has performed so well in showing itself to be ready to support democratic development and nation-building in the country, deserves more support from us.

In Panama, we face several problems as we move toward the year 2000, and we are working on the details of arrangements between ourselves and the Panamanians. My thoughts and initial recommendations are presently at the Department of Defense level in coordination with the Department of State, to see where we are going in the year 2000.

I will not try to mention the several countries of South America, except to say that Colombia, which I know better than the others, although I have visited them all this year, is an example of a country facing deep and serious threats from the guerrilla organizations, terrorists, drug traffickers, all operating to one degree or another in combination.

Overall, I feel that we saw here in the past decade or two the formation of umbrella organizations within countries, such as the FMLN in El Salvador and the FSLN in Nicaragua, in which Marxist organizations have unified themselves in order to be more powerful.

I think that is now proceeding beyond the boundaries of these countries. In fact, I have seen detailed proof of that.

We are seeing now an international Latin American insurgent guerrilla terrorist organization, and it is growing.

So, I would conclude, sir, by saying that our commitment to Latin America should be looked at as long term, and this is the most important signal that we could give to the nations that are our allies and that are not our allies in the region.

Thank you for the opportunity to make an opening statement.

[The prepared statement of General Galvin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, ladies and gentlemen. I welcome this opportunity to speak to you and respond to your questions. The work of this committee is of fundamental importance to U.S. national interests, to my responsibilities, and to our friends in Latin America. From my perspective it is important that this committee understand the forces and trends affecting the U.S. Southern Command in Latin America today, and our military strategy in support of our national interests in Latin America.

The understanding and assistance of this committee in the past has enabled my command to execute a sound military component to our national strategy which I am pleased to report is working successfully. Your support in the future will determine the pace and scope of additional progress.

Three decades ago I was a young lieutenant stationed in Latin America, where I served as a platoon leader in Puerto Rico and a ranger advisor in Colombia. With an abiding interest that stems from that time, I have watched many changes coming about—some which were not good at all.

This matrix that is Latin America is complex and changing. While democratic pluralism is now the norm rather than the exception, the countries of Latin America are challenged by enormous national debt, faltering economies, growing insurgencies, terrorism, and a traffic in drugs that has reached astounding proportions.

At the same time, the past three decades have brought about an increased interest in Latin America on the part of the United States. This interest—much of it admittedly recent—is highly productive because it is focused not simply on questions of commerce, but also on democratic values that are of mutual importance to North Americans and Latin Americans alike. Based on this perspective, I will comment first on the trends in the region that affect our interests.

First I wish to call attention to the growing destabilization of Latin America that results from Soviet and Cuban interests in the region. Both scale of the intervention—now sustained for almost three decades—and the results are matters that merit the close inspection of this committee because they are changing the face of things in this hemisphere.

During the 1970's, as a matter of deliberate policy, we pulled back from Latin America in terms of our military presence and our security assistance. Where there were 750 U.S. officers authorized for duty in the countries of the region in 1957 when I served in Colombia, there are now 88. If we discount Honduras, El Salvador and Panama, which have unique manning requirements, I have 57 military personnel in 13 countries. Similar cuts in personnel and resources were made throughout the U.S. Government presence in Latin America.

At the very time we were cutting back, a new force was emerging in Latin America, and it has brought important changes to the calculus. Communist Cuba, checked in the early 1960's by the Alliance for Progress, did not give up its objective of subverting the governments of the region. It also provided a base of operation for the military and ideological power of the Soviet Union. As a result of these new forces in the region, today we face the following:

Over 750 Soviets are in Peru with an estimated 125–150 military advisors. That is more military advisors than the United States has in the entire region.

Cuba has trained over 15,000 Latin Americans from the nations of the region and has returned them to subvert their own governments. Castro—with advise and help—has changed the nature of insurgency from a home grown revolt for popular objectives to a well-coordinated international Marxism in the region. Today's insurgents have sophisticated funding provided by international support networks. With these funds they can buy command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities that are far superior to the current capabilities of the Latin American governments and their security forces. The small

packages of rifles secretly off-loaded on beaches in the night in the 1960's are now transported by land, sea and air often using sophisticated concealment schemes or in merchant ships.

More recently, we have evidence to conclude that these Cuban-trained guerrillas of today are well connected to the region's financially powerful illegal drug dealers.

Finally, these efforts produced a major success for the spread of Marxist-Leninism when the popular revolution in Nicaragua was captured by the Marxist-Leninists in the Sandinista movement. Today Nicaragua constitutes another Communist base of subversion, interference, and intervention that seriously threatens Central America's stability and development.

In sum, we are facing a systematic effort of continental scope which these Latin American governments cannot withstand without our assistance. What that assistance should be to be effective and what it can accomplish is dramatically demonstrated in El Salvador. Because of Salvadoran courage and willingness to change, and because of our assistance, a nascent democracy exists where a harsh oligarchic and military rule was in danger of falling to an even more harsh totalitarian rule under the FLMN.

From a security perspective, our challenges are rooted in these brief outlines of the threat and our deliberate sustained withdrawal from Latin America. The results are striking. Of 19 countries in my area of responsibility, 9 have active insurgencies and at least 5 have subversive infrastructures in some phase of development. They are threatened by various brands of terrorism. Many have serious problems created by drug traffickers.

As a second comment on regional trends, I wish to cite the awesome challenges to our society that comes from drug trafficking in the hemisphere. In an ominous new aspect of the problem, we are seeing evidence of an alliance between the drug traffickers and the subversives.

The increasing level of cooperation and mutual support between drug dealers and terrorists and subversives can be clearly seen in the Colombian M-19 guerrilla attack on the Palace of Justice in Bogota on Nov. 6, 1985, in which eleven Chief Justices were murdered. The Colombians have established proof of Sandinista support, assistance from Ecuadoran guerrillas and a clear link to Colombian drug dealers. The Colombians believe drug dealers paid for the attack to destroy court records needed by the government to prosecute them.

Insurgents have more secure and more capable command control and communications and intelligence systems than many of the Latin Americans security forces.

Today there is a wide awareness that drugs are not just a North American problem. Today the leaders of Latin America accept the reality that drugs attack the fibers of our societies, crippling our productivity, undermining our ethics, defeating our educational systems, and wasting our human and financial treasures as nations. Drugs are a serious national security problem for Latin Americans and the United States. Fortunately Latin Americans understand the danger and are increasingly willing to act. This is a major positive change.

The channels over which drugs move North, and money and resources move South constitute an illegal and transnational infrastructure which is replacing some of the existing international structures of commerce. Throughout the hemisphere, north and south, drugs are becoming more relevant to peoples' culture, commerce and security than the traditional institutions. The funds they generate do not flow to the tax base. Rather, they sap funds to resist the increased crime and corruption they spawn, and increase the taxpayer's burden for indemnity, medical and rehabilitation programs. In Latin America drugs provide a source of funds for terrorists and insurgents who increase the violence and destruction visited on the campesino.

I am not encouraged by the progress being made in efforts to counter drug trafficking in the region. There is progress but it is too slow and disjointed. It is true that Latin American nations are now accepting that the problem is theirs as well as ours, and if this cancer can have a positive side, narcotics eradication has caused increased cooperation among regional governments.

The links between drug dealers and insurgent groups are becoming more apparent. The bond needs to be cut before this practice spreads throughout the hemisphere and takes deep roots in these new areas. We must eliminate this means of support for the guerrillas, thus enabling countries such as Colombia, Peru and Ecuador to keep the insurgents at a manageable level. The Department of State will submit a request for aid toward the creation of better antiterrorist forces in several Latin American countries which will greatly assist in this effort. I urge your early support of this initiative.

The dramatic trends of increasing insurgency and increasing drug trafficking are forces that work to cause further damage to the weak national economies in the region. This situation has potentially disastrous implications for democracy. During the 1960's and continuing until the disastrous increase in oil prices in the early 1970's, an economic growth rate of 7–10% per annum was routinely occurring throughout Latin America. Sub-regional economic cooperation was flourishing, and more and more people were experiencing the benefits of greater freedom, trade and productivity. After 1973, with the advent of higher oil prices, these governments had less money to invest in development. GNP growth rates fell to zero or even minus rates by the 1979/1980 period. As national economies deteriorated, political stress and social frustration grew. Today's destabilization was in part created by this chain of events.

The region's economic situation appears to be slowly recovering. In 1985 for example El Salvador had its first year of economic growth since 1980. Most of Latin America will benefit from the lower prices in oil and the higher prices this year in some commodities, but most Latin American experts believe that it is too early to tell if it will be enough to give a lasting boost to these crippled economies.

It is possible that pressure will build in Washington to cut our aid to Central America because of this windfall. That would be short-sighted. Our aid has enabled these nations to survive, not grow.

The instability occurring in Central America today and bubbling just below the surface in most of the South American countries is apparent in the trends of the last three decades. We should recognize that the challenges are long-term and there is no easy solution.

The overall strategy of the Southern Command aims at providing a stable south flank for the United States. This can best be accomplished by ensuring that the military organizations in allied countries are supportive of democratic development and are dedicated to internal stability. The strategy confronts Marxist-Leninist Nicaragua, the primary threat to stability in the region; supports counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador; and assists several other countries in combating threats from insurgency and terrorism. A vital part of the Southern Command's strategy continues to be the protection of the Panama Canal. Under conditions of an East-West conflict, strategic considerations would link this command with the Atlantic Command and other organizations for hemispheric defense.

The means used by Southern Command to execute the strategy vary from country to country. In an effort to combat the Sandinista regime's export of subversion and intimidation of its neighbors, the Southern Command provided a small control and support structure for exercises and some other activities in the region—primarily in Honduras—that encourages allies and deters the Nicaraguan government from extensive direct action against neighbors.

I will address the issue of U.S. presence in Honduras as a special topic later. In El Salvador, our small group of 55 advisors administers the largest security assistance program in the command. In other Latin American countries, the means used to accomplish the strategy include security assistance, combined exercises, mobile training teams, personnel exchange programs, small unit exchanges, conferences, workshops, visits, and a variety of other initiatives.

I would like to turn now to the operational applications of our military strategy in Latin America. As long as a Marxist-Leninist state exists in Central America, with its regionally unprecedented military force, democratic pluralism and economic development in the Caribbean Basin remain in jeopardy. Nicaraguan problems are best solved by Nicaraguans, and the Democratic Resistance Forces (DRF) currently offers the best means to reverse consolidation of this Marxist-Leninist state. However, it is unrealistic to assume that the DRF can become a viable military and political force without comprehensive U.S. support. Its growth and performance under adverse circumstances indicate that, if the United States provides military assistance, the Democratic Resistance movement is likely to succeed.

The first evidence of a consolidated armed opposition in Nicaragua came in 1981 and was only a handful of combatants. Today that force is 20,000 strong. Another way to look at the issue is to compare the DRF with the Sandinista military. The largest growth period for both forces was from 1983 to 1985. During that period, the Sandinista military grew by 52%. To achieve this, the Sandinistas introduced forced conscription, which has been a social problem for them since its inception. During that same period, the DRF grew by 133%, sustained by volunteers joining the fight and defectors from the Sandinista military.

With proper financial support and sound political and military guidance and training, the DRF could easily become the deciding factor in the future direction of Nicaragua and Central America.

The armed forces of El Salvador have become more professional and self-confident in their handling of the guerrilla challenge. For example, the national military leadership recently demonstrated their ability to mount and sustain a large multi-battalion operation. In early January 1986, the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) launched a complex operation to regain control of a strategic guerrilla base. The Guazapa area is not only close to the capital, but also the birthplace of the revolution. Operation Fenix involved the successful coordinated employment of seven infantry battalions, plus supporting units, and an extensive use of PSYOPS and civic action over a six-week period. One of the main reasons for this trend in professional growth lies in this emerging ability to analyze and respond to intelligence. Clearly, progress has been made; however, the road ahead will remain difficult. For the near term, the United States must sustain ESAF's positive momentum with a consistent level of security assistance.

One of the most troubling aspects of the war in El Salvador is the growing number of civilian casualties caused by guerrilla mines. For the past 15–18 months, the FMLN has expanded its use of mines against the Salvadoran government's soldiers. We are witnessing today what we hope is not a shift in tactics to use the mines against the Salvadoran civilian population. Our country team is reporting the continued use of indiscriminate mining and shooting by the FMLN directed against Campesinos in a program of economic attrition in which vehicles are blown up and crops are destroyed.

In Honduras, our force presence there provides the democratic leaders in the region assurance of continued U.S. concern and interest in their countries and the welfare of democracy in Central America. In the Andean Ridge countries of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, the combination effects on stability of Cuban-trained guerrillas and narco-traficantes is growing. In most of these countries our government-to-government relations are good and we are pursuing low keyed military-to-military relations in support of the U.S. Ambassadors' programs.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you. We will have some questions for you on that.

Senator Thurmond, do you have an opening statement you want to make?

Senator THURMOND. Yes, thank you Mr. Chairman. I had a couple of other meetings this morning, and I'm sorry, or I would have been here sooner.

I want to thank you for holding these hearings with our commanders of the Unified Commands.

I don't know of any more important positions held by any military people than these particular people.

The emphasis that we placed on strengthening their positions in our Department of Defense organization legislation will, in my opinion, have a very positive impact on the way we do business.

Mr. Chairman, this is the first appearance before the committee for Generals Galvin and Mahaffey in their positions as commanders, as I understand it, and I would like to welcome both of them.

I have not had the opportunity to visit General Mahaffey's command. I hope to get down there. But I was fortunate to visit with General Galvin and the Southern Command staff over the Christmas recess. General Galvin provides an excellent overview of the region, and I would recommend a trip to the Southern Command to all members of this committee.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, I want to say this, that I have not visited any general in the field who seemed to have a better grasp of his job and responsibility than General Galvin. He was familiar with every detail, and his views and knowledge about Nicaragua were very important. I wish all of the American people could hear what he had to say about that, and there would be no question as to what we should do.

He is on the right track in my opinion.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you, Senator.

General Mahaffey, we welcome you here. You may proceed any way you care to. If you have a prepared statement, we will make it a part of the record.

STATEMENT OF GEN. FRED K. MAHAFFEY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. READINESS COMMAND, AND DIRECTOR, JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY

General MAHAFFEY. Mr. Chairman, I also appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee in an effort to respond to those areas of specific interest that you identified in your letter of February 20.

I have also submitted a written statement for the record that deals with the posture of the U.S. Readiness Command and the Joint Deployment Agency. It covers areas of progress realized this past year by both the Command and the Agency. It describes some new initiatives that are focused on improving the combat capability of those forces, which are assigned to the Readiness Command, and the ability to deploy them rapidly to reinforce the regional CINC's. It also underscores some of my personal concerns relating to the potential impacts of decreasing defense budget levels on my ability to accomplish my primary mission: to provide a combat-ready central reserve, here in the United States, for rapid reinforcement of the other CINC's worldwide. That, of course, is a central feature of our national military strategy. I will, of course, be glad to answer any questions that you may have concerning that prepared statement.

Your letter of February 20, requesting that I address specifically the impact of the fiscal year 1987 President's budget and the Five-Year Defense Program in specific areas, was received in my headquarters only this last Thursday. Consequently, the specific assessments requested in that letter are not a part of the prepared statement that I submitted earlier.

I am, however, prepared to speak to those issues identified in the letter that are germane to my command and to the Joint Deployment Agency. All are not. For example, I am not assigned theater warfighting responsibilities, per se, although I do have important mission requirements related to the defense of the continental United States, Alaska, and Canada. Rather, my primary warfighting role is to furnish combat-ready reinforcements, when directed by either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Command Authority, to the regional and theater CINC's. Thus, the issue of current munitions sustainability in theater and the effects of the fiscal year 1987 budget and Five-Year Defense Program on sustainability or the estimated surge and sustained rate of operational tempos by my component forces that are made possible by spare parts inventories, are really questions that are best addressed by the regional CINC's to whom I deploy combat-ready forces for their subsequent employment.

On the other hand, the issue of communications interoperability within the Readiness Command and its robustness in the face of an electronic warfare threat is very much a matter of intense interest

to me and to my component commanders. So, too, are the war-stoppers that you referred to, as they relate to my unique mission set. I'd like first to clarify and summarize that mission set for the benefit of the committee, and then move on to the specifics of communications interoperability problems and war-stopper issues, as well as my own command's version of the security environment and the key threats that were referred to in your letter.

Several of the unified commands, as you know, are assigned regional responsibilities, that is, missions that are associated with deterrence and war-fighting in their respective theaters. Several other CINC's are assigned functional responsibilities. For example, the Military Airlift Command provides strategic intertheater as well as intratheater lift. Still other CINC's are assigned global and worldwide responsibilities. For example, the Strategic Air Command and the United States Space Command in a sense have circumglobal responsibilities. The mission set that is assigned to the Readiness Command and the Joint Deployment Agency in fact consists of all three.

There are, first, the global, worldwide responsibilities, outlined in my first two mission requirements. Then, second, there are the functional responsibilities for the development of joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures and the design and conduct of joint training, in addition to joint deployment, which interface with and in some cases overlap these functional responsibilities as they are carried out by the services in some of the other unified and specified commands, such as the Military Airlift Command.

Finally, I am assigned regional responsibilities as they pertain to planning for the defense of Alaska, the combined defense of Canada and the United States, and the defense of numerous key assets, facilities and functions in the United States which are so integral to our ability as a Nation to mobilize, deploy, and sustain forces.

It is in this latter mission area that I am concerned with the "security environment," to use your words, and the threats to our ability to mobilize, to deploy, and to sustain.

Let me return now to the issue of communications interoperability and potential war-stoppers as they impact on these specific missions and my command.

The fiscal year 1987 President's budget appears adequate and reasonable for support of command and control communications programs that are central to my mission requirements. The funding will provide the means to at least move a long way toward solving some of our interoperability disconnects, as we transition from manual, analog, and relatively unsecure devices to state-of-the-art, modern, automatic, digital, secure systems that are more survivable in the electronic warfare environment. Funding provided by the President's budget is, of course, of fundamental importance to sustaining this change-out and modernization process. I will be glad to speak to more of the specifics as they relate to my command, if you wish.

The President's budget also provides support for the continued development of a standardized, high-frequency radio that is of interest to the Readiness Command in its application as a backup to the public telephone system in order to increase our continental

United States communications capabilities for post-attack reporting, both as it relates to situational assessments and residual capability assessments throughout the CONUS.

Programs supporting interoperability of the CONUS central reserve that are also supported by the budget include improvements to the Defense Satellite Communications System, modernization of the Joint Communication Support Element, for which I am responsible and which is located at MacDill Air Force Base, and upgrades to the tactical communication system between Air Force tactical air control parties and the Army ground units, which they provide support to. I have identified a number of readiness issues to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs. These issues, although not necessarily war stoppers, can impact the combat readiness and the deployability of REDCOM's component forces. The primary concern, as you know, Mr. Chairman, that I have is with strategic lift. Shortfalls in lift capabilities seriously hinder my capability to rapidly deploy forces to the gaining theater commanders. The fiscal year 1987 President's budget addresses strategic lift procurements that will improve our strategic lift posture. Programs such as the buyout of the C-5B and the C-17 should receive the highest priority. The C-17 procurement program is the key to reducing our long-term strategic airlift shortfalls. The importance of maintaining that program in a budget constrained environment simply cannot be overemphasized from my perspective.

I am pleased to report to the committee that the readiness status of Army and Air Force units assigned to the Readiness Command have shown continued and steady improvement over the past year because of the emphasis on readiness programs in the budget process, support by the services, and I must add, dedicated and hard effort by the commanders of those units.

Ninety-one percent of REDCOM assigned active general purpose Army forces report that they are combat ready, that is, C-3 or higher, in their readiness ratings, substantially up from the 67 percent reported for the same period last year. Air Force forces continue to report a high percentage of combat-ready units, at 88 percent, with significant improvement in the percentage of units that are reporting the very highest levels of combat readiness—C-1 or C-2—up to 76 percent from the 63 percent reported at this time last year.

Despite this encouraging trend and overall improvement of readiness, Army forces still have substantial shortages in common items of equipment and in noncommissioned officers in selected career management fields, while war readiness spares kits shortages continue to be the principal limiting factor for Air Force tactical forces, along with the availability of spares for F-15 and F-16 engines.

Finally, let me turn to my assessment of the security environment and the threat to those key assets, facilities, and functions which, as I said earlier, are so integral to our ability to mobilize, deploy and sustain.

REDCOM's mission for the land defense of CONUS poses very special command and control challenges that stem both from the diverse nature of the threat to the continental United States, and the variety of civilian and military organizations which must be in-

tegrated in a command and control structure for responsive planning and execution.

The Soviet strategic nuclear threat against the CONUS is, of course, very real and a well-defined threat. On the other hand, at the present time, Soviet conventional forces appear to lack sufficient capabilities to undertake landed operations by major conventional forces against North America; and available Soviet long-range airlift and sealift assets would probably be committed to other theaters of operation in times of global crisis or war.

However, the lower level threat, encompassing sabotage by potential saboteurs and terrorist actions, either by Third World terrorist organizations, or by Soviet SPETSNAZ forces, must be treated as potentially very real and potentially serious. They must be addressed in our planning, command, and control, and force allocation decisions. I would like to expand on this concern just a bit.

The United States relies on an extraordinarily sophisticated but fragile and vulnerable set of long-distance networks for energy distribution, communication, and transportation. These networks are intricately interrelated, and a serious disruption in one would quickly cascade through the others and disrupt or severely impede our response to a national security crisis. The devastating New York City blackouts of 1965 and 1977, the Three Mile Island nuclear powerplant accident in 1975, and the closing of the Skyway Bridge across Tampa Bay and the shipping channel below when the bridge was struck by a freighter, aptly demonstrate our dependency upon these interrelated networks; the vulnerability of these networks, even to natural causes; and the possible range of effects resulting from sabotage or subversion.

Terrorists operating in our own strategic rear, foreign agents or special operations forces acting prior to some hostile, international act, and disgruntled or suborned employees, are all potential candidates for conducting such sabotage and subversive activity. Potential militarily related targets include our key mobilization, deployment and war sustainment assets, command and control centers, nuclear assets, and other targets critical to the war effort. Additionally, key leaders in the National Command Authority and nuclear chain of command could be targeted by these same factions. Enemy operations against such targets would be designed to degrade or destroy the U.S. war-waging capability.

Unfortunately, there is presently no agreed upon national-level estimate as to the nature, the extent, and probability of occurrence of these lower level threats of sabotage or subversion to our most valuable and vulnerable assets, personnel, and facilities. The operational planning community needs a national-level estimate on which to base our planning. Assistance from the national intelligence community will be of great value to us in this planning effort.

In regard to this threat, contingency planning for the security of key assets, facilities, and functions within the continental United States continues to be a high priority of the U. S. Readiness Command. Through the deliberate planning process and in close coordination with Army, Navy, and Air Force planning agents and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Readiness Command has developed concept plans for JCS approval. The plans would

focus on assisting civil authorities in the protection of key assets and facilities integral to mobilization, deployment, and sustainment, and the provision of military support to civil defense and represent a major Readiness Command effort to develop a revised command and control structure and a more focused concept for dealing with such operations.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared remarks in response to the specific issues that were raised in your February 20 letter, and I would be glad to entertain any more detailed questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of General Mahaffey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. FRED K. MAHAFFEY, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. READINESS COMMAND, AND DIRECTOR, JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to report on the status and progress of the United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA). After serving as Commander in Chief (CINC) of USREDCOM and Director, JDA, for approximately eight months, I am pleased to report that both organizations have continued to make steady progress in pursuing a variety of important national security initiatives.

USREDCOM is a command of almost a quarter million men and women. A primary strength of my command is the high quality of personnel assigned to the units and headquarters that comprise the U.S. Readiness Command. The officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel are the best soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines that I have observed in my 30 plus years of service. They are highly educated and intelligent, trained and trainable. They are extraordinarily motivated and unquestionably stand ready to meet any challenge, perform any mission and make any sacrifice in support of our nation's security. The Readiness Command and Joint Deployment Agency are also served by an important cadre of dedicated, loyal and effective civilian employees who are an essential part of the USREDCOM/JDA team.

As the Commander in Chief, United States Readiness Command (USCINCRED), I am charged by the Unified Command Plan, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and the Secretary of Defense, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), with the responsibility for carrying out a number of major missions tasking USREDCOM to: (1) provide combat-ready conventional forces as a strategic reserve for rapid reinforcement of other unified and specified commands worldwide; (2) provide for the development of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) for the joint employment of forces assigned; (3) provide for the joint training of forces assigned; (4) provide contingency planning, a joint task force headquarters (JTF HQ), and forces for contingency operations worldwide; and (5) provide contingency planning and forces to assist civil authorities in protecting key assets, facilities, and functions within the continental United States (CONUS) that are essential to mobilize, deploy, and sustain US military forces.

Most of the CINCs have regional missions, evident in their titles (e.g., EUCOM, PACOM, LANTCOM). I view my mission set as comprised of three distinct categories: functional, regional and global. USREDCOM has broad functional responsibilities such as the development of JTTP and the conduct of joint training, which, in many instances overlap Service functions. I am assigned regional responsibilities related to the defense of CONUS and joint defense of Canada and the US. I also have major worldwide responsibilities assigned by the JCS to provide a JTF HQ and to provide and deploy combat-ready forces from the strategic reserve in CONUS to reinforce the regional CINCs in the overseas theaters. It is because of the uniqueness of this mission set, and its relationship to the other unified commands, that we feel justified in characterizing the US Readiness Command as the "centerpiece" of the unified command structure.

The Joint Deployment Agency, established in 1979 as a result of the lessons learned during the 1978 mobilization exercise NIFTY NUGGET, provides a single focal point for strategic deployment planning, coordination and execution. By performing this mission, the JDA significantly improves our national capability to swiftly project strong military forces worldwide. This past September we officially fielded the Joint Deployment System (JDS), developed by the JDA, as an operational system. I believe it is fair to say that with the fielding of JDS we have achieved, as a nation, a new dimension in strategic deployment planning and execution capabil-

ity, one that will improve our ability substantially to perform our deterrence and warfighting missions. I shall discuss the JDS in more detail later in this statement.

Before discussing the progress we have made this past year, I would like to point out that I am pleased with the positive direction of the CINC's enhanced role in the programming phase of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). My influence over resource allocation is crucial to fulfilling USREDCOM's warfighting requirements to accomplish its assigned missions. As you know, in an effort to integrate the needs and concerns of the joint operational commanders into the resource allocation process within the Department of Defense (DOD), a major restructuring of the DOD PPBS process has been evolving. The resulting increased emphasis on CINC involvement in resource decisions should help to improve the focus of the PPBS on those vital issues within the unified and specified commands from an operational viewpoint.

This past year featured USREDCOM efforts focused on how to more effectively interact with our assigned Army and Air Force components and support the other CINCs in several key mission areas: force readiness, joint training, joint force employment, joint force deployment and defense in the strategic rear (CONUS).

FORCE READINESS

As you are aware, the military departments do not command combat forces nor conduct deterrent or combat operations per se. Rather, their functions under the law are to organize, train, and equip the forces that are then assigned to the unified and specified commands—the "warfighting" commands. Since the majority of CONUS-based Army and Air Force general purpose forces are assigned to USREDCOM, it is my responsibility to ensure that these forces are fully ready to augment or reinforce the other unified and specified commands when directed by the National Command Authority through the JCS.

I am pleased to report that the readiness status of Army and Air Force forces assigned to USREDCOM has shown continued, steady improvement over the past year, because of emphasis on readiness programs in the budget process, support by the Services and dedicated hard effort by commanders of assigned units.

Of USREDCOM-assigned active general purpose Army forces, 91 percent report they are combat ready (C-3 or higher); substantially up from the 67 percent reported for the same period last year. Air Force forces continue to report a high percentage of combat ready units, at 88 percent, with significant improvement in the percentage of units that are reporting the highest levels of combat readiness (C-1 or C-2); up to 76 percent from the 63 percent reported last year. Despite this encouraging trend in overall improvement of readiness, Army forces still have substantial shortages in common equipment and noncommissioned officers in selected career management fields, while War Readiness Spares Kits shortages continue to be the principal limiting factor for Air Force forces, along with availability of spares for F-15/F-16 engines.

While steady improvement over the last year has been evident in the readiness of USREDCOM-assigned general purpose forces, the Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) system continues to mask significant force capability improvements resulting from force structure improvements and the fielding of modernized equipment. UNITREP, for instance, does not adequately differentiate between the capability of units equipped with M-1 tanks from those with M-60 series tanks. The M-1, of course, is a highly improved tank--much more capable than the M-60 against an improving threat. The same point could also be made for the Air Force squadrons that have been upgraded to F-16 fighter aircraft. This ongoing force modernization process will have a substantial effect on the improvement of the combat readiness and capability of our armed forces.

A top priority for USREDCOM is to develop improved means for evaluating and thus, improving, the combat readiness and capability of assigned forces. To this end, during the past year USREDCOM has initiated development of a Force Status Assessment Program to support the need for improved means of assessing force capability or output. In this effort, we have formulated an improved methodology and procedures for assessing the force status of both Army and Air Force elements of the strategic reserve and relating the results to the major warfighting plans (OPLANs) of the other CINCs. Standard formats are being developed for each major OPLAN to depict both a macro-view and the specifics of USREDCOM force availability, force readiness and sustainability, and force capability, as they change over time. The status of the strategic reserve, including active and reserve Army/Air Force "above-the-line" and "below-the-line" forces is analyzed in-depth in an effort to gain more comprehensive insights into our real capability to reinforce and sus-

tain each of the regional CINCs, and where improvements should be pursued, either as a Service initiative, or through actions by both the supporting (USCINCRED) and supported CINCs in the PPBS process.

During last year's testimony, my predecessor, General Wallace Nutting, highlighted the need for improved interoperability of Service tactical communications, specifically citing the problem of lack of equipment compatibility between the Services at various echelons deployed across the full spectrum of conflict. While this shortcoming remains and will probably remain with us for some time, significant progress has been made in identifying the dimensions of the problem, developing plans accordingly, and taking measures to minimize its impact in future operations. USREDCOM has actively supported the revision of DOD and JCS directives designed to ensure life cycle joint tactical Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) system compatibility and interoperability. These directives enabled the JCS, through the Joint Tactical Command, Control and Communications Agency, to take significant steps to prevent future interoperability "disconnects" by establishing a mechanism and responsibilities for identifying and resolving issues before production begins on any new C3I system. As a major complement to this, USREDCOM is now structuring its joint readiness exercises to focus specifically on joint functional C3I interfaces in order to improve and/or develop needed joint procedures, and so that planners and operators of joint C3I systems can identify potential interoperability problems in a training environment, up front, rather than in combat.

JOINT TRAINING

Regarding joint training, there is an obvious need to find smarter, more cost-effective ways to train commanders, staffs and units in joint operations, in light of downward pressures on the defense budget. The value of such cost-saving, complementary approaches as use of exercise simulation support and structuring of exercises to focus on key joint operational interfaces has been recognized by USREDCOM. This past year USREDCOM moved from a one-year to a two-year joint exercise planning cycle and made major improvements in the design and quality of our joint readiness exercises. This extended planning cycle will provide for more effective reserve component participation in our exercises by enabling us to firm up objectives early enough to allow the Reserve and National Guard units to identify and program their training mandays. This also benefits employers of reserve component members by allowing additional time for both to plan for exercise participation, reducing the inherent conflicts that often arise. Additionally, it allows us to sharpen the focus of our exercises by moving away from large force-on-force exercises which tend to be wasteful and emphasize Service training, and to focus instead on joint interoperability issues.

During 1985 USREDCOM conducted three highly successful joint readiness exercises, designed in this manner. All demonstrated significant improvements in the operations of joint military forces. One of the more significant improvements involves our ability to effectively integrate air defense forces from all four Services through voice and data net links, and through the establishment of joint area air defense command and control procedures. This is a complex process but one in which we are becoming increasingly more proficient through our joint training exercises.

Joint readiness exercises (JRXs) have also clearly demonstrated the need to develop improved joint capabilities to deploy and insert combat forces and to sustain supplies over-the-shore, particularly in lesser developed regions of the world such as might be required in Southwest Asia and Central America. Toward the goal of improving such capabilities, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) activities comprised a key joint operational function of USREDCOM's JRX Bold Eagle 86, in November of this past year. Using a combination of Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel and equipment, participating units transported approximately 1000 pieces of combat equipment and pumped over 200,000 gallons of jet fuel from ships across-the-shore in less than 38 hours. We are expanding our involvement in JLOTS exercise activities and intend to continue using the Bold Eagle series as a crucible for improving, testing and exercising JLOTS procedures to enhance the DOD capability to rapidly project and support forces worldwide.

During 1985 USREDCOM deployed some 32 units from the active and reserve components to Central America for training. These deployments for training are outside the planned exercise schedule and are small unit type training events ranging in size from eight-man medical detachments to 330-man Ranger units. In addition, USREDCOM deployed forces to U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) for participation in four exercises (Ahuas Tara III, Cabanas 85, Granadero 86 and

Kindle Liberty 85). We are also providing rotational support, in the form of Army aviation task forces and military police units, to USSOUTHCOM's Joint Task Force (JTF-B) operating in Palmerola, Honduras. In support of other unified commands, USREDCOM also provided and deployed some 265 units ranging from detachment size to divisions to participate in six major joint readiness exercises worldwide, such as Reforger and Team Spirit. These exercises provide for the joint and combined training of assigned forces including the active and reserve components of the CONUS-based central reserve. Aside from providing forces, we also have exercised our Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF-7) in two USREDCOM joint readiness exercises (Border Star 85 and Bold Eagle 86), as well as USSOUTHCOM's Ahuas Tara III in the spring of 1985.

The Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control System (JINTACCS) program continues to move toward fruition. Due for full implementation by September 1986, the program includes standardization of message formats and communication protocols to allow all Services to better exchange information for joint command and control purposes. USREDCOM has recently been charged with training other unified command users and other joint operational facilities in JINTACCS usage. This ambitious program, begun last year, will carry through to full implementation in 1986.

In an effort to satisfy the joint community's need to find smarter and more cost-effective ways to train jointly, USREDCOM initiated a program this past year, along with the component commands, to establish a USREDCOM Joint Warfare Center (JWC). The JWC will house the people and support systems necessary to provide joint combat operations training, and conduct analyses of joint operational issues, concepts, tactics, techniques and procedures. JWC operations will capitalize on current state-of-the-art technology in joint warfare simulations and distributive communications. This technology will support selected on-site training and/or, through distributed data networking/communications, enable Army and Air Force commanders, staffs and units to remain at their garrison/home station locations while participating in joint readiness command post exercises (CPXs). The ability to participate in CPXs from home station will result in a significant long-term savings in manpower, transportation and training dollars, and improve the joint warfighting capability of our forces.

The development plan for the JWC provides for a three-phased implementation strategy. Phase I, oriented on improving the quality of joint and Service-unique training at reduced dollar and manpower costs can be accomplished by FY88, building on an existing facility and state-of-the-art simulations which are essentially in hand. After the JWC is operational (FY88) and we have demonstrated its cost effectiveness, capability, and utility in providing improved training support for both USREDCOM-assigned forces and selected reserve components, we will then seek to broaden its application to four-Service participation and expanded reserve component involvement during PHASE II. We believe this can be accomplished by the end of FY89. In the third phase (FY90/91), the JWC will be interlinked with CONUS-based supporting and supported commands, the Service War Colleges, the National Defense University, and certain other analytical organizations.

I am convinced that the JWC will provide a cost-effective way to support joint training and increase readiness, while supporting reductions in optempos, in an increasingly tight budget environment. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations have indicated support for the program. I expect JWC development to accelerate in 1986 as an important Army/Air Force and Navy cooperative effort, under the Joint Force Development Process.

Despite efforts to narrow the scope of exercises and reduce costs by using computer simulations, and distributive communications, the requirement for joint readiness field training exercises, featuring reasonable levels of participating Army and Air Force maneuver units, will continue to be necessary to ensure commanders and staffs are skilled at command and control of actual forces and to provide our forces with realistic hands-on air/land training. Because of this requirement, I would like to call your attention to the on-going Congressional legislative effort to amend the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). As the members of this committee may be aware, joint readiness field exercises require considerable ground and air maneuver space, and the FLPMA could have a significant impact on our future capability to obtain the land and space necessary to conduct such exercises. The FLPMA amendment, which would allow temporary use of lands in proximity to our established ground maneuver areas, could substantially enhance the quality of the joint readiness exercise setting and maneuver play and, in turn, contribute to the combat readiness of USREDCOM-assigned forces. I support passage of the FLPMA

amendment and solicit your continued support for the measure to improve the effectiveness of joint readiness training.

JOINT FORCE EMPLOYMENT

Our joint training program is driven by the need for a fully trained strategic reserve of combat ready conventional forces, prepared to fight jointly in any theater to which they may be deployed. To achieve this national objective, there is a requirement for improved standardization, both technical and procedural, to ensure the interoperability of our forces. In this regard, USREDCOM cannot afford to concentrate on preparing and sustaining our forces for employment in only one theater. We must consider all of the regional CINCs' requirements, to include joint tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as those necessary to fight effectively with Allied forces.

In this regard, USREDCOM is postured to serve a highly effective role in the unified command structure in the development of joint doctrine and the identification of joint interoperability requirements, in both equipment and procedural issues. During this past year USREDCOM continued to pursue the development of joint tactics, techniques and procedures (JTTP) as a means of improving our joint warfighting capability at relatively low cost. As part of this effort, we played a lead role in the development and fielding of JTTP manuals. One of these publications, the "System Manual for the Employment of TRI-TAC Equipment," provides the standards and procedures to support secure voice data networks essential to the successful deployment of joint US forces worldwide. We also assisted Army, Navy, and Air Force agencies in the development of other joint manuals, such as the "Joint Application of Fire Power and Joint Laser Designation Procedures," which are essential to the effective joint employment of modern weapon systems. Developmental work is ongoing in a wide variety of other functional areas; and we intend to continue to develop, document and produce JTTP that are so vital to successful joint force operations.

During this past year, USREDCOM became a key participant in the Joint Force Development Process (JFDP). As you may recall, the JFDP emanated from the May 1984 agreement between the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force as a way of instituting a long-term, dynamic process for joint service cooperation with the objective of fielding the most affordable and effective air/land combat forces possible. Out of these basic agreements and the associated process a total of 35 initiatives have evolved, requiring joint Army/Air Force addressal of common warfighting objectives.

On 9 October 1985, the JCS designated USREDCOM as the principal agent for the evaluation and validation of selected JTTP resulting from the Army/Air Force JFDP. This puts USREDCOM in the role of validating the detailed joint tactics, techniques and procedures emanating from the JFDP process to "close the loop" on these initiatives. Thus far, the Army and Air Force have nominated six candidate initiatives for USREDCOM validation. In addition to assessing these procedures and tactics in USREDCOM-sponsored exercises, we plan on validating them "in-theater", in full coordination with and as part of other unified command joint readiness exercises.

Agreements with the other unified commands allow us to participate, as observers, in the major joint exercises that they sponsor, in order that we can assess joint tactics, techniques and procedures associated with key objectives during joint and combined theater operations, including those involving the deployment and sustainment of forces overseas. Data collected is retained in the Joint Exercise Observation File, a Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) computer-based file available to all unified commands. The data collected from several theaters provides a view of the impact of present and emerging concepts and procedures on the battlefield, and allow us to develop and structure future training to ensure that Army and Air Force forces are employed to maximum effectiveness. Additionally, we can evaluate our deployment procedures and our capability to support the forces in an overseas theater.

JOINT FORCE DEPLOYMENT

Balanced, responsive strategic mobility forces are the foundation of USREDCOM's ability to globally project the strategic reserve of CONUS-based Army and Air Force conventional forces. During the past year, the mobility means by which to deploy USREDCOM forces by both air and sea have improved. The delivery of the first of 42 primary mission C-5Bs and continued delivery of dual-role KC-10s have strengthened airlift power projection capability. The Navy's sealift force projection

capabilities have also been strengthened by continued acquisition of the TAK-R class of fast sealift, expansion of the Ready Reserve Force with the acquisition of 13 cargo ships, the continued procurement of Auxiliary Crane Ships and container ship conversion hardware, and the deployment of two Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadrons.

Despite such improvements, significant shortfalls remain in our strategic deployment posture and will persist into the next century. Stretchouts in the acquisition and deployment of the full C-17 capability, including a strategic direct-delivery capability not currently available, will severely limit USREDCOM's ability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces. The C-17 is the key to reducing our strategic lift shortfalls by the end of the century, and maintaining our strategic lift baseline capability, as provided for in the US Air Force Airlift Master Plan, by off-setting the retirement of C-141 aircraft as they reach the end of their useful service life. The importance of maintaining the C-17 acquisition program, even in an increasingly austere fiscal environment, cannot be overemphasized from my perspective.

Strategic sealift continues to be the cornerstone of US deterrent and force projection policies. Although contemporary sealift programs have increased capability and aided the DOD in reducing the impact of a declining US maritime industry, definitive follow-on unit equipment-capable sealift programs are vital to satisfy strategic sealift force projection requirements in the coming years. In my view, a formal Strategic Sealift Master Plan, analogous to the Airlift Master Plan, also is essential to provide long-range planning and programming guidance, and a common baseline of understanding between the Navy and operational users. A strong, positive national maritime policy which defines and supports national goals is also needed to aid both the development and realization of a long-range Strategic Sealift Master Plan. The foundation of strategic sealift programs rests on a maritime industry capable of supporting US economic and defense policies well into the next century.

In 1985, with the fielding of the Joint Deployment System (JDS), we achieved an entirely new dimension in joint force deployment planning and execution. The JDS is an automated command and control system for planning and controlling the execution of global deployments. The most beneficial aspect of the JDS is the unprecedented visibility it provides over the deployment process. Representatives of the National Command Authorities, JCS, theater commanders, and supporting commanders are able to direct force deployment operations during simultaneous execution of multiple major OPLANs. The JDS provides an order-of-magnitude improvement in our capability to project US military power for deterrent and warfighting purposes.

To date we have employed the JDS in four major joint/combined exercises. CPX Port Call 86 thoroughly tested the system with simultaneous execution of seven OPLANs. We intentionally overloaded the system to highlight weaknesses and to identify software design improvements. While exercise results in this case were highly encouraging, we are continuing to refine the system to be more responsive to the operational needs of the community. The remaining three exercises, Reforger, Team Spirit and Kindle Liberty, were field training exercises and involved JDS support in the execution of single OPLANs. The JDS performed well in this less complex role, and in all of these exercises functioned as designed. Use of the JDS in exercises allows us to maintain proficiency with the system as well as improve on our ability to manage the deployment of combat forces.

Another integral and important part of the JDA mission involves acting as a catalyst for the refinement of OPLANs of the unified and specified commands. By acting as an agent of the JCS, the JDA ensures that the CINC's plans are increasingly more feasible and capable of being executed by bringing together participants of the joint planning community and coordinating more effectively the joint planning effort.

Our future efforts will focus on continuing to refine the Joint Deployment System, and, concurrently, to develop procedures to automate other areas supporting our joint deployment and warfighting effort. Development of the follow-on Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) will support this goal in the areas of mobilization, execution, employment and sustainment, as well as deployment management. As directed by the JCS, we plan to implement JOPES in sequential increments, with the first increment operational by the end of this decade.

DEFENSE IN THE STRATEGIC REAR (CONUS)

USREDCOM's mission for the land defense of CONUS poses special command and control (C^2) challenges stemming both from the diverse nature of the threat to CONUS, and the variety of civilian and military organizations who must be integrated in a C^2 structure for responsive planning and execution. The Soviet strategic

nuclear threat against the CONUS is both a real and well defined threat. On the other hand, at present, Soviet conventional forces appear to lack sufficient capabilities to undertake landed operations by major conventional forces against North America; and available Soviet long-range airlift and sealift assets would probably be committed to other theaters of operation in times of crisis or war. However, the lower level threat—encompassing sabotage by potential saboteurs and/or terrorist actions and by Soviet Spetsnaz or Third-World terrorist organizations—must be treated as potentially very real and must be addressed in our planning and C^2 and force allocation decisions. Let me expand on this concern.

The U.S. relies on an extraordinarily sophisticated but fragile and vulnerable set of long-distance networks for energy distribution, communication, and transportation. These networks are intricately interrelated, and a serious disruption in one could quickly cascade through the others and completely disrupt or severely impede our response to national security crises. The devastating New York City blackouts of 1965 and 1977; the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in 1979; and the closing of the Skyway bridge across Tampa Bay and the shipping channel below, when the bridge was struck by a freighter, aptly demonstrate our dependency upon interrelated networks; the vulnerability of these networks, even to natural causes; and the possible range of effects resulting from sabotage or subversion. Terrorists seeking publicity in our own "strategic rear", foreign agents or special operations forces acting prior to some hostile international act, and disgruntled or suborned employees are all potential candidates for conducting such sabotage and subversive activity. Potential military related targets include our key mobilization, deployment and war sustainment assets, command and control centers, nuclear assets, and other targets critical to the war effort. Additionally, key leaders in the National Command Authority and nuclear chain of command could be targeted by these same factions. Enemy operations against such targets would be designed to degrade or destroy the US war-waging capability.

Unfortunately, there is presently no agreed-upon national-level estimate as to the nature, extent and probability of occurrence of these threats of sabotage or subversion to our most valuable and vulnerable assets, personnel, and facilities. The operational planning community needs a national-level estimate on which to base our planning. Assistance from the National Intelligence Community will be of great value to us in this planning endeavor.

In regard to this threat, contingency planning for the security of key assets, facilities and functions within CONUS continues to be a high priority at Readiness Command. Through the deliberate planning process and in close coordination with Army, Navy and Air Force planning agents and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), USREDCOM has developed two concept plans for JCS approval. These plans, which focus on assisting civil authorities in the protection of key assets and facilities integral to mobilization, deployment and sustainment of forces and the provision of Military Support to Civil Defense, represent a major USREDCOM effort to develop a revised command and control structure and more focused concept for such operations.

In a related action, as DOD's executive agent for the development of the Key Assets Protection Program, USREDCOM completed and published the first iteration of the DOD Key Assets List (KAL) on 1 October 1985. The KAL provides a listing of those critical assets for which partial or complete loss would have an immediate and serious impact on national defense. It is expected that the forthcoming NIE will allow us to further improve planning for the protection of these key assets.

SUMMARY

In conclusion, USREDCOM and JDA have continued to pursue, with vigor, imagination, and some measure of success, all available avenues for the improvement of the combat readiness and capability of the strategic reserve. During this past year, we have made real progress in finding new and innovative ways to more effectively accomplish our assigned missions, but much remains to be done. In light of our national military strategy of forward-deploying only a portion of the conventional forces needed to support our commitments, and to protect our vital interests worldwide by retaining the bulk of our general purpose forces here in the United States, it is essential that there be a capability for planning, coordinating, and executing the rapid, prioritized deployment of combat-ready forces throughout the world to meet contingency requirements for deterrent and/or warfighting purposes. In support of our strategy of forward defense, USREDCOM's over-arching mission requirement is to maintain and be prepared to provide, on short notice, combat-ready conventional forces for rapid reinforcement of the other unified and specified com-

mands worldwide. The Joint Deployment Agency's role in providing a single focal point for deployment planning, coordination, and execution is essential to the successful accomplishment of the USREDCOM mission. Our worldwide responsibilities to provide and deploy the CONUS-based central reserve, coupled with our mission to develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure interoperability of our forces in joint operations, are in the broadest sense, also crucial to the nation's overall strategic deterrent and warfighting capabilities.

The forces of the United States Readiness Command are stronger, better-equipped and more ready than at any time in our recent history. However, we are at a critical juncture today. The progress that we have made in recent years, especially in the area of readiness, is a direct reflection of the support by, and cooperation of, the Congress. Continued Congressional support is essential to preserving our "go-to-war" readiness in an era of long-term modernization and change—a major challenge for all of us through the rest of this century and beyond. As for the state of the United States Readiness Command today, we are significantly more ready to deploy and fight than we were a year ago, and we will be even more ready in the weeks and months to come.

Mr. Chairman, I have addressed the state of the United States Readiness Command and the Joint Deployment Agency in a broad sense. I thank you for your attention and stand ready to answer your questions.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, General.

Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

FORCES ASSIGNED TO JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY

General Mahaffey, let me ask you a couple of questions.

First, you have primarily Army and Air Force forces assigned to you. Do you have any naval forces?

General MAHAFFEY. I have no naval operating elements. I have naval personnel assigned to my headquarters and to the Joint Deployment Agency. But I have no naval operating elements.

Senator NUNN. How about marines?

General MAHAFFEY. No marine operating elements.

Again, I have marine personnel, both in the Readiness Command Headquarters and in the Joint Deployment Agency.

Senator NUNN. What do the Navy and Marine people with you do?

General MAHAFFEY. They function, as do the Army and Air Force individuals, as everything from action officers up to and including the Readiness Command and JDA Chief of Staff, who is a Navy rear admiral. On the joint deployment side of the house, they engage in the very important work that goes on there to continue to refine what is now an operational Joint Deployment System.

Senator NUNN. Which involves the Navy?

General MAHAFFEY. It does.

Senator NUNN. Do they interrelate to the Navy and the Marine Corps?

General MAHAFFEY. Not on any kind of direct basis.

It is the Joint Deployment Agency itself, which I direct as a second hat, that interfaces with the Military Airlift Command, the Military Sealift Command and the Military Traffic Management Command. We, in fact, are performing what amounts to a functional integration of the lift capability, or move capability, provided by those commands.

Senator NUNN. Well, how do you relate to the Navy and the Marine Corps, then? That escapes me.

How do you coordinate your plans with them? If your Navy and Marine officers are not charged with that responsibility, who does coordinate your plans with the Navy?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, my staff does, both on the Joint Deployment Agency side and on the Readiness Command side.

For example, the development of contingency plans by the other unified commands is coordinated directly between my headquarters and those other unified commands.

Senator NUNN. So you relate to the Navy and the Marines through the other CINC's, then.

General MAHAFFEY. That's correct.

Senator NUNN. You don't go directly to the Navy or directly to the Marines. You go through the CINC's and their planning?

General MAHAFFEY. Except for the provision of routine personnel and administrative support provided by the Marines and by the Navy.

Senator NUNN. How do you coordinate your transportation needs, then? How do you coordinate the sealift part of the Navy and Marine efforts with your other plans to deliver personnel to the CINC's, because the CINC's do not have that kind of lift capability?

How do you coordinate all transportation needs?

General MAHAFFEY. That is a principal function of the Joint Deployment Agency.

Senator NUNN. But that is under you.

General MAHAFFEY. That's correct.

Senator NUNN. How do they relate to the Navy, then?

General MAHAFFEY. It is principally through the development and the refinement of the operational plans that are devised by the regional CINC's, which lay out the forces that they require in order to carry out their war-fighting plans.

From that, the Joint Deployment Agency, working in concert with the unified commands, the services and the Transportation Operating Agencies, develops a Time-Phased Force Deployment Data list. That becomes the basis, then, for the development of deployment estimates by the Military Sealift Command, the Military Airlift Command, and MTMC, with the allocation of forces against those OPLANs carried out by the services, including the Navy and the Marines.

So, the simple answer to your question is that in the course of the OPLAN development and refinement conferences conducted by the Joint Deployment Agency, the services, the Transportation Operating Agencies and the Unified Command structure are, in fact, brought together in a systematic way.

Senator NUNN. Did the Joint Deployment Agency get involved or did any of your outfit get involved in the transportation aspects of the Grenada operation?

General MAHAFFEY. Only marginally, for a very good reason.

The Joint Deployment System itself was not at that time operational. It is now.

We have today an on-line, real-time, automated deployment, planning, and execution command and control system. We did not have that during the time of Grenada.

The role of the Readiness Command in Grenada was peripheral in the sense that the principal planning responsibility for the Grenada operation devolved upon the Atlantic Command.

Now, of course, the Army forces that were then chopped to the operational command of Admiral McDonald came out of the Readiness Command assigned forces.

Senator NUNN. Would you get involved in the Grenada operation if it were to repeat itself today?

General MAHAFFEY. Certainly on the JDA side, with respect to the Joint Deployment System, I would expect to be very heavily involved. That system provides us for the first time with the ability to develop in real time, on-line, close-hold, top secret plans, and then to selectively bring into that planning process all involved parties.

Again, I know that sounds very technical, but that is a very key capability in the planning community.

JOINT TRANSPORTATION AGENCY

Senator NUNN. The Packard Commission has recommended a joint transportation-type agency.

What do they call that—a Unified Command for All Lift.

Is that something you would look favorably upon or not?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, let me answer that, Senator Nunn, by again underscoring the fact that with the development and fielding of the Joint Deployment System, which came on-line this last September, we, as a Nation, have gone a long way toward removing some of the principal concerns that the earlier proposals for organizational merger and consolidation were designed to correct.

We have, in fact, achieved a very large measure of functional integration between the Transportation Operating Agencies, the JCS, and the supporting and supported commanders.

So, I think a large part of the cause for organizational consolidation has, in essence, gone away.

On the other hand, I can see both some merits and I must add demerits associated with forming a unified strategic deployment command. Some of the merits would come, I suppose, from achieving greater unity of effort, getting all of the Transportation Operating Agencies oriented on a single objective or set of objectives, and so on.

But I must also say there are some real downsides to that.

All of the Transportation Operating Agencies—MAC, MSC, and MTMC—perform many more functions than simply strategic lift. MAC, for example, has the Air Force's special operations forces, and carries out those special operations functions. The Military Sealift Command has all of the tankers, oilers, and support for the fleets in its organizational makeup. MTMC performs peacetime household goods transportation, planning, and execution functions.

So, we would certainly confront some difficulties, in terms of stripping out those nonstrategic lift functions from those three large organizations if the Secretary were to decide to attempt to form such a strategic mobility command.

I have not had a chance, Senator, to really study it in any great detail, but there are some downsides to that.

Senator NUNN. General Galvin, last year General Gorman said, and I quote him:

> I do not see any prospect that these guys in blue suits in the hills, i.e., the Contras, are going to march into Managua. It seems to me that the whole resistance movement has got another year or more of slogging to go before that were ever a prospect, and a lot of violence associated with it. The answer lies in some combination of pressure plus diplomacy.

How do you assess in your own words that situation today?

General GALVIN. Well, sir, you will recall that I was present when General Gorman said that. I have reread that recently, and I would say that he was looking at a "what does win mean" question, although I hesitate to try to interpret his words. But I do agree with the assessment that pressure plus diplomacy is what we are looking for.

I appreciate the opportunity to assess that question.

First of all, how do we assess UNO, the FDN, the resistance. I think in order to assess that, Senator, we have to take a historical look at other insurgencies that have grown elsewhere in the world, but, specifically in Latin America.

These insurgencies grow over a period of about 15 years or so, a couple of decades, during which they spread and improve their ideology, their training, their logistics, their strategy, and their underground organization. All of that happens before a lot of violence breaks out.

When it does, that kind of organization is in place to facilitate communications, contact, command and control, and so forth.

When you compare that with the growth of what is now UNO, you are talking about a growth that started in late 1981, almost 1982, at almost zero, and has grown now to what is apparently at about 20,000 strength. I'm talking about numbers alone as a representation of strength.

But I do not want to talk about strength alone. My own intelligence tells me that the number of shooting contacts that occur in Nicaragua on a monthly basis has risen over the year that I have been there from about 120 to about 160 contacts a month. That's a significant rise. There is a lot of fighting going on there.

Now, UNO has an organization that, because of its explosive growth over a very short period of time and because of other reasons, lacks a lot of the things that we have seen in all kinds of other insurgent operations. They have been atypical of these other operations.

So, we see an organization that lacks many things. We could point out some of those. They seem to be improving in overall strategy, but they have lacked that in the past. The growth of their ability to communicate an ideological message to the people of Nicaragua, has been somewhat stunted.

There are other deep problems which UNO faces.

At the same time, a force that can grow like UNO has while it does not have some of the advantages that these other insurgent forces in Latin America have had, such as an old Communist underground from the twenties that has existed with safe houses and things like that to help is an important force. This growth has occurred while it has been faced by a very strong military force—100,000 plus in strength, if you count regulars, reserves, and mili-

tia—and a very powerful Marxist government, which, like all Marxist governments, immediately after takeover took quick steps to suppress any kind of resistance.

Given all of that, I feel, first of all, that we have a viable insurgency, a strong insurgency, given all of these circumstances that have operated against it. We have an insurgency that I think has the possibility of making change occur, of forcing change to occur in Nicaragua.

I firmly believe that.

Now, what that change is to be is another matter, and we could speculate on that. But I would like to give you two scenarios. Where could we go if we supported UNO and where could we go if we do not support UNO. After looking at this situation for a year, just about every day, from our intelligence, let me outline my conclusions as best I can.

I would be very quick to add, by the way, that I do not know the key members of UNO. I have had no contact whatsoever with the resistance within Nicaragua because that is not within the purview of my responsibilities according to the law.

I have never personally met any of those people in the resistance.

I would say a scenario of support would end up with some kind of recognition of the strength of UNO at some point in the future. I think that that is possible because I do not believe that the junta in Nicaragua is as unified and homogeneous as they would like to present themselves. I think that there are differences between them and, as with any other group of human beings, there is room for negotiation if the situation is right. For them, the situation being right would include sufficient pressure which forces them to a negotiating table. It would not be anything else because they are Communists, they are Marxists, they are internationalists, and they are dedicated to spreading the ideology, not to contracting it.

On the other hand, I think that if we do not support them, sir, UNO will fight on. I could make an analogy to my earlier comments about what happened to other insurgencies in Latin America when they lacked organization and they lacked support.

I do not think UNO will disappear overnight. The insurgency will drag out over a long period of time. I do not know how successful it could be without the logistical support and the other things I have listed. But under this scenario, the Marxists, internationalists, that are represented by the junta—Daniel Ortega, Umberto Ortega, Borge, and the rest—will be able to take their position in the heart of Central America and intimidate and force the rest of Central America to some kind of recognition of their power.

We have seen already their willingness to interfere with their neighbors. Even as early as 1980, when the Sandinistas were in a very critical situation as they were trying to expand from the 5,000 fighters who existed when Somosa fled. By the way, as you know, it took 15 years to get to 5,000 in strength, and it took a lot of work in infrastructure that UNO has not been able to do. But, even as weak as they were immediately after the takeover, they were already exporting people and doctrine to other countries in Central America. The Sandinistas were the people picked up in Olancho province of Honduras. They were the people in El Pariso. Both

these groups were Hondurans trained in Cuba, who passed through Nicaragua back into Honduras to cause destabilization in Honduras.

There were other examples of this interference and intervention.

So, I would say that those two rough scenarios, sir, would give you my judgments of what can happen pro or con on this question of supporting UNO. It is the most vital question, as far as I am concerned, in my area.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions, but my time has expired.

Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Hart.

LATIN AMERICA

Senator HART. General, a couple of weeks ago, the Secretary of State was here on the Hill, testifying before various committees, particularly about Latin America. He had two maps, one showing the political makeup of Latin America in 1975 and another in 1985, and the maps were to illustrate the dramatic improvement in the presence of democracies through Latin America.

Your testimony is at variance with that just about 180 degrees. You talk about our deliberate sustained withdrawal from Latin America. I am not sure what that means. You talk about the growing destabilization of Latin America resulting from Soviet and Cuban interests.

Is your view of Latin America the accurate one or is Secretary Shultz'?

General GALVIN. Let me make a comment on deliberate sustained withdrawal and the role of external powers.

From a military point of view—when I served in Latin America as a lieutenant in 1956, 30 years ago, there were 750 officers in the military groups in Latin America. There are 88 in the same positions today.

There are 43 military officers belonging to the United States south of Panama. I would say that that, to some degree, represents an example of doing less than we had done before.

Senator HART. But does it neccssarily? I mean, there might be other reasons why we don't have the same military presence.

First of all, a nation does not create a presence simply by military officers. We might have a greater presence, as the United States of America, in Latin America today than we did 15 years ago with fewer military officers.

You would agree with that, wouldn't you?

General GALVIN. I think fewer can do more. It can be done.

Senator HART . No, that's not my point.

My point is that a great nation creates a presence in ways other than just its military presence. You don't say "military withdrawal" here, you say "withdrawal."

I can't see how on the one hand we have, as a nation, withdrawn from Latin America and, on the other hand, achieved these remarkable successes of emerging new democracies in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru that Secretary Shultz was so proud of. I mean, that

is an argument, it seems to me, to withdraw our military forces from everywhere, if there is some correlation.

General GALVIN. There is some kind of dichotomy here, and I would say that it is this.

First of all, I would agree with you that the interest expressed in the Congress and by the American people in Latin America today is a very healthy interest and is better, in my opinion, than it has been over time, although there has been some kind of sine curve working there. Nevertheless, the sine curve went up. The interest is there.

Part of the result of that interest is the number of countries which before were totalitarian or authoritarian and which now are democratic. I think that we have made great progress there.

Also, I think that the military-to-military relationships can be better because the government-to-government relationships are so good.

Now, at the same time, as you know, young democracies are not necessarily the strongest democracies. A democracy that is older, with a century or two of life, can have a lot of give and take and face critical problems and challenges more easily than one of the young democracies, which tends to sweep the difficult issues under the rug because it just doesn't want to quite deal with them.

At the same time that we have had these democracies, which is so healthy, we also have had this very strong support for insurgency by Cuba, by the Soviet Union, and by now, recently, the drug traffickers.

So, at the same time that we have a definite trend toward democracy we now have eight or nine insurgencies in the 19 countries which fall under the Southern Command's area of responsibility.

So, that is the dichotomy that I see there.

INSURGENCIES

Senator HART. These are insurgencies that were not there before these countries became democracies, are they?

General GALVIN. Well, I commented earlier that many of these were there.

In fact, when I was in Colombia, Tito Fijo was an insurgent. He still is an insurgent today. I was a lieutenant then. And the roots of these insurgencies were there.

But, what has happened is they have been given a sense of organization, aims, and goals. They have been given resources that they had not had before. The organization, aims, and goals, the umbrella effect, has been provided by Fidel Castro in Cuba, as a prerequisite to assistance from Cuba. Almost all of those insurgencies have accepted that and have united themselves, such as the FMLN, in El Salvador, and the FSLN, as it did, the Sandinistas, in Nicaragua.

So I think you are seeing a growth.

I believe I have seen this growth. I have a deja vu, a dual vision, as I look at what I am seeing today down there, as a general, and what I saw 30 years ago down there, as a lieutenant. Of course, I have been interested in the area ever since, as you have.

I believe we are seeing both things that you mentioned—a trend toward democracy and a trend toward insurgency. We are seeing a very strong move toward democracy on the part of these countries and we are seeing a very strong trend in destabilization that is taking place in them simultaneously. Destabilization has to be fought by them, and with our assistance.

Senator HART. I think my limited understanding of United States involvement in Latin America in this century is that a lot of those military officers we had down there were affiliated with authoritarian—and, by the way, I have never understood this distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian repression. Repression is repression. In any case, we had a military presence in countries which were repressive, usually from the right. And, as those countries have become democratic, our presence militarily has declined.

I do not think that justifies the statement that the United States has had a policy of deliberate, sustained withdrawal from Latin America. That is what throws me off.

Finally, if Castro has been doing this now for 25 or 26 years, and has not done any better than what he is after, while I don't think it diminishes the Castro-Cuban threat, but it does not say a whole lot for his effectiveness.

General GALVIN. I would say, sir, that I differ with you there. I think that he has done an enormous amount over this period of time.

You know, when Castro——

Senator HART. Excuse me. I'm just talking about results. Of course he is active and he is doing a lot of this. But I would go back to the maps of Secretary Shultz, which show in 1975 all of these undemocratic governments, and in 1985 with all of the democratic governments. That is the only thing I was pointing out.

What are the results that you see of the Castro efforts in terms of moving governments into the Communist column?

General GALVIN. I think we are beginning to see that. I think it takes time.

Castro has been working this for 20 years. The first result that you are seeing is what has happened in Nicaragua, where you do have a Marxist government. The other results you are seeing in at least eight other countries. I would say you are seeing 2,000 guerrillas in Guatemala. You are seeing 6,000 in El Salvador. In Honduras there are probably armed subversives, but they have not emerged yet.

You are seeing the Mora Cañas Brigade of Costa Ricans, who are Marxists, fighting alongside the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and seven different Communist parties more or less linked together in Costa Rica. You are seeing M-19, FARC, and the others in Colombia, and Alfaro Vive, Carajo in Ecuador. You are seeing the insurgencies there that are bigger than they were before. They have really grown.

Most of those have been supported by Castro. I think, really, that the Soviet Union was not that anxious to move into what they thought was potentially a morass for them in Latin America. But, within the last several years, I think Castro has convinced the Soviet Union that more support, increasing support for insurgency

in Latin America is probably very profitable, and certainly his efforts have proven this.

Now, you can say that in the meantime all of these democracies have come. I think that is true. I think it is commendable. And I think to a great degree assistance from the U.S. military has played a supporting role. We have been more effective in the past few years than say the 1970's because the government-to-government interest and interrelationships between the United States and these countries was stronger.

So you are seeing both things working at the same time.

Senator HART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will lead off with questions for General Mahaffey.

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

General, I will refer to a New York Times article of March 2, 1985, headlined "Army phones need $30 million in repair."

The Army is planning to spend $30 million to change its new long-range combat communications system because it discovered the devices were not capable of communicating with those used by the Air Force.

General Nutting, chief of the U.S. Readiness Command, confirmed the incident today in a hearing before this committee.

Could you bring us up to date on that situation? It is one that I know the chairman has been concerned with, as have others and I for some time.

General MAHAFFEY. Senator, I might characterize what is being done in terms of what the fiscal year 1987 budget itself will afford to move us toward resolution of that problem.

It was principally oriented, I believe, on the communications security equipment, or COMSEC equipment, which, at the time General Nutting spoke, was deemed to be incompatible.

The Army had moved out ahead of the Air Force in using the new VINSON communications security devices, and the Air Force was still, at that time, largely equipped with the older NESTOR equipment.

Senator WARNER. It is also the tactical satellite coverage?

General MAHAFFEY. That's right.

I spoke in my earlier prepared statement about a continued upgrade of the Defense Satellite Communications System. That is supported in large measure by the fiscal year 1987 budget.

Senator WARNER. Right. My question goes to the interoperability of these between the services.

General MAHAFFEY. That, of course, occurs at many different echelons, as you know, and it also involves not only the technical question of electronic communications interoperability, but the procedural question. With the fielding of such equipment as the new SINCGARS family of radios, in both the Army and the Air Force at the tactical echelon, we are promoting improved interoperability between the Army and the Air Force. With the added fielding by the Air Force of the new VINSON COMSEC equipment, we are

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promoting improved interoperability. Both of those are provided for in the 1987 budget.

Particularly with the acquisition and fielding of that communications security equipment by the tactical air control parties, who directly support Army ground elements, we are improving essential interoperability.

Now, beyond that, there are a number of other major acquisition systems: high frequency radios, continued fielding of the TRI-TAC family of equipment, and the digital secure equipment, by both the Army and the Air Force, that at the higher levels also promote improved interoperability.

On the procedural side, the Readiness Command is very centrally involved in the development and documentation of those joint procedures that are essential to interoperability between the Army, Air Force, and the other services.

We have in the past year to year and a half produced upwards of 9 or 10 joint field manuals——

Senator WARNER. Was that reduced or produced?

General MAHAFFEY. Produced.

Senator WARNER. Produced.

General MAHAFFEY. Yes—in tandem with the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and Air Force's Tactical Air Command, we have produced detailed interoperability manuals for the first time. We are engaged now in a collaborative effort with the services to produce another dozen or so that deal with various aspects of interoperability.

Beyond all that and our joint readiness exercises, the latest of which was conducted this past November, we put into practice the joint interoperability procedures that are essential to effective joint warfighting between the Army and Air Force and the Joint Task Force Headquarters, which I field.

Senator WARNER. Well, I will have to study the record.

Are there any major remaining areas, significant areas, where interoperability problems exist today?

General MAHAFFEY. Yes, there are. It is largely a matter of needing to complete the fielding of the equipment that I have referred to on both the Air Force side and the Army side. I'm talking about equipment like the COMSEC equipment, the Army's acquisition of the Have-Quick systems that the Air Force currently has, but of equal importance the requirement to move ahead with the development, documentation, review and approval of the joint tactics, techniques, and procedures that are the foundation, the bedrock, of true interoperability.

Senator WARNER. Under optimum conditions, when, in your opinion, would it be that we would get what I would call a good, strong interoperability situation, procedurally and tactically?

General MAHAFFEY. I think we are on the verge of that now, Senator.

Senator WARNER. What does verge mean?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, it is evident in the fact that the services are beginning to field the common items of COMSEC equipment and communications equipment that I referred to.

I would say over the period of the President's 5-year Defense Program, we will in large measure have achieved a much stronger position of interoperability.

Senator WARNER. When you say the President's 5-year Defense Program, what is your base year in that program?

General MAHAFFEY. 1987.

Senator WARNER. 1987. Beginning in 1987, and 5 years forward?

General MAHAFFEY. Yes.

Now this is not to say that there has not been improvement over the past 3 or 4 years. There has indeed been improvement in the technical side of interoperability and in the procedural side. But we have a long way to go.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, general.

May I inquire of the Chair if it is the Chair's desire to go into an executive session at some point with these witnesses today?

Chairman GOLDWATER. Not today, no. Possibly tomorrow.

But if you care to, we can do that.

Senator WARNER. I am anxious to talk to General Galvin about Panama.

Would you care in open session to give us your views about the situation in Panama at the present time, particularly the capability of the commander of the National Guard?

Senator NUNN. Would the Senator yield for just 1 second?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Your line of questioning for General Mahaffey is very important.

General, did you include the Navy in that? All I heard was the Air Force and the Army?

Where is the Navy?

General MAHAFFEY. Both on the technical side and on the procedural side, the Navy is very much involved. During the production of the communications interoperability manuals that I referred to, the Atlantic Command and the Marine Corps Development and Education Center participated in the development of those operating manuals. They were also key players in the joint training exercise that I referred to, which occurred this last November.

Senator NUNN. I am just trying to get to the bottom line. You said that the Army and Air Force would be compatible over the next 5 years. Are you putting the Navy in there, too, or are you just talking about the Army and the Air Force?

General MAHAFFEY. I believe that a much greater degree of interoperability will have been achieved by the Army, Air Force, and naval maritime elements over that 5 year period, because of the commonality of equipment and because of our efforts to develop agreed-upon joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Senator WARNER. Well, let me restate that question in another way.

Is there any differentiation between the level of interoperability between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, and that would include the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, I can only give you a personal judgment on that, Senator. I am not technically qualified to talk to the technical side of it.

I think that it is true that there is a greater degree of cooperative effort to develop joint doctrine between the Army and the Air Force on the one hand and between the Navy and the Marine Corps on the other, by virtue of their mission and their differing mission requirements.

But, having said that, I want to emphasize again that we have had as major players in our joint doctrinal development efforts and our joint training exercise, naval and Marine elements. They have carried out and helped us define joint interoperability procedures in a very important way.

Senator WARNER. We will have to revisit that.

PANAMA

Could General Galvin return to my question, and then my time will be up, Mr. Chairman.

General GALVIN. Senator, I can answer that question to some degree in open session. I would prefer to do both, if possible.

But if we don't get to an executive session, I will give you an answer for this open session.

First of all, my relationship with General Noriega and the Panama Defense Forces is, of course, military to military. I realize that there are other aspects to any relationship, and I would like to deal with both sides.

But, first, I would like to take the military-to-military relationships.

Under the treaty, it is our responsibility, of course, to work toward the year 2000 and the eventualities that will come about at that time. I say "eventualities" because it is not very clear to me at this time what the year 2000 is going to be like, even in terms of the treaty. This is because within the treaty, there are some clauses that say that the two countries will remain mutually responsible for the defense of the Canal. That implies a lot of things.

Also in the treaty, it says if the two countries can come to some agreement with reference to basing of any forces by the United States, that these agreements obviously can be arranged.

I think, as we move forward, the most important thing in my relationship with the military in Panama and, of course, the ambassador's relationship with other sectors of Panamanian life, is to see to it that we do this in some kind of good, organized fashion, even though we are talking about something that is 14 years away.

In terms of construction planning and many other things, that is not a very long distance. Even if we looked at the Fort Drum episode and we overlayed the years that we have been working on moving somebody to Fort Drum and arranging that with engineers, Congress, and everything else, we could see that you are talking about more or less the same timeframe.

So that is a very important question that we are working on.

Part of that, of course, is the development through our assistance and, of course, with their own efforts, of the Panama Defense Force into a force that will be capable of defending the Canal. The force at the present time is one battalion, and four separate companies. Another battalion is forming. It is not a large military force.

You can see many implications of that.

Now, of course there are other relationships there that I have to take into account. The most important of those is a political situation in which I personally, and I believe my Government, would like to see an evolution to a more pluralistic situation, with more political space than is evident there now.

I have discussed that at various times over the past year with General Noriega and with many other leaders in the Republic of Panama.

I personally believe that this is the way to proceed—gradual evolution toward stronger democratic pluralism in Panama. I believe General Noriega agrees absolutely with that also.

That is as far as I would like to go in this part of the session, sir.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask General Galvin, if I could, a few questions on his testimony.

DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (DRF)

You indicate on page 8 that the growth and performance of the DRF under adverse circumstances indicates that if the U.S. provides military assistance, the democratic resistance movement is likely to succeed.

How do you define success for purposes of that statement?

General GALVIN. I would define success, sir, as the capability of UNO, or the democratic resistance, to have a political effect on the junta, on the Sandinistas in the country, which would result in a democratic pluralism within the country.

Senator BINGAMAN. Could you be any more specific about how increased military activity by these Contra forces will result in a more open, pluralistic society in Nicaragua? How do we get from here to there?

General GALVIN. I would say, first of all, that the junta, the Sandinista junta, is a very strong, Marxist junta, which is not going to be moved by simple considerations of what some other country might think were common sense or something else like that. I think that an element of the negotiation with such a junta, with such an organization as the Sandinistas, has to have in it some kind of power. Some call it coercion, but I think that is too strong.

But I think you have to negotiate with a strong organization like the Sandinistas from a position of power yourself.

I do not believe that the United States should insert its own military power into that area or this equation, but I certainly think the United States is negotiating from a position of political power. If that is combined with the political power of the other countries of the area and world opinion, and if these are combined with an internal situation in Nicaragua, it is very clear to the Sandinistas that a whole lot of people in Nicaragua do not like or support them. We have to say that if 20,000 of them are in arms now, certainly that is the tip of an iceberg regardless of what they are doing, and there must be a lot of other people who don't like the regime.

I personally think that what we have in Nicaragua is about 20 percent of the people who are solidly for the Sandinistas and 20 percent who are solidly for UNO, and a large percentage in the middle that is not decided on anything.

The attitude of the United States and the people of the United States toward this whole question I think will have a profound effect on this process. Other nations' and group's attitudes will also be important. But alone such attitudes, such expressed opposition would have no effect because the Sandinistas would laugh at that. But they cannot laugh at military power, especially if yielded by some of their own people.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me see if I understand you.

Your basic point is that by increasing the military pressure on them, they will eventually see the need to negotiate with the Contras and to go to a more pluralistic form of government through elections or something—is that basically your point?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir, that is basically my position.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask about the timeframe. You talked about how most insurgencies take about 15 years to really get up and running. This one has been going now since 1981. The Sandinistas themselves worked in the vineyards for 15 or 20 years before they were able to do anything significant.

What do you see as the timeframe for the success that you are talking about here by these Contras?

General GALVIN. I think, first of all, the major effect on the timeframe that would cause that variable to move one way or another, is the sustained logistics. Whether that comes from the United States partially or in some other fashion, or whether it comes from many other places, sustained logistics must be there. Logistics to sustain operations is really a lot of what causes the whole 15 years dynamic as you know, for any other insurgency's growth.

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me just interrupt.

Is the request for the $100 million this year a request to sustain the resistance or a request to increase the resistance?

General GALVIN. I would think that what would happen if they received $100 million, would be that they could create a solid base of logistic support. But they must understand that our aid was going to be sustained, that the United States was committed to them. I think things might move quite rapidly because I think this would allow them to operate in a manner they have not operated before. As you know, they have been sporadic in their operation in a large degree because of sporadic logistics.

This sporadic nature—let me go into that for a moment because I think it is very important. It is very difficult, as I believe you know, for them to go into Nicaragua and fight in a given area and build relationships with the people who are living in that area. Later they have to leave and break that contact and then try to reestablish it at a later time. So there is a great deal of wasteful expended energy which does not have anything to do with moving toward some reconciliation within the country. The sustained logistics would not necessarily increase the size of the organization very much. I am not sure it has to increase much above what it is now. If it is at 20,000, as they say, it is already as big as the sum of all the rest of the guerrillas in Latin America.

With sustained support I believe UNO would move quickly to a position of great influence in the country.

Senator BINGAMAN. Are you suggesting that with the increased logistics that we are contemplating here with this administration request, they would be in a position to actually take territory and hold it and, therefore, would not have to go back and forth? Is that what I interpret you to say?

General GALVIN. No, I would not say they would necessarily take territory. I don't know what they will do about taking territory. If you take territory, then you have to defend it, and if you are a guerrilla, you probably want to be more mobile than that.

But my guess is that they would be able to plan on an operational basis that would be strategically sound and would have greater tactical impact for their forces, rather than live from hand to mouth, in which the planning is terrible.

Senator BINGAMAN. Could you venture a figure? Are we talking about 2 years? You say they will be successful more quickly if we maintain this level of support. Are you talking about 2 years? Five years? It would be 10 years if we gave them the 15-year norm that you earlier referred to.

Which kind of figure are we looking at?

General GALVIN. Well, first of all, I would say it is a good deal less than 15 years. I think that we have seen a remarkable development, historically speaking, when compared to any other insurgent organization.

Would it be 2 years? I think it is very tempting at times to say that we'll finish this this year, or we'll finish this in 2 years, or something good is going to come out of this in that period of time. I don't know.

That's why I concluded my opening remarks by saying I think that the most important thing that I could think of for Latin America is U.S. commitment over the long haul to democratic pluralism. That's very evident not only in the commitment we have seen in other countries, but in Nicaragua. We have to take sides with the people who are for democratic pluralism. They must sense that we are committed to them. The rest of Latin America must sense it as well.

Now, how long? I would say that there are so many variables for certainty; but I would say that you would definitely see a profound difference in, say, 1½ years or 2 years.

Now, I would not want to specify a set time and have to come back and talk to you 2 years from now. I wouldn't want to say that they can win in 2 years. I would say you would see profound differences in attitudes in Central America. You would see differences in attitudes among the junta. You would probably see the beginnings of people trying to talk to each other on both sides, from UNO to the Sandinistas, within Nicaragua. Maybe better than that.

Senator BINGAMAN. In your testimony you also say that it is unrealistic to assume that DRF could become a viable military-political force without comprehensive U.S. support. That is the term you use.

That is the $100 million, is it?

General GALVIN. That's the $100 million. That seems to be what the administration is coming up with, $100 million.

Senator BINGAMAN. So we can expect that for the next couple of years, in addition to this year, at least?

General GALVIN. By comprehensive, I meant that our support be military as well as nonmilitary.

Senator BINGAMAN. You didn't mean quantity of support, you meant the type of support?

General GALVIN. I meant the type, across-the-board support. That was what I meant by comprehensive.

Senator BINGAMAN. Is it realistic to think that if we need to sustain a level of support for several years here that we are talking in the range of $100 million in order to get this job done and provide the logistics necessary?

Is that reasonable?

General GALVIN. I have not studied that part of it. I am not sure that it would be $100 million a year for several years or something like that.

I think that the state of the people in UNO right now is such that I think that $100 million sounds about right to me, but not necessarily for the years to come.

A hundred million dollars would stockpile a lot of things.

Senator BINGAMAN. So you are suggesting that we would not need to spend as much in future years as we are spending this year in order to sustain the same level of activity?

General GALVIN. I hesitate, Senator, but I would say yes, based on what I know from intelligence sources, we would not need to spend as much in future years. I would not see them expanding too much beyond what they are now. I don't think that is necessary.

I think the other things I mentioned, the strategy, the tactics, even the techniques, the military techniques, the presentation of ideology, the convincing of the people, the establishment of logistical lines that really function—all of that are needed but will come with our sustained commitment.

Senator BINGAMAN. Now you are talking here about improved quality of their military activity.

General GALVIN. Right.

Senator BINGAMAN. Presumably they need a great deal of expert help to develop that quality. What are we talking about there? We are talking here just about logistics, pumping money into the operation. Are we also suggesting that we will provide them with assistance in how to improve their military capability?

General GALVIN. I think, like other insurgent organizations, they will gradually improve themselves. I would say that if we were to provide them military assistance in improving themselves, they would improve more rapidly. But, like other organizations, and we have to compare them—sometimes we say they weren't able to do this or they don't look like they are tactically very good at that—all guerrilla organizations have grown in that manner and have improved themselves as they go.

But, obviously, if military experts were able to work with them, they would improve faster.

Senator BINGAMAN. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I think Senator Wilson is next in line.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question is for General Mahaffey.

AIR FORCE AIRLIFT MASTER PLAN

General, while you were the Army operations chief, you were a most articulate and vocal supporter of the Air Force airlift master plan, and specifically of proceeding on the C–17 program in order to achieve the capability required under the airlift master plan.

Now, at REDCOM, obviously you are concerned with the budget priorities of all the services in a joint way and that provides a different perspective.

I would be curious, in this time, when a number of desirable things are threatened by budgetary constraint, what priority you attach to that program?

General MAHAFFEY. In my earlier remarks, Senator Wilson, I highlighted my concern for continued support of the C–17 program as the central program in our strategic airlift picture. From my perspective, both as the Director of the Joint Deployment Agency and as the Unified Commander responsible for rapid deployment of forces to overseas theaters, it is absolutely key to our power projection capability in the future, especially as some of the older Air Force systems necessarily are phased out. My concern is heightened, of course, by the budget crunch that we face now and the very real prospect that the C–17 could be accorded some lower priority than what I think it deserves.

In my book, it is the one potential, real war stopper that I can see in the Air Force-Army program; that is to say, if we lose our support for the C–17 program, if it is, somehow or another, killed.

Senator WILSON. Thank you.

I was unhappily delayed with a group of California mayors, so I am afraid I missed that the first time around. But I am pleased to hear you articulate that so clearly.

My own feeling, Mr. Chairman, is in a time when classic conflicts seem a little bit more remote, I think there is a greatly increased danger that we are going to be involved in a number of regional conflicts unless we are able to project credibly the ability to bring force to them.

I think to the extent we demonstrate that capability, we may not be engaged in actual fighting, of brushfire kinds of things that have a potential for either escalating or extending.

Let me ask General Galvin this question.

Your comments I think are clear enough, General.

Over the weekend I watched Mr. Robelo on one of the news programs, public affairs programs. He was equally clear in asserting a premise, and the premise is that much of the public response of the neighbors of the Sandinistas and of Latin nations generally has been conditioned by their observation of our performance, and, to put it bluntly, that they look to the United States with great uncertainty and do not find us a reliable or credible ally.

He told me the same thing 3 years ago, when I was in Costa Rica.

It seems to me that all that you said this morning states that, but perhaps understates it. I think, in the interest of clarity, particularly as a decision is looming before us, it would be useful to

have your view. You have talked about the sustained withdrawal on the part of the United States, and it is clear from what you say that you think that has signified not only a lesser presence militarily, but, I gather, a much lesser presence in terms of political commitment to the area, notwithstanding whatever may be the increased interest.

My own perception is that those people in Honduras, in Costa Rica, in Panama, in El Salvador, to a lesser degree, because we do have some obvious commitment there, but by and large in Central and Latin America, the United States is seen as somehow paralyzed and unable to really say to its neighbors we will make a commitment if you do, and that the consequence is that they are fearful of making the kind of commitment in their own defense, that they otherwise would be very pleased to make.

I am leading the witness disgracefully.

Don't you agree? [General laughter.]

General GALVIN. Senator, I expect leadership from the Congress. [General laughter.]

Sir, I constantly hear what you are saying. I hear it from military colleagues in Latin America, I hear it from political people in Latin America. I have had an opportunity to talk, for example, to every president in Central America, except Daniel Ortega, and to lots of other people.

The constant theme, above any other theme, is the questioning of sustained commitment by the United States—not necessarily thousands of gold bars or something like that. But what they are talking about is will you come up with a policy that will sustain a certain thing.

GUATEMALA

Let's start with Guatemala.

The military has turned over to the civilians the government of Guatemala in such a form that they did it over a year's timeframe. They worked it out so well, out in the districts and all the way up, that by the time President Cerezo came in, a civilian structure existed. He was the last of the civilians to move into the government. It was beautifully done.

Our commitment to them this year, in terms of MAP, Military Assistance Program, for example, is zero. The same could be said about a lot of other countries.

Our commitment overall, for example, to Costa Rica has been higher than our commitment to Honduras—just talking about dollars and if you add up the different MAP, FMS, and the other commitments.

The whole of the military assistance program for South America, for the entire continent of South America, for this year is $3 million.

I have addressed this question only from a military point of view. But I go into a country like Bolivia, which right now has an enormous problem with drugs up in the northern areas of the country, and they explain to me what they would like to do, how they would like to patrol the rivers, how they would like to raid these drug factories, of which there may be 500 producing paste

right now in the northern part of Bolivia. That's 500 factories. So, even if we take out one, it is no big success when compared to the problem.

I spend a lot of my time treading water and backtracking and making sure that I do not promise anything, because we don't have anything to promise except our hearty, emotional support for them.

So I would say yes, the biggest question is the sustained commitment of the United States. That is why I think moving, for example, to support UNO; right now, especially if that is viewed as what the American people and the American Congress want to do—which I hope they do want to do—is more important than anything else.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN SERVICES

General Mahaffey, let's return to the difficulties of communications between the services.

We have heard a lot of horror stories in this committee and elsewhere with regard to the breakdown of communications during the Grenada operation. Were the communication horror stories that we heard about detrimental to the efficient use of military force during that operation?

How would you rate the overall communications situation during that operation? Good? Fair? Poor?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, I think, judged on the basis of the result, you would have to say that it was good enough. We accomplished our objective.

Senator EXON. Well, that is a foregone conclusion, General. Don't beg the question.

You heard what I said. Can you answer my question?

General MAHAFFEY. It certainly, in a technical sense and to some extent in a procedural sense, left something to be desired.

We did not have the connectivity, if you will, between the Joint Task Force Headquarters and the forces ashore that I, for example, would like to have seen had I been the ground force commander.

In part, that was the result of the compressed planning time that was available to the headquarters and to the component elements that participated in that very compressed, urgent planning process. We overcame it through the kind of procedural field expedience that one normally resorts to, that is to say, sending liaison parties with the Army's own communications to the ship in order to provide that ship to shore link.

GRENADA

I do not think, though, that it is fair to characterize what happened in Grenada as a "horror story." To be sure, the communications connectivity could have been and should have been better. But, to my knowledge, there was no instance in which requisite support, either combat service support, fire support, mobility sup-

port or whatever, went without being satisfied as a result of communications breakdown.

The often-told story about the use of an AT&T credit card to make a telephone call from Grenada to the United States or to the ship—I don't know that that has any validity in fact, Senator. I have not been able to establish it as fact.

Senator EXON. Are you aware that General Wickham just testified over in the House that that did happen?

Let me ask you this key question.

Should you be ordered to carry on a Grenada-type action tomorrow, are you satisfied that the problems that you conceded were there have in fact been corrected?

General MAHAFFEY. I believe so.

I would remind you again that the responsibility for another Grenada in that region would fall to the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Command and not to me. But I do believe from what I know that both the procedures and the technical interconnectivity that were seen as less than optimum for Grenada have been redressed.

I know that is true in the case of the procedures because we, in conjunction with the other commands, have produced a very substantial number of procedural manuals that deal not only with communications, but with the joint application of fire power, the kind provided by naval air and naval battleships and so on.

So there has been a great deal of improvement actually achieved since the time of Grenada in a procedural sense and in a technical communications connectivity sense.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

NICARAGUA

General Galvin, I was very much interested in your assessment of the situation in Nicaragua. From the briefings that I have had on this, I would generally agree with your assessment that about 20 percent of the people probably support the Contra forces and 20 percent of the people support the Marxist dictatorship down there. That leaves about 60 percent of the people who are not involved, don't care, or have not made up their minds.

How would our further military aid to the Contras be perceived by that remaining 60 percent?

Do you have any perception, or would you make a projection on how it would be perceived by that 60 percent that have not made up their minds?

I guess what I am worried about is how forceful is the "Yankee go home" syndrome down there, right now, inside Nicaragua, with the people that have not made up their minds? I guess there is some concern, in this Senator's mind, as to whether or not CIA activity down there, as envisioned by the President's request for military aid and other aid totaling $100 million, might adversely affect the majority of that 60 percent, rather than the other way, as we would hope.

General GALVIN. Well, Senator, if we do go into executive session, I will talk about it in some more detail. But I would like to say this about it.

I think, first of all, we ought to look at how the people in Nicaragua perceive the United States in general and how they react to United States initiatives.

I think Shirley Christian's recent book on Nicaragua is good in the sense that it shows how, under Somoza, near the end, when the change of obvious opinion in the United States and support, when opinion went against Somoza and support went against Somoza, how quickly things changed in the country. What I derive from her book and from other things is that you do have, in Central America, as in many other places of the world, "watchers" of the United States, people who are deeply interested in how the United States thinks and moves. There would be great attention to this.

Now, the other part of the question is would they see it as a positive move or not? I believe they would see it as a very positive move. I think there may be mixed feelings in Nicaragua, but I think a lot of people would say, as they have said many times up to now, as long as you are not trying to come in to Nicaragua and influence events yourself, or stay there, and as long as you are recognizing Nicaraguan sovereignty and desire for independence, we like your commitment in here.

That is my own personal opinion.

I would go into the sources for that opinion, but I would prefer to do that in a closed session.

Senator EXON. I can understand that.

MILITARY AID FOR SOUTH AMERICA

I was very much interested in the statements that you made, I believe in response to questions of Senator Wilson. I believe you said that in all of Central America today—or did you say South America—it must be Central America——

General GALVIN. It was South America.

Senator EXON [continuing.] That we have a total of only $3 million in military aid.

General GALVIN. Sir, that is for all of South America.

Senator EXON. In all of South America?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir—in military assistance programs, MAP aid. Of course, there are FMS sales, where we are willing to sell things to certain countries.

Senator EXON. Yes, but I mean money.

General GALVIN. Yes, money.

Senator EXON. $3 million in all of South America?

General GALVIN. A little under $3 million, sir, all going to one nation—about $2.8 million to Bolivia.

Senator EXON. That is not very impressive to those countries and obviously it is not very impressive on its face.

It seems to me that this brings up the question, though, as to how those other countries would perceive our giving $100 million, to the Contra forces as proposed by the President. Wouldn't they like to see it split up maybe $20 million to the Contras and the other $80 million scattered around to the rest of the countries?

General GALVIN. They have said to me many times in Latin America and in South America, especially, why can't you help us? Why do you wait until you have a disaster, for example, before you

react with some help? Why do you wait until the patient is dead before you send the doctor? They say things like that. They make those kinds of comments, which I take as meaning look, if you can be generous enough to help El Salvador and to help, let's say, UNO, then why can't you help us also. But they don't say take it away from UNO.

I think there is a general recognition of the situation in Central America, and, at least the way I see it anyway, there is a general desire that the United States help out in the situation. Those countries are very conscious of their sovereignty and conscious of the need to talk against American military intervention. But, American sustained commitment is a very different thing and they would like to have it there.

I'd like to add one thing, sir.

Military assistance is a vehicle by which we can attain military-to-military contact, in which we can help by serving as an example to work with countries where the military has given up the control, the political control, of the country and is reverting back to what a military role should be, as we understand it in the United States, which is apolitical, supportive of democracy, supportive of pluralism, supportive of national development.

For example, I think we have a 200 year, good history ourselves in the U.S. military. We helped to build the railroads. We helped to build the Mississippi River system and the ports. But we never tried to take any political clout from that.

This allows us to be good examples and good contacts, and obviously you can do that with nothing, with zero, in terms of military assistance. But military assistance, as a vehicle, certainly would help, and we have precious little of it in South America.

Senator EXON. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Cohen, It is your turn. I believe you came in before Senator Denton, but if you want to yield, you go right ahead.

Senator COHEN. I think Jerry was here before I was.

Chairman GOLDWATER. All right.

Senator DENTON. I'll do whatever you direct, Mr. Chairman. I don't want to ask for any special favors.

Senator COHEN. I'll defer to you.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Go ahead.

Senator DENTON. I would first like, if it has not been done, to congratulate Senator Nunn. He not only remains in these hearings all the way through, is not only a very fine partner to our chairman, and all of us know that, but this week, Thursday, he is being awarded the Forrestal Award, given annually by the National Security Industrial Association to civilians who have made contributions to building national security. Such men as Scoop Jackson, John Tower, Richard Russell, and Carl Vinson have previously received it, and I thought that we should take note of that at this hearing.

I want to offer him my congratulations, and I am sure everyone else's.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Jerry. I appreciate your generous comments.

Thank you.

AID TO CONTRAS

Senator DENTON. I would like to start with you, General Galvin, I know General Mahaffey will feel ignored, but as you said, General Galvin, we have a number one issue for your region, the aid to the Contras, up this week. Perhaps, General Galvin, it might be a key issue in areas other than your region.

Would you say that our decision would have considerable impact psychologically in other areas if we failed to meet what you and I might consider to be our needs and the needs of the Nicaraguan people?

General GALVIN. Senator, I would say that it would have a strong impact. That is my own view of it.

I would see it this way.

I think that one of the strongest tenets of Marxism, of communism, is its supposed inevitability, its coming as a great wave which nothing can stop. When we take a look at situations in places like Angola, Afghanistan, and others, as well as Nicaragua, and what we are doing to help countries in Latin America, to fight problems of instability caused by communism, caused by Marxist dedication to undermining, I think we are facing the Communist world with the proposition that expansion is not inevitable. In fact, for a lot of different reasons contraction is inevitable because they cannot sustain the kinds of governments they would like to see in these countries.

When that contraction becomes more and more evident, we will be in a far better position in this world, all of us.

Senator DENTON. Assuming we do the proper things, like aid to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua?

General GALVIN. I would like to see us do that, yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. Would you comment on the link between U.S. support in the manner you have just described and the fear of a repetition of the kind behavior we showed to South Vietnam, after we had, I believe, broken the enemy's will—in fact, I'm quite sure we had—and then withdrew all aid to the South Vietnamese Government. We have done things to the Shah of Iran and other friends of ours. I would like you to draw a link between the fear that we are continuing to move that way, not because of the Presidents, but because of what I characterize as some of the media being very liberal and Congress taking exception to the leadership of President Carter, for example, in trying to stop Brezhnev from the invasion of Angola with Cuban troops, or whatever other examples. I will be taking these up on the floor on this issue. Consider the fear of that and the political positions that these people take. I have in mind President Betancur of Colombia, realizing that a good friend of mind, Ambassador Tambs, went down to Colombia—a very brave man and very optimistic about what he was going to be able to do. He made good friends with Don Lava Alarbania, who was not of his political bent but very determined to stop the drug traffic and so on. The next time I saw Mr. Tambs, he was fleeing in

fear from that country, and President Betancur is now saying that we should not give aid properly, that it would be improprietous and inadvisable for us to give aid to the Contras, to the freedom fighters.

His critics and friends are reported, even in the liberal media, as saying that he is a little frightened.

Isn't it a real fear? Isn't it a tangible terror, which they should feel down there with the link between the narco-terrorism and communism and the efforts to overthrow their governments? Would you comment on that?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

To take your example of President Betancur, I think that President Betancur is a courageous man, capable of acting with great decision and great courage, as he did, for example, in the Palace of Justice affair. But any political figure, any man, in fact, any human being needs support. Without support, we can always wonder how long such an effort can be sustained.

I do not want to say at this time that he, as President of Colombia, has waivered in any way in his determination to get rid of drugs and to get rid of the guerrillas. But I will say this. He tries different ways, and he does that and other leaders in other countries of Latin America make different efforts, down different roads, as they question, among other things, how well we will support something; how well we will act based on the philosophy that we espouse.

Senator DENTON. Then you have noticed, as have I—and I wrote a letter to the President about this and to the Secretary of State—sort of a double-tiered kind of diplomacy in which over the table they have to say one thing, in deference to the reality of the fear and doubt they feel, and under the table they are saying a very different thing to Americans about what they should be doing to help them in that region.

General GALVIN. Statements are qualified and actions are qualified probably because, at least in one facet of this, U.S. support is qualified.

Senator DENTON. You mentioned that $3 million went to all of the South American continent from the United States. Was that for last year?

General GALVIN. This year. It's the plan for this year.

Senator DENTON. This year?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator DENTON. And now we are going to have Gramm-Rudman, and I will make no predictions. I heard Congressman Aspin in my own State recently predict maybe a $90 billion cut on the defense side, including in the kind of aid you are talking about.

The Soviets have given a known $600 million from 1979 to 1984 to Nicaragua. To my knowledge, we last year gave $27 million of humanitarian aid to the freedom fighters, much of which did not reach them, and we have given some covert aid. There are 4,000 to 5,000 Cubans there, and North Koreans, Libyans, Basques, Montenero guerrillas from Uruguay. How would you advise those of us here who are convinced that there is a stark and driving need, both from the standpoint of protection of freedom in the world and of our own national security, to address those who are asking you

such questions as were asked all through Vietnam? How long is it going to take?

Can't they understand that it depends on what the other side does and on what our side does? I feel desperately lonely here at times, and I would appreciate any—not that there are not others like me—advice you would have on the line of reasoning to follow in what seems to be such an obvious situation.

General GALVIN. I would say that, when the question is asked of me, how long will it take in a situation like this, how long will it take for UNO to get into a position where it can influence events in Nicaragua, I am always reminded of Winston Churchill's comment during World War II when he said that even the best of tacticians on occasion has to take the enemy into account.

It is hard to predict these things because we do not run either side of this. But the danger that is there is well stated by you, sir, in terms of the variety of different terrorists and insurgents that are housed in Managua today.

Senator DENTON. My last question is this.

Many of the people doing the criticism and presenting the opposition to aid are people referred to as liberals. Would you say that the liberal part of the establishment in Nicaragua, the press and the church, is being treated any better in view of Pedro Chamorro's fleeing, after a very brave stint there, after his father was slain by the Somocistas, and then he was threatened and intimidated and his family intimidated and brutalized? I would like to know whether you agree with an estimate recently given to me by Cardinal, recently Archbishop, Obando y Bravo, who said we have no more than a year—this was about a month ago—to nourish what is left of the possibility of reform of the revolution, if you will. He put it that way.

We are going to be facing maybe a 6-month delay or a 3-month delay or a 1-year delay in any aid we provide. How critical is that time, in your estimate, before we come forth with some substantial aid to them?

General GALVIN. Well, I think Archbishop Obando y Bravo brought it out from the point of view of internally. I would agree with him on that.

I would say that there is another problem, and that is externally.

If we allow the Sandinistas to gain time, which they are doing—that is their obvious tactic, fighting to gain time—if we allow them to gain time, they, as they grow stronger, will have a stronger, destabilizing influence on Honduras, on Costa Rica, on El Salvador, on Guatemala, on Panama, than we are seeing now.

Until what is now UNO or the resistance, until the resistance grew enough to preoccupy the Sandinistas, they were doing more of what they were doing before. With reference, for example, to Honduras, they sent two very strong teams into Honduras for destabilization. Now they are more preoccupied with trying to fight the battle inside Nicaragua. They have created 14 battalions of irregular fighting and they are working that problem. Now they are fighting all over the country.

That is keeping them, to some degree, from doing what they would like to do—export their model of revolution.

So I would agree with the Archbishop that we are seeing a struggle by the Sandinistas to gain time so that they can do what they want to do.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, gentlemen. My time is up.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Cohen.

SUPPORT OF REORGANIZATION OF DOD

Senator COHEN. I missed the beginning of your testimony. I wonder if it would be impolitic or impolite if I were to ask whether you gentlemen support the chairman's efforts to reorganize the Department of Defense so as to give you folks more power in the field?

[No response.]

Do I construe your silence as acceptance?

[No response.]

I see both generals are strongly in favor of the Goldwater-Nunn reorganization proposal. [General laughter.]

General GALVIN. We are down here lateralling the ball.

Senator COHEN. All right. I will not put you on the spot. You can strike that from the record and you need not respond.

SANDINISTAS

I am listening with great interest about the Sandinistas.

General Galvin, in your judgment, how many Sandinistas are there? You said, "if there are 20,000." In some reports, for example, they may be as few as 11,000?

General GALVIN. UNO? I would say that UNO probably is up around 20,000.

Senator COHEN. About 20,000?

General GALVIN. I heard the program the other night and I heard the figure by UNO leadership as 25,000. That may be possible also. As you know the size doubled in the past year. So you have gotten an enormous growth, 10,000 in a year. That's almost 1,000 a month. So it's pretty hard to say that that would not have stopped.

I would say that it is 20,000 and growing, maybe more.

Senator COHEN. I gather from your statements in response to Senator Wilson and Senator Denton that, even though these neighboring countries publicly express opposition to the President's proposal, that privately we are to discount their public statements and accept their private statements that are in fact made?

General GALVIN. I would prefer to comment on that, if we could, in the closed session. If possible.

Senator COHEN. That would be fine.

I might point out that one of the difficulties in my judgment about this whole proposal is the absence of clarity about our purpose and our policy.

I think it has been indicated that both Senator Wilson and Senator Denton have suggested that these folks have to say something different from what they actually mean.

I would say that the same applies to the United States. We have to say something different than what we intend. Part of the difficulty is that we are unwilling to say, clearly, that the very exist-

ence of the Sandinistas is inimical to the interests of the United States and the Western Hemisphere. We dance around it and we keep talking. I think you used the phrase, if we allow the Sandinistas to grow stronger, they will destabilize their neighbors. Well, what is the follow-on to that, that, therefore, you must force them to be weaker so that they can be—what—either removed or, I would assume, democratized.

But nowhere is that expression articulated as part of a policy. For example, we still maintain normal diplomatic relations with the government, while proposing to fund a group that has, as its declared policy, the overthrow of the Sandinistas.

How do you reconcile that?

Part of our difficulty is that we are unwilling to reconcile that publicly, that we are content, at least for the time being, to operate on the peripheries of the area of diplomatic vagary, so that we do not have to make that kind of declaration, for all the consequences that flow from it. This, in turn, causes the many problems that we have in terms of getting that consistency, that commitment, that perception of sustainability that the Latin American and Central American countries feel the United States is lacking—because we are unwilling to say exactly what we mean, because of the consequences that might flow from it.

Every time there is a report, for example, when we operate in this vague field, a report of an atrocity, where innocent civilians are murdered and television cameras move in, you immediately have the seeds of discontent, disillusionment, and criticism, and suddenly you have a new dynamic set into motion for the United States. And that will continue. In my judgment, that will continue as long as we continue to operate in the periphery, without saying exactly what we have in mind.

I ask you—though I think I know the answer—if you can tell me, for example, if, in fact, the Sandinistas are Marxists—and I believe they are—is there any experience that you have where a Marxist government has agreed to negotiate away its political power and share it?

General GALVIN. No. We don't have any previous, that I know of, Marxist government that has negotiated away political power.

However, I don't think that somehow that absence sets a precedent. I think action of some kind usually sets a precedent.

I would like to go back for a moment to comment on the situation as you describe it.

I think that you are right. I think that the Soviet Union certainly, for many years, has had it as a stated policy that they will support wars of liberation, as they call them. Those can be anything. They do not necessarily have to have the designation of a war.

A struggle is good, struggles of liberation. I think, confronted by a strong power in this world that has a policy like that, we need to take a very hard look at our own strategy, world strategy.

Senator COHEN. I think that we have sort of invited some of the difficulties we have by not having some clarity of purpose; that, in fact, we find ourselves quite similarly being in a position of having to say something different than what we either mean or intend.

Let me move on to another question.

I think you have indicated in your testimony that there are active insurgencies in more than 9 of the 19 countries in your area of responsibility.

I know that there are a number of officers who believe that any good soldier can handle guerrillas. But I want to know whether in your judgment conventional forces are capable of responding to these much lower, or lesser intense conflicts. Do you think the academies of services are really preparing ourselves to deal with low-intensity conflict?

General GALVIN. I think, right now, that is a weakness that we are trying to correct. I think that we should fault ourselves for having moved very slowly on that. After Vietnam, we did the opposite. We failed in a recognition of these wars of liberation and in a recognition that the major, the most immediate threat to us at any time would be these small wars or these insurgencies, or counter-insurgent action.

However, now we are moving. I have a low-intensity conflict group within my staff which is tied in to the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command, and this group is tied to Langley, where the Air Force has a new group. There is work going on in other places. I was involved in this even yesterday at headquarters in Fort Monroe.

We have published a classified study of about 100 different papers within the past 6 months on low-intensity conflict and we are moving on it. We still need a heavier emphasis and we need to move faster, because that is the world in which we are going to be fighting if we are lucky enough only to fight those kinds of wars, and to help our allies fight them.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

General Mahaffey, the Readiness Command has authority over some areas traditionally that have been reserved for the services. Your command, as I understand it, is involved in the training, equipping, and preparing our forces for joint operations that are forward deployed. You also have some responsibilities in CONUS as well during wartime.

Is there any arrangement of this sort that leads to command and control problems in a time of war, switching from that peacetime mission to wartime responsibility?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, we have current weaknesses in the communications component of our command and control arrangements for actions here in CONUS. As I indicated earlier, we are now supported by the service programs to acquire an improved high frequency radio system as an essential backup to the public telephone system, which is basically what we would have to rely upon for post-attack reporting from all the various locales, States, regions, and so on.

So that is a problem.

I am satisfied, however, that it is being addressed by the service budgets in 1987 and the Five-Year Defense Program.

We are also just now seeking to streamline the command and control structure that exists throughout the United States for both responding to requests for assistance from civil authorities at the local, State, and Federal level, and also for the employment of

forces and resources that might be required in conjunction with that.

We have, heretofore, had what in my judgment has been a too complicated command and control arrangement. I have submitted proposals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to streamline that, and they are under review by them at this point.

BENEFITS OF JOINT OPERATIONS ON READINESS COMMAND

Senator COHEN. Could you point to some tangible benefits that your preparations for joint operations have had on the Readiness Command?

Could you give us some examples?

General MAHAFFEY. Going back to the question asked earlier by the other Senator concerning Grenada, I think what that served to highlight, in retrospect, was the need for better documented joint procedures as they relate to interoperability in a number of different respects—not only communications, but calling for and receiving combat support, fire support, and so on. The Readiness Command has been central to the efforts since that time to develop, document, and have approved the procedural manuals that we now have in hand, and hopefully will go a long way toward avoiding any such problems in the future.

We routinely design our joint readiness exercises in such a way as to exercise those key joint interfaces. We have moved away from the classic force-on-force design of the old exercises and instead concentrate on such areas as joint tactical air operations, achieving the technical internetting and then exercising the command and control procedures that involve air elements from all the services in the framework of those exercises. Additionally, we exercise joint logistics over-the-shore procedures, involving Navy and Marine elements working in tandem with Army lighterage units and the like.

So the readiness command has been very active in promoting true joint interoperability.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

My time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. General Mahaffey, you are commander of the Readiness Command. You said earlier that you have no Navy serving on your staff, did you not?

General MAHAFFEY. No, sir.

I do have Navy personnel serving on the staff of both the Readiness Command and the Joint Deployment Agency.

What I said was I have no assigned naval component, that is, no operating naval units in the Readiness Command.

Chairman GOLDWATER. What is your highest ranked naval officer?

General MAHAFFEY. Rear admiral, upper half.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Let's say that it becomes rather obvious that we need some defense of Panama, and that requires naval forces. Does that come under your command, or even your suggestion, or anything?

General MAHAFFEY. No.

That would become General Galvin's responsibility. He has that specific defense mission. Whatever the naval components were that were furnished to him would then either be in support of him or come under his operational command.

Chairman GOLDWATER. General Galvin, do you have naval officers on your staff that can handle command?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir; I do. I have a rear admiral, a two star rear admiral, who is commander of the naval component in my command.

Chairman GOLDWATER. General Mahaffey, what would you say the condition of your ammunition supplies are at the present time?

General MAHAFFEY. Mr. Chairman, I have to answer that by again pointing out that in large measure the munitions supplies for the forces that are currently assigned to me are those that would be furnished or are already stockpiled in the overseas theaters. I do not have an ammunition stockpile for my forces, per se. It is given to the gaining unified commanders.

In general, however, for Army forces and Air Force forces, in general terms, it is getting better each year. I have some graphs that could give you some general indication of what those munition stockages look like, if you are interested.

But, in general, we are making steady progress in the stockpile levels across the board.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY

Chairman GOLDWATER. If it is not classified, do you have a sufficient ammunition supply?

General MAHAFFEY. No, sir; not yet.

Chairman GOLDWATER. So you don't have enough ammunition.

General MAHAFFEY. Not as measured against the objectives that have been established for the Army and the Air Force at large, by the Defense Guidance, that's correct.

However, again, our Five-Year Defense Program will move us, in the case of the Air Force, to the achievement of those wartime levels, and in the case of the Army, a long way toward achieving it.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I think to fight a war, you have to have not only some ammunition, you have to have all of it.

Now, in the matter of communications, you indicated that you still had communications problems. Have you solved the communications problems that existed because of the naval demand for print-out communications? Is there a three way concept against the Air Force, one way concept, and the Army's one way concept, or two way, if you count the Air?

General MAHAFFEY. Mr. Chairman, I'm not entirely sure what that refers to.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Do you have absolute communications with all your forces? That is, the naval aviator up there. the Air Force aviator up there, the ground commander down there, and the submarine commander over there, and the naval vessel over here?

General MAHAFFEY. Yes, but not as good as I would like to see.

Chairman GOLDWATER. You mean that it's not good.

Well, when do you think it is going to get better?

General MAHAFFEY. It is improving.

As I indicated earlier, I think we will make a major step forward in true interoperability, both technically and procedurally, by the end of that 5-year period.

I might point out some reasons for that optimism, Senator. It has to do with the programs that the Army now has supported. We are buying the new SINCGARS family of equipment, the improved high frequency radios, the TRI-TAC equipment, the communications security devices, all of which are interoperable systems; and, on the other hand, the Army and Air Force decision to acquire the Have-Quick, the antijam ultrahigh frequency system, and the VINSON equipment, so that it matches the secure equipment being procured by the Army.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I think we just spent $3 billion with the French to buy that equipment.

Doesn't it ever upset you to think about the United States, that developed all the communications technology, not being able to supply the proper command?

I was down at an Army base not so long ago, and I found that the Army couldn't talk from one Army to the other. I found they had satellite capability, but not the ability to talk about 15 miles. I know that this has existed for a long time between the aviators of the Air Force and the aviators of the Navy and the aviators of the Army.

I want to make it abundantly clear to you that we will stand behind you if you want to make criticism of the forces of the Pentagon that are not providing these things. Do not hesitate for a moment to sound off. We have been inferior in this superior area for too long.

General Galvin, how are your forces fixed for mortars at the present time?

General GALVIN. Sir, in the Army forces there, we have one brigade and that brigade has its table of organization equipment mortars. They are good mortars.

Chairman GOLDWATER. How about your howitzers?

General GALVIN. We also have an artillery battalion, and it is equipped correctly.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Are your mortars new mortars?

General GALVIN. I would have to provide that answer to you, sir. I don't think they are brand new.

[The information follows:]

MORTARS AND ARTILLERY

The 193d Infantry Brigade has mortars and light artillery. They have twelve 60mm mortars, M-224; eight 81mm mortars, M-29 and M 29A-1; and six 105mm artillery pieces, model M-102.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Do you have any of the new mortars that I understand are rifled, using Israeli shells?

General GALVIN. The brigade does not have any nonstandard, non-U.S.A. tubes or ammunition.

Chairman GOLDWATER. By the way, General Galvin, we are going to have a closed hearing tomorrow afternoon involving Central America, and we are going to ask you to come back to participate in that. There are many members who wanted to ask questions this

morning who felt a little hesitant because of the classification involved.

I have no further questions.

Senator Nunn, I think you had some more questions.

Senator NUNN. I just have a couple.

NEED FOR COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY

General Mahaffey, last year, your predecessor, General Nutting, highlighted the need for improved communications interoperability and he also, gave us frank testimony that he was frustrated about the lack of communication interoperability, and that he did not have the authority to do much about it.

Do you feel that you have the full authority to make sure that the Army, Air Force, and Navy can communicate in a satisfactory fashion in the wars of the future?

General MAHAFFEY. No. I wouldn't go that far. I certainly have the opportunity to be heard in support of those interoperability needs in the PPBS process, in the DRB proceedings, and in my regular communications with the Secretary of Defense; and I take advantage of that opportunity, particularly as it relates to this area.

Senator NUNN. But you are not frustrated with any lack of authority?

General MAHAFFEY. Yes. Well—authority——

Senator NUNN. Now General Nutting was. He felt he did not have the authority to carry that out. And you today seem to me to be saying that you do have the authority and you are confident it is going to be accomplished.

What we want somebody to do is to take that responsibility. But if you are not willing to assume responsibility, and don't have the authority, you ought to tell us—which is what General Nutting did.

General MAHAFFEY. I think it is fair to say that I do not have the authority to make that happen.

I do have the opportunity, the entree, if you will, to be heard on the issue.

I think it also needs to be said that this is an area where, in fact, the services are putting money where their mouths have been. The Army is showing something like a 20-percent increase in the C-3I area in fiscal year 1987 over past years.

The Air Force is devoting a substantial hunk of their budget and program moneys to the C-3 area.

Having said all that, I am not satisfied with the state of technical or procedural interoperability today, as indeed I would suspect no unified commander is.

Senator NUNN. You keep talking about the Air Force and the Army and I never hear you mention Navy. Where is the Navy in all of this?

Are you assuming responsibility for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, or are you just involved in the Army and the Air Force?

General MAHAFFEY. I have responsibility principally oriented on those forces that are assigned to me, and they are only Army and Air Force.

Senator NUNN. So you are not assuming any responsibility for seeing that the Army can talk to the Navy?

General MAHAFFEY. Yes, in the sense of the identification of the technical means of interoperability and the development of the procedures that are the foundation.

Senator NUNN. That's part of your job?

General MAHAFFEY. Absolutely.

Senator NUNN. Procedures and plans?

General MAHAFFEY. Absolutely.

Senator NUNN. Who is supposed to implement it?

Who do we look to in 5 years, sitting up here, to tell us that it was either done or not done? If we can't look to you, to whom do we look?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, I would say that it is a shared responsibility, certainly. I have developmental responsibilities. I think the services clearly share the responsibility for achieving technical and procedural interoperability.

Senator NUNN. They have had that for the last 30 years and have not done it. Haven't they?

General MAHAFFEY. I am not myself comfortable with——

Senator NUNN. Since World War II, if you were the average citizen out there, wouldn't you presume that somebody was responsible for this in that great five-sided building over there?

General MAHAFFEY. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. But it hasn't been done?

General MAHAFFEY. Not as well as I think it should have.

Senator NUNN. Whose fault is that?

General MAHAFFEY. That's a hard question to answer.

Senator NUNN. I know it is. That is the reason I asked you. [General laughter.]

Whose fault is it going to be in 5 years, if we look back and still can't do it? Who are we going to look to?

General MAHAFFEY. I would hope that out of the national dialog that has been going on, in which you have both been so prominent, that a clarification of responsibilities for interoperability, both technical and procedural, would be forthcoming, and that, therefore, answering who is responsible for the progress or lack of progress 5 years from now ought to be an easier matter.

Senator NUNN. I hope so, too.

We have addressed that subject.

I am not trying to give you individually a hard time on it. I know how frustrated General Nutting was in this area.

Again, let me ask you this.

You talked about the Army and Air Force. They are under your command.

Is the new equipment coming on line for the Army and the new equipment coming on line for the Air Force that you have talked about going to be compatible with Navy equipment? And Marine equipment?

General MAHAFFEY. In some measure.

Now, what I mean by that is this. Of late, my understanding is that the Navy has agreed now to begin equipping its forces with the same kind of communications security devices as the Army and the Air Force are using, that is the VINSON devices. The Navy

has, of late, I understand, agreed to acquire the same Joint Tactical Information Data System, JTIDS system, as the Army and the Air Force intend to acquire.

The Navy has been participating in the development of the procedural dimension of interoperability of late. And so, what oversight I have of the Navy's programs and the Navy's contribution, limited as it is, leads me to conclude that they are, in fact, a player in the joint interoperability area.

Senator NUNN. To a lawyer's ears, I heard a lot of qualifications in that.

General MAHAFFEY. I would not want to mislead you about the scope of my charter or command authority.

Senator NUNN. You are basically telling us that you don't have any authority over the Navy and the Marine Corps.

General MAHAFFEY. Not direct authority, that's correct, except for those who work on my staff.

Senator NUNN. And they are not responsible for this area.

General MAHAFFEY. They certainly help me in addressing it, though.

Senator NUNN. So, we really still do not know who to look to at the present time for that total service kind of interoperability.

General MAHAFFEY. I think that I ought to point out that in the past year, 2 years at the most, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have established an agency whose exclusive charter is one of overseeing both the technical and the procedural dimensions of joint interoperability. That agency is their agency. It is located at Fort Monmouth, NJ, and my interaction, along with that of the other CINC's, is very extensive.

But it is evidence of their commitment to assume and to discharge the responsibility for achieving and resolving the kind of problems you are talking about, achieving the kind of improvements we need.

Senator NUNN. Well, if the Joint Deployment Agency does not have jurisdiction, and they are under you, and I assume they don't, over the Navy and the Marine Corps communications, who does? Why don't they? What is the Joint Deployment Agency if it is not truly joint?

Does "joint" just mean Air Force and Army?

General MAHAFFEY. I think either you or I have mixed two things here, Senator.

JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY

The Joint Deployment Agency is, indeed, a truly joint agency. The Joint Deployment System, the automated on-line system, for planning and coordinating the execution of major deployments, uses the Worldwide Military Command and Control System, the WWMCCS system. So, in that sense, we have, to all of the over 100 participants and users of the Joint Deployment System, interoperability—procedurally and technically. And we demonstrated that during the recent national mobilization and deployment exercise in spades.

Now, I make a distinction between the Joint Deployment System and its interconnectivity and interoperability on the one hand,

from the tactical and strategic communications means and the command and control procedures associated with the employment of joint forces on the other hand.

Senator NUNN. The latter is not under the Joint Deployment System?

General MAHAFFEY. It is not.

The Joint Deployment Agency is exclusively chartered to develop, operate and maintain the Joint Deployment System, and, as a follow-on effort to that, to define and to develop the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System.

Senator NUNN. Would you then support efforts to try to clarify this authority? I guess you are saying that it needs clarifying further than the present system?

General MAHAFFEY. I believe that there is a need to clarify responsibilities for developing, documenting, reviewing, validating, and approving joint tactics, techniques, and procedures, which are the essence of interoperability.

I am satisfied with the responsibilities of the Joint Deployment Agency, as they are currently laid out. I don't think there is a problem there.

Senator NUNN. Do either of you have any comments on the reorganization efforts, our efforts to particularly try to strengthen the Commanders in Chief in the field?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, there are features of the bill, as I understand it, that have been reported out by the Senate Armed Services Committee that will certainly contribute to strengthening the authority and the role of the unified commanders.

Senator NUNN. Do you support those features?

General MAHAFFEY. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. General Galvin.

General GALVIN. I have read the bill, sir, and I support a great deal of the bill. I have some reservations with some of it, based on my own experience. I feel, for example, where it refers to training, that there are some responsibilities as a forward deployed commander and a combatant commander that would be better that I not have—although I would like to have the capabilities I do now to comment on the quality of training or even on the substance of it and to be influential in that.

Senator NUNN. Regarding training, the only training that is referred to in the bill, as I recall—and we will look this up—is the joint training, the joint exercising of troops under your command. We are not talking about basic or any of that kind of training. Maybe you are talking about joint, too. You don't think that is your responsibility?

General GALVIN. Well, I do not feel that I have to have the responsibility for either service-oriented training or joint training. Obviously the exercises are a part of training. But that is a deployment. I have control of the exercises as it is now, when they occur in my region.

Senator NUNN. Who should have control of joint training of the forces under you?

General GALVIN. Joint training, as it is now, is a matter of General Mahaffey's responsibility, as I understand it.

General MAHAFFEY. For those forces that are assigned to the United States Readiness Command.

Senator NUNN. Yes.

But those are not your forces out there, though. They're not on the assignment of the command. He doesn't even have any Navy forces, so how are you going to have joint training under the Readiness Command when he doesn't have Navy forces?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, Senator, to be fair——

Senator NUNN. I mean, he does have joint training, but it is not your forces.

General MAHAFFEY. Let me add that Navy forces do participate extensively in our joint readiness exercises.

Senator NUNN. General Galvin, I am not sure I understand whose responsibility that ought to be.

General GALVIN. Well, as I read the document—and, of course, I could have misread it—the document seemed to me to say that the CINCs would, it was recommending that the CINCs receive the training responsibility. I took that to mean training of the service component—in other words, that the units that come to me for operations, that I am also concerned with their training.

As it is now, as you know, the service is responsible for their training, and you have the whole Training and Doctrine Command, and the Army National Training Center and a whole lot of other things.

Senator NUNN. Let me read this to you. Section 164(d)(1) says: "forces assigned to combatant command are under the full operation and command of the commander of the combatant command, to which they are assigned. Full operational command includes, number one, all aspects of military operations and joint training."

Now does that give you a problem?

General GALVIN. No, that does not give me a problem.

I don't know whether I have read an earlier markup of this or not. I will have to check that myself.

Senator NUNN. You may have.

Take a look at it because we would like to know—both of you. If you have any kinds of questions on this, we want to know.

General MAHAFFEY. I think that is exactly right. I think that authority and responsibility ought to be. I have assumed it was, but if not, it ought to be fixed; it ought to be the responsibility of the commander to whom those forces are assigned.

Senator NUNN. You don't have a problem with that, General Galvin?

General GALVIN. No, Senator. I don't.

Senator NUNN. You don't want responsibility for training, period; but joint training is different.

General GALVIN. That's correct, as it is stated there.

Senator NUNN. Well, take a look at that section or any other section. We would very much welcome your comments, pro or con.

General GALVIN. Thank you, sir.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate both of you being here.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Good morning.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Good morning or good afternoon.

Senator LEVIN. I will be very brief.

THE CONTRAS

I know you have talked about the Contras at some length. I have just one question on that, General Galvin, and that is the following.

In order for insurgents to succeed generally, they have to have a political plan and a military plan. I am wondering whether you have seen such plans?

General GALVIN. I have seen a lot of development in the past year as far as UNO is concerned.

Remember, last March 4, they issued the San Jose Declaration, which is a pretty good political plan. They reissued another declaration here based on the UNO–FDN Keysan alliance, which I thought was a good plan.

I think, really, they have the plan. It is the propagation that I think is one of the big problems in it.

Senator LEVIN. Have you seen a military plan?

General GALVIN. I have not seen a military plan. You know, I don't have any connection with them.

What I see, of course, is through intelligence means. I watch what happens in Nicaragua to the best extent I can.

I would say that I have seen, especially in the past 4 or 5 months, an unfolding of what looks like to me a strategic plan or a grand tactical plan for what they seem to have in mind. By that, I mean they have moved more into the south, they have moved into the center of the country, they are not concentrated in the north-central highlands.

Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether they have a written military plan that our intelligence has seen or reviewed in any way?

General GALVIN. I do not know of any plan like that.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you, Senator.

Gentlemen, it has been a pleasure having you with us this morning. As you can tell, we have a lot more questions that we would like to ask you.

[Questions submitted for the hearing record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN QUAYLE

EL SALVADOR

Senator QUAYLE. Recent reports indicate that nearly 60% of Salvadoran Armed Forces' casualties have been due to rebel antipersonnel mines and urban terror tactics. What can be done to limit these losses?

General GALVIN. The guerrillas have been using land mines very effectively. We identified the trend approximately 12–14 months ago as a change in tactics. Their purpose is to maim, not to kill. This slows down the ESAF advance in the field, and has the added effect of burdening the society with crippled victims, with its accompanying psychological effects on the ESAF and Salvadoran population. Recently we identified an even more disturbing trend and tactic—using mines to maim and kill civilians. From June 16 to December 31, 1985, the guerrillas took the lives of 17 civilians and wounded over 56 others. They are placing mines in areas and pathways frequently traveled by civilians. Men, women, and children are being killed and crippled every day as a result of the FMLN's inhumane tactics. The ESAF has acquired [deleted] mine detectors [deleted]. They have received training and are now

using the detectors in the field. In conjunction with the U.S. Embassy and the ESAF, we continue to seek equipment, tactics, and training to improve countermine capabilities. Urban terrorism is on the increase because the ESAF have effectively neutralized the guerrilla offensive in the outlying departments. We anticipate more attacks in the urban environment. To counter this threat, training and equipping the Public Security Forces is essential. Under the country teams leadership, we are cooperating with other U.S. agencies to provide the best and most timely capability improvements for the public security forces. I might add that this program has already provided a direct benefit to our citizens. The two elements, who are undergoing U.S. training now, recently conducted the largest single drug bust in Salvadoran history. Three millions of dollars of cocaine destined for LA and the men involved were captured by the Salvadoran Security Forces. It was a very professional operation.

Senator QUAYLE. In a recent edition of Armed Forces Journal International, a critique of El Salvadoran Armed Forces' tactics and strategy was featured that called for the U.S. to encourage the Salvadorans to adopt small unit tactics rather than the Vietnam style raids assisted with helicopters currently being used. What progress is being made to encourage the Salvadorans to adopt small unit tactics?

General GALVIN. It is important to stress that the process of developing a professional and competent military is not an overnight task. We have always stressed the importance of small unit operations to the ESAF, but it takes time to equip, train, and develop a force capable of carrying out such tactics. Primarily, two factors have consistently slowed wholesale adoption of the tactics the article's author and we agree are most appropriate to this war—the small number of leaders and the relative unwillingness to the armed forces to take tactical risks. Both of these are to be expected in any Army that goes from a Garrison to field force. In El Salvador's case the situation was further complicated by the involvement of the military in politics until 1984 and their belief that because U.S. support was not a guaranteed certainty from year to year, caution was the wiser course. A final factor was the expansion of the force which reinforced caution and further overextended the available leadership talent. The Salvadoran Armed Forces have grown from 12,000 troops in 1981 to 50,000 in 1986. They began as a small force which was poorly equipped and trained with little or no experience in counterinsurgency warfare. Today, these issues are behind them and they are adopting smaller unit tactics. They have demonstrated superb leadership and adaptability over the last five years. They are quickly becoming the most effective military in Latin America with regards to counterinsurgency operations.

Small unit operations are very important to success in a low-intensity conflict war such as in El Salvador. The ESAF small unit operations are quickly becoming the norm rather than the exception. "Operacion Fenix" which began in January 1986 used small unit operations within the context of a large operational campaign. As a result, the Guazapa region has been liberated and re-opened. The Suchitoto Aguilares road is open for the first time in six years, and civilians are returning to the area.

I disagree with the author of the article in the Armed Forces Journal when it comes to the employment of the helicopter in a low-intensity conflict environment. It is a most effective tool when used properly. I also disagree with the author's comparison of El Salvador to Vietnam. We, your U.S. military, learned from the experience of Vietnam. As policy, we keep no more than 55 trainers in El Salvador. The result is that Salvadorans plan and carry out their own operations. Self-sufficiency is the goal for El Salvador. When the war is won, the Salvadoran Armed Forces, as a supporting agency of a democratically elected government will have won it.

Senator QUAYLE. What will it take in your estimation for the Armed Forces of El Salvador to win in the next 5 years? How much more U.S. military aid will be needed and what should it specifically be spent on? Do we have a blueprint for victory?

General GALVIN. A blueprint for victory is another way of saying a strategy to ensure success for U.S. foreign policy. Our foreign policy should be clear, well defined and bipartisan.

Foreign policy directs and guides our actions toward a goal. The goal is clear, to protect the U.S. southern flank, thereby denying any enemy access and control over the maritime routes through the Gulf of Mexico. Victory in El Salvador is dependent upon the success of U.S. foreign policy in all of Central America, including a free and democratic Nicaragua. President Duarte has said, as long as the Sandinista regime supports and exports regional insurgencies against its neighbors, there can be no real victory in Central America, especially not in El Salvador. On the other hand, a near term military victory is developing in El Salvador, largely due to the

outstanding leadership of President Duarte and the ever increasing effectiveness of the Salvadoran Armed Forces. This year, they will expand the use of small unit and night operations to deny the FMLN the initiative. They have formulated a National Military Plan which sets specific objectives to liberate some of the conflictive areas. I spoke earlier of one such effort in Guazapa. The Armed Forces have forced the guerrillas into small units and caused the insurgents to resort to terrorism and attacks against the economic infrastructure.

As a result of the Salvadoran Armed Forces successes, the FMLN will mount more attacks on civilians and targets in San Salvador and other urban centers. Therefore, the Public Security Forces will face the threat of urban terrorism on a continuous basis. The Public Security Forces are not adequately equipped or trained to perform basic police functions, much less to confront well-trained and equipped terrorist elements. Due to restrictions specified in the Foreign Assistance Act, the Defense Department was unable to assist these forces until recently when restrictions were lifted earlier this year. However, no additional funds have been dedicated to pay for the new program. Ambassador Corr has asked for $31M for this program, a request that should be considered and supported soonest. Therefore, victory in El Salvador is dependent on the following: assistance to the Public Security Forces, sustaining support to the Armed Forces, economic assistance to the Government of El Salvador, integration of civil and military planning, political and socio-economic stability in El Salvador and its neighboring nations, and a free democratic Nicaragua.

More military aid will be required in the future, first to sustain the present forces, and second, to complete force structure development. I anticipate only a slight increase in funding in the near term to equip and train the public security forces. Otherwise, funding will remain near the 1985 MAP levels through 1988. Depending on the circumstances in Central America and the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy, the yearly funding requirements beginning in fiscal year 1989 should decrease. However, reduced funding for El Salvador is clearly linked to a free, democratic Nicaragua. Perhaps more important than military assistance is economic aid. If there is to be a real and lasting peace in Central America, the socio-economic problems in El Salvador and its neighboring nations must be addressed and resolved. The Kissinger Commission clearly defined the problem and made some initial recommendations, but now is the time to energetically attack the problem. In my judgment, as stability returns with security and governmental presence, so will the displaced people and refugees. If we wait too long, we may not be able to keep pace.

We can summarize victory in El Salvador as attainable only in the greater context of victory in Central America. President Duarte and his government serve as a beacon of democracy in the region. To preserve a free, democratic El Salvador will require both military and economic assistance. The real key to victory in El Salvador is a coherent and integrated U.S. foreign policy. All the nations of Central America are important, if a true peace is to be attained. A strictly military solution is not the answer nor in my view, possible. The socio-economic problems in the region must be resolved to ensure regional security and stability.

CONTRAS

Senator QUAYLE. What should the Contras specifically buy with the proposed $70M in military aid?

General GALVIN. As you all are well aware, responsibility for the activities of the Democratic Resistance Forces is not currently in my charter as USCINCSO, nor have I been directed by the National Command Authorities to become involved in those activities. From the information I currently have available on DRF activities, I can estimate that the DRF is in need of military equipment [deleted] sustainment items (ammunition, rations, and etc.), training, logistics support, and strategic planning, but I do not have the specific information that a thorough assessment would provide.

Senator QUAYLE. What agency of the U.S. Government might best administer this aid?

General GALVIN. There is little doubt that a broad range of expertise and assistance would be required which various U.S. Government agencies could provide. The administrative responsibility is not an issue if the designated agency is adequately funded and can tap into all the available resources of our government.

Senator QUAYLE. Beyond the $70M aid proposed, what will it take to make the Contras a viable force capable of doing much more than merely hitting targets of opportunity? Do we have a 5 year plan or long term strategy to prevent the Contras

from merely being overtaken by a better equipped Soviet assisted Sandinista Army after we give them the proposed $70M in military aid. What is this plan?

General GALVIN. As I said, responsibility for the activities of the DRF are not currently in my charter as USCINCSO, nor have I been directed by the competent authorities to become involved in those activities. The answer to your question could best be provided by others currently responsible for supporting DRF activities. As a military commander, I can state in general terms that without adequate U.S. Government resourcing and support which includes funding, equipment, training, and strategic direction, the DRF will not quickly become a viable force. The Sandinista regime will consolidate its revolution and will improve its counterinsurgency capabilities with increased Cuban and Soviet training and equipment.

HONDURAS

Senator QUAYLE. Are the Hondurans satisfied with the military aid they are receiving from the United States? What else do they want?

General GALVIN. [Deleted.] Additionally, they need heavy transportation vehicles to ensure better ground mobility, and helicopters to increase rapid troop deployments to rugged isolated regions of the country. The engineer battalion and reconnaissance units are required to provide better [deleted]. To provide adequate sea and riverine capabilities, the Honduran Armed Forces needs to enhance facilities at Puerto Castilla and continue to upgrade and modernize their naval equipment. Funding for U.S. MTT's and IMET funds for schooling in CONUS are critical to ensure proper training for the Hondurans.

Senator QUAYLE. Does the Honduran military (or some part of it) fear the current build-up of Salvadoran Forces? If so, why?

General GALVIN. The build-up of Salvadoran forces to meet El Salvador's guerrilla problems, no doubt makes some Hondurans uneasy, especially since the residuals of the 1969 "Soccer War" and unresolved border disputes continue at issue between the two governments. However, the Hondurans recognize that a victory by leftist guerrillas in El Salvador would place Honduras in an untenable security situation. Thus, Honduras has supported U.S. efforts to assist El Salvador, including the training of Salvadorans at the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras. In addition, Salvadoran-Honduran military cooperation along the border is slowly improving. Resolution of the border issues, either bilaterally or through the International Court of Justice, will improve the cooperation and confidence between the two governments.

Senator QUAYLE. Do the Hondurans believe that the United States has a long-term strategy for the deployment of Contra forces that will eventually reduce the Soviet backed Sandinista threat that is now growing?

General GALVIN. [Deleted.]

Senator QUAYLE. What evidence, If any, do we have that our persistent military exercises in Honduras can deter Nicaragua from attempting to undermine Honduras or other governments in Central America?

General GALVIN. We have no direct evidence that U.S. military exercises in Honduras have deterred the Sandinistas from supporting regional insurgency and subversion. We believe, however, that the U.S. military presence associated with those exercises in Honduras clearly manifests U.S. commitment to regional security. Additionally, increased professionalism in the Honduran Armed Forces also grows out of the close association with the U.S. military during the combined military exercises.

NICARAGUA

Senator QUAYLE. For several years now it has been argued that we cannot withdraw our recognition of the Sandinista Government. Although the arguments might have been sustainable initially, they have lost much of their appeal over time. How much longer do you think the US should sustain formal relations with the Sandinistas and why?

General GALVIN. The United States and DRF goal in Nicaragua has been to create a pluralistic democracy which embodies the goals of the 1979 revolution. The U.S. and DRF have gone on record as stating that these goals could be achieved through dialogue and negotiations between the Sandinistas and the DRF. To date, the Sandinistas have stalled negotiations and have not accepted one recommendation put forth by the various international peace commissions. Without military pressure from the DRF, which the proposed $70M in military assistance would help provide, the Sandinistas will not seriously consider dialogue or negotiations. If the U.S. Government could develop a specific timetable for achieving peaceful negotiations, after which time, alternative and credible consequences would have to be

faced by the Sandinistas (i.e., military aid to the DRF) perhaps they would feel the pressure to negotiate. However, our response in the absence of a positive Sandinista reaction must be credible. At some point it may be necessary to break relations with the Sandinistas, but that is a political issue and I defer to administration officials.

MUTUAL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Senator QUAYLE. The Administration has recently submitted a legislative proposal to the Congress to extend the authorities in the NATO Mutual Support Act to U.S. forces operating in the Republic of Korea. What is your current capability to exchange logistical support, services, or supplies with friendly foreign forces within your area of responsibility?

General GALVIN. Currently the capability to exchange logistical support, services or supplies is limited within USSOUTHCOM's area of responsibility. The friendly foreign forces within the region, due to the lack of a logistical infrastructure, are almost totally dependent on the United States and other industrial nations for their equipment and supplies. The exceptions are Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela which have developing military industrial complexes. Even these countries rely heavily on U.S. and foreign technology. The majority of logistical services utilized by U.S. forces in the region are provided by U.S. and Host Nation contractors. I might add that there is great potential in this area, especially if we are prepared to enter seriously into coproduction relationships with some to these nations. This dimension is being actively explored by DOD, State and Commerce today.

Senator QUAYLE. What kind of specific problems do you encounter when you try to exchange logistical support, services, or supplies with friendly foreign forces?

General GALVIN. The major problems we face in this region in the exchange of logistical support with friendly foreign forces are:

(1) Friendly foreign forces lack their own logistical infrastructure for support of their forces;

(2) lack of standardization of equipment between U.S. forces and our allies forces within the region;

(3) the lack of a military industrial capacity to produce items to support U.S. forces; and

(4) the lack of a strong treaty framework from which mutual logistical support could be exchanged.

Senator QUAYLE. Please provide your view on the advisability of extending the authority in the NATO Mutual Support Act to not only Korea, but to the area within your command as well.

General GALVIN. Extending NATO Mutual Support Act authority to friendly Latin American countries would be welcomed. While I would not anticipate using it as frequently as in NATO or Korea, it would provide a useful alternative in some logistic support settings. I must be frank, however. We will have to be careful in its application in this theatre. When you are dealing with basically impoverished countries, the tendency to provide them the logistic support they desperately need must be tempered by the fact that there is a day of reckoning when the bills must be paid. If we have provided them more logistic support than they have provided us, they must pay up—and many of the countries in my AOR do not have the ability to pay. In this regard, it is critical that the legislation clearly indicate that security assistance funding may be used to offset any reimbursement due the United States. In summary, I support the initiative and will be judicious in its use in my AOR, but the equal reciprocity aspect of the NATO Act probably will not work here.

Senator GOLDWATER. I would like to comment that under the new regulations for organization that we are suggesting to the Pentagon, General Galvin, your job receives probably the most attention of any of the parts of the entire directive because we feel that the Commander in Chief of any segment should be the boss and should have command of all uniformed personnel under him. It's like Eisenhower said at the end of the last war, that should be the last war we would fight like that; the next one we would come under the commands.

General Mahaffey, your Readiness Command we have watched with a great deal of interest. I had been down to your base before you took command. I have watched the troops train. Your job is going to be an increasingly important one.

I would just like to impress upon you two gentlemen that if you ever have problems that you don't think anybody will listen to, just pick up a phone and call me. I have an airplane and I'll come down to see you.

You can give me hell and I'll give the right people hell.

General GALVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General MAHAFFEY. Thank you, sir.

Chairman GOLDWATER. This meeting will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987

TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDS

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Barry Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Humphrey, Cohen, Wilson, Denton, and Nunn.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Robert G. Bell, Richard D. Finn, Jr., John J. Hamre, Drew A. Harker, George K. Johnson, Jr., and David S. Lyles; professional staff members; Russell C. Miller, research assistant; and Mary J. Kampo, staff assistant.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Dale F. Gerry, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; John L. Roddy, assistant to Senator East; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; William S. Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman GOLDWATER. The meeting will come to order.

The committee meets this afternoon to continue to receive testimony from the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Commands.

I explained at the outset of this morning's hearing that the committee is very interested in the views of the war-fighting commanders in the field.

In each of the past several years, we have taken testimony from them on the annual defense budget request and on the military, political, and economic issues within their areas of responsibility.

This afternoon, we have the opportunity to hear from Adm. Ronald Hays, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Com-

mand, and Gen. George Crist, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command.

Both of these officers have had distinguished military careers that have prepared them for the extremely important responsibilities they now bear.

Gentlemen, we welcome you to the Armed Services Committee today.

Senator Nunn says that he is detained a little bit. That is not too unusual on a Tuesday afternoon. The Senate spends most of its time looking around for something to do anyway. [General laughter.]

I think we had better start off with you, Admiral. You have the larger command.

STATEMENT OF ADM. RONALD J. HAYS, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral HAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for that very kind invitation.

May I respectfully endorse the emphasis that this committee is placing on joint matters and on mission output. I think there is no question about the fact that a well-coordinated, well-planned joint operation has the potential of producing results which are far superior to that of the individual parts, and it can, in fact, be the difference between victory and success.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, my area of responsibility includes the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and what we refer to as South Asia.

I am, in general, very optimistic about the Pacific area today. I think that things are brighter there than in other parts of the world. I base that optimism, among other factors, on the fact that when one looks at the trade patterns, you see that about 35 percent of our Nation's trade now occurs within the Pacific region, overshadowing that with Europe. There are opportunities in the Pacific today for our industries.

We have very important treaties and relationships with countries in the Pacific theater. On balance, those treaties and relationships serve us exceedingly well.

But, by far, the primary source of my enthusiasm is the state of the military forces which are under my command.

I maintain that the capacity of our military forces today to fulfill the responsibilities to the Nation are better than they have ever been in peacetime. There are many reasons for that, not the least of which are the resources that the Congress has made available that have allowed us to acquire the proper hardware to do the operations that are necessary for proper training, and, very importantly, to retain those people, those well-experienced and motivated people, to maintain and operate our equipment.

We have some problems in the Pacific, not the least of which is our ability to sustain any operation that might be called upon to be executed. Sustainability is an issue which has been with us for a long time, but I would emphasize that we are improving our abilities in this area.

In the category of ammunition, we have a lot of "dumb bombs" and relatively unsophisticated ordnance—enough, in fact, to execute a prolonged operation.

Where we are deficient is in the more sophisticated weaponry—Sparrows, Mavericks, torpedoes, and the like. But I would emphasize that we are realizing delivery now of contracts which were let in the preceding couple of years, so that our posture is improving.

We are not able, I will concede up front, to communicate, to interoperate, to the degree that I want, but I would like to reassure this committee that we recognize that fact and that we are working that problem very diligently with lots of top attention.

INTEROPERABILITY GROUP

At my headquarters, I have formed a group which I refer to as the Interoperability Group. It is their task to look at the programs that the services have under way, to ensure that we do, in fact, have interoperability with our communications equipment that we are buying. We are not there yet, but it is recognized as a problem and we are, in fact, very serious about working it.

AIR DEFENSE

Another area that I concern myself about is in the category of air defense. We see the Soviets wandering far wider today than in previous times, and it highlights the fact that we are not well prepared to defend our forward bases, starting with surveillance, air interceptors, and those kinds of equipments that make for a proper air defense posture.

We concern ourselves with the ability for long-range attack and airlift and sealift, and, in particular, I think that we must be concerned about retaining those good people that we have in the force today that I bragged about earlier. The programs that are necessary to keep us competitive in this regard deserve our highest consideration.

I would like to see some kind of mutual support act, an act that is similar to that which now exists between our country and the NATO countries. If we had that prerogative in the Pacific, we would be able to do more sensible things, in my judgment, in the category of training, mutual support, and, in general, have a much more effective relationship and operation.

In the military-strategic category, North Korea is a concern, and the fact that they have poised about 60 percent of those 800,000 troops forward, just north of the DMZ, prepared to strike with very minimal notice if a decision were made to do so. Of course, that would implicate and involve American troops almost immediately.

In the Philippines, for those of us who have watched the details unfold there, I think that one can conclude that today we have a far better prospect for the continuation of democracy in that country than many of us would have predicted.

It is not to say that the problems are solved. The problems of the rising insurgency that have plagued the country are still with the people of the Philippines, but we should hope that this will be properly addressed by the new administration in Manila.

Over in Vietnam, the 1-million-man army that we see there, a large portion of which is involved in the occupation of Cambodia, is, of course, a concern. It is a concern because the fighting continues and it involves a very close neighbor, a treaty ally, Thailand. That situation will be with us for a period in the future, I am afraid.

ANTINUCLEAR

Another concern is the general antinuclear sentiment that one encounters, particularly in the South Pacific. The problem that we have with New Zealand probably typifies that issue, which, if not contained, has the potential of adversely affecting our operations. Clearly it can be a destabilizing influence.

The tempo of operations for the Navy has been high, but we are under way now with an effort to bring that within more acceptable bounds so far as peacetime operations are concerned.

Of greatest concern, sir, is what has happened in the Soviet force structure. You are aware of the growth, principally in quality improvements, in the Soviet force structure. With the introduction of new ships, new aircraft, and far more mobility for their land forces, it is evident that the Soviets have made a decision to increase their military posture in the Pacific. That is occurring today.

But, on balance, and in summary, sir, I can say that the presence of a very capable, very ready U.S. military force has provided the counter to that growth in the Soviet armed forces and, with your support, we will continue to provide the posture that is necessary in order to provide the appropriate balance and protect our Nation's interests in the Pacific.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Hays follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM. RONALD J. HAYS, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, as you address important political, economic, and military issues, I am grateful for this committee's consideration of the unified commanders' assessments. I welcome this opportunity, my first as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, to present an evaluation of the command and its area of responsibility—a region that is increasing in importance.

My evaluation is based upon visits to many of the nations within the Pacific Command and on discussions with numerous leaders of those nations. I would like to share with you views formed in the five months and three weeks that I have been in the job.

The USCINCPAC area of responsibility is vast. It includes about 50% of the Earth's surface with both the Pacific and Indian Oceans included, and it can be characterized as a maritime theater. Of greater importance than its size is the increasing economic and political influence the area's nations have on a global scale—to a degree that one of your former colleagues has predicted that the 21st century will be the century of the Pacific.

The military forces provided to the Pacific Command are first rate, across the board. We are not without deficiencies, but assigned forces are better able at this point to fulfill their responsibilities to the Nation than they have ever been in peacetime. Military men and women of high caliber are well trained, well equipped, and well led. I ask for your continuing help to keep it so.

In general, countries in the USPACOM area continue to grow economically, politically, and militarily. One-third of our foreign trade is with nations in the USPACOM area, and the percentage is on the rise. The influence of democracy is expanding and individual rights and freedoms, with some exceptions, are also increasing.

Among the free countries in the region, problems are being worked out diplomatically, rather than by less desirable means. Cooperation among the countries is increasing, and our relations with those countries are good and getting better.

The political and economic developments in the area are to a great degree attributable to the efforts of the peoples in the region and their governments, but those developments were also made possible by the region's stability. Our military presence and the defense forces of our friends and allies are the key factors in that stability.

Our military-to-military relations with nations in the area continue to improve, as do the defense forces of our principal friends and allies—and we continue to emphasize combined exercises, joint conferences, and the need for interoperability so that our forces can work together effectively.

I am optimistic about the USPACOM region and believe its importance to the United States and the world will continue to grow.

I would now like to make some specific observations about some of the individual countries within the USPACOM area.

JAPAN

One of our most important security relationships is with Japan, and Japan is critical to our well established forward defense strategy. Japan continues to expand its strategic and economic influence and is our largest trading partner outside of North America. Our combined economies equal about one-third of the total gross world product. The U.S. public is acutely aware of the imbalance in our trade, and that imbalance needs to be dealt with decisively. Nonetheless, we should avoid the inevitable pressures needed to address economics from undercutting our ongoing mutual defense activities which are in our own best interest.

We continue to encourage Japan to meet its security goals, and we are seeing progress. The Japanese Government recognizes the growing Soviet threat and has approved a five-year defense plan which, if fully implemented, will posture Japan to meet better its security goals, including the significant commitment by Japan to defend sea lines of communication out to 1,000 miles from Japan.

Our Bilateral Exercise Program with Japan has experienced noteworthy growth. Since 1981, when the U.S. and Japan signed an agreement for combined training and exercises, we have expanded the program so that today we are conducting 15 annual combined exercises, ranging from a national-level command post exercise to infantry brigade-level field training exercises.

Japanese support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan is improving. Japan contributes over $1 billion annually in support of our military there, equating to over $25,000 per U.S. military member. We expect the Japanese to provide our forces over $300 million in new construction in the coming year.

There is a deep understanding of the U.S.-Japan security relationship by the Japanese people, and the Japanese people support the efforts of their government to improve that relationship. I believe our security efforts are well invested in Japan and that our relations continue to deepen, to the benefit of both countries.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)

The Republic of Korea continues to grow in stature internationally, and it seeks even further recognition through sponsorship of the Asian Games this year and the Olympics in 1988. The ROK's economy is strong and its defense forces formidable. Militarily, we are deeply committed to Korea, and a superb defense relationship continues to mature.

As you are aware, we have a Combined Forces Command in Korea that sees U.S. and ROK forces using the same procedures, tactics and training in a truly integrated fashion. To improve interoperability between the forces of the two countries even further and to enhance readiness to fight, I strongly support the enactment of mutual support legislation already approved for use in NATO. Such authorization would allow the two forces equal exchange of supplies, services and training. While specific legislation is being worked for Korea, I also believe that this same type legislation applicable to all our friends and allies would benefit sustainability and every day operations throughout my area of responsibility.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

The situation within the Philippines is dynamic. Former President Marcos has departed the country, and President Aquino has just begun her term of office.

Several concerns remain unchanged in spite of the change of government: the state of the Philippine economy, the capabilities of the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the future of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New Peoples Army (NPA). The Philippine economy is outside of my direct jurisdiction. The AFP and NPA are my concerns.

The NPA is active throughout most of the country and has infiltrated various labor and student groups. There are today in excess of 15,000 armed insurgents in that country, and former President Marcos' government was unable to control the rather dramatic expansion of the NPA. One of the reasons the Marcos government was unable to contain the NPA was the absence of an effective military force. The AFP was characterized by poor leadership, lack of training, poor morale, lack of discipline and low readiness. During the Marcos government, many Americans, in uniform and out, had tried to assist the AFP to improve its capabilities. But improvements required fundamental reforms and the Philippine Government was unwilling to undertake the reforms needed.

Under the new Government of the Philippines, we have a unique opportunity to assist the AFP in the bootstrap operation that is necessary. It is a task which will not be easy, cannot be done quickly, will not be cheap, but must be done. A revitalization of the economy and an improved political environment will be necessary to counter the insurgency, but to succeed, a third ingredient will be necessary—a capable armed force.

Before leaving the discussions on the Philippines, a few words on Clark and Subic, two of our largest and most important overseas facilities, are appropriate.

Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Naval facilities including Cubi Point Naval Air Station are critical to our security posture in the Pacific and to forward deployed forces such as those operating in the Indian Ocean. Subic is our largest naval supply depot. Its ship repair facility is second to none, and the facility can repair as many as 25 ships at one time. The labor force is skilled, loyal, and inexpensive. Clark Air Base is the home of the 13th Air Force and the base averages about 3,900 tons of freight and 17,000 passengers monthly. The Subic/Clark complex contains one of our best instrumented training ranges that includes impact areas for firing live ordnance, a major worldwide communications center, extensive munition storage facilities and large areas of air, land and sea space for training. In time of war, these two bases would greatly facilitate offensive operations, sea control, protection of sea lines of communication, ship repair, response times, and, in general, the overall operational effectiveness of our forces. In peacetime and time of crisis, these bases are also of great importance to the security of our friends and allies in the Pacific.

THAILAND

Thailand is a staunch ally that is threatened by unrest from beyond its borders. It has been burdened with the need to care for over 250,000 Cambodian refugees and must remain constantly on guard for Vietnamese military incursions into its territory.

We are linked to Thailand by the Manila Pact, and our continued security assistance to Thailand is a necessary part of the link. We maintain a military assistance group in Bangkok, provide credits toward Thailand's purchase of military equipment and training courses and conduct combined exercises each year. Our efforts to improve Royal Thai armed forces capabilities to deal with the military threats the country now faces are paying off. Thailand needs and deserves our continued political and military support.

AUSTRALIA

In the South Pacific, we are fortunate to be allied strongly with Australia whose Government promotes regional stability through its own cooperative and consultative programs with the area's island nations. The Australian Government is modernizing its forces by acquiring U.S.-origin defense equipment, such as the F/A-18 Hornet fighter. Such acquisitions improve interoperability and strengthen regional security.

The labor government has a major review of its security requirements underway, and the results are not yet available. In the meanwhile, we continue to improve our military relationship with Australia through exercises and bilateral consultative programs.

NEW ZEALAND AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC

Our 34-year-old ANZUS alliance among Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. has been weakened by the New Zealand Government's attitude on nuclear weapons and the resulting impasse over U.S. port access. New Zealand is not now an active participant in ANZUS, and the future of the ANZUS relationship with New Zealand is uncertain. New Zealand's stance on the nuclear issue has the potential to spread to other areas in a way that could bring our successful deterrent strategy under increasing criticism. Overall, the turn of events in New Zealand has reduced stability in the area. The area is vast, of strategic significance, with numerous island nations, most of whom are small, with few resources and with populations with rising expectations. It's a fertile field for those who wish to influence the future and there are indications of increased USSR diplomatic and economic overtures to the South Pacific island nations. Kiribati has now entered into an important fishing agreement with the Soviets. More recently Fiji has been approached by the Soviets with offers to buy sugar, bring in ships for repair, and pay for fishing rights as well as provide fish for the underused island canneries. The Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are interested in a Soviet deal. To prevent the islands' reliance on Soviet economic initiatives, it is in our best interests to increase our economic development assistance efforts in the South Pacific and resolve major irritants in our relations with these neighbors, such as our fishing policies.

ASEAN

ASEAN nations of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines have become cohesive in spite of fundamental differences among member nations. The ASEAN members share a common interest in regional political and economic stability. ASEAN has been a principal factor in denying Vietnam a political victory in Cambodia. We have important cooperative bilateral arrangements with some ASEAN members, and we assist those nations in maintaining peace, prosperity, and stability in the region.

INDIA

In the Indian Ocean, India's Government appears more interested in developing harmonious relations with its neighbors, including Pakistan, and supporting regional cooperation through the South Asia Association of Regional Cooperation. This new approach by India, when successful, will contribute to regional stability. The process will take time, but we should encourage it.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is also a major factor in our strategic equation. China's three and a half-million-man armed forces provide a counterbalance to Soviet land power in the Far East and the world's largest army plays a key role in containing Vietnamese aggression. Moscow maintains 90% of its Far East ground forces along its common border with the PRC, and PRC posturing compels Hanoi to base about half of its military forces near the shared border. Soviet uncertainty over China's role in any global conflict provides some assurance that those Soviet forces will not be used elsewhere.

China's political and strategic alignment has always had a major effect on U.S. and USSR planning and national security goals. Our relationship with China is not and will not be one of alliance, but rather of friendship and of mutual recognition of common interests and shared needs. The most evident common interest is concern over the political objectives in the Far East of the Soviet Union. Friendly relations between the United States and the PRC can benefit both nations and serve as an important force for regional and global stability.

Throughout the Pacific Theater, our forward-deployed forces demonstrate America's continued commitment to the defense of the region and serve as a primary deterrent to aggression. Professional, combat ready forces and increased cooperation with our friends and allies send a clear signal to the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries that we are committed to preserving freedom and security throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

THREAT DEVELOPMENTS

Although much can be said about improving regional stability, USPACOM is not without serious problems:

There is an active insurgency in the Philippines, of which I have already spoken.

There are growing threats to South Korea and Thailand.
There remains excessive instability in the Indian Ocean area, and
The military power of the Soviet Union in the Pacific continues to grow.

NORTH KOREA

North Korea is one of the most militarized societies in the world. It continues to spend approximately 25% of its gross national product on its military and, with Soviet assistance, is upgrading its military forces. It has, for example, three times as many tanks and assault guns as South Korea. Within the last 15 months, North Korea has reorganized and redeployed a preponderance of its ground forces just north of the DMZ. Recent Soviet military aid has included MiG–23s, new early warning, ground controlled approach radars, and surface-to-air missiles. Given these developments and the unpredictable and bellicose nature of the North Koreans, we and our ROK allies must maintain a high state of readiness on the peninsula because a North Korean attack across the DMZ would quickly involve U.S. forces, and it could come with less than a 24-hour warning.

VIETNAM

Farther south, the Vietnamese possess a strong and capable force of over a million men—the world's fifth largest armed force. Our allies and friends—notably Thailand and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are seriously concerned about Vietnam's intentions. Despite condemnation in the United Nations and artillery barrages from the Chinese along the Sino-Vietnamese border, Vietnamese troops continue to occupy Cambodia and suppress its people, and continue to pose a potential threat to Thailand, especially in the area of Cambodian refugee camps inside Thailand.

INDIAN OCEAN

Three ongoing wars in Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, and a civil war in South Yemen, attest to the region's instability. The Iran-Iraq war, in Central Command's region, threatens the flow of Persian Gulf oil, critical to the livelihood of our allies. In addition, both Iran and Iraq have attacked non-belligerent commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and, in January, Iran boarded and inspected the U.S. flag vessel, *President Taylor,* in the Gulf of Oman.

SOVIET UNION

Moscow is acutely aware of the increasing importance of Asia and the Pacific and of the important global role the area plays. Unable thus far to compete politically, diplomatically, or economically, the Soviet Union has chosen the instrument of state power which it can control unilaterally to exert its influence in the region—its military power. In addition to their other military force improvements in their own defense, the Soviets have undertaken to develop power projection capabilities. Moscow now has the capability of attacking U.S. and allied facilities and forces in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, and even the mainland of the United States, and we have seen Soviet forces practice their tactics for such strikes.

The high priority given to the Soviet Pacific fleet, already the largest of Moscow's four fleets, is demonstrated by its continued growth and modernization. Three new classes of surface combatants armed with five new missile systems have joined the fleet. One of these classes, the nuclear-powered Kirov cruiser, is the most capable cruiser in the Soviet inventory. It has extensive command and control capabilities and, aside from U.S. aircraft carriers, is the most heavily armed combatant in the world.

The Soviet Far East Air Force (with almost 2,000 aircraft) is able to strike all of Asia, our Aleutian facilities and much of the continental United States. Soviet cruise missile capability and new generation fighter aircraft, including the MiG–31 with advanced technology systems, are deploying to the Soviet far eastern district. There has been some growth in numbers, but qualitative improvements have been far more impressive.

Consistent with naval and air buildups, the Soviets have also modernized ground forces in the Pacific regions and along the Sino-Soviet border. Modernization includes improved mobility with newer, more advanced tanks, fighting vehicles, and artillery. Finally, and not widely recognized, over one-third of the entire mobile SS–20 IRBM force is deployed in the Far East.

With Soviet emphasis on mobility and steady increases in offensive systems, we see a force that can project its war-making power far from Soviet borders. With sup-

port and operations based in South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Vietnam, the Soviets have achieved long-sought warm water ports far from mother Russia. Their permanent naval and air presence at Cam Ranh Bay is particularly disturbing. On a daily basis, 20 or more ships, including submarines, are located at that facility. Supplementing their maritime presence at Cam Ranh are long-range Bear reconnaissance aircraft, Badger bombers, and MiG-23 fighters. These aircraft pose a direct threat to all ASEAN nations, to U.S. naval and air facilities in the Philippines, and to the vital sea lines throughout Southeast Asia. The Soviets' offensive power projection capability allows them to capitalize on opportunities presented by crisis and to intimidate third world countries. The growing strength of the Soviet Pacific forces is indicative of the new emphasis Moscow has placed on the Pacific—in recognition of the growing global importance of the area.

The Soviet strategy is clear. Moscow will continue to build its military strength to gain what it cannot win in the political and economic arenas alone. As Soviet military capabilities grow, Moscow expands potential battle zones farther from their homeland—to Guam, the Aleutians, and Alaska, as well as to our Pacific friends and allies. It is likely that Moscow's goal is to upset the balance in the region and exploit opportunities wherever they can be found. Where none are found, negotiating access via such economic avenues as fishing agreements, sugar purchases, ship refueling, and maintenance contracts are but a few examples of Soviet probes in USPACOM. Other more subtle Soviet moves are successful efforts to penetrate trade union movements and offers of educational "scholarships" to island states.

In short, the Soviets have apparently determined that the importance of the Asia-Pacific area warrants challenge of United States influence in the region—and a principal bulwark to prevent the Soviets from attaining their objectives is the U.S. military force structure in the area.

USPACOM FORCES

The Pacific Command's largest military component is our Pacific fleet approaching half of the total U.S. Navy strength. Approximately two-thirds of the combat strength of the United States Marine Corps is in USPACOM. The Army has two divisions assigned, the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, and the Air Force has five tactical fighter wings, with aircraft assigned to the Fifth Air Force in Korea and Japan, and aircraft assigned to the Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines, at Clark Air Base.

The U.S. has played a large part in ensuring peace in the Pacific, and we must continue to do so. Much credit for our success is due to the highly motivated men and women in our armed services. These well-trained professionals, when supplied with appropriate equipment, give us a qualitative edge.

Our overall posture is improving, and I am grateful to Congress and particularly this committee for past efforts in support of our defense programs. Your support is reflected in our achievements in the Pacific. Force improvements include the Aegis cruiser, the Trident submarine, the battleship *New Jersey*, and its surface combatant task group of *Perry*-class frigates and *Spruance*-class destroyers. *New Jersey*, armed with 16-inch guns, the Tomahawk long-range cruise missile, and the Harpoon antiship missile, is a 40-year-old platform with today's state of the art offensive punch—and it's a formidable ship. Our second battleship, *Missouri*, is on the way. Our Marine forces continue modernizing with the new F/A-18 Hornet strike fighter aircraft, the CH-53E heavy lift helicopter, and the M-198 155MM howitzer. Our Army component is steadily being modernized with the AH-1S Cobra attack helicopter and the UH-60 Blackhawk troop-carrying helicopter. In the Air Force, modern aircraft include the F-15, the premier air superiority aircraft; the F-16, an extremely versatile fighter; and the A-10, a highly effective attack aircraft built specifically to destroy tanks and provide close air support for ground troops. E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and strategic reconnaissance assets are also based in the theater to improve regional air defense and intelligence collection.

Force structure changes have been keyed toward increased capabilities. The conversion of the 25th Infantry Division to a light infantry division will provide a rapid, responsive fighting force. The second battleship group assigned to the theater will increase our surface posture. The activation of the third maritime prepositioning set along with its required support facilities on Guam will enhance our ability to respond quickly to a distant crisis situation.

Improvements have also been realized in service unit readiness and in-theater sustainability. Because of your past support, selected war reserve ammunition stocks have nearly doubled in the past year, and our readiness ratings are up.

But the threat is not standing still either, and I have serious concerns about sustainability. USPACOM forces have significant shortages in modern munitions, war reserve materials, spare parts, petroleum storage, active and passive air defense, long range attack platforms, lift capabilities, and the manning and equipping of combat support/combat service support units. To improve our capabilities, USPACOM forces also need improved secure, survivable and interoperable command, control, and communications (C3) systems.

Manpower programs are the key to preparedness and our service end strengths have not kept up with requirements. I urge that requested increases in end strengths be allowed in order to provide the force structure necessary to man the new weapons systems entering the inventory. The people we have are more capable, better trained and as dedicated as any I have seen in my 36 years of military service. A comparable benefits package of appropriate pay incentives and quality of life programs merit your support.

Another program from which we can reap future dividends is the legislative initiative to build greater cooperation with our regional friends and allies through the "cooperative programs with friendly nations". This low cost, high return program can bring about training for both active duty and reserve components in foreign environments and advance the capability of USPACOM forces to address low intensity conflict.

In security assistance, we have pressed regional allies and friends to develop realistic force modernization programs stressing interoperability with U.S. forces. I am concerned about reductions in our security assistance programs, particularly in foreign military sales credits. Cuts in credits have several distinct disadvantages: they result in less U.S. influence, less regional interoperability, and an overall weaker free world defense.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly in this time of austerity and growing controversy, I urge your support for maintaining and modernizing our nuclear deterrent forces, both strategic and non-strategic. Such weapons have served in the maintenance of peace for the last 40 years, and they will continue to do so if we speak from a position of strength. I also urge the acquisition of binary chemical weapons to achieve a credible chemical warfare deterrent.

THE BUDGET/DEFICIT REDUCTION BILL

I support deficit reduction. The FY86 defense cuts imposed by the Deficit Reduction Act will hurt, particularly in training and readiness. I cannot speculate about FY87 cuts, but the reduction methodology requiring across-the-board cuts in all service programs could seriously damage our worldwide defense posture and delay the completion of many programs that are now righting the decade of the 70's defense shortcomings.

CONCLUSION

U.S. military strength has been key to peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific. A protective umbrella has enabled our friends and allies to grow politically and economically. With the onset of prosperity and maturity, those nations have, on an increasing scale, cooperated with the U.S. militarily as they have improved their own defense forces. Such developments also contribute to peace and stability in the region, and are of great benefit to the United States.

The Soviets are posturing to expand their influence in the USPACOM area, principally by the use of their military forces, but economic and political inroads will be pursued also. U.S. military strength and assistance programs are the principal elements of counterbalance. Over the past several years, with the strong support of this committee, we have revitalized our armed forces, and there exists a force in the Pacific in which the Nation can be proud. The challenge before us is to maintain the keen edge.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before this committee.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Admiral.

I just completed a trip through your command, and I was very, very much impressed with the quality of the troops. In fact, I made the statement that never in my life—and that covers a long time—have I seen the quality of our troops, from enlisted men to officers, so high as we have them today. I can assure you that we are going

to do everything that this committee can do to hold that high, regardless of Gramm-Rudman or anything else that comes along.

I will go one step further and use a statement that I have often used. I think the perimeter of the Pacific is the secret of peace in this world.

So you have a much larger command in charge than you believe, with all that land that forms the land mass around the Pacific. As long as we have a good hand on that, a good hold on it, we have the world pretty much by the you know what, and that's the way we want to keep it.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Chairman GOLDWATER. General, it will be a great pleasure to hear from you.

I also visited a few of the places that come under your command. I especially started with Masirah Island, that I affectionately call "Misery Island," because I used to land there in World War II when we ran short of fuel trying to get to India, after flying across Africa, and it is still the damndest place I have ever been.

General, you may proceed any way you see fit.

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE B. CRIST, USMC, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

General CRIST. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to appear before you today and testify on the posture of your youngest territorial unified command, the U.S. Central Command.

I have submitted a prepared statement which I would request be included in the record.

Chairman GOLDWATER. It will be made part of the record.

General CRIST. I would like to make a short overview presentation.

I have given you a small handout, Mr. Chairman, to use as a ready reference as I go through it.

As you can see, on the first chart, the CENTCOM area of responsibility is vast, encompassing 19 countries. It is larger than the continental United States, stretching some 3,100 miles from east to west, and 3,400 miles from north to south.

CHARACTERISTICS

- 316 + MILLION POPULATION
- WIDE GEOGRAPHIC AND CLIMATIC EXTREMES
- 17 DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS
- 420 MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPINGS
- LANGUAGES ... SIX MAJOR GROUPINGS, HUNDREDS OF DIALECTS, TRIBAL AND REGIONAL LANGUAGES
- RELIGIONS ... SUNNI AND SHIA MOSLEM, CHRISTIANITY, ZOROASTRIANISM, JUDAISM AND ANIMISM
- ECONOMIC DISPARITY ... PER CAPITA: QATAR $20,000 VS ETHIOPIA $400
- ILL DEFINED BOUNDARIES
- HISTORIC REGIONAL HOSTILITIES
- EXCESSIVE POPULATION GROWTH
- UNPREDICTABLE LEADERSHIP CHANGES

Turning to chart No. 2, with a population of over 316 million, the region is a study in extremes. Its topography varies from over 24,000 feet to below sea level, with temperatures that range from freezing to over 130 degrees.

The social fabric is complex and, particularly for a Westerner, it is also bewildering. There are great ethnic, language, religious, economic, and political diversities, all of which are overlaid by political systems and boundaries which can be both mutable and unpredictable.

The very history that makes this region the cradle of civilization and religion is also the source of tension and conflict.

Oil remains the principal strategic resource.

PERSIAN GULF OIL IMPORTS

PERCENTAGE OF WORLD'S PROVED CRUDE OIL RESERVES		PERCENT OF NATIONAL REQUIREMENTS IMPORTED FROM GULF	
PERSIAN GULF	55.2%		
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	17.3%	U.S.	2-4%
COMMUNIST BLOC	12.6%	WESTERN EUROPE	20%
AFRICA	8.5%	JAPAN	56%
WESTERN EUROPE	3.5%	SOUTH KOREA	74%
ASIA/PACIFIC	2.9%		

As I think is graphically displayed in chart No. 3, 55 percent of the world's proven oil resources are located there.

Now, as oil prices decline and the free world becomes less dependent on Gulf oil, some have suggested that the area is no longer so vital to the United States.

While this thought may be reassuring, studies widely predict that Gulf oil will, once again, gain in importance by the 1990's, as smaller reserves in the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union dwindle.

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

- MAINTAIN AN INCREASED U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE TO DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION AND COUNTER SOVIET EFFORTS TO GAIN POWER AND HEGEMONY IN THE REGION.
- STRIVE TO REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR REGIONAL CONFLICT, ENHANCE REGIONAL STABILITY, AND PROMOTE A FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL DEFENSE COOPERATION.
- MAINTAIN ACCESS TO AND UNHINDERED USE OF PERSIAN GULF OIL RESOURCES.

The U.S. national security objectives, which are shown on chart 4, have been clearly articulated, and President Reagan has steadfastly reaffirmed our commitment to protect U.S. and free world interests in the region.

Turning to chart 5, while our objectives are clear, the tensions and the danger of conflict that characterize the Middle East and Southwest Asia present a most difficult context for implementation

of those objectives. The primary threat to Southwest Asia is the historic Russian goal of expanding their boundaries and influence to the south.

These ambitions date back as far as Peter the Great.

In the 20th century alone, the Soviet Union has occupied or invaded Iran and Afghanistan six times.

Today, the Soviets have a firm foothold in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. They are developing a strategic network of bases and basing rights. They have established a significant advisory presence, and they are continuing to increase their diplomatic representation.

In the early 1980's, they formed a new theater of military operations, which is opposite Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, with a force of some 32 divisions and over 800 aircraft. They now possess not only the desire to expand to the south, but have established a military capability to do so as well.

Complicating the equation are the other threats to regional stability, such as the Iran-Iraq War, Libyan adventurism, the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and state sponsored terrorism, just to name a few.

USCENTCOM Mission

Ensure continued Western access to Persian Gulf oil.
Deter Soviet aggression and preserve regional stability.
Reduce Soviet regional influence.

6

My challenge, laid out on chart No. 6, is to help friendly nations in the region preserve their freedom in the face of the growing threats while ensuring free world access to Persian Gulf oil.

FORCES AVAILABLE

ARMY
1 AIRBORNE DIVISION
1 AIR MOBILE / AIR ASSAULT DIVISION
1 MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION
1 INFANTRY DIVISION
1 MECHANIZED BRIGADE
1 CALVARY BRIGADE (AIR COMBAT)

MARINE CORPS
1-1/3 MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

AIR FORCE
7 TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS
2 STRATEGIC BOMBER SQUADRONS

NAVY
3 CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS
1 SURFACE ACTION GROUP
5 MARITIME PATROL AIR SQUADRONS

ALL SERVICES
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

7

To do my job, I have been assigned, for planning, the forces shown in chart No. 7. Overall, the readiness of the forces you see there is exceptionally high.

My chief area of concern is with Army combat service support, since over 40 percent of these units are reporting not combat ready.

The challenge is to move those forces into my area of responsibility some 7,000 miles by air, or 12,000 miles by sea within 6 weeks, as shown on chart No. 8.

FORCE PROJECTION



The key to doing that is rapid force projection using a combination of airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning.

Airlift is the most flexible and rapid means of force projection.

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT



As can be seen on chart No. 9, we have been making steady progress toward meeting the requirements. With the addition of C-5B's, KC-10's, and a new transport aircraft, plus the planned improvements to the military and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), the shortfall should be virtually eliminated by the year 2000.

Although fastest, as you know, Mr. Chairman, airlift is also limited.

STRATEGIC SEALIFT



Consequently sealift, addressed on chart No. 10, will be the primary method of delivering force equipment and supplies as well as the bulk of our ammunition and cargo.

As you can see, the Navy has done a remarkable job in meeting the sealift requirements, and they are continuing to work on expanding both capability and capacity.

PRE-POSITIONING



Moving to chart No. 11, pre-positioning, whether ashore or afloat, can sharply reduce total response time and lift if needed.

Afloat pre-positioning has been progressing very well. The 17 pre-positioning ships, now deployed, carry some 165,000 short tons of ammunition and supplies. This is the equivalent of more than 6,100 C–141 sorties.

Ashore pre-positioning has been moving more slowly. We are currently pursuing increased access, but the realities of the political situation make it more difficult for the United States to reach agreement in many areas.

Nonetheless, progress is being made and I remain optimistic.

SUSTAINABILITY



Once in theater, sustainability of our combat forces becomes the challenge. Chart No. 12 shows our current sustainability posture.

As you can see, supplies and equipment and threat munitions are at the moment the softest.

SUSTAINABILITY

- MUNITIONS - MODERN MUNITIONS SHORTFALLS
- WATER - GOAL 20 GAL/DAY/PERSON
  - FY81-86: PRODUCTION GOAL MET
  - FY87-91: THEATER-DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM COMPLETE
- POL - STORAGE CAPACITY
  - FY83-86: 600K TO 1.2M BBLS
  - FY87-91: 1.2M TO 6.4M BBLS
- MEDICAL
  - FY86 - 52% OF BED REQUIREMENT AVAILABLE
  - FY87-91 - INCREASES AVAILABILITY TO 73%
- HOST NATION SUPPORT
  - SIGNIFICANT: OMAN, SUDAN, BAHRAIN
  - MINIMUM: EGYPT, JORDAN, SOMALIA, KENYA, UAE
  - MARGINAL/NONE: PAKISTAN, KUWAIT, YEMEN (YAR)
- FACILITIES
  - OMAN, SOMALIA, KENYA, MOROCCO, DIEGO GARCIA, LAJES
  - FY80-86: $996M
  - FY87: $40.6M PROGRAMMED

Chart No. 12–A addresses some of the specifics.

Now we are looking at new ways to solve these problems. The services are working with us to overcome the shortage of modern air and ground munitions. Two hundred eighty million dollars have been spent to provide potable water, and an additional $72 million is included in the 1987 budget for this purpose.

The in-theater need for POL is being addressed by leased tankage and milcon. Ongoing initiatives should quadruple the current storage capacity by 1990.

In the medical area, we currently meet 52 percent of our hospital bed requirement, and the 1987-91 program will raise the figure to 73 percent.

Progress has been made in gaining host nation agreements, but in many areas U.S. laws and local attitudes make final agreements difficult.

Consequently, we are exploring other innovative ways to procure local support, such as contracting with private firms who operate in my region.

We have recently reviewed a staff draft of an allied mutual support act, which would extend the provisions of the NATO Mutual Support Act to all countries where host nation support is required.

We believe that the provisions for reciprocal support and relief from some of the more restrictive acquisition regulations, would greatly strengthen our ability to obtain host nation cooperation and access.

Command and control of 10 million square miles is no small challenge when you do not live there.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

- PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS
- USCENTCOM HQs IN AREA
- THEATER COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
  - 3 MAJOR NODES
  - 9 MINOR NODES
- TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS
  - FY80-86: 50% TO 60%
  - FY87: 64%
  - FY92: 78%

For this reason, and several others, looking at chart No. 13, relocating the CENTCOM headquarters in or near the area of responsibility remains a top priority—getting out of Tampa and getting into the area.

Lacking that, I am seeking a viable method to deploy a credible forward headquarters within the area.

Of equal priority is the establishment of an in-place theater communications system, consisting of three major and nine minor communication nodes. The introduction of the first major node is planned for 1987, with the minor nodes planned for procurement between 1990 and 1993.

In the area of tactical communications, we are at about 64 percent of our requirement on hand right now, and the planned enhancements that are in the theater will increase our capacity to 78 percent of requirement by 1992.

INTELLIGENCE

- SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS
  - INCREASED PRODUCTION
  - INTEGRATED THEATER ARCHITECTURE
  - EMPHASIZING INDICATION AND WARNING
  - IMPROVING TERRORIST THREAT REPORTING AND WARNING
- IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED
  - SIZE, DETAIL DATA BASE
  - IMAGERY EXPLOITATION
  - DEPLOYABLE, AUTOMATED PROCESSING SYSTEMS
  - CONTINUOUS COLLECTION CAPABILITY
  - EXPANDED LINGUISTIC CAPACITY
  - MORE, BETTER HUMINT

Turning to chart No. 14, with the headquarters located some 7,000 miles from the area of responsibility, extensive, high quality intelligence is not only a requirement, it is an absolute necessity.

We are making substantial progress, but shortfalls still exist in the size and detail of the data base, deployable automated systems, area collection capability, linguistic capacity, and HUMINT.

EXERCISES

	CONUS	OCONUS
FY83	1 EXERCISE 12,000 PERSONNEL $9 MIL	3 EXERCISES 15,000 PERSONNEL $55 MIL
FY84	2 EXERCISES 60,000 PERSONNEL $40 MIL	6 EXERCISES 1900 PERSONNEL $12 MIL
FY85	1 EXERCISE 50 PERSONNEL NO COST	4 EXERCISES 60,600 PERSONNEL $58 MIL
FY86	2 EXERCISES 49,000 $31 MIL	5 EXERCISES 9,300 $10 MIL
FY87	1 EXERCISE 50 PERSONNEL $0.1 MIL	5 EXERCISES TO BE DETERMINED $50 MIL

OCONUS EXERCISES ARE HELD IN EGYPT, JORDAN, OMAN, SOMALIA AND KENYA

Looking at chart No. 15, there is no substitute for demanding realistic exercises to shape our contingency plans and acclimate our forces to live in and fight in the harsh environment of Southwest Asia.

In fiscal year 1985, we conducted four exercises overseas in five countries, involving over 60,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM LEVELS

	FY85	FY86	Pres Bud FY87
EGYPT	$1,176.7	$1,245.8	$1,302.0
PAKISTAN	326.0	311.9	341.4
JORDAN	91.9	83.0	117.0
KENYA	21.7	20.8	21.8
SUDAN	46.4	20.3	51.8
SOMALIA	34.1	20.2	37.2
OMAN	40.2	19.3	40.2
YEMEN	1.4	3.1	9.6
DJIBOUTI	2.6	2.0	3.2
TOTAL ($ in millions)	$1,741.0	$1,726.4	$1,924.2

NOTE: 1. Includes MAP, FMS Credits and IMET
2. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar are totally FMS cash sales

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not mention on chart No. 16, the vital contribution security assistance makes toward projecting and maintaining U.S. influence and presence in my region, while at the same time helping to lay the groundwork for future access and military security cooperation.

In fiscal year 1986, CENTCOM countries were allocated $1.7 billion. The fiscal year 1987 budget proposed a small increase of $200 million.

My concern is that in an effort to trim the budget, security assistance is an easy account to cut. However, the effect of doing so has a far greater impact on U.S. influence in the countries concerned than the dollar amounts alone would indicate, particularly in those small nations where our total allocations are already fairly limited to begin with.

To wrap it all up, sir, the Middle East and Southwest Asia remain volatile and unpredictable areas in which the United States continues to have a vital interest. The major external threat to stability in the region is Soviet expansion, against which the only credible deterrent is the U.S. Central Command.

CENTCOM continues to make demonstrable progress in working with our friends to promote regional stability, while increasing our capability to project military force, should that be necessary to assist our allies or to counter Soviet aggression.

We are not home free. But those who might be tempted to commit mischief will have to take into account this growing capability.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement and charts of General Crist follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. CRIST

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is a singular privilege to appear before you today to present an overview on the state of my command. As you are well aware, the region for which I am responsible encompasses diverse ethnic, religious and political forces that are often the source of tensions and conflict. When you add a precious mineral resource, oil, and consider established and expanding Soviet activities and interests in the area, it becomes clear why our nation is so concerned with this region of the world. Likewise, it is easy to discern the magnitude of the challenges our nation faces there and perhaps to better understand why there is a U.S. Central Command.

Today I'd like to report on the status of USCENTCOM - outlining what we are tasked to do, how well we can do it and solicit your support for programs which would help us to do it better.

THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

GEOGRAPHY

Located on the southern flank of Turkey and NATO, the Central Command area includes 19 countries in Northeast Africa, along the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia as well as the waters of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

This region is spread over an area larger than the Continental United States and is characterized by isolated surface lines of communication and limited terminals for air and sea movement.

The terrain of the U.S. Central Command area is diverse. The majestic mountains of Iran contrast with the desert plains of the Horn of Africa. The lower Nile river valley, with its dense population and large urban areas, stands in stark contrast to the uninhabited quarter of the Arabian Peninsula. Climatic extremes range from intense cold in the region's mountains to 130 degrees Fahrenheit on the desert floor.

Finally, distances to my area of responsibility are, in themselves, significant obstacles to movement and communication. The air distance from our East Coast to the Persian Gulf is at least 7,000 miles - a fifteen hour trip on an air-refueled, non-stop C-5 aircraft. The distance by sea through the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf is over 8,000 miles long and the route around the Cape of Good Hope is 12,000 miles. The following map graphically portrays the distances from CONUS to the USCENTCOM area.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

The USCENTCOM area has been called both the cradle and crossroads of civilization. The cultures of the Nile and the Tigris and Euphrates valleys go back over fifteen centuries and several of the world's major religions began here. The area has been a center of both power and learning and a strategic passage for commerce and conquerors. Modern western civilization owes many

debts to its scientific, philosophical, and artistic accomplishments. Today, this region is characterized by a wide range of economic and social developments. It is also marked by great ethnic, religious, economic and political diversity, reflecting a rich history and producing tensions which have often resulted in armed conflict. The diversity of the region is even more complex when all the characteristics of the area are considered.

CHARACTERISTICS

-316+ MILLION POPULATION

-17 DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS

-420 MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPINGS

-LANGUAGES...SIX MAJOR GROUPINGS, HUNDREDS OF DIALECTS, TRIBAL AND REGIONAL LANGUAGES

-RELIGIONS...SUNNI AND SHIA MOSLEM, CHRISTIANITY, ZOROASTRIANISM, JUDAISM AND ANIMISM

-ECONOMIC DISPARITY...PER CAPITA: QATAR $20,000 VS ETHIOPIA $400

-ILL DEFINED BOUNDARIES

-HISTORIC REGIONAL HOSTILITIES

-EXCESSIVE POPULATION GROWTH

-UNPREDICTABLE LEADERSHIP CHANGES

SIGNIFICANCE

Oil remains the cornerstone of the majority of the national economies in the area. While some countries such as Egypt have attempted to diversify their economic base, most countries rely exclusively on oil revenues or foreign assistance to sustain their economies. Oil is also significant to Western and Far Eastern economies, since over half of the free world's petroleum reserves as well as much of the surplus oil production capacity is located in the Persian Gulf area. While the United States only imports 2-4 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf, Japan satisfies 56 percent and Europe 20 percent of their requirements with Persian Gulf oil. This reliance, coupled with our agreement in 1976 to share U.S. oil with our allies should their supplies be significantly reduced, ensures that this region will remain vital to the West for the foreseeable future.

The current oil glut and plans to by-pass the Strait of Hormuz with a pipeline may temporarily reduce Western vulnerability to a "turning off" of the flow of oil. However, as oil reserves in the U.S., Europe and the Soviet Union diminish, Persian Gulf oil is likely to resume its previous prominence. Furthermore, increased use of Red Sea and Mediterranean oil terminals will simply shift the focus of interest without reducing the importance of the oil producing areas.

Recent decades have been marked by internal social revolutionary change, a growing Soviet military presence in the area, three Arab-Israeli wars and major efforts by successive U.S. administrations to develop a fair and workable process that could lead to a just and lasting Arab-Israeli peace.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter made the following statement: "Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force."

President Reagan has steadfastly reaffirmed this commitment to protect U.S. and free world interests in the region, especially the pursuit of a lasting Arab-Israeli peace and continued access to Persian Gulf oil. He stated that our objective in this region is "to develop with our friends and allies a joint policy to deter the Soviets and their surrogates from further expansion and, if necessary, to defend against it."

In our region, the primary potential risk, in addition to a continuation of the Iran-Iraq war, would be direct Soviet exploitation of Iran's unsettled conditions stemming from the effects of long-term fighting and economic dislocation. Our

challenge is to help friendly nations in the region preserve their freedom in the face of growing threats.

REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS

There is little doubt that most regional states see their best chance of survival in the exclusion of superpower rivalries and conflicts from the region. Tensions between potential host nations; the Arab-Israeli dispute; fear of ostracism; and sensitivity to questions of sovereignty have limited our ability to influence nations and events. The underlying issue is that Israel, and not the Soviet Union, is perceived by many as the major regional problem and that many of these countries believe the United States is unable to deal fairly with the Arab side. Nevertheless, offsetting political and economic concerns have led to increasing cooperation. Given patience and continued diplomatic initiatives, this cooperation is expected to continue and improve over time.

THE THREAT

Having described briefly the composition and significance of the area, let us now turn to the threat. The threat can be divided into three categories - the Soviets, regional concerns and terrorism.

SOVIET THREAT

Soviet strategic interests in the USCENTCOM area reflect the fact that this area is the highest priority target for expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World.

It is important to note that historically the Russians, motivated by a variety of security, economic, and political concerns, have attempted to expand their presence in the region. As early as 1689, Russians moved south of the Caspian Sea to an area crossed by rich trade routes connecting Russia, Persia, India and China.

In the 19th Century, the "Great Game" between Russia and Great Britain resulted in the partitioning of Persia into Russian and British spheres of influence. In the early 1900's, the Russians were pre-occupied with the Russo-Japanese War and with internal upheavals. However, in 1916 and 1917 Russian forces again occupied Persia as far south as Kermanshah and Hamadan.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviets moved into NW Iran and helped create the Gilan Socialist Republic. The Republic was disestablished after the Soviets and Persians signed a treaty in 1921.

For the remainder of this century, the Soviets repeatedly demonstrated their interest in opening a window to the south. In 1941, the Soviets and the British occupied Iran, agreeing to withdraw their forces six months after the war ended. The British

did, but the Soviets did not. The Soviets expanded their activity in Iran and in December 1945 they supported the establishment of the autonomous state of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in NW Iran. Only after repeated protests from Great Britain, the U.S. and the UN, did the Soviet forces withdraw from Iran in March 1946. The two "independent" republics collapsed in 1947.



In the post World War II era, Soviet efforts to expand their influence in this area of the world have met with mixed results. In

Egypt and Somalia they were eventually asked to leave. On the other hand, the Soviets have established a firm foothold in Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and operate out of military bases there. From these bases the Soviets can threaten critical international lines of communication.

Additionally, they have an advisory presence in North Yemen, Kuwait and Syria, perpetuated by Soviet arms deliveries. The Soviets have also made significant diplomatic inroads in the region. Having

established diplomatic relations with the UAE and Oman in 1985, the Soviets now have the basis for representation with all the countries of our AOR except Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain. In addition, the Soviets have treaties of friendship with Afghanistan (1978), Ethiopia (1978), Iraq (1972), South Yemen (1979), North Yemen (1985) and Iran (1921) (the Khomeini regime has unilaterally renounced articles of this treaty that gave the USSR the right to intervene in Iranian affairs).

There are other indicators of the importance the Soviets currently place on our region. In the early 1980s, the Soviets created the Southern Theater of Military Operations (TVD) as part of a nationwide military reorganization. This command structure increases their capability to conduct military operations into the area.

While there are many questions yet unanswered about the Southern TVD, the Soviet leadership has underscored its importance with the appointment last year of General of the Army Mikhail Zaytsev, the former head of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany, as Commander of the Soviet Southern Theater. General Zaytsev commands 32 Army divisions and approximately 1000 tactical aircraft, to include Soviet forces currently occupying Afghanistan.

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. The decision to invade appears to have been carefully considered and was precipitated by a complex set of political circumstances. The USSR introduced forces to Afghanistan to insure the survival of the regime in Kabul in the face of growing popular resistance. Moreover, Moscow was convinced that the United States would not take steps to militarily oppose the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Most certainly, the Soviet leadership in 1979 did not anticipate the costly war of attrition that has since developed in the country. Now, six years later, the invasion, designed to achieve certain limited goals, has become a conscious and dedicated effort to pacify and Sovietize an entire society. Their long term strategy of Sovietization is becoming increasingly obvious:

- Imposition of a governmental structure that mirrors the Soviet system.
- Continued effort to control cities and lines-of-communication.
- Unremitting pressure on the Mujahedin and their civilian supporters.
- Vicious and selective employment of a scorched earth policy, which has resulted in an unprecedented population exodus to Iran and Pakistan now estimated to number 4,000,000 out of a population of 16 million.

Reeducation of over 50,000 children who have been forcibly removed to the Soviet Union.

There is one last point on Afghanistan - Soviet forces are now 400 miles closer to the Persian Gulf and North Arabian Sea, operating from well-positioned military bases that could be used to intimidate other countries in the area.

REGIONAL THREATS

In addition to the Soviet threat, there are numerous other current and potential areas of concern in or near the AOR.

Iran-Iraq War

One of the more volatile conflicts is the Iran/Iraq war, now in its sixth year. The war has destabilized the Persian Gulf region as a whole. Although the ground war has developed into a stalemate, Iran is currently conducting a relatively successful military operation in the southern border region.

A very visible aspect of the conflict has been the "Tanker War" in the Gulf. Since March 1984, Iraq has attacked some 65-70 oil tankers carrying Iranian oil and Iran has retaliated by striking a total of 25-30 ships allegedly moving war material to Iraq.

Iraq escalated its attacks against economic targets, in August 1985, conducting air strikes on Iran's major oil export facilities on and near Kharg Island. The Iranian reaction to these attacks has been to stop, board, and seize freighters bound for third country ports with cargo destined for Iraq. To date, over 50 ships have been boarded, including one U.S. merchantman, and more than a dozen have been temporarily seized. In addition, the Gulf States' support of Iraq increases the possibility of Iranian retaliation through actual military attack or terrorist action.

Iran

Following Iran's 1979 revolution, concerns grew over Teheran's policy of actively exporting its radical, fundamentalistic brand of Islam, particularly among the Shia populations of the region. For the most part, however, this threat has been contained and a present concern in our region is that Iran may eventually resort to force to export its revolution. To date, Iran's clerical leaders have resisted Soviet diplomatic advances for improved relations, in large part because the Iranian mullahs resent Moscow's supply of arms to Iraq and military activity in Afghanistan.

Iraq

Iraq, along with Egypt and Syria, continues to be a traditional Arab world leader, despite its preoccupation with the war. In the past, smaller Arab states have feared Iraq because of radical policies pursued by the government since 1958. Coincidental with the Iran-Iraq war, however, Baghdad has drawn closer to its Arab neighbors and is now seen by many Gulf Arabs as the major Arab force countering Iranian expansion. Despite being a long-time customer of Soviet arms, Iraq has never subordinated itself to Soviet demands or interests.

Saudi Arabia

All members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) look to Saudi Arabia as the key to their common defense. Saudi Arabia defense capability has played an important role in limiting the spread of the Iran-Iraq war to the western side of the Gulf. Nevertheless, a key Saudi Arabian concern remains the Iranian threat. Its unhardened, highly vulnerable oil production infrastructure represents a lucrative target for conventional or terrorist attack.

Jordan

Jordan's main Arab threat comes from Syria, a country which has greatly strengthened its military posture through the acquisition of Soviet arms. In addition to the traditional rivalry between the regimes of King Hussein and President Assad, Syrian animosity is based upon Jordan's active initiatives to develop a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

South Yemen (PDRY)

Further south, in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, radical Marxist forces seized control of the government in January. The Soviets possibly were dissatisfied with the moderating trends in the Ali Nasir (Al Hasani) government as evidenced by the return of hard-line ex-president Ismail from exile in the USSR. Moscow rallied behind the radical elements as they began to consolidate power during the recent coup. The radical element's success threatens to increase tensions between PDRY and its neighbors, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Oman, particularly since North Yemen and Saudi Arabia continue to express support for the deposed moderates. We expect the new regime in Aden to have close ties with the Soviet Union because of its ideological composition and increased need for military and economic assistance.

Libya

Although not in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility, Libya is included here because of the considerable impact of its policies on USCENTCOM's area. While Libya faces no immediate external threat, the country is viewed warily by its neighbors and many African, Western, and Middle Eastern states. In Chad, Libyan forces are actively deployed as Qadhafi presses his claims to the Aozou strip and seeks to topple the Habre government. In addition, Libya has trained and funded radical Palestinian, Lebanese, and other terrorists from around the world. These terrorists, acting alone or at the behest of Libya, are a very real and present danger to USCENTCOM's area and the world community as a whole.

Egypt

Egypt's greatest threat comes from Libyan adventurism on its western borders and from Libyan-sponsored terrorism against Egyptian citizens internally and abroad. Egypt is also concerned with developments in Sudan as the new Sudanese government seeks to deal with vexing economic issues, establish its political orientation, and contend with a long -standing insurgency in the South.

Sudan

Recent events in Sudan, particularly the fall of President Nimeiri, have altered Sudan's threat posture. Historically, Sudan has viewed Ethiopia as its greatest threat. With the fall of Nimeiri, Qadhafi now has an opportunity to take advantage of Sudan's unsettled internal situation. The Ethiopian-supported southern insurgency, conducted by the Sudanese People's Liberation Army under John Garang, has served to fragment the country's African South, further dividing it from the Arab North. Internal divisions, squabbling among its emerging political parties and military unrest raise the specter of a difficult future.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia has the largest armed forces in sub-Saharan Africa and would pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa. However, Ethiopia's military is tied down by large-scale counter-insurgency operations. The country faces serious economic disorder as a result of failures in agriculture, due in large measure to ill-advised government policy, forced population

resettlement, and severe drought. Ethnic rebellions in Tigre, Eritrea and in the Ogaden have tied down its military establishment. Ethiopia's relationship with the Soviet Union will continue to be an unsettling influence to the Horn of Africa.

Somalia

The primary threat to Somalia is posed by Soviet-supported Ethiopia, which has occupied two Somali border towns since 1982. Somalia's ambitions to unite all ethnic Somalis have long concerned Kenya and Ethiopia, serving to isolate the country regionally. Fortunately, recent Somali diplomacy has de-emphasized this issue, and has led to much improved relations with Kenya. Long dominated by tribal clans, Somalia's political development has been a delicate balancing act. The lack of entrenched political institutions and scarce resources make the country vulnerable to external subversion.

Pakistan

Pakistan faces an indigenous threat from tribal dissidents in the northwest border territories supported to some extent by foreign sponsors. Additionally, Iran has sought to extend its influence in Pakistan, particularly among the Shia population. As a result of Pakistani support to the Afghan Mujahedin, the Soviets and their Afghan surrogates have applied considerable military and political pressure on Pakistan. As part of this campaign to intimidate the

GOP, Soviet supported and trained members of Afghanistan's intelligence organization have reportedly conducted bombings and incited trouble among the nearly three million Afghan refugees now in camps inside Pakistan. However, Pakistan's major concern has been and remains, India, the dominant military power in the area. Strong historical animosities between the two nations and difficult real-world problems over borders and the Sikh minorities complicate Indo-Pakistani relations. However, recent diplomatic initiatives, supported by Pakistan's Zia and India's Ghandi, may contribute to improved relations between the two countries.

TERRORISM

The threat of international terrorism against the U.S. and other nations is acute and serves as a destabilizing factor in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Many of the terrorist groups originate in the Middle East and are influenced and supported by Iran, Libya and Syria. These groups pose a significant threat to U.S. interests in the area. The terrorists are becoming more sophisticated in their operations, and are rapidly increasing their ability to identify, target, and successfully attack well-secured facilities. The success of these groups during the past two years demonstrates their increasing proficiency and the consequences of misjudging their intentions and capabilities.

GOALS/OBJECTIVES

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

-Maintain an increased U.S. military presence to deter Soviet aggression and counter Soviet efforts to gain power and negemony in the region.

-Strive to reduce the potential for regional conflict, enhance regional stability, and promote a framework for regional defense cooperation.

-Maintain access to and unhindered use of Persian Gulf oil resources.

USCENTCOM MISSION

The primary responsibilities given the United States Central Command are to ensure continued Western access to Persian Gulf oil; to deter Soviet aggression and preserve regional stability; and to reduce Soviet regional influence.

DETERRENCE AND WARFIGHTING

In order to enable me to carry out my responsibilities and fulfill my mission, a number of our military's most mobile and ready units have been identified for priority allocation to USCENTCOM in a crisis. These forces are provided by all four military Services.

ARMY FORCES

USARCENT, FT MCPHERSON, GA

(THIRD U.S. ARMY)

1 AIRBORNE DIVISION

1 AIRMOBILE/AIR ASSAULT DIVISION

1 MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISION

1 INFANTRY DIVISION

1 MECHANIZED BRIGADE

1 CAVALRY BRIGADE (AIR COMBAT)

As the Army component of U.S. Central Command, the Third U.S. Army has overall responsibility for planning the operations of U.S. Central Command's Army units. The airborne, air assault, mechanized and infantry fighting units shown are heavy on mobility and firepower and are capable of deploying to our area of responsibility rapidly. Combat support and combat service support forces deploy at

the same time to provide sustainment for the combat units. While none of our combat units assigned are from the reserve component, over 50% of our combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) comes from that component. We continue to review the Army forces allocated to the USCENTCOM area for planning purposes to ensure we can accomplish our mission.

Readiness

We at USCENTCOM are confident that our Army elements are more ready and better able to deploy and, if necessary, fight than at any time in the past five years. However, the readiness levels of CS/CSS units, especially in the reserve, cause us some concern. Consequently, we support the Army readiness programs in the FY87 budget to achieve their goal of having all early deploying units in the two highest readiness categories in the next five years.

Improvements

Substantial progress has been made in improving Army combat strength during the last few years. The FY87-91 programs which will enhance equipment fills, equipment upgrades, maintenance and spare parts are important to continued improvement in Army capabilities.

Limitations

Although we have made progress, we have more work ahead of us. The reduced fiscal guidance will force the Army to moderate its aggressive training program. The training tempo for units will be reduced by 15%, equating to one battalion and one company-sized exercise per unit per year. We must maintain our training programs to keep our readiness level high, enabling us to respond to any contingency without needless loss of life. As mentioned, I am concerned about the Army's combat support and combat service support force structure and its readiness to support our contingency plans. Fifty three percent of the CS/CSS units are from the reserve components and 43% of my total CS/CSS forces are not combat ready (C-4). This marginal readiness is caused by shortfalls in personnel, equipment and training which could significantly hamper our ability to introduce large forces into the area and to sustain them. The Army is attempting to improve on these shortfalls through productivity enhancements and contingency contracting.

Priorities

My major emphasis for the Army is in the areas of readiness and sustainability. To show a credible deterrence posture, our units must maintain a high state of readiness, be able to rapidly deploy when needed, and have the necessary supplies and equipment readily available to prosecute a war if necessary.

AIR FORCE FORCES

USCENTAF, SHAW AFB, SC

7 TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS	(F-4, F-15, F-16, F-111, A-7, A-10)
ELECTRONIC COMBAT SQUADRONS	(EF-111, EC-130)
TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRONS	(RF-4)
TACTICAL AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL SQUADRONS	(E-3A, EC-130)
TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQUADRONS	(C-130)

Units from the United States Air Force provide USCENTCOM a wide range of capabilities. Tactical Air Command units provide offensive and defensive counterair, close air support, electronic combat, aerial reconnaissance, interdiction, and airborne command and control capability. Combat airlift of our forces is accomplished by C-130 tactical airlift squadrons provided by the Military Airlift Command, but under the operational control of USCENTAF. Strategic airlift is under the control of the Military Airlift Command and involves a combination of C-5s and C-141s. Forces provided by the Strategic Air Command, including two B-52 squadrons and reconnaissance, air refueling and airborne C3 support aircraft, are also tasked to support USCENTCOM operations. The reserve component

is an important contributor to USCENTCOM. Two thirds of the C-130 squadrons available to me, all of my tactical reconnaissance squadrons, and nearly 60% of our communications support come from the reserve component.

Readiness

The readiness of the Air Force fighter force has increased markedly over the past six years and Air Force mission capable rates continue to climb. Readiness programs, such as acquisition of war reserve spare kits, munitions and training remain a high priority concern.

Improvements

Air Force force modernization efforts continue as more advanced aircraft and aircraft enhancement modifications are procured to increase our combat capabilities. Additionally, the integrated Air-Land Battle doctrine being developed by the Air Force and Army will help ensure the most effective use of air power in the combat environment.

Limitations

Force limitations include the lack of a true all-weather day-

night attack capability and a paucity of long range interdiction aircraft. Secondly, although fully funded, adequate war reserve spare kits are not currently available to our units. This factor has a detrimental effect on our readiness. Additionally, although not currently deployed in our AOR, we are concerned with the significant improvements in Soviet aircraft and weapons systems. An entirely new generation of Soviet aircraft now threatens to reduce our superiority in tactical air forces. The MIG-29 Fulcrum, now operational, and the Su-27 Flanker, which should be operational this year, give the Soviets their first look-down/shoot-down capability. This fact coupled with Soviet advances in air defenses and air-to-surface attack capabilities complicate our planning tasks.

Priorities

Consequently, our priorities in the FY87 budget include F-15 and F-16 procurement, money for advanced aircraft development and programs which will give us an all-weather day-night capability such as the Low Altitude Night Targeting Infrared Navigation System (LANTIRN). Finally, we support the programs in the budget which will enhance air base survivability, electronic combat and reconnaissance.

USMC FORCES

I MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

CAMP PENDLETON, CA

1 1/3 MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

- o AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT
- o MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING SHIPS PROGRAM

The Marine forces designated for planning consist of the Headquarters, First Marine Amphibious Force at Camp Pendleton, CA, and 1 1/3 Marine Amphibious Forces. These units would arrive in my area on the amphibious ships of available task forces and by deploying by air or sea to join their pre-positioned equipment at a port facility in our area of responsibility.

Readiness

Assigned units continue to maintain their consistently high levels of combat readiness. The routine presence of amphibious forces in the oceans adjacent to the USCENTCOM area and their occasional training exercises in our region provide the visible and measured support required to deter or prevent escalation of crises.

Improvements

Navy shipbuilding programs of the LHD and LSD 41 class, when coupled with delivery of the Landing Craft-Air Cushioned (LCAC) will further enhance our amphibious lift capability and assist in developing an over-the-horizon launch option for amphibious forces. Complementing this amphibious lift is the Maritime Pre-positioning Ships (MPS) squadron deployed to Diego Garcia in support of Marine forces assigned to USCENTCOM. This gives us the capability of moving a 16,500-man Marine brigade to a crisis area and rapidly marrying it up with its equipment.

Priorities

The development of the MV22A "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft with its improved speed and range over conventional helicopters will further enhance the tactical mobility of Marine forces. This will be crucial to amphibious operations in the USCENTCOM area, where vast distances must be covered in short periods of time and over difficult terrain. In view of the current threat in the area, we support the ongoing emphasis to improve the mobility and firepower of Marine forces and the various amphibious shipbuilding programs mentioned above.

NAVY FORCES

USNAVCENT, PEARL HARBOR, HI

USS LASALLE (AGF-3)

USS FAHRION (FFG-22)

USS LUCE (DDG-38)

USS J. STRAUSS (DDG-16)

USS RATHBURNE (FF-1057)

Our Navy component consists of the Middle East Force Surface Action Group, five ships currently deployed in the Persian Gulf. Also available for planning are three aircraft carrier battle groups which would operate outside the Persian Gulf in the Indian Ocean/North Arabian Sea. In addition to the aircraft carriers, these carrier battle groups include surface and subsurface combatants, supply and support ships and various types of aircraft. Amphibious ready groups, with a mix of assault ships and helicopter or VSTOL platforms, are available for planning, as are P-3 Maritime Patrol Squadrons. Finally, a number of oceangoing minesweepers, minehunters and airborne mine countermeasure helicopters can be made available to support our plans. In peacetime, the presence of COMIDEASTFOR ships and the carrier battle group operating in the North Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean provide the most visible evidence of our commitment to the area and serve as our main deterrent force.

Navy reserve component forces provide port operations support and will augment shipboard manning of naval forces operating in support of USCENTCOM.

Readiness

Available Naval forces are ready and capable of providing credible deterrence. The budget supports 50.5 steaming days per quarter for the forward deployed fleets which support us.

Improvements

Progress in ship building, particularly towards the 15 carrier battle group objective, will ensure that there will be sufficient assets to support our wartime plans and maintain a peacetime presence. Additional amphibious shipping and the recent activation of the Maritime Pre-positioned Ships squadron at Diego Garcia are also improving our capabilities. Furthermore, the decision to procure two auxiliary crane ships (TACS) and four additional minehunter sweepers (MSH-1) in FY87 and three mine countermeasures ships (MCM-1) in FY88 will improve our capabilities.

Limitations

Lack of naval presence in the Indian Ocean raises the risk of a

misperception of our commitment to this vital area of the world and limits our response options. Consequently, we support the Navy's goal of recruiting and retaining enough qualified people to operate the 600 ship Navy at an OPTEMPO sufficient to fulfill its worldwide commitments. Other limitations may result from delays in construction of modern surface combatants and the failure of the Navy to achieve its goals for support and mine warfare forces until the mid-1990s.

Priorities

To deter and to ensure we have the capability to manage contingencies, it is important that the ship building program and amphibious support programs not be further delayed. Attainment of the 600 ship goal is of particular importance to USCENTCOM in view of our extended sea lines of communication.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

SOCCENT, MACDILL AFB, FL

U.S. ARMY RANGERS

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

U.S. AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS

U.S. NAVY SPECIAL WARFARE FORCES

Rounding out our forces designated for planning is the Special Operations Command, Central. SOCCENT forces include Army Rangers and Special Forces, Air Force Special Operations Squadrons, and a Navy Special Warfare Task Group. Forty percent of our special operations squadrons are from the reserve component.

Readiness

Recent Congressional interest has served to focus efforts at improving these special operations capabilities. While some of the forces listed above are fully manned and highly capable of performing assigned missions, others lack effective equipment and training. Linguists are in especially short supply.

Improvements

The FY87 budget contains numerous initiatives to modernize and expand our Special Operations Forces. Procurement of five modern transport and reconnaissance MC-130H aircraft and the development of the MV-22A "Osprey" will provide an all weather capability to transport troops. Additional AC-130 aircraft, another Special Forces Group, a new SEAL team and Army SOF aircraft upgrades will improve these valuable forces.

Limitations/Priorities

Our most pressing problem is developing and procuring a long range, vertical lift aircraft. If demonstrated to be effective and affordable, the "Osprey's" unique combination of fixed and rotary wing capabilities will greatly enhance our ability to effectively employ SOF forces and expand our response options. Additionally, we need to ensure the Services' SOF Master Plans are implemented, that special operations units are fully trained and manned and that necessary communications equipment is provided. Lack of a dedicated communications capability for SOCCENT and inadequate communications assets within all three SOCCENT components limits the ability to command and control forces. The FY87-91 program provides necessary SOF communications by FY90.

FORCE PROJECTION

General

Central to deterrence and warfighting is the capability to project forces. USCENTCOM's lift requirements to move the forces shown to a major conflict are portrayed as follows:

FORCES	STATISTICS	
4 2/3 Army Divisions	Personnel	389,260
7 Air Force Wings (Equiv)	Organic Aircraft	1,392
1 1/3 Marine Amphibious Forces	Helicopters	1,362
3 CVBGs	Short Tons (Airlift)	205,650
1 Special Operations Force	MEAS Tons (Sealift)	4,177,226
Additional Accompanying	C-5 Sorties	273
CSS Units	C-141 Sorties	8,205
	CRAF Sorties	1,003
	Shiploads	418

As previously mentioned, the 7,000 mile air route to the Central region requires at least 15 hours of flight from the East Coast of the United States. The 12,000 mile sea route involves approximately 31 days of transit for cargo ships. The problem of strategic lift availability is not new. It has faced all U.S. forces for some time but is a more glaring deficiency in the USCENTCOM area because of our limited access, the lack of forward deployed forces, long distances and the time-critical requirement for credible forces once the decision is made to deploy.

Airlift

The strategic airlift chart shows the DOD goal of 66 million-ton-miles per day of strategic airlift, the capability at the end of

FY87, shortfalls, and programs that would help resolve this problem by the year 2000. While sufficient assets are allocated to build up combat power, a sizeable amount of our airlift is dependent on the Civil Reserve Air Fleet or CRAF. CRAF is composed of U.S. civil air carriers who commit themselves to provide operating and support personnel, facilities, and aircraft to the Military Airlift Command.



To help relieve our nation's airlift availability problem, there are four airlift enhancement programs in progress that should improve our airlift capacity in the future. The C-5A service life extension program is underway with the strengthening of aircraft wings. Each month, aircraft enter modification and all 77 are

scheduled to be completed by 1987. This improvement will extend the C-5 service life well into the 21st century.

The C-5B procurement is on schedule. Delivery of the first of 50 aircraft took place in January of this year and the FY87 budget includes projected procurement of 21 aircraft. The C-5B buy will add 7.5 million-ton-miles per day of outsized strategic airlift capability.

The KC-10 aircraft provides an inflight refueling system that significantly improves the overall capability of the SAC tanker fleet. The KC-10 can air-refuel Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft and the upper deck is available for cargo and passengers. Thirty of these versatile tankers are used worldwide to support military activities. An additional eight KC-10s are included in the FY87 budget.

The CRAF Enhancement program, is adding "cargo-convertible" features to 19 wide-bodied passenger aircraft. This program will increase cargo capability by over one million-ton-miles per day, while avoiding the cost of acquiring and operating additional military transports of comparable capability.

Although these programs will significantly increase our intertheater airlift capability, we will still not meet our long

term goal. Consequently, the FY87 budget includes a request for funds to continue full-scale engineering development of the C-17 cargo aircraft, working toward a production start in FY88. Though smaller than the C-5, the C-17 will be able to carry the full range of military equipment, including all armored vehicles and most other outsized cargo. Unlike other intertheater transports, the air-refuelable C-17 has outstanding ground maneuverability and takeoff and landing profiles designed to allow routine operations at small, austere airfields. This will greatly increase our operational flexibility since C-5/C-141 capable airfields are limited.

In the area of intratheater airlift, our C-130s and various helicopters contribute to our ability to move troops and supplies within the theater. The program to repair C-130 corrosion damage and stress problems, begun in FY84, will be completed by FY89. These refurbishments will extend the life of the C-130A model through the mid-1990s and the life of later models into the next century. The C-17 will also contribute significantly to our intratheater lift capability. Being able to land at austere locations, the C-17 will decrease our intratheater lift requirements since troops and equipment will not have to be moved from C-5/C-141 capable airfields. Secondly, after its intertheater mission is complete, the C-17s can be used to augment the C-130s.

Sealift



Another lift challenge facing the U.S. Central Command is in the area of strategic sealift. In a major contingency, we are heavily dependent upon sealift to deliver our forces and cargo, including much of the non pre-positioned equipment for heavy divisions and support units, as well as the bulk of our ammunition and supplies. A deployment to SWA could well require unloading ships in austere or damaged ports, or in areas lacking port facilities. Key programs to insure we can deliver forces under these conditions include the procurement of transportable barges for unloading ships unable to navigate in shallow water; mobile piers; portable facilities for unloading petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) from tankers;

portable ramps for removing cargo from roll-on/roll-off ships; and 12 auxiliary crane ships (TACS) for unloading "non-self-sustaining" containerships. The TACS is a cargo carrier with the capability to offload military cargo from all existing ship types where port facilities are non-existent or inadequate.

These programs will be rounded out by the modification of some cargo ships to accommodate flatracks and seasheds. The movement of military cargo from CONUS to overseas operational areas has become increasingly dependent on systems designed for efficient and economical movement of commercial modularized cargo. However, as configured, the military utility of the containerships is limited to cargo which can be inserted into containers. For some Army units, only 8 to 34 percent of the unit equipment can be accommodated.

There are two techniques for giving containerships a breakbulk capability. One uses container-sized platforms, called "flatracks", to build a tier of decks for carrying cargo. The racks fit into the standard container guides and can support even the heaviest military equipment. In essence, they function as portable decks that are loaded and unloaded with the cargo they carry.

FLATRACK



Alternatively, selected containerships can be fitted with large structures, called "seasheds", that create a cargo hold accessible from the main deck. Installed in reinforced container guides, seasheds are strong enough to carry the full range of military cargo and have a work through floor allowing the cargo to be unloaded without removing the sheds themselves. By using flatracks and seasheds over 90% of Army and Marine Corps unit equipment can be accommodated in containerships.

SEASHED



SEA SHEDS STACKED IN CONTAINERSHIP HOLD

We have made great progress in expanding our sealift capabilities. In 1986, the third Maritime Pre-positioning Ships (MPS) squadron will be deployed and the Fast Sealift Ship (FSS) program will be completed, greatly increasing our ability to deploy large, heavily armed forces rapidly. FY88 will bring the completion of improvements in the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). These three programs will more than triple our 1981 sealift capability.

SUSTAINABILITY

Pre-positioning

Sustaining forces deployed to the Central area presents another challenge. Neither forces nor supplies are available in our area to the degree they are in Western Europe or Korea. Consequently, our command relies on pre-positioning supplies and equipment in or near our area of responsibility. The objectives of the pre-positioning program are two-fold - first, to reduce dependence on strategic lift by pre-positioning Air Force bare base support packages, Army brigade sets and port and terminal equipment necessary to establish berths to offload and throughput pre-positioning ships and early arriving strategic sealift cargo; second, to pre-position sustaining supplies to support forces for combat.

We estimate it would take 145 warehouses, 1,000 ammo igloos and 125 POL tanks to store the goods needed to meet these requirements. Of this total, approximately 35% of our Air Force requirements can be satisfied by current government-to-government agreements. Additionally, we have permission to store a barge-mounted Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit in the area and plan to store two more at Diego Garcia. We have also recently loaded an Army brigade set on a pre-positioned ship.

The second objective is partially met by the USMC Maritime Pre-positioning Ships and twelve Pre-positioning Ships that provide sustaining supplies for a Marine Amphibious Brigade and Army forces.

Shown here are the percentages of our total requirements which are prepositioned afloat and ashore.



Sustainment is exacerbated when follow-on forces arrive and total consumption increases. We are examining various options to resolve these problems. One option would be to create rapid

deployment storage sites at or close to one or more CONUS ports of embarkation. These sites would store pre-sourced and pre-configured materiel, readily available for loading and fast shipment to the USCENTCOM area or elsewhere.

The airlift savings associated with pre-positioning are significant. For example, the total ammunition tonnage aboard the pre-positioning force ships would require more than 6,100 C-141 sorties if airlifted from the East Coast to the Middle East. Further, for every 60,000 short tons of supplies and equipment we pre-position within 1,000 air miles of our objective, we can free about 100 C-141 sorties per day for an entire month for other essential duties. This will allow us to greatly reduce our force closure times and simultaneously enhance our sustainability.

Munitions

With the exception of U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force missiles and munitions aboard MPS/pre-positioned ships, only limited amounts of munitions are pre-positioned in theater and in CONUS facilities for USCENTCOM use. Of major concern is the lack of available modern air and ground munitions which are required to sustain the force. Critical modern munitions shortfalls are attributed to longer lead times required to procure preferred munitions and to high costs associated with procurement. The

Services recognize these shortfalls and are working to obtain additional stocks.

Water Support

The Army, as the DOD executive agent for water, is responsible for developing equipment to provide our entire force with up to 20 gallons per person per day. Given the hot, arid desert environment and the paucity of fresh water sources in the area, the Army has developed and fielded a new generation of water production and distribution equipment. The Services have spent $280 million on water equipment. Items such as Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPUs) and Tactical Water Distribution Systems are capable of yielding fresh water from salt or brackish water and getting it to the individual soldier at the front. An additional $73.6 million is in the FY87 budget in support of these vital programs.

Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants

Pre-positioning fuel to sustain our warfighting forces has gradually progressed since the birth of the U.S. Central Command. The requirement for large quantities of fuel, primarily jet fuel, still exists; but the amount of USCENTCOM fuel storage, including leased tankage and facilities constructed by MILCON, in the area of responsibility has doubled, from 600 thousand to 1.2 million

barrels. Further, ongoing initiatives should quadruple the current storage by FY90. The primary limitations are non-availability of host nation tankage and lack of access to many countries. The challenge is to match storage availability with increases in fuel allotments for the U.S. Central Command.

Medical

Few issues have received as much attention recently as the ability of our armed forces medical services to provide adequate care to combat casualties. I share that concern, not only from the aspect of sufficient numbers of qualified specialists but also because my area, unlike most other theaters, lacks the back-up host nation health care infrastructure that might be available to U.S. forces in time of war. Added to this, is a significant hospital bed shortfall that translates into a critical need for pre-positioned assets. We currently meet 52% of our hospital bed requirement, and the FY87-91 program will raise us to 73%.

Host Nation Support

Host nation support involves the facilities, materiel and services provided by a host government to support U.S. forces deployed to its country during a contingency. Such support, agreed to in advance by the host and the U.S. government, includes:

- Facilities (airfields, ports, cantonment areas, etc.)
- Fuels (Jet, Mogas, Diesel)
- Water
- Medical facilities/services
- Transportation assets (general and special vehicles)
- Laborers (skilled and unskilled)
- Interpreters
- Logistical services (laundry, local purchase, etc.)

We have made progress in host nation agreements. However, in many cases, U.S. laws and country political views make formal agreements difficult. Despite this, the support that has been provided during past contingencies, such as INTENSE LOOK, leads me to believe that host nations would be forthcoming in providing significant assistance during future contingencies when their interests are involved. Additionally, we would expect to receive some support from some NATO countries and other friends and allies should a contingency arise. We have recently reviewed a proposal by the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee which would extend authority for special acquisition and cross-servicing agreements with friendly governments. We believe that expanding allied mutual support provisions would greatly improve our readiness, sustainability, interoperability, and exercise support as well as everyday operations.

MILCON

Approximately $1.1 Billion has been provided for MILCON to support USCENTCOM in Oman, Somalia, Kenya, Morocco, Diego Garcia and Lajes, Azores. However, only about 37% of this money can be attributed to support of USCENTCOM forces alone. Facilities constructed in Diego Garcia, Lajes, and Morocco, which account for 67% of the funds provided, are, in fact, dual-use facilities which also provide support for either USPACOM or USEUCOM. As previously noted, USCENTCOM shortfalls continue to exist in pre-positioning,

intermediate staging and en route support.

We are currently pursuing five methods of satisfying these shortfalls. They are, in priority order, (1) host nation support; (2) allied cooperation for SWA construction/services projects; (3) leasing, build-to-lease and service contracting; (4) relocatable assets, and finally; (5) MILCON.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command Headquarters

Another critical factor in warfighting is the ability to command and control. Unlike other regional unified commands, USCENTCOM must presently accomplish its mission without a headquarters in or near the AOR. USCENTCOM maintains a small (four person) Forward Headquarters Element, collocated with Commander, Middle East Forces (COMIDEASTFOR) on the USS LaSalle. However, this element, constrained by space limitations on COMIDEASTFOR's flag ship, is not manned to provide the necessary USCINCCENT representation and capability desired in the AOR. This serious limitation, coupled with the lack of U.S. military forces in the region, degrades the credibility of our military strategy and invites a test of our resolve. Further, the lack of a viable, in-place USCENTCOM presence significantly impedes ongoing activities to assist individual

nations and regional collective efforts towards improving defensive capabilities.

The political climate in the AOR which precluded establishment of a USCENTCOM Forward Headquarters, much less the full staff, probably will not change in the foreseeable future. Even if an opportunity develops to establish a headquarters in one or more nations, USCENTCOM must avoid a potential risk of becoming embroiled in intraregional disagreements. Such a development could adversely affect the USCENTCOM basic mission of promoting harmony among friendly nations and deterring Soviet adventurism within the region.

USCENTCOM continues to seek a solution for this very difficult and challenging problem. Establishing Headquarters, USCENTCOM within its AOR remains a top priority of this command. Pending realization of this essential objective, USCENTCOM is striving to establish a viable Forward Headquarters within the AOR.

Theater Communications

A secure, survivable C^3I network is essential for conducting military operations in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. USCENTCOM must have the ability to: quickly deploy a sizeable force; promptly receive, process and use intelligence from national, strategic, and tactical sources; exercise effective command and

control over forces deployed across a large geographic area; and sustain those forces logistically. The challenge is to establish and maintain intertheater communications upward to the National Command Authorities and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, laterally to supporting Unified commands, embassies, and host governments and downward to component commands. In addition, communications facilities in the region, unlike those in other, more developed theaters are practically non-existent, except in a few urban areas. Presently, the entire USCENTCOM communications capability must be deployed with its field headquarters into an area of harsh climate and difficult terrain and must operate from austere bases without the benefit of a supporting in-place communications system. Lack of an adequate infrastructure will require USCENTCOM to erect, establish, maintain and operate critical strategic and tactical communications links, perhaps simultaneously with the conduct of combat operations. To provide that communication, USCENTCOM has developed a communication structure that consists of three major and nine minor nodes. This system, when deployed, will provide working communications during the critical early stages of military operations; provide command and control, intelligence, logistic, and administrative communications support for mission execution; reduce critical strategic mobility requirements; and facilitate conduct of peacetime U.S. military activities.

THEATER COMMUNICATIONS



When sited at select locations in the area, these nodes will provide communications to deploying headquarters, combat forces, combat support forces and combat service support forces in concert with operational and logistical concepts. The three major nodes will extend the Defense Communications System (DCS) backbone into Southwest Asia to meet initial demands as well as to cope with the high volume of intertheater communications required to control the forces deployed over a large geographical area. The nine minor nodes will also provide DCS access and an intratheater

communications capability for intermediate staging bases, port facilities, air bases, and forces located in the vicinity of these nodes. Equipment will be capable of operating over long distances, and will be transportable for relocation within a country or throughout the theater as the situation demands. Previous incompatibility problems in Service tactical satellite systems have been resolved. Existing satellite terminals are being retrofitted to insure interoperability and new purchases of like equipment are underway. Resources to procure equipment were included in the Five Year Defense Program beginning in FY 1985 and negotiations for host nation access continue.

Tactical Communications



USCENTCOM requires an organic tactical communications capability to support command, control, logistics and intelligence functions of the USCENTCOM Deployable Field Headquarters (DFH) during mission execution. Once deployment is initiated, USCENTCOM must promptly move all supporting communications systems forward to establish critical telecommunications links within the theater and to higher and lateral command levels for effective force employment. Communications equipment must be compatible, compact, rugged, air transportable, and mobile to support joint command and component headquarters engaged in combat operations. Equipment assemblages must be able to operate reliably under extreme conditions of heat and cold and sustained penetration by dirt, dust, and sand. Currently, we rely on the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) at MacDill AFB, Florida, to provide tactical communications support. The JCSE is being expanded to provide simultaneous support for two deployed Joint Task Force Headquarters. Equipment is being procured and manpower augmentation will be provided from two Air National Guard Combat Information System Squadrons. However, JCS assets are not assigned to USCENTCOM and there is no guarantee that communications support will be available during global conflicts. Therefore, a dedicated tactical communications capability is required for the USCENTCOM DFH.

SOF Communications

The special operations mission of USCENTCOM requires a highly specialized, secure and survivable communications capability. Communications must have a low probability of interception and detection as well as have the ability to transmit and receive special intelligence data and imagery. The equipment must be capable of operating in a secure mode over a distance of a thousand miles or more, be self-contained and light weight for transport and use over extended periods of operation, and be rugged to withstand the extremes of environment.

INTELLIGENCE

With a headquarters located some 7,000 miles from the area of responsibility, extensive, high quality intelligence is not only a requirement, it is an absolute necessity. We have made substantial progress in this area. Increased production for the USCENTCOM AOR has been initiated through the recently established Intelligence Production Element (IPE). Additionally, we have an improved intelligence processing/communications interface system and we are developing an integrated intelligence architecture under the Theater Intelligence Architecture Program.

Indications and warning are also receiving greater emphasis as a

result of the need to monitor the growing terrorist threat and intraregional conflicts in the AOR. USCENTCOM has improved its access to terrorism reporting and seeks analytic exchanges with other elements concerned with the assessment of the terrorist threat.

The Deployable Intelligence Data Handling System (DIDHS) is now replacing the prototype DIDHS and processor improvements to the garrison host computer will maintain state-of-the-art IDHS capability.

However, further improvements in our current posture are, a matter of urgent priority. There is a paucity of capability to provide continuous collection throughout the area. We require the capability to receive and exploit near-real-time (NRT) imagery, enabling us to fully support immediate threat assessments and emergency actions, as well as contingencies, special operations, and plans execution. The improvements we need include NRT access to all-weather, day/night collection sensors and the next generation of deployable equipment for processing and transmitting data to the operational user.

Finally, in view of our lack of human intelligence resources in the area, we must continue to acquire a larger, more detailed data base and to expand our linguistic capacity.

EXERCISES

Another important element of our deterrence and warfighting posture is the USCENTCOM exercise program which provides a visible display of U.S. commitment and resolve. The USCENTCOM exercise program is improving regional defense within the AOR. It promotes interoperability with Gulf nation defense forces and enhances military-to-military relationships, which frequently lead to long term agreements and treaties between countries. Through the USCENTCOM OCONUS exercise program, considerable progress has been made in opening up new countries and activities for the training of USCENTCOM forces and host country personnel.

OCONUS exercises also give our forces the opportunity to train in areas and under conditions in which they may be required to fight, and also enable us to practice deployment and employment strategies. Exercise programs like the most recent "BRIGHT STAR" series, which lasted about 45 days and involved more than 9,000 U.S. troops in three countries, are invaluable. In Egypt, U.S. and Egyptian staffs participated side-by-side in a major live-fire exercise. The United States and Jordan also conducted a series of combined exercises, many of which were a continuation of annual U.S.-Jordanian exercises. Moreover, building on experience from previous BRIGHT STAR scenarios, U.S. and Somali forces joined in combined operations and command post exercises.

At home, CONUS Command Post Exercises (CPX) and Field Training Exercises (FTX) allow USCENTCOM forces to hone warfighting skills at considerable savings and without undue restriction from host countries. Joint operations, sustainability and special operations are key areas in these exercises, as we concentrate on equipment interoperability and command and control procedures. The "GALLANT KNIGHT" CPX, which was recently concluded at Ft. Bragg, provided invaluable training to the USCENTCOM staff and component headquarters. Another major exercise, "GALLANT EAGLE", conducted biennially in the Southwest U.S., enables large numbers of forces to train in a semi-desert environment with emphasis on joint warfighting.

In addition, USCENTCOM CONUS exercises have provided participants and observers from countries within the AOR and some of our European allies the opportunity to witness U.S. regular and reserve forces in action.

ACCESS

Finally, no discussion of deterrence and warfighting can be complete without considering access. In order to fulfill our twin missions of deterrence and warfighting, should that be necessary, we are heavily dependent upon access to the countries in our area of responsibility. We need access for exercises, for pre-positioning

and, in the worst case, for bases to support warfighting.

Furthermore, access to multiple countries and facilities is desirable because it assures that one country does not have defacto veto power over U.S. options, provides USCENTCOM greater flexibility over a range of scenarios, and presents a significantly greater targeting problem for a potential enemy.

We are actively pursuing our goal of increased access in the Gulf area. However, the realities of the political situation make it difficult for the U.S. to reach agreements to use and modernize air and sea facilities at many locations. Tensions between potential host nations; the Arab-Israeli dispute; fear of ostracism; differing perceptions of the threat; and questions relating to upgrading costs, rental fees, and sharing of financial burdens, all serve to complicate the access issue.

Additionally, nations in the region are generally nonaligned, and all are wary of perceived superpower insensitivity to their sovereignty.

However, we are making gradual but steady progress in discussions with several friendly countries concerning requirements for mutual support of our military forces in a crisis. For example, the Egyptian government has periodically reaffirmed its willingness

to allow us temporary access to its facilities in the event the United States is invited to come to the defense of a friendly Arab country.

Additionally, the U.S. has now reached tentative agreements or arrangements with several countries for use of facilities. Access to these facilities would give the U.S. a number of staging areas from which air and seapower assets could be deployed. Diego Garcia provides an important anchorage for pre-positioned ships and an assembly point for amphibious vessels. We have enlarged the airfield to support refueling and related facilities can be utilized to pre-position ecuipment. In a contingency, Omani airfields could be useful for airlift and tactical operations with agreement by the host government. Other bases are important for maritime patrol aircraft and sea-control missions. For example, in the event of a conflict, Berbera and Mogadishu in Somalia could be vital in keeping the Red Sea open and for resupplying naval forces in the Arabian Sea. Additionally, USAF tactical units have occasionally operated from remote airfields in the region.

Finally, to promote better understanding between the United States and friendly regional states, we have established several bilateral consultation groups. An important feature of our defense cooperation with Egypt involves annual meetings of the U.S.-Egyptian Military Coordinating Committee (MCC), a high-level forum for the

planning, coordination, and discussion of security projects of mutual interest. The United States and Jordan also conduct annual meetings each fall under the aegis of the U.S.-Jordan Joint Military Commission (JMC). Established in 1974, the JMC is the forum in which all outstanding security-related issues are reviewed. With Pakistan, we have consultative groups which meet periodically to discuss security assistance issues.

REGIONAL SECURITY

MULTINATIONAL STRATEGY

While the ultimate danger to Southwest Asia is a direct Soviet attack, regional conflicts are much more likely. Consequently, we at USCENTCOM spend a great deal of time on regional security issues. To contribute to our goal of country development through bilateral assistance and political-military cooperation, we have developed a multinational strategy. That strategy articulates a methodical and coherent approach to creating military programs that are fully integrated with those of other U.S. agencies in the region. It identifies USCENTCOM's key initiatives for the region and offers concrete policy proposals for solving many of the problems endemic to the area. Individual plans for each country assess its geostrategic value to the region and the major internal and external threats it faces.

USCENTCOM's goals and objectives for a country are the core of each country plan. Specific proposals address security assistance, logistics, combined exercises, planning for contingencies, and coalition activities with U.S. military forces. These objectives, though tempered by a country's current political and economic atmosphere, are realistic and achievable.

The USCENTCOM Multinational Strategy offers a pragmatic approach other agencies can use in developing their own regional and country programs. In fact, the Department of State's recent initiative for a "Diplomatic Strategy to Achieve U.S. National Security Objectives in SWA" closely parallels the command's approach.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our financing and cash sales programs have helped regional states contain the Iran-Iraq war in the Gulf, encouraged the Arab-Israel peace process, and helped ensure the unimpeded flow of critical resources to the West. These programs have helped the U.S. gain access and use of power projection facilities necessary to deter aggression, support our friends in the area and protect critical sea-lanes. Further, by building the defense capabilities of these countries through security assistance and encouraging regional defense cooperation, we are building forces which, should we be required to fight in the area, could be a significant force multiplier.

In short, security assistance is an extremely valuable tool in achieving our objective of enhancing regional stability. As can be seen in the following charts, our share of security assistance funds is significant. Also significant is the fact that over 50% of total U.S. Government FMS cash sales are made to countries in our AOR.

FY86 SECURITY ASSISTANCE
ALLOCATIONS



NOTE: INCLUDES
MAP, FMS CREDIT & IMET

PROPOSED
FY87 SECURITY ASSISTANCE
ALLOCATIONS



NOTE: INCLUDES
MAP, FMS CREDIT & IMET

FY86 AND FY87 USCENTCOM SHARE OF
WORLDWIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
FUNDING



From these charts, you can see that USCENTCOM's aggregate percentage share of the security assistance funding for MAP, FMS credit and IMET for FY87 is 1.3% lower than it was in the FY86 allocation. However, the total dollar amount requested is up about $160M. The $160M difference restores reductions made in the FY86 program. The impact of these cuts was greatly magnified in the case of several USCENTCOM countries. Unequal application of the funding reductions to individual countries resulted due to "earmarking" and the necessity to maintain the continuity levels for "base rights" countries.

Because of the importance of security assistance, I have included an annex to this statement which provides a country catalog outlining the security assistance programs in the USCENTCOM AOR. The following chart compares our 1986 security assistance program with the FY87 requests.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

PROGRAM LEVELS *

($ in Millions)

	FY86 PRES BUD	FY86 APPROPRIATED	FY87 PRES BUD	PRES BUD DELTA %
EGYPT	1302.0	1245.8	1302.0	0
PAKISTAN	326.2	311.9	341.4	+5
JORDAN	97.0	83.0	117.0	+21
KENYA	26.8	20.8	21.8	-19
SUDAN	60.3	20.3	51.8	-14
SOMALIA	41.5	20.2	37.2	-10
OMAN	58.5	19.3	40.2	-31
YEMEN	7.6	3.1	9.6	+26
DJIBOUTI	2.6	2.0	3.2	+23

*INCLUDES MAP, FMS CREDITS AND IMET

NOTE: Security Assistance Programs with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar are totally FMS cash sales.

Our efforts to promote peace in the Middle East are aided by foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia and assistance to Egypt. Jordan needs assistance to correct the serious military imbalance caused by massive Soviet arms sales to Syria. Providing adequate security assistance to Jordan and Saudi Arabia to help them meet

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their legitimate security needs increases their capability to better defend themselves and complements USCENTCOM's deterrence posture. Moreover, U.S. influence and accessibility in the region are greatly enhanced by continuing a strong and consistent security relationship with these countries. In addition, Pakistani defense capabilities need bolstering to deter a spill-over from Afghanistan. Assistance to these and other countries in the area would be a positive investment in U.S. national security. As you review the security assistance effort this year, we ask that you consider these country needs and the important role security assistance plays in achieving U.S. national objectives in our AOR.

PRESENCE

Finally, and perhaps most important to regional security is U.S. presence. U.S. forces provide the most tangible manifestation of our interests in, and commitment to, this vital area of the world.

AWACS in Saudi Arabia

In response to the Iran/Iraq war, the Saudi Arabian Government presented a formal request to the United States Government for defensive assistance. The request included USAF E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft and crews to monitor the Saudi Eastern Defense Sector (along the Persian Gulf approaches to

Saudi Arabia). The request was honored by the U.S. and, in October 1980, USAF AWACS were sent to Riyadh. The AWACS has provided nearly continuous air defense surveillance in the Eastern Sector ever since.

As the Saudis acquire their own E3A aircraft and assume the mission of gathering surveillance data to be shared with us, 12% of our AWACs fleet will eventually be free for other missions. In sum, the Saudi AWACS program is of significant interest to this command - it solidifies U.S.-Saudi military cooperation, it displays U.S. determination to meet its commitments to nations in this vital area of the world and it demonstrates U.S. support of regional cooperative defense arrangements.

Naval Forces in the Persian Gulf

The U.S. Navy has maintained a permanent force in the Persian Gulf since the end of World War II. Originally formed in January 1948, the force was designated Commander, Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR) in August 1949. The mission of MIDEASTFOR has been to show the flag, secure the sea line of communication in the Gulf and demonstrate U.S. resolve in that troubled part of the world. To do this, MIDEASTFOR conducts naval exercises with regional navies, promotes goodwill through visits and port calls, and conducts surface operations and maritime surveillance.

Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

The establishment of the MFO resulted from the Egypt-Israeli Treaty of Peace in March 1979. The MFO assumed its present form and organization in April 1982 as a result of agreement between Egypt and Israel and the participating nations. It consists of a Director General and staff located in Rome, a Force Commander and staff in the Sinai, three infantry battalions totaling less than 2,000 troops, and other specialized units. These personnel are provided from 11 different nations. United States troops, which form a Light Infantry Battalion Task Force and Logistic Support Unit (LSU), total 1157. USCENTCOM has Operational Command (OPCOM) of the U.S. contingent to the MFO.

REGIONAL EXERCISES AND REAL WORLD CONTINGENCIES

We also engage in "real world" deployments and exercises which prepare us for regional contingency operations. Exercises like SHADOW HAWK with Jordan and IRON COBRA with Egypt are extremely beneficial to us and provide another demonstration of U.S. commitment.

In addition, we have participated in a number of "real world" operations that have demonstrated the ability of U.S. forces to respond to regional crises and improved relationships with friendly

regional nations.

For example, in February 1983 AWACS aircraft deployed to Egypt to help prevent a Libyan sponsored coup attempt against Sudan. Similarly, in response to the bombing of the radio station in Omdurman, Sudan in March 1984 and a request for help from Egypt and Sudan, USCENTCOM deployed Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and support aircraft. Our force arrived in a timely manner, operated in support of friendly forces, and departed when the mission was successfully completed.

In July 1984, when mines threatened the vital waterways of the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea, both Egypt and Saudi Arabia requested mine countermeasures assistance to ensure the safety of transiting vessels. Most recently, our war ships, under the command of COMIDEASTFOR, have provided a protective presence in the Persian Gulf enabling U.S. merchant ships to safely navigate international waters, thereby discouraging provocative boarding and search activity by Iranian forces.

TERRORISM

As previously alluded to, we have been active in combating terrorism, working to develop a credible, rapid and effective response to this problem.

We have increased our intelligence collection efforts against groups and individuals involved in international terrorism. Other actions to confront this problem include threat-awareness training and the establishment of physical security programs.

USCENTCOM is taking a proactive approach to protecting our personnel and facilities. In 1984, we began a program to review the security posture of our security assistance organizations within the AOR. This initial effort concentrated primarily on office and storage facilities. We are now reviewing, in detail, security provided to residences occupied by USCENTCOM personnel and their dependents. Through these reviews and subsequent corrective actions, we have reduced vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks.

Other programs to counter terrorism are reflected on the security review chart.

TERRORISM SECURITY REVIEWS

- Threat awareness training for assigned personnel
- Refresher training for DOD travelers
- Publication of antiterrorism pamphlets
- Dissemination of threat information
- Rapid response to assistance requests
- Continual inspections and assistance visits

In the majority of our countries, we receive excellent security support from the host nation governments. This support normally comes in the form of security personnel to monitor critical facilities, provisions of threat information, and response to incidents. Finally, we work closely with Department of State personnel in the AOR to ensure a coordinated effort is made to protect all U.S. assets.

REORGANIZATION ISSUES

For some time there has been concern that the CINC's warfighting requirements were not being given enough consideration by the Services during POM formulation. OSD has instituted a number of recent initiatives to ensure that these requirements are taken into account during the POM deliberative process. We are now completing the first cycle subsequent to implementing these initiatives. They have definitely been of benefit to the CINCs and may be all that is required. However, until we have evaluated the results it would be premature to comment on whether other initiatives may be required.

Additionally, the JCS has just undertaken a review of JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, with a view toward strengthening the role of the CINCs. We have been given an opportunity to input to the process, and are now awaiting the first draft of the revised document.

As to reorganization in general, I believe my objectives are similar to those of the other unified commanders: authority to select the best staff available to direct unified effort within the theater; a clear line of command to fight and allocate forces and resources within the theater to successfully accomplish the mission; and a direct voice in the allocation of resources (personnel, material, and fiscal) provided by the Military Departments which

enable my Command to do its job. Inherent in the foregoing is the distinction between organizing, training and equipping forces for assignment to unified commands and the authority and responsibility for effectively planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling available resources for the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this statement is to present an overview of the USCENTCOM posture, as we see it at USCENTCOM. I have described our area of responsibility, its importance, the threats we face and have outlined our mission, goals and objectives. I discussed our capabilities, highlighting the programs in the FY87 budget which are most important to USCENTCOM.

With your help, the progress which USCENTCOM has made in the last five years has been significant. We are more ready and more capable today than ever before. However, much remains to be done. The FY87 President's budget, if adopted, will ensure that next year I can again report that USCENTCOM's abilities to deter and to fight have increased.

ANNEX A

Country Catalog

Bahrain

U.S.-Bahraini relations are generally good. Recommendations from the 1984 Defense Review Survey Team (DRST) have begun to be implemented within the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF). Purchases of U.S. military equipment by Bahrain are designed to help that country participate in a regional defense effort under the auspices of the GCC. Provision of projected equipment will modestly improve Bahrain's self-defense capability and will contribute to regional efforts to deter adventurism. The support facilities leased from Bahrain for the U.S. Navy's Middle East Force is crucial to our ability to maintain a modest naval presence in the Persian Gulf.

Security Assistance Program

Although presently modest, the security assistance program for Bahrain is growing rapidly when compared to the FY 75-85 period. Bahrainian purchase of the U.S. F-5 aircraft and M60A3 tanks through FMS cash sales will provide the GOB a significantly enhanced military capability. Bahrain has also shown an interest in purchasing extensive C3 equipment, air defense radars, missiles and transport aircraft. Additionally, we would expect increased FMS expenditures for maintenance and training for their newly acquired equipment.

BAHRAIN PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

FY75-85	FY86	FY87
$226,533,000	$100,000,000	$10,000,000

BAHARAIN TRAINING

YEAR	STUDENTS	COST $(000)
83	4	67
84	1	26
85	6	68

Djibouti

Djibouti has permitted the U.S. Navy access to its modern and well-located seaport and airport. Since late 1979, with the increased U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean, that access has become even more important. The Djiboutian Government has adopted positions on most international issues compatible with those of the United States. The objective of U.S. military assistance is to aid Djibouti in maintaining a small military force capable of successfully defending its territory for a limited time until military or diplomatic assistance from other sources can become effective. U.S. efforts are intended to complement the French supporting role in Djibouti and to contribute to the development of the nation and its military's civic action capability.

Security Assistance Program

The program for Djibouti consists of the Military Assistance Program (MAP), International Military Training and Education (IMET) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance. The MAP program is specifically designed, in conjunction with IMET, to enable the Djiboutians to create a heavy engineering construction company, to provide an English language laboratory and to buy spare parts. A portion of the program has been devoted to the purchase of a small passenger and transport aircraft to be used for interior transport, training, disaster relief, etc., and a portion for the purchase of military uniforms. The engineer program will facilitate road

construction in a country with a severely limited transportation network and will benefit both the military and civilian infrastructure. The IMET program provides essential training to effectively use U.S. equipment provided through MAP. Training for the engineering company is the highest training priority for Djibouti. ESF provides balance of payments support and project assistance in the areas of health, human resources development, low-income housing, fisheries development and energy development.

DJIBOUTI PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY81-85	FY86	FY87
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	5,975	1,914	3,000
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	362	96	150
GRANT AID TOTAL	6,337	2,010	3,150
USG CREDIT	0	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	0	0	0

DJIBOUTI TRAINING

	IMET		PMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
82	4	60	8	104	12	268
83	7	100	0	0	7	100
84	6	140	0	0	6	140
85	7	100	0	0	7	100

Egypt

Egypt is key to our strategy in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. The country acts as a focal point for regional cooperation and leadership on military and security matters. The GOE shares our concern about the potential growth of Soviet and Soviet surrogate influence in the area. Egyptian cooperation was essential to the successful multinational effort to clear the Gulf of Suez and Red Sea of mines in 1984. Egypt has also participated with us in a number of joint military training exercises which have benefited both countries. Our security assistance is designed to encourage Egypt to continue their positive participation in the peace process and to deter Libyan aggression. It is directed toward replacing Egypt's older Soviet equipment with modern U.S. systems to help ensure Egyptian modernization, self-confidence, and ability to deter aggression.

Security Assistance Program

The program for Egypt consists of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET) grants and Economic Support Funds (ESF). FMS financing is used by the Egyptians to fund the acquisition of weapons and equipment. IMET reinforces the FMS program by training Egyptian personnel to operate and maintain U.S. equipment and familiarizing them with U.S. military management concepts and military doctrine. The proposed all-grant ESF program will enable Egypt to import capital goods and

establish new productive capacity in the industrial and agricultural sectors. Project assistance will be used to improve and expand critical infrastructure such as agricultural technology, urban water and sewer systems.

EGYPT PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN MILLIONS)

USG GRANT AID	FY79-85	FY86	FY87
MAP	0	0	0
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	3,390	1,244.1	1,300
IMET	10.8	1.7	2
GRANT AID TOTAL	3,400.8	1,245.8	1,302
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	4,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	4,000	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	0	0	0

EGYPT TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
83	338	2,000	15	64	353	2,064
84	258	2,000	7	106	265	2,106
85	203	1,800	156	602	359	2,602
86	169	2,000	TBD	TBD		

Jordan

Jordan's role in the peace process, scrupulous maintenance of the security of its frontier with Israeli and favorable political orientation make this country a key factor in promoting regional stability. Jordan has traditionally looked to the West as its primary military supplier. Failure to provide for Jordan's defense needs not only detracts from their ability to continue to play a moderating role in the region, but may result in Jordan turning elsewhere for arms. A strong Jordan would seem to be in our best interests and the best interests of the nations of the region. The serious imbalance which has been caused by the massive Soviet arms assistance program with Syria is a matter of legitimate concern.

Security Assistance Program

The Jordanian program consists of FMS Financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Economic Support Funds (ESF). MAP assistance ended in FY80. FMS financing, approximately one-half of their credits, will be used to support the Jordanian Air Force's force modernization programs: upgrading F-5 aircraft and the Improved Hawk air defense system already in inventory and purchasing additional communications equipment, tactical vehicles, and increased war reserve stocks of ammunition. FMS funds are also earmarked to maintain the existing force structure with spare parts and consumables and to acquire training ammunition. The IMET program is designed to continue the training of instructor cadres to

.mprove the quality of Jordanian military schools and improve operations and logistic support of U.S. furnished equipment. The ESF program focuses on agriculture, water resources and education.

JORDAN PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN MILLIONS)

USG GRANT AID	FY75-85	FY86	FY87(Proposed)
MAP	295,588	0	0
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	13,941	1,675	2,000
GRANT AID TOTAL	309,529	1,675	2,000
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	674,000	19,140	50,000
FMS CONCESSIONAL	55,000	62,205/	65,000
CREDIT TOTAL	729,000	81,345	115,000
FMS CASH SALES	1,705,754	0	0

JORDAN TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
83	384	1,295	229	5,878	613	7,173
84	374	1,729	25	170	397	1,899
85	384	1,750	0	0	384	1,750
86	381	2,000	15	TBD	396	2,000+

Kenya

During the late 1970s and 1980s, a close relationship has developed between the United States and Kenya culminating in increased economic ties, a large U.S. aid program, and the presence of the second largest U.S. Peace Corps element in the world. Kenya plays a critical role in our security strategy in Southwest Asia and the Horn of Africa and is one of two countries in East Africa with which the United States has a formal military access agreement. Kenya permits U.S. military access to its airfields, ports and other facilities and provides fuel, repair facilities and resupply for U.S. ships and aircraft. Security assistance contributes to stability by helping Kenya improve its self-defense capabilities and by promoting U.S.-Kenyan military cooperation.

Security Assistance Program

The proposed security assistance program for Kenya consists of Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants, International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Economic Support Funds (ESF). The MAP Program is designed to provide follow-on support for Kenyan F-5 fighter aircraft; follow-on support for the Kenyan anti-tank helicopter (Hughes 500 D/MD) program; and assistance in improving the Kenyan army engineer brigade. The IMET program concentrates on aircraft operations and maintenance training and assists the Kenyan military in developing skills for the effective management of its defense establishment. ESF provides resources for programs which assist economic development.

KENYA PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY75-85	FY86	FY87(Proposed)
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	50,500	19,140	20,000
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	8,929	1,627	1,800
GRANT AID TOTAL	59,429	20,767	21,800
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	155,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	155,000	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	0	0	0

KENYA TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
82	72	927	0	0	72	927
83	90	1,400	15	2,713	105	4,113
84	126	1,621	0	0	126	1,621
85	138	1,688	4	1,776	142	3,464

Kuwait

While the U.S. has provided some military assistance to Kuwait, our involvement and interest in this country are basically economic: international investment, oil, and trade. Kuwait's location at the northern tip of the Arabian Peninsula makes it the first line of defense in the event of a military incursion against the moderate Gulf states. The escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, to include attacks on non-belligerent shipping in the Gulf during the past year, has increased Kuwait's need to upgrade its defensive capability. U.S. security assistance is intended to provide defense equipment and services which will enhance Kuwait's ability to participate in regional defense arrangements with other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.

Security Assistance Program

All purchases under the security assistance program are on a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash or commercial sale basis. Kuwaiti purchases include: follow-on support for previously purchased aircraft, artillery, anti-tank and air defense systems; upgraded air defense command and control system; construction of an air force flight training school; professional military training and pilot training. Kuwait also has indicated an interest in purchasing new fighter aircraft. All training for Kuwait is FMS funded and provides professional development courses for officer and aircraft operations and maintenance courses for pilots and mechanics respectively.

KUWAIT PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY75-85	FY86	FY87
USG GRANT AID	0	0	0
USG CREDIT	0	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	2,564	100,000	80,000

KUWAIT TRAINING

YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)
82	263	5,335
83	108	1,501
84	227	5,970
85	297	8,470
86	311	9,540 (estimated)

Oman

The U.S.-Oman Access Agreement, which provides for limited peacetime and contingency use of designated Omani military facilities, is key to U.S. Central Command responses to contingencies threatening U.S. interests in the region. The Sultan has supported U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East and openly indorses a balance of U.S. and Soviet influence in Southwest Asia. Military cooperation between the U.S. and Oman during peacetime includes use of specific facilities, support for the Navy's Indian Ocean Battle Group and participation in periodic joint exercises. Security assistance for Oman is intended to provide that country with the equipment and training necessary to deter or defend against aggression from Iran or PDRY. As the southernmost member of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the guardian of the Strait of Hormuz, a strong Oman is important to regional stability.

Security Assistance Program

The security assistance program for Oman consists of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance. Oman is interested in FMS financing for the purchase of air-to-air missiles, additional C-130 transport/tanker aircraft, recovery vehicles and heavy equipment transporters. FMS financing is also used to support U.S. equipment already in Oman's inventory. The IMET program is intended to provide professional training for mid-

level military officers as well as operational and technical skill training to enhance Oman's overall military capability. IMET is expected to be significantly reduced in the coming years due to Omani budget decreases in military spending. Oman's willingness to share student travel and living allowance costs maximizes benefits. Grant ESF will be used to fund the operation of the Omani-American Joint Commission and to provide for feasibility and design studies and technical assistance; most of the grant monies will be used for a scholarship and training project. An ESF loan will finance a project to improve and expand the water supply system for the capital region.

OMAN PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

			(Proposed)
USG GRANT AID	FY75-85	FY86	FY87
MAP	0	0	0
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	479	144	205
GRANT AID TOTAL	479	144	205
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	190,000	19,140	40,000
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	190,000	19,140	40,000
FMS CASH SALES	190,995	0	0

OMAN TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
84	13	146	0	0	15	127
85	33	150	0	0	24	150
86	52	274	0	0	52	274

Pakistan

Pakistan is a haven for over three million Afghan refugees and has been under intense pressure from the Soviets due to the continuing GOP support for the Mujahedin. Pakistan's large and well trained forces lack modern equipment necessary to deter or successfully defend against potential Soviet/Afghan aggression. U.S. security assistance is intended to support regional stability by helping Pakistan improve and gain confidence in its defense capabilities and economic performance.

Security Assistance Program

The Security Assistance Program consists of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit financing and cash sales, International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Economic Support Funds (ESF). FMS financing helps pay for the continued modernization of the Pakistani armed forces, principally for the acquisition of aircraft, light helicopters, howitzers, armored vehicles, shipboard weapons systems and munitions. FMS credit purchases will be augmented by cash purchases of similar equipment. The IMET program trains Pakistanis to operate and maintain a range of American-made military equipment. It provides professional leadership and management training, as well as graduate level courses, pilot training and technical training in

maintenance, operations and communications electronics. IMET training is divided, with 50% going to the Army and 25% going to both the Air Force and Navy. ESF funds focus on assisting Pakistani development in energy, agriculture and health sectors. A commodity import program will fund imports of fertilizer, energy and agricultural equipment and will also provide the Pakistani economy with balance of payments support to help it compensate for heavy costs connected with strengthening of its armed forces.

PAKISTAN PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

USG GRANT AID	FY75-85	FY86	FY87(Proposed)
MAP	650,281	0	0
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	27,626	885	1,400
GRANT AID TOTAL	677,907	885	1,400
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	567,633	311,025	340,000
FMS CONCESSIONAL	325,000	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	892,633	311,025	340,000
FMS CASH SALES	2,954,139	0	0

PAKISTAN TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
83	81	700	28	102	109	802
84	94	800	327	6,207	414	7,007
85	122	1,000	107	1,507	229	2,507

Qatar

The security of Qatar is important to the free passage of oil through the Gulf. With ample oil revenues and a shortage of native manpower, Qatar is a GCC member and maintains a small military force equipped primarily with British and French weapons systems. Our security assistance program is structured to enable Qatar to assure internal order, to cooperate with its GCC partners in regional defense and to promote a closer U.S.-Qatari relationship. Security assistance to Qatar is limited to modest FMS cash purchases, mostly for technical training.

Security Assistance Program

QATAR PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

	FY75-85	FY86	FY87
FMS CASH SALES	843	0	0

QATAR TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
83	0	0	13	209	13	209
84	0	0	2	38	2	38
85	0	0	4	15	4	15

Saudi Arabia

Conservative and stable, the Saudi Arabian government has taken a staunch anti-communist position in its foreign policy relationships. Revenues from the sale of oil enable the Saudis to play a key role in the economic life of the region and has allowed the Kingdom to extend financial assistance to countries such as Morocco, Somalia and Pakistan. Without this assistance, U.S. arms transfers to these countries would not have been possible. Military sales to Saudi Arabia, which are designed to improve and modernize its forces, are directed toward developing internal security capabilities and encouraging a collective regional defense with other GCC states. Saudi Arabia continues its quiet, but significant, efforts to encourage a peaceful settlement of the Iran-Iraq War, the fighting in Lebanon, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Security Assistance Program

Through FMS cash sales, Saudi Arabia purchases defense articles and services needed for its defense modernization program. The purchase of the E3A AWACS aircraft by Saudi Arabia will further enhance its air defense capability, an important factor in containing the Iran-Iraq War. Additionally, we will eventually be able to redirect our AWACS aircraft, now in Saudi Arabia, to other priority missions. The sale is important to our efforts to show our commitment in the region, encourage cooperative defense arrangements and show support for our friends. Other programs include the

mechanization of additional Saudi Arabian Land Forces brigades; training and modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard; strengthening the air defense posture of the Royal Saudi Air Force through continued support for the F-5 and F-15 aircraft programs and the enhancement of communications and control capabilities; and continued training on new equipment for the Saudi Navy. All training is FMS funded.

SAUDI ARABIA PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN MILLIONS)

	FY74-85	FY86	FY87
USG GRANT AID			
MAP	26	0	0
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	12.5	0	0
GRANT AID TOTAL	38.5	0	0
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	254	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	254	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	51,974	4,000	4,000

SA TRAINING

YEAR	STUDENTS
82	563
83	866
84	447
85	928
86	682

Somalia

Somalia is one of the poorest nations in the area. However, it is one of the most cooperative supporters of U.S. goals in the region. Somalia requires outside assistance to offset its lack of natural resources and hardships caused by recent drought, famine and war. Somalia's stability continues to be jeopardized by threats from Ethiopia, primarily related to the Ogaden territorial disputes. In addition, Somali dissidents continue to mount hit-and-run raids against targets of opportunity such as villages, vehicles on highways, and isolated Somali military installations. U.S. security assistance adds to Somalia's modest self-defense capabilities, promotes stability in the Horn of Africa and ensures access to military facilities in the region.

Security Assistance Programs

The security assistance program is composed of: Military Assistance Program (MAP), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance. Somalia's severe balance of payments crisis requires that military assistance be provided on a grant rather than credit basis. MAP funds the most serious shortfalls in Somalia's defensive posture, including artillery, small arms, personnel carriers, air defense, radar communications equipment, and a logistics improvement program. IMET programs include English language training, officer participation in basic armor and infantry programs, enrollment of

selected enlisted personnel in technical NCO courses, and senior grade officer attendance at professional military education courses. ESF is allocated to a Commodity Import Program (CIP) and initiatives to enhance private enterprise. The program will finance raw materials, spare parts, capital equipment, transport, water delivery systems, and light industrial equipment.

SOMALIA PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

USG GRANT AID	FY80-85	FY86	FY87(Proposed)
MAP	95,000	19,140	35,600
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	3,554	1,101	1,550
GRANT AID TOTAL	98,554	20,241	37,150
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	60,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	60,000	0	0
FMS CASH SALES***	0	0	0

SOMALIA TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
82	26	454	8	104	34	558
83	32	600	0	0	32	600
84	46	993	0	0	46	993
85	72	957	0	0	72	957
86	93	1,303	0	0	93	1,303

Sudan

The geographic location of Sudan is of strategic importance to U.S. military access and deployments to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. An immediate serious threat to Sudan's stability derives from its chronically weak economy and the spectre of default on a foreign debt now exceeding the country's total GNP. Recent efforts on the part of Qhadafi to normalize Libyan/Sudanese relations, the continued hostility of Ethiopia and the rebel insurgency in southern Sudan will continue to threaten the stability of the country. By responding to critical short-term needs, the U.S. has helped Sudan maintain international solvency and access to external credit. Without continued U.S. economic assistance, there is little hope of Sudan covering its external debt gap and mobilizing assistance from other bilateral donors. Selective rehabilitation of the Sudanese armed forces, with primary emphasis on maintenance, logistics and air defense, will enable Sudan to present a credible deterrent to hostile regional powers. IMET training and MAP assistance will strengthen the overall readiness of Sudan's armed forces and enhance its ability to counter violations of its long borders.

Security Assistance Program

The proposed FY86 security assistance program for Sudan consists of Military Assistance Program (MAP), International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Economic Support Fund (ESF)

assistance. The U.S. Military Assistance Program money is primarily used to build and support a light, mobile, maintainable and deployable desert force able to defend Sudan's borders. The central element of the IMET program is English language instruction. Functional training by Mobile Training Teams (MTT's) in logistics and maintenance is geared to improving utilization of U.S. equipment in the Sudanese inventory. MTTs provide engineering, armor, and artillery in-country training. Additional training in the U.S. is given to Sudanese officers in such fields as communications, maintenance, logistics and operations. ESF funds are allocated to the purchase of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, jute wrapping for cotton exports, industrial inputs, and spare parts and equipment for the power, transport, petroleum and communications sectors.

SUDAN PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

USG GRANT AID	FY75-85	FY86	FY87(Proposed)
MAP	134,720	19,140	50,000
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	50,000	0	0
IMET	6,724	1,148	1,750
GRANT AID TOTAL	191,444	20,288	51,750
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	100,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	0
CREDIT TOTAL	100,000	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	0	0	0

SUDAN TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
82	98	1,146	131	842	229	1,988
83	74	1,330	38	232	112	1,930
84	132	1,459	17	279	149	1,738
85	120	1.407	30	411	150	1,818

UAE

The UAE, located near the strategic Strait of Hormuz, plays an active role in OPEC and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Its oil wealth and generous foreign assistance program, as well as its efforts to mediate in regional conflicts, give it more influence than its size would suggest. Adequate defense of the UAE's long coast line is important to security of the Arabian Peninsula as a whole and necessitates defense equipment appropriate for the task. U.S. security assistance is designed to improve air defense and early warning capabilities to counter the Iranian threat to Gulf security.

Security Assistance Program

The entire UAE program consists of Foreign Military cash sales. The UAE is also interested in possible purchase of an advanced U.S. fighter aircraft later in the decade as well as helicopters, armored personnel carriers, TOW missiles and possibly the E-2C early warning aircraft. The majority of UAE training dollars are spent on Air Force pilot training, I-Hawk system training and PME.

UAE PROGRAM LEVELS

($ THOUSANDS)

	FY75-85	FY86	FY87(Proposed)
GRANT AID	0	0	0
USG CREDIT	0	0	0
FMS CASH SALES	879,504	130,000	150,000

UAE TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
83	0	0	93	2,017	93	2,017
84	0	0	44	1,709	44	1,709
85	0	0	30	4,101	30	4,101

Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)

Economically, the YAR is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the Middle East. Although oil has recently been discovered, it will be several years before substantial income is realized from this source. The Soviet Union has obtained a foothold in the YAR through the sale of Soviet military equipment and training on liberal credit terms. The debt resulting from this credit gives Moscow considerable political leverage. While the comparatively modest U.S. security assistance programs are unlikely to reverse Soviet gains, they do reinforce elements within the Yemeni government and military that seek alternatives to reliance on the Soviet Union. Specific U.S. programs have been designed to highlight the qualitative superiority of our assistance. U.S. aid is also important in augmenting existing and future cooperative assistance programs with Saudi Arabia. The security assistance program for the YAR is designed to assist in the maintenance of U.S.-origin equipment provided by Saudi Arabia and by the U.S. It is intended to contribute to YAR's stability, by countering Soviet influence and deterring renewed insurgency threats from South Yemen.

Security Assistance Program

The security assistance program consists of Military Assistance Program (MAP) and International Military Education and Training (IMET). MAP will be used to buy follow-on support that will sustain

present force levels and modestly enhance the capabilities of all three armed services. Equipment purchases may include replacement trucks and tracked vehicles and possibly follow-on support for other U.S.-origin items already in inventory. In addition, the YAR may seek to buy armored vehicles and TOW anti-tank missiles. The IMET program finances operations and maintenance training on U.S. equipment and an in-country English language training course.

YAR PROGRAM LEVELS

($ IN THOUSANDS)

USG GRANT AID	FY74-85	FY86	FY87(Proposed)
MAP	11,000	1,914	5,000
FMS CREDIT (FORGIVEN)	0	0	0
IMET	8,028	1,148	1,550
GRANT AID TOTAL	19,028	3,062	6,550
USG CREDIT			
FMS GUARANTEED	14,000	0	0
FMS CONCESSIONAL	0	0	3,000
CREDIT TOTAL	14,000	0	3,000
FMS CASH SALES	375,439	0	0

YAR TRAINING

	IMET		FMS		TOTAL	
YEAR	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)	STUDENTS	$(000)
82	48	1,205	22	*	70	1,205
83	58	1,200	39	*	97	1,200
84	31	1,063	56	*	87	1,063
85	62	1,200	24	*	86	1,200

* Saudi Funded

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, General. That was a very comprehensive, quick, and easily understood report, which I know we will have questions on.

Because he was the first man here today, which is usual, we expect that of the Navy, Admiral Denton, you may start.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, I am not usually the first man here.

I would like to ask you, General Crist, this question. As a matter of clarification, none of these forces that you have are actually available to you at this point; if you wanted to send the 101st or the 82d somewhere, you couldn't do it right now. Is that correct?

General CRIST. That's correct, Senator, except for the Navy ships of the Middle East Force and ELF-1 that are located in my theater. The rest of the forces are available for planning.

Senator DENTON. These forces that you have listed as yours for planning, are they not also required in other plans, such as the reinforcement of Europe in the case of a NATO problem?

General CRIST. Yes sir, that is correct. All forces except some special forces and tactical fighter squadrons in my small force plan are also available to other unified commanders in their major plans.

Senator DENTON. How would you assess the difference in your ability to fulfill your mission of maintaining access to and unhindered use of Persian Gulf oil resources in these two conditions.

Condition (A): The United States gets indications that the Soviets might accomplish the following scenario: start moving into the Mideast on the claim that they are going to preserve stability. They say, "there is a war between Iran and Iraq, the Moslems are killing the Jews, the Moslems are killing Moslems, we are going to come on in here and preserve stability, and don't anybody worry about their oil, they are going to get it, we will take care of that. But we are going to bring order into this chaos." Then they move in there, and after a while they start to cut off the oil. You then have the task of going in there and landing on opposed shores and trying to maintain access to the Persian Gulf oil resources.

Condition (B): We get indications that the Soviets are planning to do that kind of thing and you wish to pre-position yourself in order to deter it. It would be like moving a chess piece as large as, say, a rook, into an area, thereby deterring conflict, preventing that move on the part of the Soviets, and you actually have forces there.

In your answer, would you compare your task of hitting and holding that opposed shore and expanding from it with the task of reinforcing Europe and all of the complexities and difficulties it represents, with the SWA, the uncertainties that exist there. Which would be more difficult—landing and accomplishing your mission to maintain access in the Persian Gulf to that oil, or the reinforcement of Europe? Particularly, I want to know how much easier it would be to do (B) than (A), in other words, to pre-position. That taxes your powers as an analyst, not just a military tactician and general.

I would like to hear something about that because, I think, it is very important.

It is a vital national interest to protect the oil. Brezhnev said he is going to deny to the West, one, the treasure trove of oil in the

Mideast, and two, the treasure trove of metals and minerals in Africa. It seems to me that the Soviets are well on the way to being in a position to do that, and I do not see that we have at hand a reasonable confidence that we can defend against either if they do it as cleverly as, I think, they are able to do.

General CRIST. Senator, you have given me two scenarios. Let me back off and first say what, I think, the Soviet objectives are, because, I think, that is fairly important.

Senator DENTON. Excuse me, sir. Would you repeat that. I could not hear you.

General CRIST. I'm sorry, sir. You have given me a fairly wide question there.

Let me back off first and say what, I think, the Soviet objectives are.

To paraphrase a popular television show, I think Iran is for the Soviets the "Jewel in the Crown."

If the Soviets could either own Iran or have influence over the government, such as the Kharmal government in Afghanistan, they have the whole bag. Persian Gulf oil, in the fields of Khuzestan and directly across the border in Kuwait, and in the northern region of Saudi Arabia can be influenced by any military forces situated in southern Iran.

If the Soviets could put armed forces in Abadan and Bandar-Abbas, they could absolutely control militarily, access to the entire gulf and intimidate the nations sitting across the gulf.

I have a counterpart, by the way whose name is Zaytsev. One of the finest generals in the Soviet Army, he took over the southern TVD which was recently established to project power south. He is doing a very good job, upgrading his forces and is a very tough soldier.

I believe he is moving along some timeline, which will eventually do exactly what you say, that is put him into Iran.

Senator DENTON. Don't they have nearly 30 divisions opposite Iran right now?

General CRIST. They have 32 divisions and between 800 and 900 aircraft. That, of course, includes the five divisions that he has in Afghanistan now. But he could move those into Iran if he so wished.

The key, of course, is to keep him from going into Iran, Senator.

Now, how does one do that?

The first thing to do, I think, is to start filling in the vacuum. As you are more aware than I, the Persian Gulf was protected by the colonial powers, primarily France and England, who, in fact, contained the Russians until 1941. At the end of World War II, when they occupied Iran through 1946, it was our nuclear power and the threat of using it which I think encouraged them to leave. Then CENTO provided the buffer through 1979.

I think it is probably no coincidence that in 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, CENTO collapsed, or was dissolved, and our hostage situation all took place in the same year.

That resulted in a vacuum.

The United States established the RDJTF to try to fill the vacuum. What one has to do first, from my point of view—is to encourage regional defense arrangements among those countries. The

Soviets should perceive that the Saudis, the Bahrainis, the Omanis, and all the GCC countries are linked with the Pakistanis to provide some sort of regional defensive capability.

Then it is our job—my job—to come up with a credible plan which says yes, Mr. Soviet, if you wish to come across the border, I will be able to deploy my forces in such strength that I am going to make you pay.

Now, what do I mean by "make you pay?"

It is about 1,200 miles from the border of the Soviet Union down to the gulf, and they must go two places to achieve their goal. They have to go to Khuzestan and Bandar-Abbas. It's a long way down.

Airpower, and special operations forces, can make that a very expensive operation for them as they move south. When they get near the gulf, they can only bring so many divisions to bear at one time because of the terrain. We can make it very expensive.

What I must put in the mind of my counterpart is: "Is it worth it to you to pay that price?" I must do this by developing a credible capability and credible plan.

Now, it has been said to me that you are a paper tiger, General. You are sitting in Tampa with you, your sergeant major, and a flag.

That is not true.

As you can see from my charts, I have the sealift. I am pretty well on the way with airlift, now, to get over there. So we can get our forces in and put them on the ground.

Will these countries cooperate with us? Will the ones that have been hesitant to give us access, such as Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, do so? Yes, I believe they will. In talking to their leaders, if they see the Soviet Union invading, school is out. They will be as terrified and perhaps even more terrified than they are of Iranian forces crossing the Shatt-al-Arab.

We will be able to come in.

I think I can show the Soviets the readiness and the capabilities of the forces, and that I exercise them. I just came off a 2-week exercise at Fort Bragg. Wringing our guys through it. Can we do it? Yes, we can.

I have some long poles in the tent, but the tent is up. It is not down around my ears.

You asked me what would happen if the Soviets took Iran.

Let's presume if I might, Senator, for a moment, the Afghanistan scenario. They are there in force, in the key locations and still have resistance. I don't think the Persians will put up with the Russians any more than they have put up with an Iraqi invasion. They will resist the Soviets.

Nonetheless, if the Soviets are established in Iran, it would be very, very difficult, without a major investment of U.S. Forces, for us to go back into Iran and take the key places that we would need to.

The answer to that, of course, is to get there before they do and make them come to us.

With regard to the NATO linkage, that you mentioned, Senator, and the diversion of forces from NATO, my counterpart has a little bit better situation than I do in that he does not have to divert his

forces to do what he has to do, other than the possibility of an excursion into Turkey.

So he has the force in place to accomplish his mission.

What I must do is plan for a minimum force which will do what I said: Extract the maximum toll on him, or at least make him think it will, and deny him those final objectives that he needs to take. Or, if he wishes to bring all the power necessary to dislodge me, he pays a very great price, and must divert forces from NATO.

If the Soviet Union wants to commit enough resources and enough forces over enough time against the forces I have, he can, indeed, prevail. That is the decision that I am trying to dissuade my Soviet counterpart from making. To make him think it is not worth the doing.

Part of making him think of that, of course, is my own projection capability. An equal part, as I mentioned earlier, is getting these regional defense arrangements in the gulf established so that we would not have to do all of this by ourselves.

I don't know if I answered all your questions, Senator.

Senator DENTON. Thank you very much, General.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I think the admiral has a comment.

Admiral HAYS. Mr. Chairman, if I might offer another perspective, we have, since 1979, maintained a carrier battle group in the area. That conveys to the Soviets a seriousness about our Nation's interest in the area. I think, with a continuation of that kind of signal, perhaps the scenario which you described, sir, would be prevented in the first place.

Senator DENTON. That sounds like no sweat.

If that is a vital interest area, though, for us, whose denial to us would mean "death to the West," he would be willing to spend quite a few resources, I would think. I don't think that the battle group or the forces assigned to you would be sufficient to the task.

But that is just a personal opinion.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I came in late. Has everybody else had a chance? I would defer to my colleagues.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I yield to you if you want to say something.

Senator NUNN. I'll defer to my colleagues.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Pete, let's start with you.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, let me ask you a question pursuant to the stated national security objective of maintaining an increased U.S. presence to deter Soviet aggression and counter Soviet efforts to gain power and hegemony in the region.

I assume this means not only directly but also through Soviet surrogates.

Looking at your two charts, Nos. 8 and 9, which have to do with force projection and how you achieve it through strategic airlift, I note that the sorties required to achieve that national security objective include over 8,000 C-141B sorties, and looking at chart 9, you indicate the ability to achieve a portion of the master airlift capability of 66 million ton-miles per day.

Your chart makes clear that there is a shortfall, and I would gather that your command, in particular, is one where it would be more acutely felt. The concentration that you have put on force projection, it seems to me is a proper one and reflects the need to be able to move troops convincingly in a hurry.

The specific shortfall that you identify looks like it is about, from the chart, if I am reading it correctly, somewhere in the neighborhood of 20 million ton-miles per day.

Is that about right?

General CRIST. That's about right.

C–17 PROGRAM CANCELED

Senator WILSON. Let me ask how the cancellation of the C–17 program would affect your ability to project force credibly and convincingly?

General CRIST. Well, sir, I am very hopeful that you do not cancel that capability.

As you look at the chart on strategic airlift, for instance, you see with the addition of the C–5B in addition to the other enhancements, we get to about 50 million ton-miles per day. What gets me from 50 to the 66 million ton-miles goal is going to be a new transport of some type.

The airlift program that gets me there includes the C–5B's, the new 141 stretch program, the KC–10 buy, the CRAF enhancements, the 747's, and a new transport aircraft which fills in the last square. If we do not get the new transport aircraft, I do not fill in the square—whether that be a C–17, sir, or some other aircraft. In my mind I need an aircraft which operates like a 130 and has the capacity of a C–141. If I can get something like that, I've got it made.

But I really do need that capability.

Senator WILSON. I would think that in the various scenarios that you have devised to test the adequacy of our force projection capability, you have looked at the distinct possibility of having to move troops quickly to an area where we may be denied access to existing air bases.

General CRIST. I really have not worked so much on an air assault scenario, although that is always a possibility, Senator.

Primarily, I am looking at first getting the forces into the theater. The problem is then, when you talk about intratheater airlift as they talk about in Europe, I can put Europe in the corner of my area. The C–130 takes literally days to move around inside the theater. So, if I marshall my troops, strategically deploy them, say to Cairo, then on to Saudi Arabia, and across the Gulf, normally in most people's lexicon, in the European lexicon, that would be called intratheater lift. But here we are talking in terms of maybe 1,000 miles, which is really strategic lift.

So, my limitations therefore are primarily in the numbers of fields that can handle C–5's and C–141's. There are a fair amount of such fields in Saudi Arabia. They dwindle as you move along the coast, till they get to one or two that can handle those kinds of loads and aircraft.

Obviously, I need multiple entry points. So I need an aircraft that can handle something under 7,000 feet of runway, getting down to about 3,000 feet. Then I would be able to fly directly across the Gulf into Iran, if that is where I am at that point in time, and not have to transship troops, supplies or equipment.

So, again, for me it is more than just a function of numbers of aircraft and how fast they get to the fields. It is the small size of the fields vis-a-vis a sizable payload that I can put on the field which is the criterion, as opposed to simply an assault or transport aircraft.

Senator WILSON. Thank you.

Admiral, you are confronted with great distances in your command as well.

I would be interested in your comments—and you probably could take all afternoon to do this, though we don't have that kind of time.

ACCESS OF PHILIPPINE BASES

In the recent Philippine election, a number of opinions were ventured, I thought rather cavalierly, that, well, so what if, in fact, a hostile administration should decide that when those leases are up, they will not be renewed, we can always pull back to Guam.

This struck me as a bit fatuous.

Once again, I am leading the witness. But I would be interested in your response and also your response to the same question that I asked General Crist: What would cancellation or a protracted deferral of the C-17 Program do to your capability to achieve your mission?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

As regards the Philippines and our base structure there, the first point I would make is that strategically, they are situated in an optimum location. We have, over the years, made quite an investment in an infrastructure there, and what we have today serves us exceedingly well—not only in the support of forces, both naval and air forces, but also in the training of those forces. We have a lot of training facilities there which are extremely important to our future, and would be very difficult and expensive to replace anywhere else. Now, I think it is significant to note that the new president, Mrs. Aquino, has stated a number of times that she intends to abide by the base agreement and that she will keep all options open for the future.

I would expect that we will engage in a review of the agreement at some point in the not too distant future, and that review will be very difficult. However, I am optimistic that we will succeed in arriving at an agreement for an extension of those accesses that we have to those two facilities at the present time.

One has to be concerned, I think, about the security aspects. There is a rising insurgency that, theoretically, could jeopardize the base structure. The fact is that, thus far, we have seen an apparent policy of the New People's Army avoiding attack against either Americans or those facilities.

Now, that policy on the part of the New People's Army could change without notification, and it behooves us, in the interim, to

do those things which are appropriate to the security, the physical security, of those bases. We do now, in fact, have under way projects which enhance the physical security of those bases.

So I am optimistic, sir, about our bases in the Philippines, and I think that is very fortunate, because to contemplate alternatives—and we have done that—causes you to realize that we really cannot replace all of the facilities that we have there, and to do so would cost us an awful lot of money.

As regards the C–17, you pointed out quite correctly that in the Pacific we have to deal with vast distances. That is a characteristic of the theater. There are no short trips in the Pacific. We must, therefore, have adequate airlift if we are to respond as you expect, as the nation's interest requires.

The statistics which General Crist has recited, I can recite also, and the conclusions are similar, that we have a deficiency that will improve with a new airlift aircraft, and for our readiness, for our ability to accomplish our objectives in the future, we need enhanced airlift.

Senator WILSON. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Bill.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, if I could follow up on that, you are not coming down one way or the other on what type of aircraft that should be, are you?

Admiral HAYS. No, sir.

Senator COHEN. We have to make a decision fairly soon. I suppose one could argue that because you do have long distances, it might favor a C–5 approach, which can carry nearly twice as much payload as the C–17, and to produce more C–5's.

I am not arguing that, but one certainly could make that argument on your behalf.

Admiral HAYS. What we must do in my judgment, sir, is to ensure that we have the capacity to airlift those urgent items which will be necessary.

NEW ZEALAND

Senator COHEN. Would you comment, Admiral, on New Zealand.

I understand that this summer they intend to move to formally incorporate, legislatively, their current antinuclear policy.

Would you comment, No. 1, if they do, would that in your judgment cause us to terminate any formal relationship with ANZUS? And two, in the absence of moving legislatively, if they continue the current policy and no progress is made, would you recommend that we simply declare our inability to carry out our mission in that region, with respect to that country?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

That is a grievous dispute that we have with an old friend and an ally, which is most unfortunate.

I would hope that whatever we do in response to the legislative package, which I believe will pass and put into law the administrative prohibition that now exists for our port visits, will allow us to preserve the fabric of the ANZUS alliance.

I think that is important, so that if, in the future, attitudes or circumstances change, you can simply pick up and resume the activity which is important, not only to us but to the two other signatories and all of the South Pacific.

Senator COHEN. What does that mean?

I don't know what that means.

Admiral HAYS. That means that we ought not to cancel the ANZUS Treaty, but I think we ought to take very visible and very firm action, which will, essentially, say that while the treaty fabric remains, New Zealand has made it too hard for us to continue the military activity and the obligations that we now have under that treaty.

Senator COHEN. Sharing of intelligence——

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

Senator COHEN [continuing]. Would be something that would be terminated?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir. That would be my recommendation.

As you know, we have terminated an awful lot of meaningful activity that has been going on over the years, and it has been very detrimental to the armed forces of New Zealand, the termination of bilateral, trilateral exercises, and the conferences and the exchange programs. All that is gone now. We do have certain arrangements with the New Zealanders that are still in being. It would be my recommendation, if that law passes, that we reevaluate the remaining.

SAUDI ARABIA

Senator COHEN. Admiral, have you seen any evidence that Saudi Arabia is in danger of attack from either Iran or Iraq?

Admiral HAYS. I think General Crist would be in a better position to respond to that than I, sir. May I pass that to him.

Senator COHEN. General.

General CRIST. Well, Senator, we have had a war going on, as you know, since 1980. Up to now that war has essentially been a stalemate. The Iraqis were pretty well surprised when the Iranians crossed the Shatt-Al-Arab and managed to take Al Faw, but we are now back to a stalemate.

But, nonetheless, it opened up a new prospect of a threat to Kuwait.

One of the defenders of that portion of the Gulf is Saudi Arabia. Kuwait looks to her for protection against both Iran and Iraq; Iraq in the old days, when not tied up in this war, was looking toward invading Kuwait. Now Kuwait also looks to Saudi Arabia for protection against the Iranians.

The Saudis provide the bulk of the air defense in the gulf. As you know, we have AWACS in Saudi Arabia, but only for a surveillance mission. They provide the fighter aircraft.

So, the Saudis are picking up the marbles on defense of the gulf.

There is a potential for attack on Saudi Arabia. The Iranians have said to all of the gulf states that you are supporting Iraq and you must stop. As you know, part of the Iraqi oil is flowing through Saudi pipelines to the Red Sea. So that threat was directly aimed at the Saudis as well as to the other GCC states.

Senator COHEN. They have not carried it out?

General CRIST. They have not carried it out, I think, mostly because of the Saudi capabilities. But there is a potential, yes, for them to be attacked if they do not maintain their strength. There is also a greater potential for Kuwait to be attacked if, in fact, the Saudis were unable to back them up.

Another element in that particular war is the GCC military alliance which, as you know, is a little fledgling plant, just coming out of the sand, upon which I am pouring lots of fertilizer. The point is that they have put together a Peninsula Shield Force at King Khalid Military City, and that force, albeit it is a brigade with problems, is led by and supported by Saudi Arabia, and that too provides a deterrent.

So, consequently, the Saudis are threatened. I would also now add as another threat the new development that we have seen in South Yemen, which was the rather heavy-handed coup supported by the Soviets. The South Yemenis have long had a desire to unify the two Yemens, as we saw in the war not too many years ago against North Yemen. Consequently this development could pose a new threat to the Saudi border.

Consequently, one must say there is a threat to Saudi Arabia, both from Iran and from her south. I guess I could turn it around, Senator Cohen, and say if the Saudis lost their leadership in the military equation, it might be not very good for U.S. interests in the gulf.

KOREA

Senator COHEN. Let me move now to Korea.

Admiral, on page 5 you talked about the stability in Korea and that South Korea is really emerging as a much stronger force internationally in terms of their respect and so forth.

There has been a comparison from time to time in recent weeks made between the situation in South Korea and that of the Philippines. I think you pointed out in your testimony that the Philippines military could not contain the NPA, and that is one of the reasons why Marcos was so unsuccessful, because of the inability of their military to contain the NPA.

Then you switch to Korea and you point to a very strong picture there.

But I was wondering, aside from the strength of their military, what is your analysis of the political stability within South Korea? Is there any comparison or any justification for the kind of editorializing we are seeing today?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

I am very much aware of the comparisons that are being made between what has occurred in the Philippines and what conditions might exist in Korea.

It would seem to me that the principal cause for Mr. Marcos' downfall, above all else, was the economic chaos that existed in the Philippines.

In Korea, you have an economy that is thriving. You have a people who enjoy a standard of living which is many-fold greater than that which exists now in the Philippines.

So, while there might be some comparisons, there are also a lot of dissimilarities between the Philippines and Korea.

The point that I wanted to emphasize with this committee, sir, is that the relationship that exists between the armed forces of the United States in Korea and the ROK forces is very good, and you see a level of interoperability there which I think probably does not exist in many other places in the world, because they use the same equipment, the same training, the same procedures, and so forth. It gives one a lot of comfort to see the level of interoperability.

Senator COHEN. Admiral, my time is up, but I would just make one observation.

BASES IN THE PHILIPPINES

I tend to agree with you that the bases that are situated in the Philippines—if I could shift, once again—are strategically well placed, and the training facilities are intact and so forth, and that Mrs. Aquino intends to abide by the leases until 1991. But I also think it is important that the Navy and the Pentagon examine what the other options are, even knowing that it is going to be expensive, and even knowing it would not be as strategically well placed.

I would point out that in 1991, whoever is in charge, be it Mrs. Aquino at that point or not, we don't want to have such a reliance upon those two bases that we lose all leverage to either extend them or renew them. I think what we have to do is to plan for contingencies, as expensive as they may be, that would give us some flexibility.

I, at a minimum, would recommend that we not engage in the kind of improvements that were discussed, of $1 billion and so forth, until such time as we are satisfied that that kind of investment on the part of the American people is going to pay some long-term dividend.

I would, furthermore, point out that it is not only in our interest, it is very much in the interest of the Philippines for us to continue to have our bases there. But I do not think that we should categorically state over and over that they are indispensible to us. They are important, but certainly we could carry out our mission if we had to, more expensively, and with perhaps more difficulty. But we ought to explore those options, just to give ourselves some protection for the future.

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

I do not disagree with that. We are, at the present time, doing that.

Senator COHEN. The Chairman and I have had some discussions about that, and he may have an ingenious solution which we will talk about later.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Sam.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FILIPINO ARMY

Admiral Hays, I notice on page 6 of your statement, you talk about the Filipino army. I think you have stated very clearly here that one of the reasons the Marcos government was unable to con-

tain the NPA was the absence of an effective military force. The AFP was characterized by poor leadership, lack of training, poor morale, lack of discipline, and low readiness.

I think you testified that we now have a chance to help them overcome these problems, and that this will require fundamental reforms.

I agree with all of that.

What reforms of the Philippine Armed Forces do you think are primarily needed?

Admiral HAYS. Sir, I feel as though the principal reform that is necessary is in the leadership of the armed forces of the Philippines.

There have been an awful lot of references to the "overstaying generals," those who occupied top key positions, and who were regarded to be more "political" than military.

What we see ongoing today is the addressing of that fundamental problem that has existed for quite a long while in the armed forces of the Philippines.

Correct the leadership—and I believe that is being done—and you are well on the road to revitalizing the armed forces of the Philippines.

Senator NUNN. With the new government, do you mean?

Admiral HAYS. With the new government.

It is my belief that General Ramos has the capacity, the intelligence, and the integrity to do the job that is required to bootstrap the armed forces of the Philippines.

Senator NUNN. Do you know him personally?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator NUNN. Do you have a high valuation of him?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir.

It turns out that he and I are classmates of sorts. He is from the Military Academy, class of 1950, and I am from the Naval Academy, class of 1950.

Senator NUNN. How about the young officers? Do they have a good foundation there or does that need reform, too?

Admiral HAYS. I think that the strength that is emerging in the armed forces of the Philippines now, if you can come to that conclusion, might be traced to the quality of the young officer in their armed forces.

We heard a great deal over the past many months about the reform movement in the armed forces of the Philippines. Events of the last 2 to 3 weeks certainly demonstrate that it was perhaps a more powerful influence than we had appreciated at the time.

But I think, sir, that the quality of the young officer in the AFP shows a lot of promise.

Senator NUNN. So you believe that the change of government and the military reform that has been initiated offers the possibility for fundamentally strengthening the military?

Admiral HAYS. Without any question.

If I might add, sir, more than a change of leadership is required. The AFP, like a lot of other segments of society in the Philippines, have long been neglected, and they do not have the training, the fundamental equipment that is necessary for a fighting force to function. That requires an application of resources.

READINESS OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS

Senator NUNN. General Crist, you mention on page 27 of your statement the readiness levels of the combat service support units assigned to your command. You state that 43 percent of your combat support and combat service support forces are C–4, or not combat ready.

Is there an explanation for this?

Is this going to improve?

General CRIST. Yes, sir.

The primary reason is personnel and equipment.

Senator NUNN. Is what?

General CRIST. Personnel and equipment in those units.

I have talked to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army personally on the situation. Second, the Army is putting money into those areas. Together we hope that it is going to improve. But I do have problems, and I am not so sure the budget is going to completely heal those problems; particularly in the areas of ammunition companies, quartermaster companies, transportation companies, and those sorts of units that do not get a lot of highlight.

For example, using a sample of 376 units, 36 reported C–4 and only 27 reported C–1 or C–2. Overall, there is a 35,000-shortfall for Southwest Asia, in reserve units right now.

Now, the Five-Year Defense Program [FYDP] provides money for service ordnance and support units and depot maintenance, and some equipment fill, which will help, no question. They also provide in the program $10 million for LOGCAP. LOGCAP is an Army program that I support, which allows me to go obtain private contracts as a substitute for military support; such as tugboats. There are plenty of tugboats and barges in the gulf. We do not need to transport them from the United States. It is that type of support I am talking about.

So we are taking some steps to either overcome the problem or get around it.

But, nonetheless, it needs emphasis, and, as I said, I personally discussed the problem with the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and he is on it, and is going to help.

AIR FORCE SPARE PARTS PROBLEMS

Senator NUNN. How about Air Force? I understand that you have spare parts problems in the Air Force units that are assigned to you?

General CRIST. Well, let's see. My air component sustainment rate varies by weapon system. Overall, we can surge at about three sorties per day per aircraft for up to 18 days. After that, my surge rate would drop off rather dramatically down to about 0.8.

My sustained rate is about 3.0 for the first 7 days, dropping down to and holding 1.1 for the next 30 days.

That is not a bad sustainment rate up to 18 or 30 days. However, after that, it is completely dependent on resupply.

Right now, the 1987 budget will only provide for a fill of 56 percent of my air components' total aircraft spare requirements. That breaks out to 100 percent of peacetime operating stocks, but only

24 percent of the war readiness spares kits [WRSK], which is causing the biggest problem in readiness.

There are no dollars in there for sustainability stock requirements.

As I read the 1987 FYDP, I see a downward trend in spare support.

Senator NUNN. Are we going to go back through the same readiness problems that we went through in the 1970's? We have a building up of major systems, yet we are having trouble sustaining efficient production rates on these? We have a number of new starts coming, we have a budget crunch coming. Does it look to you like we are about to go through another severe readiness problem in the years ahead?

General CRIST. It varies by service and by type, Senator.

As you perhaps remember, I was here a year ago talking about that very problem, what would happen to us if we cut the O&M and what this would do to spares and overall sustainability.

Some of the services have done a very good job in buying sustainability. Others have not done quite as well. It is spotty between services.

But in this particular case, in aircraft spares, we have a problem.

I also have a problem on the Army side of the house in that, of my replacement major end items, that is to say, those items that they are supposed to have in the barn to meet my requirements beyond initial organizational equipment, there is only 3 percent fill against my requirements available.

With this present budget, the figure will rise to 11 days of supply or 18 percent of my requirement.

Senator NUNN. Over what period of time?

General CRIST. Over the 5 year period.

Senator NUNN. Over the 5 years?

General CRIST. Over the 5 year period.

So there is another area, as far as sustainability, in which there are problems.

Senator NUNN. Who do you report to with your concerns about sustainability? Do you communicate directly with the services back in Washington?

Do you go through your components?

Do you go to the chairman—or all of the above?

How do you get your views in on readiness?

General CRIST. A little bit of all of the above, Senator.

The channel, of course, is to talk to the services through my components. Since my components also happen to be dual-hatted within two of the major Army and Air Force commands, namely TAC and FORSCOM, there is a bit of filtering that goes on there.

Consequently, I avail myself of the right to go to the Chief of Service, as I did in the case of the Army Reserve units.

I also feel no compunction in writing messages to the chairman, which I have done. Also, the Secretary of Defense asks us to write him once a quarter. I use that means also.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. I do have a couple of additional questions for the next round.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Admiral, I was impressed on my trip around your country and also into parts of your world, too, General, rather of a growing feeling amongst some of the leaders that the United States does not keep its word.

This, of course, is especially true in Taiwan, where we are not furnishing those good friends the equipment they need.

I talked to the Prime Minister of Singapore, who, as you know, is just beginning to raise a proper army. I think he has about 60,000 troops. But he is not sure he is going to continue to get the type of combat aircraft that he wants.

This is particularly true over in Saudi Arabia.

I was very impressed at the readiness of the tactical air forces in Bahrain. But in speaking with the prince in charge of armament, he expressed great dissatisfaction that we had not lived up to our word to sell them F-15's, some AWACS, Sidewinders, and a few things like that.

I merely comment on that because I do not like to hear that. I can understand that there are political reasons for some of these judgments, but I think you should trust to your superiors whatever you can, if you agree, that we should be taking care of these people.

Taiwan I call the biggest aircraft carrier in the world, and I would hate like hell to lose that.

The Soviets are already using Kamranh Bay, as you know, and have greatly improved it. Also, as you know, starting with you, I heard reports of the Soviets almost daily flying over that part of the Pacific, not that it is any cause for our getting excited, but the fact that they are doing it is a bother.

I might say, Admiral, that I was very impressed, and General Crist, too, with Diego Garcia. I had pictured this place as being a little atoll about 3 miles long, where you could throw a rock across it. It's 39 miles long and about 15 miles wide. That is where you have stored a lot of your war preparedness out there.

I just want to compliment you on the type of commander that you have out there. He used to be an L&L here and is operating a wonderful base with good morale in a very tough part of the world.

Admiral, are you satisfied with the level of ammunition that you have available for the Pacific?

Admiral HAYS. Not entirely, sir.

I think that we have an adequate supply of what we have referred to as the "dumb" ammunition. We have an inadequate supply of the more sophisticated ammunition—Sparrow, Phoenix, torpedoes, and those kinds of ordnance.

Now, some of those types are fairly new, and they are just being introduced into the inventory, such as HARM. We have a very low stockage position of HARM, as you would expect since it is a new weapon. But the 5-Year Defense Program provides for a steady improvement, and we are now realizing that steady improvement as we get the deliveries which were contracted for in earlier years.

I am not totally comfortable with that. I do feel that the attention which the category deserves is occurring.

We have a way to go.

MODERN MUNITIONS

Chairman GOLDWATER. You mentioned modern munitions, but you go on to express a concern for war reserve materials, spare parts, petroleum storage, active and passive air defense, long-range attack platforms, lift capabilities, and the manning and equipping of combat support and combat support units.

Do you feel that you are making progress in these fields?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir. I do. That list is what we refer to as our integrated priorities list. It is one that we evaluate continuously, and it is a list that I use to get visibility to what I consider to be shortcomings in the theater.

I put at the top of that list sustainability. That sustainability includes our ammunition stockage, which is not as I would like to see it, as well as the spare parts and the pre-positioned war reserves.

Chairman GOLDWATER. This committee is going to spend quite a bit of time in the next month exploring these shortages because when you have a shortage of ammunition—and, mind you, you are not the only one who reports this. We have yet to meet a commander who is satisfied with his ammunition supply. When you run into spare parts problems, Lord, we thought we had had that shipped. I saw in the paper yesterday or the day before that we are now making spare parts in Japan.

General, I think you have commented on this, but I don't think I heard it.

WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ

The war between Iran and Iraq, even though Iran has had some success at Al Faw, do you think the Iranians will win that war?

General CRIST. Senator, that is a very tough crystal ball for a war that started in 1980.

They have had success at Al Faw, but that was basically a local success, I think. The Iraqis are containing them, although they are paying a pretty good price out on those salt flats. But they are forcing the Iranians back, and eventually I think they are going to take Al Faw back.

It is interesting to note the casualties in that war so far. Three percent of Iraq's population has been killed or wounded in the war, as opposed to 1.5 percent of the Iranian population even though the Iranians have had more killed and wounded overall.

What this shows me is the effect of the population in balance between the two countries in a war of attrition. Can the Iraqis continue to absorb these kinds of losses? In 1984 and 1985, the Iranians launched very big, major offenses, as they are doing now. They took horrendous casualties and exacted significant casualties on the Iraqis. They were unsuccessful.

In this one, they launched an attack in the south, as you know, and one up in Kurdistan. Both have not been terribly successful.

We are looking perhaps for a third attack. My people say that Hawizah Marshes. My guess is more like Khoramshah, if I were to do it.

The problem is the Iranian logistics. They cannot seem to mount multiple attacks at the same time. On the other hand, they have

superior engineers. They are both blowing each other away with heavy artillery.

The problem gets down, then, to who can outstay who? Khomeini has said it is an article of religious tenet and a prophecy that the government in Baghdad will be Shiite. So it does not look to me as if there is going to be any stopping of the war on the part of the Iranians.

The Iraqis, as you know, have made two or three efforts to try to stop that war, to include Saudi mediation, with no response.

What I am concerned about is the capability of the Iraqis, over the long haul, to sustain the war. We see reports now and again of desertion. We see reports of tiredness. Those kinds of things. We have not seen reports of units collapsing, deserting, or any of that sort of thing. But there is just a general war weariness, malaise, and an economic problem settling in.

On the other hand, the Iraqis gave a pretty good lick to the Iranians when they hit Gonaveh. As you know, they have been hitting Kharg. They got the T-jetty and set it afire.

But Gonaveh was where the pumps were that were supplying Kharg. When they went for the jugular there, they turned the oil off for over a week. The Iranians are back up to about 1.5 or 1.6 million barrels of oil per day, but the Iraquis are capable of turning it off.

It is a vicious war and I do not see a winner right now, Senator. But I would worry about the Iraqis in the long haul, whether they can really stay the course.

SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN

Chairman GOLDWATER. I notice that you indicate that in your opinion the Soviets are doing poorly in Afghanistan.

I recall the last briefing I had with the Chiefs of Staff where the entire wall was covered with a map of Afghanistan. They were explaining to me their great interest in Afghanistan. It was to prevent the Soviets from ever gaining access to the northern shores of the Indian Ocean, in Pakistan.

So, the tougher it gets over there, the better.

Sam, I believe you had a few more questions.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DOD REORGANIZATION

I believe you are both very anxious to comment on the committee's recent reorganization efforts. [General laughter.]

I wanted to give you that opportunity.

General Crist, have you had a chance to read the final version of the bill, because there have been considerable changes in it during our mark-up?

General CRIST. Senator Nunn, I have not had an opportunity to read the actual legislation. I have read in some detail the press release, with its attachment, that I believe you put out on March 6, which has a pretty detailed rundown of the salient points. But I have not read the actual document.

Senator NUNN. Well, we would welcome any comments. Fundamentally, we are trying to strengthen the elements in DOD respon-

sible for joint operations and you gentlemen have that responsibility every day. It is a very important part of our national security. So we would appreciate any comments you might have about the CINCs and the authority we give you, or for that matter on other aspects of the bill.

General CRIST. Senator, I immediately went to the sections dealing with combatant commands, unified and specified, because that is where I sit.

What happens in Washington is interesting, but a little bit remote from my problems at the moment.

I have read through what you propose to give me, and I am delighted to accept those authorities, Senator.

Senator NUNN. Do you think it will improve your ability to carry out the peacetime and wartime operations that are your responsibility?

General CRIST. Well, understanding, sir, that, as the lawyer would say, I have not read all the fine print in the legislation, the points that are laid out here certainly are not going to hurt. They will assist me in my job.

Senator NUNN. Haven't you served on the Joint Staff, General Crist?

General CRIST. Yes, I have, sir.

Senator NUNN. What was your position there?

General CRIST. I was the Vice Director of the Joint Staff.

Senator NUNN. As you know, one of the big, big points of controversy is the Vice Chairman, whether he should preside in the absence of the chairman.

We arrived at this position so that he would preside in the absence of the Chairman. We did permit the Secretary of Defense or the President to overrule that if they so chose.

What do you think of that provision?

General CRIST. Well, you have established the position, but you have also given the right to decide how the actual duties should be sorted out to the people who have to do the job. I would find it difficult to argue with that, Senator.

Serving on the Joint Staff, one of the problems that we had was with the Director of the Joint Staff being just a three star, among three star peers. That may work well in the Senate, sir, but it does not work too well in the military. He needed a fourth star. There is a potential to make the Vice Chairman not only a Vice Chairman, but also to let him run the Joint Staff for the Chairman, another provision of your legislation.

Again, that would be a call of the administration. If I understand your legislation, it is for the President and Secretary of Defense to decide exactly how the duties of the Vice Chairman might be sorted out.

I was there when the Chiefs took on the quarterly rotation as acting chairman. In my own opinion, that was grand.

The JCS, prior to that time, had taken a certain detached view of the activities of the Chairman. They did not have to meet with the Secretary of Defense at 11:30 in the morning. They did not have to walk over to see the President of the United States carrying something that might be unpleasant. They could stand back a little bit.

Once General Vessey made them pick up the cudgels for a quarter and they had to do those things, not only just speak for their service, but speak for the Department of Defense or for the Joint Chiefs, it made quite a difference.

I thought that was a very good system for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It made quite a difference to the effective functioning of the Joint Staff.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Hays?

Admiral HAYS. Sir, we very much appreciate the emphasis that you are placing on jointness. I am a strong believer of the benefits of jointness.

The Chairman has stated that he needs help. From my observations of the duties of the Chairman, they are, indeed, all-consuming, and he can use help.

My concern about a Vice Chairman who is the No. 2 ranking military man in the country, is that he could become a power unto himself, and if he is the one who exercises the oversight of the unified commanders, will he become inserted between the unified commander and the Chairman, or the Secretary of Defense?

So far as the provisions, as I am aware of them, that pertain to the unified commander, it would seem to me that you are codifying the arrangements which a unified commander ought to have in order to organize and to command his forces.

Senator NUNN. Do you think the provisions relating to the CINCs will strengthen your own ability to carry out your responsibilities?

Admiral HAYS. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator NUNN. General Crist, do you concur in that?

General CRIST. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Thank you both.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I hope both of you will study that paper because this committee has tremendous respect for both of you.

As you know, the Constitution charges us with raising the Army and the Navy, but then everybody forgets that the next line says "and overseeing."

We have not taken a look at the military in 204 years. That is just what we did.

We may be right, we may be wrong. We want to maintain the strongest fighting force in the world.

Anything you can do to help we will appreciate.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

We have some additional questions which you may answer for the hearing record.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

PEOPLE'S ARMY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Hays, we hear very many reports about the strength of the New Peoples Army in the Philippines and the amount of popular support that they receive in the country. Other reports indicate, however, that the New Peoples Army is more like the Khmer Rouge was during the mid 1970's in Cambodia. Would you give us your assessment (of) this situation?

Admiral HAYS. The comparison of the New People's Army (NPA) to the Khmer Rouge was first brought to the public's attention in the article "The New Khmer

Rouge", written by Mr. Ross Munro for the Washington based monthly, Commentary. The thrust was on the savagery and terror that the NPA employ in their bid to wrest control from the Government of the Philippines. I do not deny the many examples Munro cites; however, he does conclude that "If the future brings no substantial flow of money to the Communists from abroad, and if Marcos were to die or be toppled and succeeded by a competent, reformist government, it is quite conceivable that the current rapid growth of the Communists could stall." I think that is an excellent assessment of the Philippine situation. How many NPA members accept President Aquino's call for a cease fire and enter into meaningful negotiations remains to be seen, but clearly the anti-Marcos theme that resulted in the rapid growth of the NPA in recent years is no longer operative. The support the NPA enjoys in certain areas has a direct correlation to dissatisfaction with Marcos and a deplorable economy. Now that Marcos has departed, the NPA recruitment base could be in jeopardy if there is an upturn in the economy.

U.S. FORCES IN THAILAND

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Hays, after the Vietnam War ended, the United States drew down its considerable military presence in Thailand. Considering the importance of the region and the efforts of the Vietnamese to destabilize Thailand, do you think it would be advisable for the United States to restore some of its presence in Thailand?

Admiral HAYS. Although the United States does not have military units permanently stationed in Thailand, we do have an active security relationship based on the Manila Pact, further defined by the 1962 Rusk-Thanat Communique. The United States maintains a military assistance group in Thailand, conducts numerous joint exercises with Thai military forces each year and provides credits and aid for Thailand's purchase of military equipment and training courses. We have expedited military equipment to Thailand in the past years to counter the Vietnamese during their dry season offensives. Recently, we signed a Logistics Memorandum of Understanding which will facilitate additional logistics support during periods of international tension or in circumstances of armed conflict. We are also exploring the possibility of establishing a War Reserve Stockage Program for Thailand which would further enhance their capability to respond to armed aggression.

Our security programs with Thailand and friendly ASEAN countries have been carefully paced to ensure that we take into account the political sensitivities in the region. We have consistently supported the ASEAN position on a Cambodian settlement because we have maintained that regional nations should tackle this regional problem. All things considered, I think we are doing it about right now. I do not advise restoring a military presence in Thailand at this time.

SOVIET MINE WARFARE CAPABILITIES

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Hays, do you feel that Soviet mine warfare capabilities pose a serious threat to your ability to conduct operations in the Pacific theater?

Admiral HAYS. Soviet mining capability is of great concern. Soviet Pacific based forces have a significant mine warfare capability and constitute a real threat to U.S./allied operations. The Soviet Pacific Fleet possesses an extensive stockpile of mines which can be laid by a variety of platforms (aircraft, naval surface ships and submarines, and merchant ships). The Soviet mine warfare capability is particularly formidable in waters contiguous to the Soviet landmass (Sea of Japan/Sea of Okhotsk). The Soviet offensive mine warfare capability in distant waters (U.S. West Coast/sea lines of communication) is more limited, but covert operations still pose a threat to U.S./allied interests.

CLARK AIR FORCE BASE

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Hays, a recent congressional delegation consisting of members of the House Armed Services Committee visited several countries in your region. It is my understanding that they were concerned about the age and condition of the facilities at Clark Air Base and at Subic Bay. What priority do you place on the modernization of these facilities?

Admiral HAYS. I fully support the services' efforts to modernize the facilities at Clark and Subic Bay. We share the congressional delegations' concern about the age and condition of the facilities, and the 1987 military construction program should not be deferred. An even flow of MILCON funds is needed to sustain our facility

modernization program in support of our military missions and in support of the men and women who serve at these important outposts.

CONTINUING BASES IN PHILIPPINES

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Hays, after 1991 our basing arrangement in the Philippines can be terminated by either country. What are your long term projections for our being able to continue to use the bases?

Admiral HAYS. The Government of the Philippines will allow us to continue to use the Philippine bases long after 1991 unless the communists take over the country and I don't believe that will happen.

RECRUITING FOREIGN NATIONALS

Senator THURMOND. General Crist, I introduced a bill, S. 369, that would allow the Army to recruit foreign nationals. The same authority was granted to the Army during the 1950's, and many of those recruited went into our Special Operations Forces. General Kingston was a strong supporter of this legislation. Would you review this bill and furnish us your opinion?

General CRIST. Since this bill addresses the recruiting of forces, which is within the purview of the services, I defer to the Department of Army's position on this issue.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Senator THURMOND. General Crist, we are receiving some conflicting reports about the Iran-Iraq War. Would you provide us your assessment of this conflict?

General CRIST. After five years, the situation remains effectively stalemated. Iraq in recent years has desired only to get out of the war as cleanly as possible. However, Iran appears intent on prolonging the conflict, as witnessed by the current offensive, ongoing since February. We believe Iraq will probably prevail in the current round of fighting. However, each major Iranian attack in the south increases the chance of a major Iraqi military reversal, which we believe the current regime in Baghdad might not be able to survive. The chief danger to United States interests will continue to be the possibility of an escalation which would affect the moderate Arab Gulf States. However, at this time, we doubt that Iran wishes to attack overtly any member state of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). USCENTCOM is monitoring these developments closely.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN QUAYLE

EXCHANGE OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Senator QUAYLE. What is your current capability to exchange logistical support, services or supplies with friendly foreign forces within your area of responsibility?

Admiral HAYS. The Arms Export Control and Foreign Assistance Acts unwisely preclude exchanging logistical support, services or supplies except through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. The U.S. Pacific Command has extensive capabilities to cooperate with friendly foreign forces in combined exercises and operations. But the Command lacks the authorities to permit the exchange of goods and services short of FMS procedures. Formal FMS procedures are detrimental to training, interoperability and daily operations since they preclude operating in peace as we would in war. Limited authority for the regional unified commanders to engage in exchanges of goods and services to increase combined cooperation is especially desirable.

Senator QUAYLE. What kind of specific problems do you encounter when you try to exchange logistical support, services, or supplies with friendly foreign forces?

Admiral HAYS. The exchange of logistical support, services or supplies can only be accomplished using FMS procedures. These procedures are time consuming and cumbersome. The resulting delays serve neither U.S. nor allied interests, since we are prohibited from exchanging support, supplies and services with friendly foreign forces. Under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Foreign Assistance Act, we are required to seek dollar compensation for the goods and services which we provide to foreign forces under regular transfers and in combined exercises or operations. The reimbursement is usually accomplished through FMS procedures. Foreign forces, familiar with our requirement that they pay up for assistance rendered and the relatively high cost of U.S. assistance, are reluctant to ask for support.

NATO MUTUAL SUPPORT ACT

Senator QUAYLE. Please provide your view on the advisability of extending the authority in the NATO Mutual Support Act to not only Korea, but to the area within your command as well.

Admiral HAYS. Successful defense of the Pacific will require combined operations between U.S. and allied forces. In order to conduct this type of warfare, logistics standardization, interoperability, actual support and combined training and exercises are necessary. Existing legislation precludes efficient mutual support by requiring FMS cases to be opened by our allies for even the most menial types of U.S. provided support. U.S. forces are also forced to pay higher costs for maintenance and supply support when operating in allied countries than would be required if Mutual Support legislation were extended. Even when local purchase procurement is used, there is a time and cost penalty to our forces. Extending the NATO Mutual Support Act will further operational economies in peacetime and effective host nation support in times of conflict.

RANGE OF TLAM/C

Senator QUAYLE. Do you agree with Admiral Crowe's testimony before this committee last year that in USPACOM it would be "particularly important" that the range of the TLAM/C be extended as far as possible beyond its current range to "increase the correlation between standoff range and platform survivability?"

Admiral HAYS. I agree with Admiral Crowe.

JAPANESE HOMELAND RESPONSIBILITY

Senator QUAYLE. Much has been made about getting the Japanese to assume responsibility for defending her sea lanes 1,000 miles out from the homeland. Isn't it true, however, that we intend to move our own aircraft carriers within this zone to protect our interests in time of crisis? Given that we cannot provide 360 degree defense and surveillance for our own carriers without additional help, wouldn't it make more sense to ask the Japanese to assume certain military functions (such as, affording our fleet air defense or warning for intercept near Japanese waters) rather than assigning them complete responsibility for defending a region that even our own fleet unassisted would have problems defending?

Admiral HAYS. You are correct in your assessment of the difficulty in defending sea lanes to a distance 1,000 miles from Japan. While a carrier battle group has an impressive capability to defend itself, any help available is appreciated. We and the GOJ agree that Japan needs to develop more capability to provide for its own defense. As an island nation, Japan views open sea lanes as vital to its existence. There ought to be mutual support at any level of conflict, but the wider the conflict, the more important is Japan's ability to defend its sea lanes. Some U.S. assets which would be available in a narrowly defined scenario may be required to respond elsewhere in a global struggle, and in this context, defense of the sea lanes becomes very important not only to Japan, but to the allied effort.

TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT

Senator QUAYLE. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is obligated to sell Taiwan weapons sufficient for its defensive needs. In light of the proposed U.S. sale of improved avionics for the PRC's F-8 fighter, what compensating sale, if any, do you think would be in order for Taiwan? Would F-5Gs make sense? If not, why not?

Admiral HAYS. The proposed F-8 avionics package is for the purpose of upgrading the air defense posture of the PRC. An improved self defense capability ought to be a stabilizing factor in the theater.

TOMAHAWK AND HARPOON

Senator QUAYLE. In your testimony you indicate that Tomahawk and Harpoon deployments are helping to check the growing Soviet threat. Do you think our unilaterally imposed SALT II limit of 384 miles range for conventional cruise missiles serves the long-term interest of the United States?

Admiral HAYS. The implications of a range limitation on any weapon system are directly related to your plans for the employment of that particular weapon system. From a strict warfighting perspective, an arbitrarily imposed range limit is not in our best interest. But I accept that decisions which could place us at a disadvantage with respect to the military capabilities may serve in larger national considerations.

MILITARY AID TO HELP PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES

Senator QUAYLE. Over the next 5 years how much U.S. military aid (in dollars) do you think should be spent to improve the armed forces of the Philippines? On what should this money specifically be spent?

Admiral HAYS. The armed forces of the Philippines will need a lot of help over the next few years. As a minimum, we should strive to obtain the level of funding agreed to as the President's "best efforts pledge" under the Military Bases Agreement review. BGEN Allen, the Chief of JUSMAG, Manila, in his testimony last year before Congress, related his priority requirements for the New Armed Forces of the Philippines (NAFP) in terms of improving their capability to move, shoot, and communicate. I have asked BGEN Allen to develop, in concert with the NAFP, the level of additional funding required for the NAFP. We have completed the review of the urgent items needed now to launch an initial recovery effort and the dollar amount is $50M additional to what the Congress has approved for fiscal year 1986.

MUTUAL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Senator QUAYLE. The administration has recently submitted a legislative proposal to the Congress to extend the authorities in the NATO Mutual Support Act to U.S. forces operating in the Republic of Korea. What is your current capability to exchange logistical support, services, or supplies with friendly foreign forces within your area of responsibility? What kind of specific problems do you encounter when you try to exchange logistical support, services, or supplies with friendly foreign forces? Please provide your view on the advisability of extending the authority in the NATO Mutual Support Act to not only Korea, but to the area within your command as well.

General CRIST. At the moment, I have no legal authority to exchange logistical support, supplies with friendly foreign forces within my area of responsibility.

I have had the opportunity to review staff proposed legislation which would amend the NATO Mutual Support Act to expand the authorities to governments of countries which are not members of NATO. I fully support, as did my predecessor, any legislation which would assist my peculiar situation of preparing to operate in a region where I have neither infrastructure, in-place forces, nor a multi-national defense alliance.

The provisions for cross-servicing wherein the United States would provide logistic support, supplies and services to a designated country in my region, in return for a reciprocal provision for CENTCOM deployed forces, would open up new avenues to obtaining host nation support and access. Many of the countries in my AOR have such services which, if available, could reduce the amount of supplies and equipment required to be lifted or prepositioned, while at the same time offering us access to in-place logistic support infrastructures. In return, such provisions would give greater meaning and reassurance to our friends and allies that the United States is, indeed, prepared to help them preserve their freedom in the face of the growing threats.

Reciprocal airlift and communications support would also enhance our situation, as it would open up access to airlift and communication systems, where they exist, in return for our assistance where friendly nations lack capabilities we possess.

These cross-servicing provisions will cut through many peacetime bureaucratic procedures, but still provide the necessary safeguards to ensure that United States materiel and supplies are used for their authorized purpose and that our friends pay their own way. Our logistic system will be more responsive to both our combat forces and to our friends when they need our assistance.

In addition to the obvious gain of strengthening, the potential for obtaining a greater degree of host nation support and access, these provisions could have an ancillary, but equally important benefit. These reciprocal agreements will help promote regional defense cooperation, which is an essential goal if we are to reduce the potential for conflict in the area and deter Soviet expansion.

Relaxing the application of the more objectionable provisions of the acquisition regulations would permit us to deal with sovereign nations on a government-to-government basis, within the context of the cultural and sovereign sensitivities of the host nations in the CENTCOM region. Mandatory clauses that deal with bribery, submission of certified cost and pricing data, examination of host nation records by the Comptroller General, and U.S. contract officer concurrence in host nation contracts, have proven to be a major obstacle in concluding government-to-government agreements. For example, an agreement for fuel storage in Oman took 2 years and was rejected by the Omanis twice. A typical response from AOR country to our contract provisions was:

"We would confirm our view that the document you kindly presented for our consideration is because of style and content not suited to the operational and administrative requirements or reflective of the spirit and intent of the inter government agreement which controls our relationship. It would appear to us more suited to a procurement contract with a civilian supplier in the continental United States than an inter government arrangement."

Overall, the proposed legislation will streamline the negotiations for host nation support, reduce costs, increase sustainability, apply the same procedures in peacetime that would be followed in war, and generally enhance U.S. credibility and influence.

FORCES COMMITTED TO SACEUR

Senator QUAYLE. General Crist, Do you ever exercise jointly with U.S. or NATO forces committed to SACEUR?

General CRIST. Since all U.S. Forces are earmarked for the defense of Europe in the follow-on echelons, we continuously exercise with forces that will be employed by SACEUR. More specifically, the Mediterranean Carrier Battle Group and surface naval forces have participated in the Bright Star and Sea Wind exercise series. Furthermore, USCENTCOM anticipates continued participation by SIXTHFLT units in future exercises.

The UK has also provided a parachute company to participate in the CONUS exercise Gallant Eagle in 1984 and the upcoming Gallant Eagle '86. Both British units are committed to SACEUR. We have not exercised with any other NATO countries.

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT FROM ALLIES

Senator QUAYLE. What specifically might Japan, West Germany, Italy or France do militarily or economically to help the U.S. project force effectively into the upper-Gulf region?

General CRIST. All of the countries could cooperate with and assist the United States in protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the event of a crisis. Furthermore, all could agree that the U.S. use their merchant shipping to transport U.S. equipment. Sharing intelligence information on military operations or on regional and country infrastructure capabilities would also be useful. Established allied HUMINT sources in countries could be employed on U.S. behalf to provide current intelligence information. Specific economic or military support each country could provide is as follows:

Economic

Japan could contribute to construction/funding of military-related facilities at several locales throughout the USCENTCOM AOR.

Italy could provide additional security assistance to Somalia.

Military

UK and France have, in the past, provided escort to their respective flag shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf areas. Wider cooperation in such efforts could be undertaken.

Italy could provide minesweeping support in the Red Sea area during contingencies as they did in 1984 in the Red Sea.

France could permit bunkering of fuel at sites in the region and assist in minesweeping operations in the Red Sea and Gulf areas.

All of our allies could provide much needed moral and political support in the United Nations to limit and terminate any contingency. West Germany, Italy and other NATO allies such as the UK could provide moral support during contingencies and influence countries outside our AOR either to act in support of U.S. interests or to not act against us.

SOVIET STAGING BASES

Senator QUAYLE. General Crist, how close (in miles) are the Soviet staging bases in the Transcaucasus to the eastern-most air strips in Turkey?

General CRIST. Soviet Transcaucasus staging areas are 235NM to 415NM from active Turkish military fighter bases. Should the Turks decide to forward base fighter aircraft to helicopter bases and commercial airfields capable of accommodating them, then the ranges would vary from 100NM to 155NM.

SOVIET ADVANCE AGAINST IRAN

Senator QUAYLE. How might the United States check a Soviet advance against Iran staged from bases in the Transcaucasus, if U.S. aircraft carriers cannot or will not be positioned in the confines of the Persian Gulf?

General CRIST. We have other options besides using CVBGs in the Persian Gulf. Possible options include: utilization of USAF TACAIR from bases within Persian Gulf states; staging B-52s from bases within, or adjacent to, our AOR; and early insertion of Special Operations Forces to delay and impede a Soviet advance. This does not mean that carrier air could not be used if flown from the Gulf of Oman, by taking advantage of integral tanker assets or by using USAF tankers in the region to extend the ranges of the CVBG aircraft. None of these options will in fact check a Soviet advance. They would only serve to deter and possibly delay a Soviet advance. These options are typical of those that could be implemented in advance of major ground and air deployments, and are designed to delay Soviet advances, pending closure of USCENTCOM combat forces.

TERRORIST CAMPS

Senator QUAYLE. General Crist, have you requested, or do you have on file, TERCOM maps of suspected terrorist camps located within your command's region? Would it be helpful if you had longer-range conventional cruise missiles to target such objectives? Would such improved missiles help accomplish other force projection tasks?

General CRIST. Yes, we do have TERCOM maps on file and we have requested additional TERCOM data for targeting purposes. As to the second part of the question; yes, it definitely would be helpful if we had longer range conventional cruise missiles to target such objectives. Added range provides greater flexibility in employment, which would afford the launch platform increased survivability. Increased range would also allow targeting options deeper in potential enemy territory. Lastly, these improved missiles would be a great help in the accomplishment of other force projection tasks across a wide spectrum of potential target types. Fundamentally, increased range widens the options available to a commander to achieve his objectives and eliminates the need for U.S. military personnel in the target area.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN GLENN

MUNITIONS SUSTAINABILITY

Senator GLENN. What is the current munitions sustainability in your theater, and how will the fiscal year 1987 5-year defense plan improve your sustainability?

Admiral HAYS. While the past few years have been good ones for munitions and we have seen tangible improvements in our warfighting capability, we have not been able to eliminate all risks associated with sustainability.

Our most notable "war stoppers" include air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and modern, force multiplier ground munitions for use against a numerically superior enemy.

Although the Five-Year Defense Plan addresses many of these deficiencies, the $3 billion programmed for munitions in the FY-87 budget does not get us well. This amount will not allow us to reach our targets. Gramm-Rudman has hit sustainability programs hard, since postponing buys of short lead time items like munitions has an immediate impact on expenditures.

Our chemical capability is also limited by our inability to deploy stockpiles forward. The production and forward deployment of binary weapons would provide a much improved chemical warfare deterrent.

Senator GLENN. How much detail do you have of the munitions sustainability levels of component forces under your command?

Admiral HAYS. Our components' requirements and on-hand balances are reported to us quarterly.

Senator GLENN. How does the 1987 five year defense plan compare to the 1986 plan in terms of munitions sustainability of your component forces?

Admiral HAYS. The fiscal year 1987 FYDP has a 23 percent budget reduction as compared to the fiscal year 1986 FYDP and makes budget cuts in industrial surge capability. The services have adjusted the fiscal year 1987 FYDP to buy more state-of-the-art munitions sooner, e.g., AMRAAM; to decrease the purchase of current munitions, e.g., Phoenix; and to end some programs early, e.g., GBU-15. In essence, the plan budgets for modernization over sustainability. The overall impact on our sus-

tainability posture will be continued improvement in our stock levels of critical "war stopper" items, severe decrease in wartime resupply capability due to lack of surge funding, and slowdown in improvement of our theater sustainability posture through the FYDP.

Senator GLENN. At what point over the next 5 years will the component forces under your command have sufficient munitions stocks in theater to support your operations plan?

Admiral HAYS. We will not reach our stockage objectives over the next five years with the fiscal year 1987 to 1991 FYDP. As a result, we must concentrate on "war stoppers." These include: air-to-air missiles for the air superiority battle, air-to-surface missiles for use against ship and tank targets, and force multiplier munitions for use against ground targets, e.g., dual purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) and artillery delivered mine systems. The fiscal year 1987 FYDP, if executed, would buy some of all these "war stoppers", but not enough.

SPARE PARTS INVENTORIES

Senator GLENN. What is the estimated surge and sustained rate of operations of your component forces given their spare parts inventories in theater?

Admiral HAYS. The air component, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), has the most constraining spare parts shortages. PACAF's squadrons are authorized [deleted] of pre-positioned war reserves for surge wartime flying rates. Even if PACAF had all of the pre-positioned war reserves it is authorized, after [deleted] it would have to be resupplied from other war reserve materiel (OWRM) in the continental U.S. to sustain its air campaign.

Unfortunately, PACAF has less than the [deleted] objective of war reserves of spare parts. The shortages are mostly in avionics ("black boxes"). The Air Force has PACAF's pre-positioned war reserve shortages on order, and we expect to see improvement in our stocks this year. Of concern is the fact that the Air Force has very little OWRM in the continental U.S., and not much improvement is programmed. Also troubling is the prospect that, given reduced defense spending, future needs for pre-positioned war reserves may not be satisfied. These future needs will occur as we modernize our forces.

The Army components, Eighth U.S. Army and Western Command, if combined in action, could sustain themselves only slightly longer than PACAF before theater war reserves of spare parts are exhausted. If forced to fight separately, the Army forces' sustainability drops off sharply.

The component with the greatest sustainability is the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT). PACFLT could surge to wartime levels for at least [deleted] before requiring significant spares from outside this theater.

Senator GLENN. Are the spare parts stocks available to component forces sufficient to sustain operations consistent with your operations plan?

Admiral HAYS. No. For example, the air component is not able to sustain itself with spare parts beyond [deleted]. Even with its "fair share" of the other war reserve materiel in the continental U.S., it would be able to sustain itself for a very short time more in a global conflict with the Soviet Union. It is for that reason that sustainability is my number one conventional warfare concern.

Senator GLENN. What spare parts "war stoppers" are your component forces forced to live with?

Admiral HAYS. We have not identified "war stoppers" in repair parts. Even with the best of plans and funding, spot shortages will occur. These shortages result when anticipated failure rates or resupply times prove too optimistic for some items. Our components work to keep the shortages from becoming "war stoppers" and the services also order additional stocks of the most critical items. Our problem is not so much one of having to live with individual "war stoppers"; rather, it is one of continued underfunding of war reserves of spare parts across the board. For example, the Air Force has programmed very little for other war reserve materiel (OWRM). In fact, the Air Force has reduced by $658 million the war reserve purchases programmed for fiscal year 1987 to 1991. Likewise, the Navy has reduced its spares funding by almost $1 billion over the same period while the Army is $3 billion underfunded in its worldwide repair parts requirement. I am working with JCS and the services to address readiness, sustainability, modernization and force structure programs in a balanced way.

SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT

Senator GLENN. The magnitude of the Pacific ASW problem posed by the growing Soviet submarine threat continues to escalate. With the recognition that projected

CAPTOR deep water mines are substantially short of identified requirements, is it your opinion that adequate CAPTOR's are available to meet your assigned responsibilities, including mining of strategic choke points in the Western Pacific?

Admiral HAYS. CAPTOR is an important weapon and USCINCPAC's ability to employ mine warfare to counter the growing submarine threat in the Pacific has been significantly enhanced by a recent decision to increase the Pacific fleet CAPTOR inventory. This increase (a redistribution of CAPTOR mines to the USPACOM), which will provide 39 percent more CAPTORs than were previously programmed, is the result of CNO approval of a request for a revised distribution of the CAPTOR mines that were planned for delivery to the fleet over the next two years. Although these additional CAPTORs, combined with the capability to mine shallow straits with other type mines, will provide USCINCPAC with an earlier than planned increase in capability, we still need more and in the long term the shortage will grow if CAPTOR production is not restored.

Senator GLENN. Navy witnesses last year indicated that CAPTOR production was being allowed to lapse due to affordability despite CNO testimony that plans of the Unified Commanders required substantially more mines than were available in inventory or on order. Congress did provide funds to continue production. Now we find once again that the Navy has not included funds in 1987 for the free world's only deep water mine. What are your options if adequate mining capability is not available?

Admiral HAYS. While our first priority CAPTOR mine requirements can be met by the increase in distribution to CINCPAC, lack of funding in 1987 for additional CAPTORs will certainly close off attractive mining options. The anti-submarine problem will be more severe and the level of confidence for success will be less. To discuss this issue in any greater detail would require dialogue at a higher level of classification.

MUNITIONS SUSTAINABILITY

Senator GLENN. What is the current munitions sustainability in your theater, and how will the fiscal year 1987 five year defense plan improve your sustainability?

General CRIST. I have on hand [deleted] of the requirement for level of effort munitions and [deleted] for threat munitions. We currently are experiencing shortfalls of [deleted] for Sidewinder missiles, [deleted] for Stinger missiles, [deleted] for Hawk missiles, [deleted] for laser bomb kits, and [deleted] for Sparrow missiles. With no purchase of Hawk missiles and laser bomb kits during the fiscal year 1987 five year defense plan, the shortfall for these two items will increase. The five year defense plan does indicate buys for 35,118 Sparrow missiles, 52,171 Sidewinder missiles, and 50,928 Stinger missiles. The increase for Army and USMC munitions in the President's budgets from 1987 through 1990 will obviously improve my overall posture. However, until Service allocations are firm, I cannot determine how the fill percentages would be affected.

Senator GLENN. How much detail do you have of the munitions sustainability levels of component forces under your command?

General CRIST. I have sufficient detail available to me to break out munitions sustainability levels by service or by specific items overall. My components provide their [deleted] ammunition sustainment requirements by type and quantity. My components' munitions allocations provide them with [deleted] for ARCENT, CENTAF, NAVCENT, and I MAF. Looking at the allocation situation for fifteen Level of Effort and Threat Oriented items, I see that the overall level only amounts to [deleted]. This ranges from [deleted] of requirements for the Shrike air-to-ground missile and [deleted] for both the Sidewinder and Redeye, to [deleted] the Maverick, air launched TOW and HARM missiles respectively.

Senator GLENN. How does the fiscal year 1987 5-year defense plan compare to the fiscal year 1986 plan in terms of munitions sustainability of your component forces?

General CRIST. I have an overall [deleted] among five critical items namely, laser bomb kits, and Hawk, Sidewinder, Sparrow, and Stinger missiles. The latter three are included as buys in both the 1986 and 1987 five year defense plans. However, this will only help my situation if service allocations meet my requirements. Since neither laser bomb kits nor Hawk missiles were included in these two defense plans, I can only anticipate that the current [deleted] respectively for these two items will increase even further.

Senator GLENN. At what point over the next five years will the component forces under your command have significant munitions in theater to support your operational plans?

General CRIST. Placing ammunition assets in theater represents a significant challenge for me. The 17 pre-positioning ships, now deployed, [deleted] which represents a large portion of my total requirement [deleted]. This is the equivalent of more than [deleted] sorties. The fiscal year 1987 FYDP projects sufficient buys of ammunition to virtually eliminate my current shortfalls. However, efforts to pre-position FYDP assets ashore has been going more slowly. We are currently pursuing increased access, but the realities of the political situation make it difficult for the United States to reach agreement in many areas. Nonetheless progress is being made and I remain cautiously optimistic.

COMBAT SUSTAINABILITY

Senator GLENN. What is the estimated surge and sustained rate of operations of your component forces given their spare parts inventories in theater?

General CRIST. My Army component can sustain heavy combat operations for [deleted] days with existing stocks of repair parts. The FY87 FYDP will provide consumables up to [deleted] days. The problem is in repairables where a 72 percent shortfall will remain after the FY87 proposed budget of 8.2 million is applied.

My Marine spare part inventories can sustain [deleted] days of combat by their ground forces and [deleted] days of combat flying by the airwings. Consumables: [deleted] days ground—[deleted] days air. Repairables: [deleted] days ground—[deleted] days air.

My Air Force component surge and sustainment rates vary by type weapon system. Overall, based upon spare part inventories, CENTAF can surge tactical aircraft at a three per day per aircraft sortie rate for up to [deleted] days. After that, the rate would drop rapidly to near zero, depending upon resupply. Alternatively, CENTAF can fly at a sustained rate of 3.0 for the first 7 days, dropping down to and holding at a 1.1 sortie rate for the next 30 days. The FY87 budget provides for only 56 percent of CENTAF's total aircraft spare part requirements. Broken out, this equates to: 100 percent of peacetime operating stocks, 24 percent of War Readiness Spares Kit (WRSK) and Base Level Self-Sufficiency Spares (BLSS), and no dollars for sustainability stock requirements.

Further, the FY87 FYDP projects a downward trend in spares support resulting, for example, in a 19 percent decrease for a deficit of approximately [deleted] combat fighter aircraft sorties in FY89, for my largest OPLAN scenario.

My Navy component has [deleted] days of consumable spare parts. The majority of high priority repair parts are received via MAC flights from CONUS, the remainder come from material screens of MEF and SixthFleet ships. Material readiness of the Navy force would deteriorate if MAC channels were interrupted.

My SOF organizations can sustain themselves for [deleted] days utilizing basic load and accompanying supplies. After that period of time sustainment is hampered not only by shortages of spare parts but by shortages of SOF aircraft capable of delivering supplies to the organizations.

Senator GLENN. Are the spare parts stocks available to component forces sufficient to sustain operations consistent with your operations plan?

General CRIST. The Defense Guidance requires each service (by end - 1988 FDP) to have secondary items for [deleted] of combat in each theater. Furthermore, the services are required to pre-position, in theater, consumption through [deleted] for secondary items.

My Army component has 16% of its necessary war reserve repair parts and can sustain combat for [deleted] days with all existing stocks of repair parts. The ability of my Air Force component to conduct sustained operations [deleted] is questionable due to shortfalls in several categories including aircraft spares. As I've said earlier, my Marine forces can sustain [deleted] days of combat by their ground forces.

Considering the above, [deleted].

Senator GLENN. What spare parts "war stoppers" are your component forces forced to live with?

General CRIST. My number one spare part "war stopper" which is also the only spare part on my prioritized Critical Items List (CIL), is War Readiness Spares Kit (WRSK) for all Air Force aircraft. A WRSK kit consists of selected spares and repair parts needed to sustain aircraft operations (without resupply) for the first month of conventional activity in war. Due to the complexity of identifying specific "war stopper" repair parts from the thousands of critical items, it is not possible for me to single out specific parts. Let it suffice to say that repair parts are critical and fiscal limitations usually result in insufficient repair parts to satisfy Defense Guidance. As an example, the FY87 budget provides for only 56% of my Air Force component's total aircraft spare part requirements. Broken out, this equates to: 100% of

peacetime operating stocks, 24% of WRSK and, no dollars for sustainability stock requirements.

Senator GOLDWATER. This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 1986

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDS

The subcommittee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 9 a.m., Senator Barry Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Members present: Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Gramm, Nunn, Exon, and Dixon.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; and Patrick A. Tucker, general counsel; Robert G. Bell, Douglas R. Graham, John J. Hamre, Drew A. Harker, William E. Hoehn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., Carl M. Smith, Judith A. Freedman, and Patricia L. Watson, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, and Russell C. Miller, research assistants; and Mary J. Kampo, staff assistant.

Also present: Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Dale F. Gerry, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan W. Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; William S. Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; and Milton D. Beach, assistant to Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman GOLDWATER. The meeting will come to order.

I want to apologize for the lack of attendance.

We are trying to get a constitutional amendment passed, balanced budget. If I live to be 200, I don't think I'll ever see it. [Laughter.]

The committee meets this morning to continue its review of the fiscal 1987 budget request by receiving testimony from commanders of the Unified Commands.

Our hearing this morning is the third and final in a series of hearings which are intended to allow our commanders who have operational responsibility to report on the state of their commands

and the extent to which the 1987 budget request meets their military requirements.

Today we will hear from Gen. Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command; and Adm. Lee Baggett, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command.

General Rogers, as always, it's a pleasure to welcome you before this committee and receive your annual assessment of the state of our most vital political and military alliance, NATO.

I might add that today is a particularly important day for the Alliance; today Spain will decide, by referendum, whether or not she will remain a member of NATO. And we certainly would welcome any comments you would have on that situation.

I am also very pleased to welcome Admiral Baggett, in his first appearance before the committee as CINCLANT. Since your command is tasked with protecting our vital sea lanes of communications in the Atlantic and in the Caribbean, we are anxious to receive your testimony.

Gentlemen, you may proceed as you see fit. If you have a prepared text and you would like to put them in the record and comment, that's fine. I think we will start with General Rogers.

I do have a statement from Senator Dixon which I will insert in the record at this point.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, today we will continue to receive testimony on the status of the Unified Commands. I look forward to hearing from General Rogers, Commander in Chief, European Command and Admiral Baggett, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command.

The testimony we receive today will be important because with the budget problems we face in this Congress, I know there will be those who will call for a reduction of U.S. troop strength in Europe. I will also be interested in General Rogers' and Admiral Baggett's opinions on the committee's actions in giving more authority to the unified commanders. I also look forward to hearing from General Rogers on his progress in working out the problems between two of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be back with this committee, and I am particularly pleased to share this morning with my distinguished colleague, Admiral Baggett, who not only is a colleague in the U.S. national chain of command, but a fellow major NATO Commander, as you know.

What I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, if it is agreeable, would be to put my statement in the record and just to cover some of the high points of it, if I may.

Chairman GOLDWATER. That will be done.

General ROGERS. At the outset, I wish to comment on three security considerations that affect the U.S. European Command. And as you know, it is very difficult to talk about the U.S. European Command without it relating directly to Allied Command Europe on the NATO side.

SECURITY CONSIDERATION

But the first security consideration is the importance of the region. Beyond the direct defense of the homeland, the security of Western Europe remains the U.S.'s highest priority in its Defense Guidance. And should deterrence fail in Western Europe, United States and Soviet troops would be in direct conflict, which could well develop into NATO facing the difficult choice between resorting to nuclear weapons or suffering a defeat. So the immediate consequences to the United States are greatest if deterrence fails in Western Europe.

FISCAL FLUCTUATION

The second consideration is fiscal fluctuation.

To avoid the failure of deterrence, we need forces ready, modernized, sustainable, and survivable, and over the past 4 or 5 years, thanks to the Congress, we have made steady progress in these areas. Care must be taken that gains are not jeopardized. By fiscal year 1987, the defense budget recommendations will be more equitably balanced between near-term readiness and sustainability on the one hand and long-term modernization and force structure accounts on the other.

My concern is that there will be a disproportionate share of reduction from readiness and sustainability accounts, and every dollar cut from readiness and sustainability means loss today in operational capability and deterrence. And although I'll have some feel as to the impact of the Gramm-Rudman amendment for the rest of this fiscal year, it is very difficult for me to predict what might be the impact in the areas about which I speak in fiscal year 1987.

STRATEGY

The third consideration is that of strategy: Deterrence and defense in Western Europe rely on a triad of military capabilities to support NATO strategy of flexible response. The strategic nuclear leg's modernization is well underway, both in this country and in the United Kingdom. And the nonstrategic nuclear force is also collectively being modernized with the deployment of the Pershing II's and the ground launch cruise missiles on schedule up to this time.

The third leg of the triad, conventional forces, is where I see the greatest difficulty. The danger today is that the Soviets might conclude that they possess both the capability to inflict a quick conventional defeat on us and the visible nuclear strength to sap allied will to resist. The more likely menace that I think we face is for the Soviets, with the massive backdrop of military might, to attempt economic/political intimidation, coercion and blackmail of West European nations. That is one of the Soviet's long-term objectives and, as I say, that is to my mind the major menace we face in Western Europe.

Our conventional forces within the alliance must be improved if deterrence of intimidation and aggression is to be credible.

Given the constraining budgets and the need to enhance the conventional leg, it is important to adhere to established priorities, in my opinion. At the outset of this decade, we set the priority task for U.S. forces in Europe, whose primary mission is to support Allied Command Europe.

We set those priorities both for EUCOM and for Allied Command Europe. And the first priority task is taking care of our people. I won't go into the details on that, but I would just point out that daily we expect these men and women in our Armed Forces to summon up an extraordinary dedication on behalf of their country and, in turn, this Nation must be prepared to meet its responsibility to them.

So I urge the continued support by this committee of our people programs.

PROTECTING PERSONNEL OVERSEAS

A special area of concern is protecting our personnel overseas. Today we are at war with terrorism. The funds in the fiscal year 1987 budget will provide for basic security improvements, and I request your support.

The second priority task for the improvement of conventional forces has to do with the readiness and sustainability of those forces.

Thanks to congressional support, the U.S. forces in Europe are now more robust and operationally capable than at any time in recent memory. We still have shortages of critical spare parts, major end items and preferred ammunition which reduce our ability to exploit fully the forces assigned.

I urge the Congress, again, within its capabilities, to maintain the momentum which has developed in readiness and sustainability programs. We must also strive to fulfill our commitment to reinforce Europe with six additional divisions by M+10 day, mobilization plus 10 days.

We still have a concern because of the lack of POMCUS stocks—but they are continuing to be filled—lack of sufficient strategic lift both sea and air lift. The lack of combat service support forces of the Army for its forward deployed and reinforcing units is a major concern.

At the present time the U.S. Army combat service support forces are inadequate to support the Army units already forward deployed in Europe, let alone the reinforcing units. The Army is studying this problem in order to define and identify manpower and equipment so as to get these support forces into Europe as soon as possible after M-day.

In this regard, it would seem that the Army, with its self-imposed strength ceiling, must take into account the advisability of continuing to create additional combat units—which also require support elements—rather than using the spaces required by those additional combat units to solve its current major deficiency of insufficient combat support/combat service support units and troops.

With respect to wartime host nation agreements, this help, which will not be a panacea for all of the combat support/combat

service support units, requires your continued support. Wartime host nation support funding is very important.

With respect to our colocated operation bases for our reenforcing air forces, we need the minimum essential facilities there—fuel, ammo, parking—which must be provided from NATO infrastructure funding.

INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING

And today we have, in our proposed infrastructure funding—within this slice group—funding for 665 of the shelters for the colocated operating bases. By the end of this slice group, 1990, we will have completed 80 percent of the minimum essential facilities at the colocated bases.

Infrastructure programming is very important to us. We urge the Congress to continue to provide the U.S. share. And I can guarantee you that, as I have been since 1980, I remain dedicated to recouping the funds for those facilities that were prefinanced by this country.

WARTIME MEDICAL SUPPORT

Another readiness and sustainability concern is wartime medical support for our wounded.

The U.S.-supplied hospitalization capability falls far short of our requirements. But our allies have agreed to provide enough fully staffed hospital beds during the early days of conflict, which will meet our needs for the first 60 days. We have increased the number of hospital beds through action taken by this country and through wartime host nation support. But we need to preposition additional medical assets.

I noted with concern that several of the key war reserve medical construction programs were deleted from last year's budget. I seek your support of the medical programs.

MODERNIZATION

The third priority task is modernization.

We are focusing on the modernization programs that will contribute to joint and combined warfighting. A significant determinant of the success of Allied Command Europe's conventional defense will be how well we manage the enemy's follow-on-force and reduce to a manageable ratio the number of his forces we must engage at our defensive positions. And we are making progress in this area.

We need the United States to continue to take the lead among its allies in providing the necessary platforms, the fusion capabilities, the command, communication, and control capabilities, and the essential weapon systems.

CHEMICAL RETALIATORY WEAPONS

We must also modernize our chemical retaliatory weapons. Funds in the budget support binary agents and delivery systems to deter enemy use of chemical weapons by putting him at an equal risk with NATO. So I urge your support of this crucial program.

And we will be able to meet the stipulations that the Congress has listed in the fiscal year 1986 budget bill, which requires that certain things be done, such as a force goal for the United States approved by the appropriate body in NATO, and a deployment plan—concurred and coordinated with me as a SACEUR—to be available for the deployment of binary rounds on a contingency basis. We need continued support of the Congress in this area.

And like chemical forces, special operations forces are an area in need of refurbishment. And I ask your support of the resources in this budget to include the infiltration/exfiltration and resupply aircraft, and so on.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

At this point I would like to digress from my statement to underscore the fact that in my opinion we do not need a new structure for Special Operations Forces. We have what we need today. The unified commands have a special operational commander. In my command his command is a subunified command, a joint command. And that is what I need. I do not believe we need to have a unified command for Special Operations Forces.

I have forces dedicated to me by not only the United States but by other nations in Allied Command Europe, Special Operations Forces included. We have the command, control and communications management system established today that we need. I do not think that we should pursue any further this idea of those who believe that there should be a separate unified command or an organization whose command lies at OSD level, or what have you.

The Special Operations Forces have a mission in time of war to be utilized behind the enemy lines for a number of purposes: One, intelligence; two, for offensive actions; and three, to organize indigenous people who are dissenters and who can assist us behind the enemy lines.

EXPANDING EXISTING FORCE STRUCTURE

Returning to my statement, the fourth priority we had set and still pursue is to expand our existing force structure. It is very important that we have the mobilization exercises and that we establish casualty replacement objectives and requirements to keep the pipeline moving to fill those casualty replacements with trained manpower.

MULTINATIONAL DEFENSE PRODUCTION

The allied nations run the risk of unilaterally disarming themselves because of the burgeoning costs of modern conventional weapons. That means we replace the older weapons with fewer of the more modern ones. The solution lies in a more efficient, mission-oriented, multinational defense research development and procurement system.

Such a system can reduce the massive duplication cost and effort that we have within the alliance. And the United States must continue to assist in the development of a West European defense in-

dustrial base that can collaborate across the Atlantic with the United States defense base.

In this regard I am very encouraged by the help of some members of this committee in this area. The agreement that was reached on the 27th of February among the NATO Nations' Armament Directors to select six systems for cooperative development is in consistence with the provisions of Senator Nunn's amendment.

EUROPEAN TROOP STRENGTH

An overarching issue that needlessly poses an obstacle to meeting our deterrence and defense goals is the ceiling imposed by Congress on troop strength for the European Theater. So I raise the subject again as I have for the past 2 years. I fully understand the reasoning behind the congressional imposition of this ceiling. And although there have been some positive byproducts as a result of this ceiling, the overall effect to the theater is such that I ask that you remove it.

We have a much improved management system. We are deploying intermediate-range nuclear forces, the GLCM's and Pershing II's, and providing headroom for them under the ceiling by decrementing the existing conventional capability.

So we are really undoing the congressional intent to improve our conventional capability. We are further burdening the limited lift capability to return to Europe those units we are sending home. We have also civilianized throughout the theater to the point where my component commanders are telling me we have reached the prudent limits.

But above all there is the basic principle involved, and that is that the precise number/type troops deployed to any theater should be focused upon the threat that they face. Under the ceiling, that is not done. And I just point out, too, that the ceiling seems to encourage other congressional initiatives at micromanagement. For example, the fiscal year 1986, Senate Appropriations Committee report is a case in point. Not only does that committee want to continue the ceiling in Europe, but the SAC has even suggested the combination of NATO and U.S. national staffs for most functions. They would have us combine SHAPE and USEUCOM headquarters, which, as you know, makes no sense, in view of their entirely different functions.

So I ask that the ceiling be removed. But do not remove my management structure which we have established and under which I now have the authority to manage not only the forces directly assigned to European Command, but also those that are assigned in the stove-pipe commands reporting directly to Washington. That management of the latter is only with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to my recommendations.

In conclusion, there are some key defense programs for which USEUCOM needs your help and your support. They are—and I will just tick them off:

People programs: the continued full deployment of ground launched cruise missile until there is a breakthrough in Geneva; the M-Day essential force requirements; sustainment requirements; mobility and reenforcement requirements; funding for wartime

host nation support; support for the wartime capability for hospitalization and medical evacuation; support for systems needed for the effective engagement of follow-on forces; continued support for a modernized binary chemical retaliatory capability; and support for our special operations forces.

I repeat, again, now that real growth is constrained, I would hope that there would be continued strict adherence to national priorities, as the decisions are made within whatever flexibility remains to the Congress, so that the highest priority programs can be funded.

I just point out, finally, that in my opinion, difficult decisions have been made by the Defense Department in trying to establish a proper balance in the budget it submitted. This budget does support my highest priority needs and, therefore, subject to Gramm-Rudman, I urge your support for it.

[The prepared statement of General Rogers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and distinguished committee members. I am pleased to testify before you today and provide, for the record, a report on U.S. Forces Europe—America's forward deployed commitment to NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE). However, at the outset, I would like to comment on three security considerations affecting U.S. European Command (USEUCOM).

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Regional importance

Beyond the direct defense of the homeland, the security of Western Europe remains the United States' highest priority. Crises in other areas frequently divert the attention of policy makers and planners, but over the long run, Western Europe remains the geographic area most crucial to the United States. The reason is clear: should deterrence fail in Western Europe, U.S. and Soviet troops would be in direct conflict. Under current conditions, such a conflict could well develop into NATO facing a difficult choice: resort to nuclear weapons with the risk of escalation to the strategic nuclear exchange, or suffer defeat with the resultant dire consequences for this country. This situation does not exist elsewhere today nor will it be likely in the forseeable future. In other words, the immediate consequences to the U.S. are greatest if deterrence fails in Western Europe.

Fiscal fluctuation

To avoid such a failure, we need forces which are ready, modern, sustainable and survivable. Over the past 4–5 years, we have made steady progress in these areas. Care must be taken to ensure that those gains are not jeopardized as we transition from a period of significant defense growth to the near zero growth or even major reductions over the next years. During periods of low defense budget growth, readiness and sustainability traditionally have been mortgaged to pay for modernization and force structure growth.

We have the Congress to thank for turning this trend around. DoD learned from the experience. Changes in DoD management were made to include increased input to the decision-making process by the unified/specified Commanders. By FY87, Defense Budget recommendations will be more equitably balanced between near-term readiness/sustainability and long-term modernization/force structure accounts.

My concern is with the magnitude and the distribution of the reductions that will be required to meet fiscal and deficit targets. There will be a great temptation to take a disproportionate share of the reduction from the readiness and sustainability accounts. But, every dollar cut from readiness and sustainability means a loss today in operational capability and deterrence. That is the lesson we learned in the 1970's, and I am hopeful that we will not need to relearn it.

Strategy

Deterrence and defense in Western Europe rely on a Triad of military capabilities to support the NATO strategy of Flexible Response. The strategic nuclear leg of this

Triad rests on the U.S. and U.K. capabilities whose modernization to restore the deterrent value of this leg is now well underway. The second leg of the NATO Triad, nonstrategic nuclear forces, is also collectively being modernized with implementation of the 1979 NATO dual-track decision. PII deployment is complete and GLCM deployment continues on schedule, despite tremendous pressures against deployment, both from within and outside NATO. By remaining staunch and firm in the implementation of its decision, the Alliance has demonstrated the unity of purpose, resolve and cohesion so necessary for the Warsaw Pact to perceive as it looks to the West.

The third leg of the NATO's Triad is its conventional forces. In the past, the importance of conventional forces for deterrence was measured only by their ability to hold against Warsaw Pact aggression long enough to allow for escalation to nuclear first use by NATO. Any credibility this premise may have had was diminished as the Soviets' aggregate nuclear capability approached parity with that of the United States. The danger today is that the Soviets might conclude that they possess both the capability to inflict a quick conventional defeat on us and the visible nuclear strength to sap Allied will to resist. In a period of crisis, this perception might encourage the Soviet Union to accept the risk of direct attack or—and more likely—to attempt economic/political intimidation, coercion and blackmail of the West European nations. The latter is one of the Soviet's long-term objectives in reaching her goal of world domination; it is the major menace facing Western Europe.

Today's world dictates that conventional forces within the Alliance must be improved if deterrence of aggression is to be credible. It is encouraging to note that there is now general acceptance of this fact and of the reality that nuclear forces cannot satisfy all deterrent needs.

CONVENTIONAL PRIORITIES

Given constrained budgets and the need to enhance the conventional leg of the NATO Triad, it is important to adhere to established priorities. As a defensive alliance, NATO need not match the Warsaw Pact division for division, tank for tank, nor one for one in any area of force comparison. But what is needed is a conventional capacity adequate to deny the Soviets the possibility of a quick victory over the Alliance or the perception that they can bully us into accommodation and impotence.

Such a capacity requires ready and sustainable in-place and reinforcing forces that are modernized and adequate in size. At the outset of this decade, I set the priority tasks for the U.S. forces in Europe that contribute to NATO's deterrence and for ACE forces as well. Today, these priorities still pertain; let me address each in turn.

First priority task: Taking proper care of our people

Whereas most of our allies rely on conscription and benefit from lower associated manpower costs, DoD and Congress are faced annually with developing the most cost effective pay and benefits package to attract and retain quality people. It is essential that adequate medical care, housing, family care, working and living facilities be coupled with the "psychic compensation" that comes from being part of a well-trained and capably-led team. The soldier, sailor, marine, and airman of today are strong, have confidence and are well trained. They serve with unpretentious loyalty and discipline, contributing their bit each day to the well-being of the rest of their countrymen who are uninhibited by the constraints on those in uniform. Their efforts mean a sacrifice in terms of comfort, salary, stability, and often public esteem. These men and women willingly accept this posture, as well as the possibility of leaving their families on very short notice with the prospect of making the ultimate sacrifice. Daily we expect these men and women to summon up an extraordinary dedication on behalf of their country. In turn, this nation must be prepared to meet its responsibility to them. I urge your continued support of our people programs.

A special area of concern is protecting our personnel overseas. We are at war with terrorism, and its level of violence has increased markedly. We are attempting to take those prudent steps to prevent acts of terrorism against our people, equipment and facilities. Some of the protective measures are not costly, e.g., increased awareness, but for other measures we need your help. For example, at times during the Fall of 1985 we diverted up to 4500 soldiers from their primary duties to the mission of security of people and installations. Such major diversion has an impact on training and operations. Funds in the FY87 budget will provide for basic security improvements—fences, lighting, and contract guards for some of our important and

vulnerable areas. As we learn more and find new ways to deal with the ominous terrorist threat, we will seek your understanding and assistance.

Second priority task: Readiness and sustainability of our forces

Once we take care of the basic people needs, we have to ensure they can fight and endure. The Alliance nations recognize that they must ensure appropriate readiness and adequate sustainability for forward stationed and early reinforcing units. For example, NATO Defense Ministers have agreed upon a Conventional Defense Improvement Program which will give special emphasis to overcoming the main deficiencies of our conventional forces. Thanks to Congressional support of previous DoD efforts, the U.S. forces in Europe are now more robust and operationally capable than at any time in recent memory. The sustainability of our forces has improved, but we still have shortages of critical spare parts, major end items and preferred ammunition which reduce our ability to exploit fully the forces assigned.

I urge Congress to maintain the momentum which has developed in the readiness and sustainability programs. The value of the U.S. contribution to the Alliance rests with our sustaining our forward deployed forces as well as fulfilling our commitment to reinforce Europe with six additional divisions by M+10 day. We cannot meet that commitment today because of a lack of POMCUS stocks and insufficient strategic lift. The U.S. contribution also requires sufficient Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) forces for its forward deployed and reinforcing units. At present, U.S. Army CS/CSS forces are inadequate to support the Army units already forward deployed in Europe, let alone the reinforcing units. The manpower shortage for Army CS/CSS units required on M-Day in Europe today runs into the many thousands. In addition, these support forces lack sufficient equipment. A large proportion are not combat ready. Finally, the majority of the units are in CONUS and cannot be deployed rapidly into the European theater. The Army is studying this problem in order to define and identify manpower and equipment so as to get these support forces into Europe as soon as possible after M-day. In this regard, it would seem that the Army, with its self-imposed strength ceiling, must take into account the advisability of creating additional combat units—which also require supporting elements—rather than using the spaces required by those additional units to solve its current major deficiency of insufficient CS/CSS units and troops.

Although Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) agreements which we have negotiated with Allies will provide considerable help, it is not a panacea for all of the CS/CSS ills. However, I can report that the military technical support agreement negotiations with the FRG have been concluded and the German unit activation schedule for WHNS has been finalized. We are now obligating funds to procure our share of the equipment for these units. Your continued support of WHNS is very important.

With respect to our national commitment to reinforce NATO, the delivery of the first C-5B earlier this year is a good step forward. Other initiatives, including filling the six POMCUS sites, fast sealift programs and the earliest possible fielding of the C-17 are crucial. Without early reinforcement in the face of a large conventional attack, we will face fairly quickly the choice between escalation to the use of nuclear weapons or capitulation. In the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) area, the purchase and modification of the Reichel facility at Rheinberg, West Germany, will allow efficient reception of deploying forces and provide storage for war reserve material as well as house essential forward deployed CS/CSS units. Again this year, I solicit your support for this cost-effective and essential facility.

Through Collocated Operating Base (COB) agreements, existing European airfields are made available to U.S. reinforcing air units during wartime. Provision for early deployment of tactical air forces can make a significant contribution to deterrence. To increase the readiness and sustainability of these units, we need Minimum Essential Facilities (MEF) at the COBs—fuel, ammunition and parking for the first days of conflict—which must be provided from NATO infrastructure funds. The U.S. contribution to the NATO infrastructure account represents about 28% of the total and, if provided, helps to ensure these critical benefits are available. Failure to avail ourselves of this opportunity only exacerbates our strategic lift shortfall. I urge the Congress to provide the U.S. share of the NATO infrastructure program at the time it is required.

Another readiness and sustainability concern is wartime medical support for our wounded. At the present time, the U.S.-supplied hospitalization capability falls far short of our requirements. To eliminate this shortfall, our allies have agreed to provide enough fully-staffed hospital beds during the early days of a conflict. But these host nation beds are only an interim solution; we need to preposition additional medical assets to provide for care and evacuation of casualties. We also need to sus-

tain the acquisition of austere shelters and the medical assemblages required to make them fully operational as wartime hospitals. I noted with concern that several key war reserve medical construction projects were deleted from last year's budget. I believe we have proposed a combination of host nation support and U.S.-provided programs to care for our wounded and rapidly return to duty those who are able. I seek your support of the medical programs in this year's budget.

Modernization: The third priority

Even with good people programs and adequate readiness/sustainment, there are limits to what can be achieved. To go beyond those limits we need to make the existing systems more capable. Thus, the third major priority for USEUCOM is modernization of our forces. Specifically, we are focusing on those programs that will contribute to joint and combined warfighting. Air assets such as JSTARS, ASARS, TR-1, F-16, and our allies' Tornado can contribute dramatically to the ground battle; by the same token, ground assets such as SAMS, air defense guns, MLRS/Lance, and special forces are essential to the air battle. In combination, these modernization programs will help us to defend better and thereby contribute to our deterrent capability.

The significant determinant of the success of Allied Command Europe's conventional defense will be how well we can engage the enemy's follow-on-forces and reduce to a manageable ratio the number of his forces we must engage at our general defensive positions. We are making progress in this area. The ACE subconcept of operations, FOFA (Follow On Forces Attack), has been approved by NATO's political authorities. We need the U.S. to continue to take the lead among its allies in providing surveillance/target acquisition platforms, joint/combined tactical fusion capabilities, C^3 capabilities and essential weapons systems so that we can apply the FOFA subconcept in an appropriate and adequate manner. Thus I urge your support for programs such as the combat targeting center, JSTARS, TR-1 with ASARS, F16, JTF (LOCE), several important C3I initiatives, ATACMs and a number of the Services' black programs that will support FOFA.

In the area of air operations, the Alliance is now resolving the vexing question of identifying friendly and enemy aircraft. The MK XV IFF, once fielded, will provide standardized information on all Alliance aircraft. We must now get on with the procurement and fielding of this long overdue capability that is so basic to the air mission and has a direct application to air defense.

Air defense is a mission area where technology can be of enormous benefit. Some programs have recently come to fruition—Patriot, Stinger, Rapier. Some, like I-Hawk, provide a credible capability against medium altitude threats. The DIVAD was to complement existing air defenses and deal with low flying aircraft. Cancellation of the DIVAD did not eliminate the need it was intended to satisfy. Our front-line troops need to be able to deal effectively with low-flying, high speed aircraft and the growing threat of armored helicopters.

We also must modernize our chemical retaliatory weapons. The Soviet/WP forces routinely practice the offensive employment of chemical weapons as well as exercising their defensive capabilities. They are ready. By contrast, while we are improving in the defensive area, we do not yet possess a retaliatory capability adequate to deter Soviet/Warsaw Pact use. Our chemical munitions are old, difficult to transport and employ, and lack an effective capability to strike facilities in the enemy's rear area. The funds in the budget support binary agents and delivery systems to deter enemy use of chemical weapons by putting him at an equal risk with NATO; I urge your support of this crucial program.

Like chemical forces, Special Operations Forces are an area in need of refurbishment. The current momentum needs to be maintained, and I ask for your support of the resources in this budget (to include infiltration/exfiltration and resupply aircraft, and communications equipment).

Fourth priority: Force structure additions

The fourth priority is to expand existing force structure. The current military force is, by design, an organization structured at an acceptable risk level which we must be able to augment rapidly. Mobilization and casualty replacement objectives are requirements that we must be able to fulfill. Accordingly, mobilization tests and analyses to be conducted should help guide overall defense thinking and follow-on efforts. I encourage your support.

MULTI-NATIONAL DEFENSE PRODUCTION

As Tom Callaghan, then Director of the Allied Interdependence Program for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Georgetown University,

warned the Congress as long ago as 1977, Allied nations on both sides of the Atlantic run the risk of unilaterally disarming themselves because of the burgeoning costs of modern conventional weapons. The solution lies in a more efficient, mission-oriented, multinational defense research, development and procurement system. Experience has demonstrated that nations can reduce the massive duplicative costs and efforts by allocating among the participating nations the responsibility for specific weapon systems or group of related systems. As Michael Heseltine, the former British Secretary of State for Defense, noted, within NATO there are now eleven different firms in seven countries working on anti-tank weapons; eighteen firms in seven countries making ground-to-air weapons; sixteen firms working on air-to-ground systems and ten firms in seven countries working on ship-to-ship weapons. Such duplication is grossly wasteful. The U.S. must work with its Allies and assist in the development of a West European defense industrial base that can collaborate across the Atlantic with the US base. Doing so could lead to a reduction of duplication; an exchange of research, development and test data; a sharing of technology; and common procurement. Obviously, for the common good of collective security, the influence of parochial, vested interests on both sides of the Atlantic would have to be overcome. In this regard, I am encouraged by the help of some members of this committee, and the agreement reached on 27 February among the NATO nations' Armament Directors to select six systems for cooperative development in consistence with the provisions of Senator Nunn's Amendment.

EUROPEAN TROOP STRENGTH

An overarching issue that needlessly poses an obstacle to meeting our deterrence and defense goals is the ceiling imposed by Congress on troop strength for the European Theater. I fully understand the reasoning behind Congressional imposition of the ceiling. And although there have been some positive by-products as a result of the ETS ceiling, the overall effect to the Theater is such that, as I did last year, I ask that you remove it. We now have a much improved management system and the tools necessary to control the numbers and types of units we station in Europe. Further, our allies have been sensitized to our burdensharing concerns, and are considerably more receptive to our entreaties to improve conventional capabilities.

Yet, because of the ceiling, we are actually reducing the U.S. contribution to conventional defense. We are deploying intermediate-range nuclear forces and providing headroom for them under the ceiling by decrementing existing conventional capability.

To meet the ceiling, I have made trade-off decisions that are clearly not in the best interest of U.S. national security. We have reduced programmed deploying forces to the point where we are undoing the Congressional intent to improve conventional capability. We have also sent combat units back to CONUS thereby further burdening the limited lift capability we do possess should their rapid return be required. We have also civilianized throughout the theater to the point where my commanders are telling me we have reached prudent limits. These limitations and reductions apply equally to the forces engaged in strategic operations and inteligence in support of our worldwide interests. By so constraining them, we have imposed a NATO penalty on crucial non-NATO missions.

Above all, there is a basic principle involved. The precise troops deployed to any theater should be a DOD determination within a constrained defense budget. The focus must be on the threat. Under the ceiling it is not. Further, the ceiling seems to have encouraged other Congressional initiatives at micromanagement; initiatives against which some of you have spoken so eloquently. The FY86 Senate Appropriations Committee Report is a case in point. Now, not only does that Committee want to continue the ceiling in my area of responsibility, but the SAC has even suggested "the combination of NATO and U.S. national staffs for most functions." They would have us combine SHAPE and USEUCOM, which, as you know, have entirely different functions.

The ceiling must be removed, but not the management structure that allows me to systematically forward deploy forces when it is in the U.S. national interests to have them in theater. I ask you to allow the Defense Department to tailor force structure to the threat. Allow us to insure appropriate and adequate combat and support forces in order to avoid creating a hollow organization that performs no greater function than to act as a trip wire for use of nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSION

As I conclude I wish to summarize for this committee some of the key defense programs for which USEUCOM needs your support. They are:

People programs such as compensation, medical care, O&M and MILCON for training, and support facilities, housing, family care, and real property maintenance. Included are efforts to protect our people and installations from attack by terrorists.

Continued emphasis on the full deployment of GLCM.

M-Day essential force requirements, including increased readiness of CS/CSS units, POMCUS equipment, and storage facilities.

Sustainment requirements with special attention to storage and stocks of critical munitions and major end items.

Mobility/reinforcement requirements with special attention to meeting our national commitment for 10 divisions, 88 tactical fighter squadrons and a Marine Amphibious Brigade in Europe after 10 days of mobilization.

Funding for WHNS to complement US military capability so as to enhance US/NATO combat power as specified in HNS agreements.

Wartime capability for hospitalization and medical evacuation through procurement and prepositioning in theater of hospitals and associated equipment and supplies.

The surveillance/reconnaissance/target acquisition systems, the fusion/command and control systems and the weapons systems needed for the effective engagement of follow-on forces, with special attention to standardization/interoperability with Allied assets.

A modern, binary chemical retaliatory capability.

Special Operations Forces capabilities, especially enhanced infiltration/exfiltration and C3 systems.

With substantial real growth in Defense Budgets over the past several years, European Command has seen significant improvement in the operational capability of its forces. Now that real growth is constrained, strict adherence to national priorities is essential if the European Command is to receive adequate, appropriate support.

Difficult decisions have been made by DoD in trying to establish a proper balance in the budget it has submitted. This budget supports my highest priority needs; I urge your support of it.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, General.

Sam, did you have an opening statement?

Senator NUNN. I just welcome both of you here and look forward to getting to questions after the statements.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, we are glad to see you again, and glad to have you with us.

REORGANIZATION BILL

As you know, we have acted upon this bill to reorganize. Have you had a chance to look at it?

General ROGERS. The reorganization bill?

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

General ROGERS. I have not seen the bill, but I have seen the press release that was issued by the chairman and by Senator Nunn at the time that the vote was taken.

Senator THURMOND. I just wondered if you had any comment on it. I think a good many of the provisions it contains were suggestions really that came from you and some others, too.

General ROGERS. I do have some comments on it. Would you wish that I make them now?

Senator THURMOND. I think it would be well to give them to us.

General ROGERS. All right. With respect to the advisory role of the Chairman and the other JCS members, I notice that the Chairman has been designated as the principal military advisor to the President and so on, and that is the way it should be. But I notice,

then, that it is specified that the JCS members are "military advisors" to the President and in that capacity as "military advisors," they provide advice whenever the President, NSC, or Secretary of Defense request it.

I personally do not think those two points are necessary because they will respond to the President and to the NSC whenever they are asked without it having to be designated in legislation.

I was disappointed, frankly, with respect to the role that the Chairman is to play in programming and budgeting in coordination with the CINC's. You see, I made the assumption that the primary purpose of the legislation was to enhance considerably the authority and influence of both the Chairman and the CINC's of the combatant commands.

I personally had thought that the Chairman should be the one who would receive the Service Program Objective Memos and the budgets and he would be the man that would integrate them with major input from the Commanders in Chief. The POM's and the budgets would flow through the military channel, integrated by the Chairman with major CINC input and then sent to the Secretary of Defense.

It was in view of those two suggestions that I thought consideration had to be given as to the role, then, that the Service Secretaries would play, I had three alternatives for them, as you recall. I don't believe that, from what I read—not having seen the bill, but just the press release—that, in fact, you are going to get the kind of input in the programming and budgeting that I thought you wanted from both the Chairman and from the CINC's.

Also, under the Chairman, it specifies that the Chairman's terms shall end no later than 6 months after the beginning of a new Presidency. I do not know the rationale for that stipulation, but I will say to you that it concerns me because it tends to politicize the Chairman.

Just as a "for instance": in the run up to the election of 1976, do you recall that the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff was categorized by one candidate as not being qualified to be a sewer commissioner? And that party happened to win. We Chiefs were very concerned whether or not that Chairman was going to be summarily dismissed by the President who was elected at that time. And we were delighted to find that he was kept on until the end of his normal tour; in fact, for medical reasons, he had to leave a few months early.

I think that your proposal would tend to politicize. Anytime you politicize the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will dilute the cross-service views of the CINC's, in my opinion.

Under the Vice-Chairman, I would not, if I were writing the bill, I would not use this language—"assign the Vice-Chairman, unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense the duty of serving as the acting Chairman in the absence—" I would delete "unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense."

I would ask that you keep in mind the view from those of us out in the field and not just the view from Washington. We have to have somebody in the Washington arena, in the interagency fora, who will present our cross-service views. The only uniformed man

to do that is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When he is gone, you cannot have the cross-service views properly presented under current arrangements.

In the first place, there is a lot of discussion that goes on between CINC's and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—exchange of messages, telephone calls, meetings, and what have you.

Now, we would expect the Vice-Chairman to understand those cross-service views and when the Chairman is gone, as he must be for a considerable part of the year, we need somebody back here who can present those cross-service views.

And that is why I think it is so important that you have a Vice-Chairman, but it not be left to the option of the President or the Secretary of Defense whether or not he is the acting Chairman. And he should be the No. 2 man.

With respect to the Joint Staff, I read the four points that were listed in the press release and I think they mean and what you intend—is that the Joint Staff works for the Chairman. And I would agree with that 100 percent. You see, you start out by saying specified and under the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman, the Joint Staff shall assist the Chairman and the other JCS members from carrying out their responsibilities.

But when you get down to saying authorize only the Chairman to prescribe the duties and to prescribe the staffing procedures, you really mean you want the staff to work for the Chairman. And I can concur in that wholeheartedly.

With respect to the operational chain of command, I think the Chairman should be in the chain of command; he has to be there in time of war and even in the contingencies that arise during the so-called peacetime.

The Secretary of Defense should give the Chairman quite specific guidance as to what he wants done and then the Chairman should direct us CINCs in what needs to be done, the Chairman shouldn't have to run back to the Secretary of Defense every time with every message to get it approved by the Secretary of Defense so that he can put in there the lead paragraph "the Secretary of Defense has authorized so and so and such and such."

I personally believe that he should be in the chain of command in peacetime; he has to be there in wartime. Crises move too quickly.

In your specifying that commanders within combatant command shall communicate with other elements of DOD according to procedures established by the combatant commands, I could not agree with you more. It is too bad we have to put that in the law, but it ought to be a two-way street.

You do not say anything in there about Washington agencies communicating directly with my subordinate commanders or my subordinate subordinate commanders. It is a two-way street.

So I would suggest that if you are going to have that paragraph in there of coming from below up, you ought to put another paragraph in, I would think, from above down.

Senator NUNN. I would think that is presumed by our provision, General Rogers, because communications involve listening as well as talking. I think your point is already implicit in our bill. If you try to specify the top-down restriction you have to rule out, of

course, the Secretary of Defense. And I think you would not want to keep him from having communications with subordinates in anyway. Neither would you want to keep the President from having communications as he sees fit.

I doubt if you would want to keep the Chairman from having communications.

General ROGERS. I certainly do want to keep them from doing that with operational directives. The worst thing that happens, Senator, is when the man who bears the responsibility is short-circuited and guidance and direction and operational directives are given to a subordinate commander and I am short-circuited.

Senator NUNN. I do not think we can constitutionally write into law the President of the United States could not communicate with any military man anywhere in uniform. I think that would be patently unconstitutional.

General ROGERS. You could certainly write in the law, I would think, that at the same time he communicates operational directives, he simultaneously communicates with the man who bears the responsibility.

Senator NUNN. I do not think you can do that constitutionally. I think that is flagrantly unconstitutional. You cannot direct the Commander in Chief to skip one ring of your chain of command. In fact, we give the President the exact authority to do that in the law, to set up his own chain of command underneath you without having to go through every layer.

I think it would be patently unconstitutional if we wrote in the law that the President of the United States could not talk to anybody in uniform and anyone under Bernie Rogers' command, without going through Bernie Rogers. That would be desirable, and I think that is the way it normally ought to run.

But I do not think you could possibly do that in statute without clear questions of constitutionality.

General ROGERS. Well, I am sure you are familiar with the history of the Cuban missile crisis in which with the communications capability we had even then, there was guidance and direction directly from Washington to skippers on ships.

And I say to you, Senator Nunn, that it does not come as a happy incident in my life when I find that those who are associated with an agency in Washington who bear no responsibility feel that they can direct my subordinate commanders to perform an operation or to do certain things associated with an operation, and I find out about it after the fact.

So my suggestion, Senator is that if you cannot make it a two-way street, I would not include No. 7 on your page of your release under operational chain of command; I would delete that.

As I said at the outset, it is too bad that that needs to be put into the law. When we discussed this in December, I said that I thought that, as far as I was concerned, it did not need to be legislated and we could handle it.

Senator NUNN. Well, I think it might be possible for the services. I do not think you could do that constitutionally for communications involving the President or probably the Secretary of Defense.

But I would also submit to you that when we stipulate in the bill that component commander shall communicate according to the

procedures set up by the CINC, I consider that to be two-way communications. The communication we anticipate in our bill is two-way. Component commanders can communicate with people above him in Washington only by the procedures that you the CINC would set forth. That means listening as well as talking.

General ROGERS. I do not need that in the law.

Senator NUNN. Sir?

General ROGERS. I do not need that in the law, Senator, in order to get it accomplished. I mentioned that I thought I had gotten this under control in a special meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And since that time, there has only been one incident, that I am aware of, where I was short-circuited, and I have taken care of that.

Senator NUNN. So you do not want anything in the law, then?

General ROGERS. I do not think it is necessary to have that in the law. We can handle that ourselves.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Gentlemen, allow me to interfere. We do not have a lot of time, and we have been discussing this matter, now, for about 3 months, and we do have these gentlemen over here from their very important positions in Europe, and I think you could get along with the general questioning of General Rogers and Admiral Baggett have to tell us and we can get back into this, if you do not mind.

We are going to have more members, and all of us have questions to ask.

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, this committee, in the view of some and not the view of others, it is a compromise: I will have to tell you that. As a whole, I think it has been greatly improved, though. And you have made many suggestions that I think are very helpful, and I am sure that a great many on the committee would favor some of these suggestions you have made that were not acted upon. But at any rate, considering the situation and the various changes, I think it has been greatly improved.

Now speaking about your communications, anything requiring action ought to go through you and insofar as communicating, of course, the Commander in Chief has—can talk to anybody he wants to. But in taking action, I presume that would go through you.

I have a few questions that I would like answered for the record.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Admiral Baggett, we would welcome your remarks now.

STATEMENT OF ADM. LEE BAGGETT, JR., USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Admiral BAGGETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. I am pleased to have the opportunity today to appear before this committee to give you my assessment of the Atlantic Command; it is also a pleasure to be here with General Rogers, who in my previous assignment, was my Commander in Chief.

I am privileged to be here with General Rogers, who was my superior in the European Command and in NATO until I came to the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic position and USCINCLANT in November 1985.

This morning in my presentation, I would like to just touch on major concerns and those programs in the Department of Defense budget request for fiscal year 1987, which are related to those concerns that I have. For the most part, the concerns deal with programs that are already funded rather than new efforts, and I will address the threat posed by the improved Soviet capabilities that face us.

I will touch on the following concerns and related program issues: The threat that the Soviets pose to the Atlantic Command; Cuba and the Caribbean; anti-submarine warfare, which is a major concern; tactical aircraft procurement; command, control and communications; ordnance sustainability; and, finally, several war stoppers.

The Atlantic Command is a maritime theater, over these lines of communication will flow almost all of the supplies and military equipment for the reinforcement and resupply of Europe. In a war with the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. and NATO strategy, which are integrated strategies, depend totally on the maritime forces being able to keep those sea lines of communication open to resupply and reinforce Europe.

We have developed a concept of maritime operations within NATO. This maritime strategy, as I said, is complementary to, and almost one for one concurs with, U.S. maritime strategy. It is based on forward deployment of forces for deterrence, keeping the enemy contained, and defense in depth—not just meeting the enemy on the forward edge of the Atlantic Command, but also being able to back up those forces across the entire areas of concern in the resupply and reinforcement of Europe.

Our plans are designed around two major campaigns in the Atlantic: the Norwegian Sea campaign and the battle of the Atlantic, which includes the sea approaches to Great Britain and to Europe, the Southwest approaches.

As you can certainly understand, these campaigns are closely related. If events go badly in the Norwegian Sea and we lose bases in Iceland and Norway, it will be difficult either to defend these countries or to protect the reinforcement and resupply sea lines of communications to Europe.

Certainly, without control of the approaches to Europe, it would do us no good whatsoever, in the context of resupply and reinforcement of Europe, to win the battle of the Norwegian Sea or the battle of the Atlantic, if those sea lines of communications at their termini in Europe were not held by us.

Success in the Atlantic is heavily dependent on our ability to prevail against the Soviet combined arms, the most capable maritime component being the Soviet submarine force. They continue to have a numerical advantage of three to one over U.S. submarines. Coupled with that quantitative advantage is the fact that the Soviets have rapidly closed the technology gap that exists between our submarines and theirs, in terms of quality.

The sophistication and capability of these new Soviet submarines, their command control and communications, and their weapon systems are, in many areas, comparable to our own, and in some, such as titanium technology, superior to ours.

It can no longer be said that our numerical disadvantage can be offset by our technological skills and superiority. This situation has developed not because we have not been supported or we have been lax, but rather it is because the Soviets have made vast improvements in their submarines; they have made amazing strides.

Their large investments in research and development, including their acquisition of Western technology, have permitted them to build submarines which are much quieter and therefore much more difficult to detect. We rely very heavily on passive detections to provide information on the presence of Soviet submarines in the Atlantic area. Since these detections depend upon radiated noise, a reduction in noise has a corresponding impact upon our ability to detect.

The newest classes of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have incorporated some of the latest technology in sound quieting with a resultant decline in our detection capabilities. The implications of this trend are very clear: The deterrent effect of superior U.S. and NATO maritime capabilities is declining.

Though our submarines today are the most capable in the world, the Soviets are a close second and they are getting closer, and our superiority may not be good enough to provide us a victory. The Soviet submarine force, its here and now numerical advantage and the trend toward improved quality, is the biggest maritime threat and is what concerns me most.

The Soviets do not have to be victorious at sea; they require only enough success to slow or blunt our offensive capabilities and keep us from getting the reinforcements and resupplies to Europe.

With respect to the Caribbean and Cuba, I am concerned with the military support the Soviet Union provides to Cuba and Nicaragua. Both nations continue to receive shipments of arms that are far in excess of their defensive requirements and they use this excess to support armed insurrections in other parts of the region and make general mischief.

With the aid of both Cuba and the Soviet Union, Nicaragua has built facilities capable of supporting high-performance aircraft whose introduction would place the Panama Canal and the Caribbean sea lines of communication within range of hostile aircraft.

In a war, the Caribbean would be defended by Atlantic Command forces—the same forces that are concerned with the sea lines of communication to Europe, the Norwegian Sea, the Atlantic Command, which I earlier described.

In the event of a war in Europe, 55 percent of the United States Army's heavy lift capability and 90 percent of the petroleum products destined for the resupply of NATO would originate in gulf coast ports.

Cuba sits astride those life lines and we cannot ignore the potential threat that these Caribbean sea lines of communication face from Cuba. If we must resort to military action to protect shipping in that region, again, it would have to be done at the expense of our initial capabilities in the defense of Europe and the other Atlantic campaigns.

If we are to retain a war-winning margin over the Soviet Navy, we must press on with current antisubmarine warfare procurement

programs, as well as continue our research and development efforts for new technologies.

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

ASW, antisubmarine warfare, is not a single platform conflict; it involves multiplatform operations closely coordinated. Antisubmarine warfare is not a Mach-2 warfare area; it is a slow, taxing, integrated warfare area that requires defense in depth and offensive action, with your own submarines capable of going and conducting antisubmarine warfare in the sea control areas near the Soviet homeland.

Our nuclear attack submarines are key platforms in antisubmarine warfare. There are two programs in the fiscal year 1987 budget that are vital, not only for our current needs but also to our projected requirements into the next century. These are the 688-class submarine improvement programs and the new class submarine, the SSN 21-class. These would have new weapon systems, new detection capabilities and would be able to cope with the increasing technical advantage we see the Soviets gaining.

As we look at that Soviet threat from the mid-1990's into the 21st century, it is clear that our existing submarine force does not have the potential for sound quieting and weapon system expansion necessary to counter those Soviet advances. Your support of these programs is critical if we are going to reverse the downward trend in the gap between our submarines and those of the Soviets.

Since we count very heavily on undersea surveillance for many initial detections of submarines, it is imperative we continue research and development in that area. The towed array equipped ocean surveillance ships, T-AGOS, with their long arrays, have given us the capability to operate in those areas of the world where we don't have surveillance systems.

T-AGOS ships also have the flexibility to adjust to changing patterns of Soviet submarine employment. Your continued support of undersea surveillance programs, which are the life blood of ASW, is requested.

Programs to improve the Mark 48 submarine torpedo and the Mark 50 lightweight torpedo are necessary additions to the weapons inventory if we are to maintain the capability to destroy the newest classes of Soviet submarines.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT

With regard to tactical aircraft procurement, the Soviets are introducing new generation fighter aircraft and that underscores the need to maintain our tactical aircraft procurement rates.

Fiscal pressures continue to delay the Air Force goal of 40 tactical fighter wings. Constraints upon procurement will force the retention of older aircraft and impair our capability against this increasing Soviet air capability. Further reductions in procurement would force retention of the older aircraft and impair our capability against an increasingly capable Soviet air force.

One of the highest priorities for my Air Force forces is the LANTIRN—low altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night system—which will go on the F-15/Echo and the F-16 fighters ena-

bling them to penetrate enemy airspace and elude detection by air defense radars.

This system provides a substantial improvement in their warfighting capability. It provides them a night capability and an under-the-weather capability.

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

The security and effectiveness of our SSBN's are of primary strategic importance and dictate that attendant communications systems be current and survivable. As this committee is aware, the aircraft that we now have—the EC-130's—are nearing the end of their useful service life. They have run out of the margin for improvement.

Two of the replacement aircraft, the E-6A, have already been approved by the Congress. The fiscal year 1987 budget request for three additional aircraft is valid and I ask your support.

Interoperability continues to receive the highest priority attention from me as a unified CINC. A concerted effort has been made by the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to correct past problems and there have been substantial improvements in this area. Interoperability in a hostile electronic warfare environment has long been recognized and continues to be a serious problem. The services are firmly committed to improved interoperability, and funding for secure, interoperable antijam communications systems is contained in each of these service budgets.

In any development program it is the responsibility of the unified CINC's, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Tactical Command Control and Communications Agency to ensure that command control and communication programs in the service budgets are compatible. We have made substantial progress in ensuring that future systems are interoperable.

SUSTAINABILITY

Correcting ordnance deficiencies, both in inventory levels and weapon capabilities, is my No. 1 sustainability issue. Support from Congress over the past 5 years has been instrumental in reversing the downward trend in ordnance procurement.

We have made substantial progress, but still have a long way to go. Although our inventories are improving, as initiatives of the past few years result in deliveries of ordnance items, shortages will continue to exist in both level of effort and threat ordnance into the 1990's.

The capacity for sustaining combat operations in the Atlantic has improved a great deal. For example, if the funding request for 1987 is approved, the Navy program could achieve the goal of providing 90 days of supply of aviation spare parts for 15 carriers by 1989. However, funding constraints will slow the rate of improvement in other areas. For example, deep cuts in Air Force war readiness spares funding in fiscal year 1986 are of particular concern. Only 40 percent of the 1986 Air Force requirements for war readiness spares is funded. The end result of that will be a reduction in readiness and sustainability of tactical aircraft—aircraft sorties from that originally programmed in the fiscal year 1989 through

fiscal year 1991 time period, the delivery periods which are on the horizon for those fiscal years where the cuts occurred.

WAR-STOPPERS

In the Atlantic, my principal concerns are those which impact upon our ability to prevail in a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. First on this list, as I said before, is the submarine threat that the Soviets pose. Unless we make necessary investments to retain our antisubmarine warfare capabilities, we will not prevail in a war at sea.

Our munitions and spare parts inventories are not yet at the level required to support sustained combat operations. They are improving, but it is absolutely essential that these conventional munitions and spare parts programs are kept at levels sufficient to continue movement toward inventory objectives.

We require a credible deterrent to the use of chemical weapons, and should make a firm commitment to the production of binary weapons. The services are investing substantial funds in chemical warfare defense, a capability that has been deficient in the past.

However, if our forces are required to fight while encumbered by protective chemical warfare equipment, clothing and gear, their effectiveness would be reduced by at least 50 percent. A credible offensive capability to retaliate to any Soviet first use of chemical weapons is needed to avoid the risk of putting our personnel at such a disadvantage.

The wide disparity between Soviet and United States defense-related R&D expenditures, which we are all aware of, in the past 15 years has closed the gap but has it has not yet erased the technological advantage that we hold. This technological edge still offsets the clear fact that not only today, but in future years, my forces are going to face a formidable, numerically superior enemy.

It is necessary to increase our R&D investments if we are to ensure that our future forces are not faced with a war-stopper of superior Soviet technology.

Last and most importantly, people are readiness—the here and now readiness of my forces. Our ability to recruit and retain adequate numbers of quality personnel is becoming more difficult. If downward trends develop—and there are indications that this could be starting—I would ask that your early support be given to those programs which are so critical for recruiting and retention.

As I mentioned earlier, I believe that our defense budget for fiscal 1987 represents a proper balance between current war-fighting needs and modernization that allows us to keep pace with the Soviet military improvements.

I ask that you consider this budget in the light of the very real threat presented to us by the Soviet Union and its allies. Your past support has brought us to where we are and your continued support is essential to provide the Atlantic Command with the resources necessary to meet my commitments.

That completes my presentation, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Baggett follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM. LEE BAGGETT, JR., USN, ON THE STATUS OF THE ATLANTIC COMMAND

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. I am pleased to have the opportunity to be here today to provide you with my assessment of the status of the Atlantic Command.

In my presentation today, I will cite my major concerns and those programs in the Department of Defense budget request for fiscal year 1987 which are related to these concerns. For the most part, my concerns deal with programs already funded rather than with new efforts. Those programs which are new address significantly improved Soviet capabilities for which existing U.S. systems provide an inadequate counter.

The Unified Commanders have had the opportunity to participate throughout the development of the Services' programs. We have had direct inputs via the JCS and the Defense Resources Board, as well as indirect influence through our component commanders. I am satisfied that my participation is at an appropriate level and that my concerns are receiving the proper level of support from each of the Services through the existing process. The FY-87 budget presents an appropriate balance between the readiness of existing forces and the requirements for future capabilities.

I will address the following concerns and program issues:

The Soviet Threat in the Atlantic Command;
Cuba and the Caribbean;
Anti-Submarine Warfare;
Tactical Aircraft Procurement;
Command, Control and Communications;
Ordnance Sustainability;
War Stoppers.

THE ATLANTIC COMMAND

The Atlantic Command is predominately a maritime command, an ocean area of more than forty-five million square miles over which travels the shipping containing most of the petroleum products, strategic materials and other goods vital to the economies of the United States and our allies. Over these same sea lines of communication will flow nearly all of the supplies and military equipment for the reinforcement and resupply of wartime forces in Europe. In a war with the Warsaw Pact, U.S. strategy depends upon the ability to keep the link between Europe and North America unbroken: maritime forces are vital in guaranteeing the safe and timely arrival of reinforcement and resupply.

To accomplish our missions in the Atlantic, we have developed a concept of maritime operations based upon three principles: containment, keeping the Warsaw Pact navies from reaching the open ocean unopposed; defense in depth, not only having forces ready to fight in the forward areas, but also being able to back these forces throughout the entire area of responsibility; and, most important, seizing and maintaining the initiative. Our plans are designed around two major campaigns in the Atlantic: the Norwegian Sea Campaign and the Battle of the Atlantic, which includes the sea approaches to Europe.

As I am certain you appreciate, these campaigns are closely related to each other. If events go badly in the Norwegian Sea and we lose bases in Norway and Iceland, it will be difficult either to defend these countries or to protect reinforcement and resupply shipping in the broad areas of the Atlantic. Certainly, without control of the approaches to Europe, success in the Norwegian Sea or in the broad ocean areas of the Atlantic becomes pointless.

THE SOVIET THREAT

Success in the Atlantic Command is heavily dependent upon our ability to prevail against Soviet combined arms, the most capable maritime component being their submarine force. Soviet submarines continue to have a numerical advantage of three to one over U.S. submarines. Coupled with this quantitative advantage is the fact that the Soviets have rapidly closed the technology gap between our submarines and theirs in terms of quality. The sophistication and capability of their new submarines, and their sensors, C^3 and weapon systems are, in many areas, comparable to ours. It can no longer be said that our numerical disadvantage can be offset by our technological superiority. This situation has developed, not because we have lacked support for our programs, but because the Soviets have made vast improvements in their submarines. Their large investments in research and development, and the apparent ease with which they have acquired Western technology, have

permitted them to build submarines which are very much quieter, and therefore more and more difficult to detect.

We rely heavily upon passive detections to provide information on the presence of Soviet submarines in the Atlantic area. Since these detections depend upon radiated noise, a reduction in noise has a corresponding impact upon detection range. The newest classes of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have incorporated some of the latest technology in sound quieting, with a resultant decline in our detection capabilities. The implications of this trend are very clear: the deterrent effect of superior U.S. and NATO maritime capabilities is declining.

Although our submarine force is the most capable in the world today, the Soviets are a close second and that may be good enough to provide them with an overall victory in a war. The Soviet submarine force, its here and now numerical advantage and the vastly improved quality being built into their new submarines, is the biggest maritime threat and is what concerns me most. The Soviets do not have to be victorious at sea, they require only enough success to slow or blunt our offensive capabilities and prevent our reinforcement and resupply of Europe.

THE CARIBBEAN AND CUBA

I am very concerned with the military support the Soviet Union provides to Cuba and Nicaragua. Both nations continue to receive shipments of modern arms and military equipment far in excess of their defensive requirements, and they are able to use this excess to support armed insurgencies in other parts of the region. With the aid of both Cuba and the Soviet Union, Nicaragua has built facilities capable of supporting high performance aircraft whose introduction would place the Panama Canal and Caribbean sea lines of communications within range of hostile aircraft.

In a war, the Caribbean will be defended by Atlantic Command forces. In the event of war in Europe, fifty-five percent of the U.S. Army's heavy lift capability, and ninety percent of the petroleum products destined for the resupply of NATO would originate in Gulf Coast ports. Cuba sits astride the narrow passages through which this shipping must pass. We cannot ignore the potential threat to these critical Caribbean sea lines of communication. If we must resort to military action to protect shipping in that region, it will be accomplished at the expense of our capability to participate early in the defense of Europe and in the other Atlantic campaigns.

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

If we are to retain a war-winning margin over the Soviet navy, we must press on with current anti-submarine warfare procurement programs, as well as continue our research and development efforts to develop new technologies.

Our nuclear attack submarines are key platforms in our ASW strategy. They have the ability to covertly operate far forward in areas where other ASW platforms cannot because of Soviet strengths. The two submarine programs in the FY-87 budget are vital to our current and future requirements. The SSN-688 class submarine is being improved by the incorporation of new sound-quieting, an advanced combat system and new weapons systems. These improvements will sustain our overall technological advantage into the 1990's. As we look at the projected Soviet submarine threat from the mid-1990's into the twenty-first century, it is clear that our existing submarine force does not have the potential for sound quieting and weapon systems expansion necessary to counter Soviet advances. The SSN-21/SEAWOLF class, will provide us with the capability to maintain a qualitative edge over the Soviets. Your support of these programs is critical if we are to reverse the downward trend in our submarine force advantage over the Soviets.

Since we rely upon underseas surveillance systems for many initial detections of submarines, it is imperative that we continue research and development of new systems designed to restore the detection capabilities currently being lost to the improvements in Soviet submarine design. The towed array equipped Ocean Surveillance Ships (T-AGOS) are a most valuable addition to the fleet. They provide the flexibility to meet changes in Soviet submarine operating patterns and, to date, the first T-AGOS ships have performed superbly. Your continued support of undersea surveillance programs is requested.

Programs to improve Mk-48 torpedo capabilities and the introduction of the Mk-50 lightweight torpedo are necessary additions to our weapons inventory if we are to retain the capability to destroy the newest classes of Soviet submarines.

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT

The introduction of new generation Soviet fighter aircraft underscores the need to maintain our tactical aircraft procurement rates. Fiscal pressures continue to delay attainment of the Air Force goal of forty tactical fighter wings. Constraints upon procurement will force the retention of older aircraft and impair our capability against the increasingly modern Soviet air forces. I ask for your continued support for both Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft programs.

One of the highest priorities for my Air Force forces is the LANTIRN (Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night) system. LANTIRN equipped fighter aircraft will be able to penetrate enemy airspace and elude detection by air defense radars. This system provides a substantial improvement in their warfighting capability.

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

The security and effectiveness of our SSBNs are of primary strategic importance and dictate that attendant communications systems be current and survivable. To maintain connectivity with our SSBNs, we have employed specially equipped EC-130 aircraft for this mission. As this Committee is aware, these aircraft are nearing the end of their useful service life. Two of the replacement aircraft, the E-6A, have already been approved by the Congress; the FY-87 budget requests funding for three additional aircraft. Strategic connectivity is my highest C^3 priority, and I ask for your continued support for this critical program.

Interoperability continues to receive high priority attention from the services. A concerted effort has been made to correct past problems, and there have been substantial improvements in this area. Interoperability in a hostile electronic warfare environment has long been recognized as a potentially serious problem. The services are firmly committed to improved interoperability and funding for secure, interoperable, anti-jam communications sytems is contained in each of the service budgets.

SUSTAINABILITY

Correcting ordnance deficiencies, both in inventory levels and weapon capabilities, is my number one sustainability issue. Support from the Congress over the past five years has been instrumental in reversing the trends in ordnance procurement. We have made substantial progress, but still have a long way to go. Although our inventories are improving, as the initiatives of the past few years result in deliveries of ordnance items, shortages will continue to exist in both level of effort and threat munitions into the 1990's.

The capacity for sustaining combat operations in the Atlantic has also improved substantially. For example, if the funding requested for 1987 is approved, the Navy program could achieve the goal of providing 90 days supply of aviation spare parts for fifteen carriers by 1989. However, funding constraints will slow the rate of improvement in other areas. For example, deep cuts in Air Force war readiness spares funding in FY-86 are of particular concern. Only forty percent of the 1986 Air Force requirements for war readiness spares is funded. The end result will be a reduction in readiness and sustainability of tactical aircraft from that originally programmed in the FY-89 through FY-91 time frame.

WAR STOPPERS

In the Atlantic, my principal concerns are those which impact upon our ability to prevail in a war with the Warsaw Pact. First on this list is my very real concern about our ability to defeat the Soviet submarine force as it grows in sophistication. Unless we make the necessary investments to retain our anti-submarine warfare capabilities in the face of this increasingly difficult threat, we will not prevail in a war at sea.

Our munitions and spare parts inventories are not yet at the level required to support sustained combat operations. They are improving, and it is absolutely essential that these conventional munitions and spare parts programs are maintained at levels sufficient to continue progress toward inventory objectives.

We require a credible deterrent to the use of chemical weapons, and should make a firm commitment to the production of binary weapons. The services are investing substantial funds in chemical warfare defense, a capability which has been deficient in the past. However, if our forces are required to fight while encumbered by protective CW clothing and equipment, their effectiveness would be reduced by at least fifty percent. A credible offensive capability to retaliate to any Soviet first use of

chemical weapons is needed to avoid the risk of placing our personnel at such a disadvantage.

The wide disparity between Soviet and U.S. defense-related R&D expenditures in the past fifteen years has closed the gap but has not yet erased our technological edge in military equipment now in service. This edge offsets the clear fact that not only today, but in future years, my forces face a formidable, numerically superior enemy. It is necessary to increase our R&D investments if we are to ensure that our future forces are not faced by a war-stopper of superior Soviet technology.

Last, but most important, our ability to recruit and retain adequate numbers of quality personnel is becoming more difficult. If downward trends develop, and there are indications that this could be beginning, we will require your early support for programs to enhance both recruiting and retention.

CONCLUSION

As I mentioned earlier, I believe the Defense budget for fiscal year 1987 presents the proper balance between current warfighting needs and modernization that allows us to keep pace with Soviet military developments. I ask that you consider this budget in the light of the very real threat presented to us by the Soviet Union and its allies.

Your continued support is essential to provide the Atlantic Command with the resources we require to meet our commitments.

This completes my presentation and I am prepared to answer your questions.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much, Admiral. I can assure you although the military has been constantly shot at over here by people who think we can go back to bows and arrows, this committee is going to do all we can do to meet the budget set up by the President for this year.

I do not usually start with questions, but I do have one because currently they are in the process of voting in Spain, and we had sort of a hot line—I hope it is hot—and I would like to ask General Rogers for just general comments on what would be the results of an adverse decision in Spain on the vote that is taking place today.

SPAIN AND NATO

For example, what would military implications for NATO and the United States be of a Spanish decision to remain in NATO or get out of NATO?

General ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, if the decision is an affirmative one today for them to remain in NATO, it is, as you know, tied to a condition that they would not integrate their forces into the military structure of NATO.

However, that does not mean in my opinion—and this would be subject to discussion with the Spanish authorities subsequent to today—it does not mean that we could not expect to plan for the utilization of their forces at some time, even if it is solely for the defense of Spain, and to exercise with their forces.

Hopefully over the years, there might be a position taken by Spain that they would integrate their forces after they see the advantages to them of integrating their forces into the military structure. But I think that we could at least carry on with the Spanish forces to the extent that we do with the French today and have done with the French since they withdrew their forces in 1966. Of course, there is the geostrategic position of Spain and the utilization of facilities within that country; that would be very helpful to the Alliance.

If Spain decides not to remain in NATO, I think it would reflect directly upon the viability of the Alliance. We took great pleasure

when Spain decided to join the Alliance and stated that it demonstrated its continued viability in the 1980's. Having been in and then to withdraw, I think that would impact adversely upon the position that was taken earlier. On the military side, if Spain withdraws, we lost the opportunity to use a Navy and an Air Force that could add to our force structure today. We probably would lose much of the momentum that I believe could well be established with respect to their Army. Spain itself would say to you that there is considerable effort that needs to be devoted to their Army.

Whether or not it would mean that a negative vote would mean complete retention of U.S. military bases in Spain, I do not know, because another condition for staying in was that they would reduce. Now if they do not stay in NATO, that does not mean retention of the status quo; I just do not know what the answer to that one is. But I have been quite optimistic that the referendum would come out in the affirmative, despite the many polls to the contrary.

Much will be dependent upon the persuasive powers of the Prime Minister and the Members of his Cabinet, as they have demonstrated those powers over the past, I would say, 7 to 10 days.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much.

It is now 10 o'clock, and at this time it is 4 o'clock in Spain. The latest poll we have just received from the Pentagon, 31 percent in favor, 29 percent opposed, 27 percent undecided, 13 percent abstention.

Admiral, would you like to add anything because of your important base over there?

Admiral BAGGETT. Well, I think it is important for the Alliance that we get an affirmative vote, even with those conditions that are part of that referendum. The way the question was posed, that we may be required to reduce U.S. forces in Spain and the other stipulations raise concerns about what will happen with regard to our bases. If it is a negative vote, our future relationship with Spain is certainly unclear. I agree with General Rogers on this subject. The geo-strategic position of Spain is obviously critical, sitting as it does across these sea lines into the Mediterranean.

So this is a very important vote, I think, for the Alliance.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Thank you very much.

Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, General.

REORGANIZATION

I wanted to follow up on this point that Senator Thurmond raised just a moment ago, and I do not want to get too bogged down in the reorganization. I think you have probably had enough of it for a while.

General Rogers, you mentioned you were concerned that we did not give adequate attention to the budgetary aspects of the Chairman's role. I know you only had the press release to study, and I am sure that many things are in the bill that are not in that press release. I know you would like to study the bill and we would welcome any further comments for the record, giving us any continuing pros and cons you may have after you read the bill.

But section 141(c)(2) directly—at least from the way we attempted to do it—is directed toward that point. C says "Subject to the authority and direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs shall" and number one talks about strategic plans: number two says advise the Secretary on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defense for each fiscal year conform with the priorities established in the plans and the operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands.

Now the committee expects the Chairman to exercise a very active role in the advice; we did not want to put the burden on the Chairman to prepare the budgets. We thought the budgets ought to flow from the military department. But our intent is to have the Chairman and Vice Chairman, to the extent that he delegates, have a line of communication with the CINCs and to reflect those operational requirements in his comments on the service budgets.

So we would hope that the Chairman would become a vital participant and would vigorously inject unified military advice into the budget process, which, in my view, would greatly strengthen the role of the military in the long run on priorities.

That is the point that we were trying to make. I am not sure that it covers your concerns but that was our intent.

General ROGERS. I would like to take a look at that and comment later, if I might.

Senator NUNN. All right. We will give you the whole bill. We had not released it, but we have talked about it.

COMMUNICATIONS

The other point was about communications. Again, it was our effort here in the communications section—and this is on page 19: this is section 164—and this is (e)(1), (e)(2)—we thought we had dealt with that.

(e)(1) commanders of commands and forces assigned to a Combatant Commander under the authority, direction, and control of and are responsible to the Commander of the Combatant Commands.

Two,

Commanders of such Commands and forces shall communicate with other elements of the Department of Defense on such matter for which the Combatant Commander has been delegated for all operational command pursuant to procedures, if any, established by the Commander of the Combatant Command of which they are assigned.

Then we go on to subparagraph three:

If directed by the Combatant Commander, Commanders of such commands and forces shall advise the Combatant Commander of communications with other elements of the Department of Defense on matters for which the Combatant Commander has not been delegated full operational command pursuant to Section D of this subsection.

Section D specifically specifies the full operational command to include. One:

All aspects of military operations and joint training:

Two,

Authority as assigned by the Secretary of Defense for coordination and approval

of those aspects of administration and support including planning for wartime logistics necessary for the accomplishment of missions assigned to the command.

I believe we give a very clear delegation over operational matters to the Unified Commander. Further we give him, subject to the Secretary of Defense, control, or at least a say-so, over procedures providing the logistics support to subordinate component forces. We specify that the components under the CINC on operational matters can communicate only under the procedures set forth by the CINC, and on other matters, if the Unified Commander wants, subordinate commanders have to notify the CINC of any conversation.

We felt that this was about as far as we could go and still remain constitutional. At least I did. And I think that very implicitly in here, communication includes listening as well as talking. And I think the report will reflect that.

But I would, again, direct your attention to those sections.

General ROGERS. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. We certainly took your words into account and your testimony had a very heavy bearing on the way the bill evolved.

Just a couple of questions while we coming on munitions stocks and also on aircraft shelters.

General ROGERS. On the latter, we have 665 programmed in this infrastructure slice group, Senator Nunn. We are starting with slice group 37 and 38 in building additional ones for those that do not have them at the present time on our colocated operating bases. That still will leave over 400 to be programmed in the slice group which begins in 1991.

So we are speaking in terms of once contracts are let—once built, we are speaking about the completion of those in the late 1990s.

But I do believe, Senator, that in my recommendations to the political authorities on the utilization of the infrastructure funding, in view of all the other facilities that are competing for those funds, that that is just about the best I can expect to do at this time.

And on the minimum essential facilities, I told you last year we expected to have 100 percent completed by the end of this slice group, 1990. In view of the responses to the Defense Planning Questionnaire and the additional requirements that have been identified, I now have to tell you that it is only going to be about 80 percent completed by the end of this decade, of all of the minimum essential facilities required.

Senator NUNN. Switching to another subject:

MARITIME STRATEGY

I would like to ask both of you to comment on this. General P.X. Kelley was speaking about maritime strategy. I want to quote him and get your appraisal from the field perspective.

General Kelley said:

Exhausted and contained by stout NATO defense in the center region, stripped of his naval forces through a bold and decisive allied-maritime campaign, and harried by NATO pressure on this flanks, the Soviet invader will now be pounded by succession of NATO sea, air, and land counter offenses.

Are we prepared, Admiral Baggett, to execute that strategy today?

Admiral BAGGETT. Execution of that strategy is critically dependent on warning time and a decisionmaking process that allows us to get forward deployed early in terms of the maritime forces. There is a lot of discussion as to when we would move forward, and how far we would move forward. The time required to execute the strategy is a function of so many variables that I would not select the time period in terms of days.

The critical threat is going to be the Soviet submarine fleet, as I said, and we have to track that force in order to move forward into those areas that are critical to NATO on both flanks—particularly, the northern flank, in Iceland and Norway.

Senator NUNN. General Rogers, is this an accurate expression of the strategy that you have in the theater under your control?

General ROGERS. I do not identify that as any strategy that we have developed in Allied Command Europe. But I am dependent on my colleague here for keeping the sea lines of communication open. I am dependent on his moving into the Norwegian Sea very expeditiously with sufficient forces so that we do not lose the air fields in Northern Norway which are going to be very critical to us. And the United Kingdom, obviously, has a great interest in that.

It really, as Admiral Baggett has said, depends on this Nation, I believe, taking the unilateral action in time of ambiguous warning, to place its fleet in the appropriate disposition so that, without being under duress, it is in the right place at the right time. And I say "unilateral action" because it is very difficult to get 16 nations to reach a consensus when consensus equates to unanimity to take some of those type actions because they are often viewed as being provocative rather than as deterrent.

And the major concern that I have in anything that I do as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is whether we will get the appropriate and timely political decision to take those prudent actions that a commander should take in view of warning, which may be quite ambiguous and may be relatively short.

That is why I mention that I think this country has to be prepared to get its forces into position under ambiguous warning so that they are properly deployed, should something happen.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, welcome. It was a pleasure to be with both of you recently at Wehrkunde, and I would take you back to Wehrkunde.

EUROPEAN DEFENSE INITIATIVE

I am sure that you recall vividly the presentation that was made by the Defense Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Woerner, when he made the case, arguing eloquently, I thought, for a joint venture between the United States and NATO in the development and deployment of what was being termed at that meeting the European Defense Initiative. That was predicated on his expectation that the improved Soviet capability and range of theater

scale weapons, ballistic missiles—not nuclear tipped, necessarily, but either nuclear or conventionally tipped—posed a particular threat and recently, at Senator Quayle's urging, Senator Warner convened his subcommittee. And we received, I thought, some of the most cogent and also alarming testimony that this committee has received in some time on that threat specifically to NATO the presentation—I do not think I am oversimplifying it too much when I say that the expectation presented in that testimony was that in the event when all-out Soviet attack or Warsaw Pact attack in NATO that it would not take the form that we had been led to believe for so long it would, instead of an attack by these theater scale missile on POMCUS sites on the ports on the air fields to be followed up by special maneuver groups and SPETSNAZ attack.

Now that being the case, I was put in mind of another comment that Admiral Baggett made at Wehrkunde, when I thought he properly but also alarmingly recited the history as he has in his testimony this morning, of the advances in Soviet submarine capability and on page 4 indicated that you thought that for the rest of this century and into the 21st century, if we do not keep the pressure on in terms of developing sound quiet and other technologies, we are not going to be prepared to deal with the Soviets.

That and the concern that this missile threat has not only for NATO but perhaps more immediately for Israel make me ask the following questions of both of you, but they would be primarily directed at you, General Rogers, because of your responsibility as SACEUR, having both NATO and Israel within your command responsibility.

ATBM DEFENSE

Do you agree with Woerner's assessment of the threat and of the need to work to develop this antitactical ballistic missile capability and do you agree that there is not even more immediate threat posed to Israel?

General ROGERS. The answer to both questions—a short answer is yes, Senator, I do agree. And I am on record for some time, with respect to West Europe, that I would be hopeful that the other nations would pick up on the suggestion of the Federal Republic of Germany; namely, that they ought to pool their research resources, working with the SDI community here in the United States, to determine what it is that SDI can provide for an antitactical ballistic missile defense for West Europe. For example, as Dr. Teller pointed out, can SDI strike, in the boost phase, any weapon, irrespective of type ballistic weapon, in its very vulnerable liftoff phase? And then to determine for the rest of the ATBM defense, do we need a midterm or midflight intercept? Can we develop a terminal capability for an ATBM defense?

Now the latter two ought to be done by Europe, but it ought to be done in coordination with SDI because SDI may provide that capability for destruction in the boost phase.

I think there may be some movement along those lines. Since we talked at Wehrkunde, I sense greater interest on the part of other nations because that ATBM defense is needed irrespective of any

agreement in Geneva—whether it comes or not—on intermediate range nuclear forces.

We will still have to contend with the SS–21's, 22's and 23's.

Senator WILSON. General, let me ask you this in light of that threat—the threat that was described—and also in light of the Soviet submarine threat that Admiral Baggett has described.

The problem or reinforcing and resupplying NATO in the event of conflict seems to make it doubtful that we would be able to do so adequately by fast sea lift or at least that raises a serious question about it, and also it raises a question as to the availability of a number of major air fields, upon which we would otherwise depend as well as port facilities.

C–17 PROGRAM

You have commented on page 7 of your testimony that you regard completion of the C–17 program as among those crucial elements in your version of what is needed for readiness and sustainability.

I would like you to add to the record that I am attempting to make by asking all the CINCs what their reaction would be to cancellation of the C–17 program or deferment.

General ROGERS. I cannot speak for all of the CINCs, but I think I know what all the CINCs would say, and that is they would not wish to see the C–17 program canceled. I would hope that it would not have to be stretched out for us in Europe. It means that there are six times as many air fields available to us with the C–17 than are now available to heavy lift aircraft.

And it can lift very efficiently all the heavy loads. So I do not know how other CINCs would express it, but from my discussion with them and in CINC's conferences, we all want it and we all wanted it yesterday, and not have it stretched out.

But here, again, we do not know what the impacts of the Gramm-Rudman amendment will be. But I am not as pessimistic as you, I do not believe, Senator.

I think my colleague here, although he is very concerned about that submarine threat, I think he is going to be able to get a sizable amount of the sea lift through to us, providing he has been given the opportunity to position his forces and given the resources to do it.

And with respect to the prepositioning of the POMCUS sites and their being very vulnerable, no question about it: We have been betting on the outcome, that we will get the authority to start to redeploy our forces and get them to those POMCUS sites, married up and out into at least an initial assembly area before the first attack would come. But it is all dependent, again, on those timely and appropriate political decisions.

Those weapons, SS–21, 22, 23, are tricapable; most of the ballistic missiles that they have are tricapable, conventional, nuclear, and chemical.

Senator WILSON. Thank you.

Admiral Baggett, I have no doubt of the capability of the Navy, though I was generally alarmed at the picture that you painted. I thought it was the responsible thing to do, and I think it would be

a useful thing if you were to comment now, much as you did at Wehrkunde, and put that into focus.

Admiral BAGGETT. Well, in this open session, I will not go into source levels or that sort of detail. I would sum it up by saying that the advantage of our across-the-board technical superiority in terms of submarine quieting is a two-way advantage. If you have a quiet submarine, your ability to listen is enhanced and your detectability by another ship is decreased. And so, there is a two-way dividend for acoustic advantage. ASW is the equivalent of two men in a dark room, each armed with a baseball bat; the one that hears the other first generally wins because he can strike first.

SOVIET SUBMARINE BUILDING CAPABILITY

Between now and the year 1996, 10 years from now, the Soviet submarine force will not increase in numbers; it will remain about 330 submarines.

What will be alarming—the threat we have to face—is that one-third of those submarines will be built between now and 1996, and the Soviet capability for building submarines is great. They have introduced seven new classes of submarines since 1980. I have been asked why they were building so many different classes. I believe that they have been building prototypes, and once they make a final decision on selection, they will go into block production.

I think we have got to have some R&D initiatives that have been well thought out in terms of how to cope with the increased quieting of the Soviets. Within the last year, we have revised some of our antisubmarine warfare programs significantly and I think that the road ahead—or that road map, if you will—for antisubmarine warfare technology—out beyond the next 20 years is critical. We must pursue the right R&D projects to cope with that threat.

The new class of U.S. submarines—I talked about the SSN-21, the new submarine. If you look back, the years between where we are today in 1986 and the introduction of the first submarine in the world at the start of the century, the fact is that the final ship of the SSN-21-class will be in the fleet almost that same time ahead of us, starting right now. That is kind of sobering, and so we had better make the right choices and we had better field the right weapon systems and maintain the technological edge.

I think it is a fundamental error to build down when we have a technological advantage. The Soviet submarine threat clearly is what keeps me awake at night and its impact upon my ability to resupply and reinforce Europe. It also threatens my ability to provide direct support on the flanks, provide forces to the European and NATO SACEUR command on the southern flank, and participate in direct support of the land battle in Norway.

I would simply say that reinforcement and resupply decisions are critically important and you make those decisions early on, hopefully before hostilities have actually broken out, even in the face of ambiguous indicators and warning.

That is going to be a real problem, not only for the alliance, but also I think it would be a national problem to make that hard decision.

Senator WILSON. Thank you very much, gentlemen. My time is expired.

Mr. Chairman, since I am going to be unable to remain for a second round, I wonder if I might ask for the record that General Rogers comment on what his unit commanders have experienced or what their assessment is of the survivability of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Since I assume that since we will want to go into closed session, we will not have a second round.

Chairman GOLDWATER. If you want to go into closed session, you may request it.

Senator EXON. Well, I was following up on the question from Senator Wilson, and he said he would not be here for a second round. I would assume that you are planning to go into closed session later this morning. Are you planning to do so?

Chairman GOLDWATER. No, I am not. But if you want to, you may ask for it.

Senator EXON. All right. I have some questions for closed session I do not think it would be proper to answer here.

First, welcome, gentlemen. We are delighted to have you here. We are proud of the job that you do, and we are pleased that you can be here for these important hearings so that we can get your perspective.

MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE

General Rogers, let me ask you this question. From a NATO perspective, what is the significance of the improved military relations between Germany and France? Is this a bilateral arrangement only, or does this hint at a possible larger and more cooperative role as far as France is concerned with NATO?

General ROGERS. It is both, I think, Senator. At the present time it is a bilateral arrangement. I was very pleased, frankly, when the French went public with saying that their rapid action force could be used not only for contingencies in areas in which they had an interest from the past outside the NATO area, but that it could also be used to support Germany, particularly up in the northern part of Germany.

Now, the cooperation between the French and the Germans which will be further exemplified in a major exercise between the two shortly, is to the advantage of the Alliance in my opinion.

Second, the French forces that will be committed and, when committed, will be committed into an area where Allied Command Europe chain of command will be functioning, there will have to be arrangements made which we have not gotten to in my periodic discussions as SACEUR with the Chief of Defense of France. There will have to be arrangements made for the incorporation of those French forces in such a manner as we have done with the French First Army in the southern part of Germany, and done in a manner in which the French political system will accept in peacetime.

We do not talk about integration but we do talk about how those forces will be used, and it is known by the French that the First French Army will be under the command of the Superior Commander in the Allied Command Europe chain of command, and that at times there will be other nations' forces under the command of the First French Army Commander.

So all that is going on is, I think, to the benefit of Allied Command Europe.

Senator EXON. General, thank you very much.

Admiral, given the budget crunch here—and there is an extreme budget crunch—we think it is particularly important that CINCs have direct input to this committee. This committee has to make some very tough decisions because we are not going to have all of the money to do all the things that all of us would like to do.

HOMEPORTING

So I want to ask you a question about home porting. A recent GAO study stated that the Navy has severely underestimated the cost of the new home ports it is seeking and that these costs only address that which is needed for only an initial operating capability.

For example, it is stated that the Navy's estimate for all of the ports total $799 million, but only for the initial capability. For a full operational capability at Staten Island and Everett alone, the GAO estimated a need for $838 million. That may still be underestimated by as much as $185 million according to GAO.

How accurate, in your opinion, are the Navy's cost estimates and what specifically would that provide?

One of the Navy's arguments for the new home porting plan is that it will base together the ships that would normally operate together, thereby achieving stronger battle group integrity.

Would not preserving this integrity require ships to be on similar maintenance cycles, which we know they do not? What could you tell us as to your view of this problem with regard to the budget?

Admiral BAGGETT. Senator, I cannot comment on the accuracy of those reports because I had nothing to do with putting the Navy's report together, and certainly not down into the level of detail that would be necessary for me to assess those numbers, and I hope you will understand that.

Senator EXON. I do understand that.

Admiral BAGGETT. I think the Navy provided a report to the Congress within the first week or 10 days of November, if my memory serves me correctly. I have forgotten the date of that Navy report.

With regard to my position on strategic homeporting, I feel that there has to be a proper mix, and this is not begging the question, but among the existing ports, we need to expand some and download others; plus, we need some additional ports.

Now, when you talk about geography and you talk about proximity to strategic sea lines of communication, someone does not have to look at the charts very carefully to see what the distance is between Mayport, for example, and the Panama Canal and some of the alternative ports and the Panama Canal. Those distances are subject to easy measurements. There is not that much difference

when you talk about how far it is from the Panama Canal to Galveston, TX, and how far it is from Mayport, FL, to the Panama Canal. It does not take a seer to look at the chart and determine that the distance difference is about 8 nautical miles. Hence, it is not a significant number of miles. But that is not true across the board.

Considering that the strategic homeporting initiative would decrease our vulnerability, and that from a CINC standpoint is a big plus, it is going to require a fact of life change from current practice of almost putting all our eggs in one basket, if you will. That is the advantage that I see.

MINING AND MINE CLEARING

The susceptibility to mining, particularly off the east coast where we have a continental shelf of relatively shallow water is a concern. It would be helpful from a war-fighting standpoint to have those units dispersed.

But again, I would say that the mix and the timing have to be looked at very closely. I think it is being done and certainly it is subject to more detailed engineering studies than I have seen.

That is not to say that those studies have not been done. I just have not reviewed them and have not seen them, and I have not seen the environmental impact statements. But that mix of existing ports, expanding some, downloading some, plus additional ports, gives us a better spread and we do not put all our eggs in one basket.

Senator EXON. I was going to ask you about mining. That was my next question. But I am not sure that I understand how more ports reduce vulnerability. As a lay person, I can understand that the more you spread your forces, the less attractive they are to attack. But you have testified, I believe, that Cuba offers a particularly difficult problem to us. I assume this would be particularly true regarding the proposed gulf coast ports. Is that correct?

Admiral BAGGETT. Not from the standpoint of mining U.S. ports. Cuba poses a threat by sitting across the lifelines that run from the gulf coast port cities. More than 50 percent of our reinforcement and resupply of Europe, and some 90 percent of the petroleum products are going to have to come out of those gulf coast ports and sail past Cuba en route to Europe. Cuba is a concern because it must be dealt with in the event of hostilities, to whatever degree is necessary. The same forces that are used against Cuba are the same forces in the Atlantic Command that are going to ultimately have to be forward deployed to the Norwegian Sea, the North Atlantic, and assigned to protect the SLOC's, Senator.

Senator EXON. Well, my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say there is a continuing concern in this Senator's mind about the whole matter of mining. I am sure you are working on that.

I do take it that the NATO mining and mine clearing capabilities are increasing to some extent and there is no immediate pressing concern in that area. Is that a fair statement?

Admiral BAGGETT. No. I would say that I am concerned about mining. I am concerned about our ability to clear east coast ports,

and I am concerned about a mine threat. Each NATO nation is responsible for its own coastal waters in terms of minesweeping.

I have to say fundamentally that you have got to kill the platform. Mine countermeasures are akin to antiair warfare. If you allow the enemy to plant mines or you allow him, in an antiair warfare scenario, to shoot missiles at you with his platform going unscathed, you are asking for trouble. He is going to keep coming back and shooting missiles at you. He is going to keep coming back and mining your waters.

You have got to kill the platform, and submarines have the greatest potential to mine our ports off the east coast; we cannot allow that to happen. That is part of the antisubmarine warfare equation that I dealt with perhaps overextensively today, but that is part of the major threat that I face, Senator.

Senator EXON. Admiral, thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me that minesweeping capability is closely related with how many ports we should have and how much protection we can have for them.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I am going to send you a copy of a letter that I got from Secretary Weinberger this morning on the subject of the deep ports. I am interested in that, too, and I think you will find it very interesting.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to also add my words of commendation to the two witnesses this morning for appearing at the Wehrkunde Conference. In my estimation that conference is perhaps the most important one that takes place during the course of the year, where all NATO membership is represented, and these two gentlemen both made very fine presentations and I think elevated the discussion a great deal.

So I commend both of you for taking time to appear at that particular conference, and I would hope in the future that we might have more members from this committee who could attend.

SSN-21 AND C-17

Just a couple of comments with respect to the SSN-21 and C-17. Frankly, my own judgment is that we are not going to see any increases, real increases in the defense budget. All new starts are probably going to be in jeopardy in the coming years.

The C-17 is a program which is needed, but it is also a $39 billion program and there is, as you know, fairly strong competition taking place right now between the competitor offering a much lower price per aircraft on the C-5, and that will be a fiercely waged battle before the Congress, but dollars and cents ultimately will probably tell the story on that.

With respect to whether the CINC's support the C-17 or something else, I think the Commander of the Pacific Fleet indicated just give me a lift; I do not care what it looks like at this point, but I need something to get the equipment out here. And I do not think that the CINCPAC came down one way or the other. He just said I need more lift.

And I certainly would agree with you, General Rogers, that the C-17 makes more sense for your needs in that case.

GREECE

I might ask a quick comment about Greece as opposed to Spain. Spain poses a problem, but what is your judgment on the political situation in Greece, General Rogers, and then Admiral Baggett?

General ROGERS. We still have three major issues with Greece, Senator. One is the full implementation of the reintegration agreement of 1980 that brought their forces back into the integrated military structure. And that has never been fully implemented by the Papandreou Government because they do not agree with the language of the proposal itself, nor do they agree with the interpretation of the language which became a very important part of the agreement itself, just like the legislative history of a law.

On that one, I still remain optimistic that we will find a solution and in fact we are working now with Greek authorities at the military level to see if we cannot get some forward movement in this.

Another major issue, of course, is can Limnos Island be militarized or can't it. Turkey and Greece interpret the Lausanne Treaty as modified by the Montreux Convention in just the opposite manner. One says it can; one says it cannot.

And on that score, bearing the responsibility for defending the terrain wherever it is found and for using the forces that are committed to Allied Command Europe, wherever they are located, we do take account of the forces that the Greek Government has placed on Limnos and our order of battle for use in time of war.

The third major issue over and above that of Cyprus, is—if we could solve the Cyprus issue, a lot of other problems would fall into line—but insofar as NATO is concerned is that the Greeks have decided they will not participate in exercises which might be held in the Aegean and could have included Limnos in those exercises. If the exercises do not include Limnos, that is, the Alliance does not accept the position of Greece, they, the Greeks, have indicated they will not participate.

Having said all that, Senator, the Greeks have, in answer to the Defense Planning Questionnaire, committed additional forces to Allied Command Europe. At the time of a crisis, I would expect those Greek forces to be there when the decision is made that the Alliance must start doing something.

Senator COHEN. What about the security of the bases?

General ROGERS. We are working toward and will reach our objective this year.

One of our difficult sites, as you are well aware, is Hellenikon Air Base, which is almost downtown Athens and so close to the city, one wonders if, irrespective of what happens in the future negotiations of the Defense Economic and Cooperative Agreement, we shouldn't look very seriously at moving Hellenikon to some other site where we could still accomplish the same mission it performs.

Senator COHEN. General Rogers, on page 12 of your testimony, you call for the lifting of the ceiling that was placed on the manpower levels in Europe last year.

Part of that, of course, was predicated upon the Nunn-amendment that was offered and the ways in which we might minimize the implications if in fact it passed. We placed the restriction on the level of troops in order to get the attention of the Europeans to start dealing with construction of the semihardened aircraft shelters for tactical air and so forth.

You mentioned in your statement that they are considerably more receptive to our own treaties to improve capabilities, but what have they actually done about the increased supply and the hardening of the shelters?

General ROGERS. Well, it was very encouraging to the three major NATO commanders at one of the Ministers' meetings here last December, when one Minister of Defense from a very important nation in the Alliance suddenly said to his colleagues, "you know, if we run out of ammunition, Bernie Rogers is going to recommend the release of nuclear weapons under our guidance."

Well, that was very encouraging to those of us who had been preaching that, you see, for a number of years. And as a consequence, there was a move started among Ministers and, heaven knows, Secretary Brown and Secretary Weinberger had hammered this point time and again, there was a movement and a commitment by some nations with a schedule on how they intend to reach the required stockage level.

You measure achievements differently in NATO perhaps than you do in other areas. That was a pretty big achievement, you see, to start getting nations to commit themselves on this matter. And it will show in the force goals that the nations will agree.

AIRCRAFT SHELTERS

On the subject of the aircraft shelters, there was a major change made. Well, it may not have gotten a lot of people's attention, but I tell you it got my attention as the one who recommends the expenditure of 80 percent of the infrastructure funding. We revised our schedule, directed our major subordinate commanders in their input to increase from zero to a fairly high number of aircraft shelters that they came forward with for the infrastructure program. As a consequence you do find now that we have 665 shelters in the current Allied Command Europe long-term infrastructure program which will be programmed by the end of this decade and the other 440-some, I believe, will be programmed in the follow-on slice group for infrastructure.

So there are things happening in the Conventional Defense Improvement Initiative that the Secretary-General pushed through.

I think we have a chance that it will not go the same route as other programs before, such as the 1978 Long-Term Defense Program and some others. I think now we have an opportunity in the area of sustainment, long-term planning procedures and some others, to make some progress.

Senator COHEN. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

I do have some questions I would like answered for the record.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Gramm.

Senator GRAMM. Let me thank my distinguished colleague from Virginia for yielding.

Chairman GOLDWATER. That is Senator Gramm, General. You can take it out on him. [Laughter.]

Senator GRAMM. Well, I took John Tower's place on this committee and there was a screw-up. Tower used to sit up there and they have got me sitting down here, and I have never understood it. [Laughter.]

But I have learned to live with it.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

General Rogers, let me first begin by asking you a question about chemical and biological weapons in terms of preparing ourselves for the possibility of a chemical or biological attack.

Where are we in terms of the building of the facilities we will need, the production and deployment of the equipment that would be required? How prepared are we today? I know how prepared we are offensively in chemical and biological weapons, but let me talk first about defensively.

General ROGERS. This country, with its continuing emphasis in the chemical warfare funding on the defensive measures, is in quite good shape I think, at least in my theater.

I am talking about the individual suits, the individual protective devices. We need to do better in the warning area, we need to do better in the decontamination area and some of the other ancillary areas.

With respect to our pilots, however, we need to continue to build the facilities in Europe in which a pilot can come back, get out of his suit that he has been in for 6 hours, into a chemical-free environment; have a chance to rest a bit, to clean up, get a meal, and get himself back into a new individual protective suit; then go back and fly additional missions. Progress is being made in that area. The continual funding of the defensive portion of the chemical warfare account in the budget will mean that we will make continued progress.

On the retaliatory side, our mission in NATO is to deter war and our requirement is for a retaliatory capability that is modern, will be there when we need it, and will function as we expect and will be in adequate and appropriate types.

We cannot under current conditions deter as we should, and that is why some of us have been pleading for at least a decade to start the production of the binary rounds of at least two types—the facilities for one are ready to start production—so that we send two messages to the Soviets.

The first message we send is that we are going to have modern rounds of the appropriate types, adequate numbers, and if they use chemical weapons against us then we can in fact retaliate in kind against their use. Thus, it will enhance our deterrence.

The second impact, I think it will have a very salutary one, is to provide us some strength at the negotiating table where our objective should continue to be the elimination of these kinds of weapons from the face of the earth.

But since 1977, the strength has not been on our side of the negotiating table. I think just beginning the production and leaving the warheads here in the United States would be adequate to send

those two messages to the Soviet Union, one, our deterrence is enhanced, and we could make greater progress at the negotiating table.

Senator GRAMM. General, let me ask one additional question related to the chemical and biological weapons.

Do you agree with the thesis that our absence of an effective deterrent, number one, enhances the possibility that the Soviets would use chemical weapons; and, number two, enhances the possibility that in response to that and to the degradation of force that that would produce, that we would be more likely to have to rely on nuclear arms?

General ROGERS. The answer to both questions is yes, Senator.

Senator GRAMM. One final question on the point related to Europe itself. You talked about the preparedness of our forces. How prepared are the forces of our allies to cope with the potential threat of chemical weapons?

General ROGERS. It runs the gamut from almost zero defensive capability to nations that are almost equal to our ability to defend against chemical weapons. And it just happens that the nations that are at the lowest end of the spectrum are also the nations that have to have assistance from other nations if they are going to really have the kind of a force that is necessary, not only for defense against chemical weapons, but to have the force to accomplish the mission that has been assigned them within Allied Command Europe.

They are the poorer nations. And as a consequence, it does not get a very high priority in the expenditure of their funds. So we literally run that spectrum from quite good at the top to almost zero at the bottom.

NATO WEAPONRY

Senator GRAMM. Admiral Baggett, I had the pleasure of going out on the Ocean Safari exercise and witnessing several demonstrations of NATO weaponry. Of course, I am an economist, where we talk about things without ever putting anything to a full test or testing whether things work, and I am always amazed at engineers doing things effectively.

I was very impressed by what I saw on that exercise. What was the overall critique of the exercise and how did the Navy feel about the exercise part, such as the Silent SAM and other exercises that were taken in terms of their success?

Admiral BAGGETT. We were very pleased with that exercise. It was a large NATO exercise, 161 ships I think, and it covered the entire range of movement across the Atlantic and it involved all of the warfare areas.

In regard to Silent SAM procedures and utilization of the Aegis cruiser and the missile traps, that was a very significant part of tactics development. Not just the buying of the hardware, but the learning how to use the hardware is critical. In that respect, I would like to say that one of the more important aspects of Ocean Safari, from the standpoint of war-fighting capability, was the importance of off-board decoys to confuse inbound raid aircraft with regard to surveillance, targeting of your forces. That was a very

important factor of antiair warfare with regard to battle space, the thesis being that you really are talking about time for engagement.

It is equally as advantageous to make the enemy close you with his bomber force by a factor of an additional 100 miles, as it is for you to be able to project your fighter and antiair warfare F-14 CAP an additional 100 miles out.

We are talking about battle space, and the use of those off-board decoys and electronic warfare systems that deny the enemy the ability to target you. Such systems buy you both the battle space and the time that are so critical, specifically with regard to antiair warfare and the Silent SAM procedures.

Senator GRAMM. Let me conclude, Admiral, by asking you a question in terms of naval application of chemical and biological weapons. How concerned are we about that and how prepared are we?

Admiral BAGGETT. From a defensive standpoint, I am concerned about it. With amphibious operations primarily, that is key, and the aircraft carrier.

Just elaborating briefly on what General Rogers said, the aircraft carrier sortie rates are going to decrease by about 50 percent just by virtue of the fact that they have been contaminated, and tactical cruise missiles enter into that in terms of a delivery capability.

Finally, I would say, although it is not my responsibility to worry about ports, it is my responsibility to worry about reinforcement and resupply to Europe. If the ports are contaminated or the bases are contaminated, it does me no good to have the U.S. Army at sea being protected by the U.S. Navy if they cannot land in Europe with the reinforcements and resupply. So I am concerned about it.

I think we have made great progress. However, it has been agonizingly slow in the U.S. Navy to get people to understand that the marginal increase in the cost of a ship is small to put a citadel in that ship, to give it a gas-free envelope, so that you have a defensive capability. We are doing that with new construction ships and we are looking at backfits for the high value amphibious ships and aircraft carriers.

But we have been lagging in the U.S. Navy behind the other nations of the world. We are one of the few maritime nations that have not had gas-free personnel protection systems incorporated in their ships when they are built.

Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Well, as a follow-on, Senator, the Soviets have been in the forefront of that ship design and capability, have they not?

Admiral BAGGETT. Yes, sir.

SSN-21

Senator WARNER. Admiral Baggett, just following on with you for a few minutes on some questions, on the SSN-21. Would you provide an update on the essential requirements for that new construction, as you project your force requirements in the next decade.

Admiral BAGGETT. The number, Senator?

Senator WARNER. No. The necessity for the Navy to keep on the schedule.

Admiral BAGGETT. I will put it this way in terms of time lines. If you had asked me 10 years ago what technical advantage we held in a time sense over the Soviets, I would have said that our submarine technology was 10 to 12 years ahead of the Soviets. Today, I would say that with the Soviet submarines we are seeing coming out of the refit yards that have had their equipment overhauled, and the new construction submarines we are seeing going to sea, the gap is now down to 3 years; 3 to 5 years.

They are approaching the same acoustic quieting levels that we have on our most modern submarine force, and so the SSN-21 is needed to pace the threat and that gap is closing in terms of time.

Senator WARNER. Wouldn't you say it is essential to maintain that gap?

Admiral BAGGETT. It is essential to keep that gap open between our technology and theirs because we will never offset them with numbers and my whole theater depends on being able to take care of the Soviet submarine threat.

Senator WARNER. And in terms of priority of budget consideration, you would put this at the very top of the program?

Admiral BAGGETT. In terms of future forces, yes. In terms of priorities for here and now, I would not rank it above sustainability and war-fighting capability. Over a long term, it is critical that we have spare parts and ammunition and stocks to fight a war with the Warsaw Pact and win and not have to terminate because we ran out of conventional stores.

Senator WARNER. I was very much interested in your reply to our distinguished colleague from Nebraska, Mr. Exon, on the home-porting issue. And as I have studied, through the GAO report and other analyses, it seems to me insufficient evidence or insufficient attention is brought to bear on the fact that it is going to cost dollars to follow the present strategic plan that the Secretary of the Navy has laid down, but if we were to abandon that plan—and I certainly do not suggest we do—as a matter of fact, I support the Secretary's plan—we would have to put a very substantial amount of those same funds in the augmentation of the existing port structure to accommodate the growth of the fleet.

And so if you are trying to do a cost comparison analysis, there are really not that much savings.

Admiral BAGGETT. The only important thing is the differential, as you point out, in cost between having to build up the infrastructure in the existing ports or to look at a mix, as I said, of expanding some of our existing ports, downloading some of those, and opening new ports.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Senator WARNER. General Rogers, it is good to see you again. We have been together for many years, and I wonder if you might give us an update on the views of our allies with respect to the President's strategic defense initiative.

General ROGERS. Well, now that they understand what it is, I think you will find, or what I do find is that there is general agreement on the need to research such an initiative, particularly in view of what I believe most of them now understand the Soviets are doing in this area. And I do believe that most of them who are interested in it understand that as of this moment, ours is only research and that it will be some time before it can be determined whether or not the research proves feasible and practical; that is, the mission, and cost-effective.

There is some concern that one hears about should the decision be made to deploy this system. For example, with constrained budgets and only about three pockets of funding—conventional forces, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear—during the transition phase in which you would need both a modern retaliatory capability as well as the defensive capability, how many funds would be diverted from the other two pockets to the strategic side.

I point out to them that certainly this administration has assured me as a SACEUR that it does not intend that SDI will divert funds from conventional forces. But it is also recognized that this administration will no longer be in power when that decision is made to deploy or not. There is concern also about what the West Europeans would call decoupling the security of Western Europe from the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States. If both the United States and the Soviet Union were to deploy a defensive system, that they, the West Europeans, might be caught in the middle without the level of escalation to the strategic level which is provided now in the strategy of flexible response and which is the ultimate guarantor of the deterrent for NATO.

I think that that argument is not well-founded on the part of the Europeans; that in fact it means that if a defensive system is deployed that it just gives the United States a greater capability to have its forces available for the defense of Western Europe when the time comes. I do not think it means a decoupling. Then you have, just as you have on this side of the Atlantic, the two schools. One school says it—[SDI]—can be done and other school says it cannot be done and therefore we are just wasting $26 billion of research funding for something that cannot be done anyway. I do not agree with that and try to disabuse whomever I can when they raise that argument. Those are pretty much the positions that I have found taken by West Europeans. But it was very important for this country to spend a considerable amount of effort in educating its Allies as to just what SDI is intended to be, and that it was just a research program, and to educate them on what the Soviets are doing so that they could put all of that into the proper perspective which they were not able to do at the outset.

BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE

Senator WARNER. Turning to a specific program, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, what is your personal analysis of that program?

General ROGERS. Well, it is a good program. I was the Chief at the time we were getting that program underway and made the separate decision to add a TOW weapon to it, to multiply the numbers of antitank weapons that we had on the battlefield by adding

one to the Bradley. But the Bradley was never intended to be a tank, and when people get unhappy because it cannot turn antitank weapons, they are expecting that vehicle to do things it was not created to do.

That vehicle was created to do two primary things. One was to ensure that the infantry could keep up with the tanks on the battlefield at 35 miles an hour cross country. You cannot do that with an M-113. At every little ditch, you have to stop and go over it slowly with the M-113. But now that we have got the proper suspension systems on both the M-1 and the Bradley, it can keep up, so it is there when the tanker needs infantry dismounted to protect it.

The second mission that it has, which the M-113 could not accomplish, is that the Bradley does have the armament aboard so that it can in an overwatch position reach the enemy with its 25 millimeter gun and keep their heads down with the machine gun and can kill other vehicles that are on the battlefield, to include tanks with the tow. Therefore it is a more capable member of the tank infantry team because it can, in certain circumstances, be put in the overwatch position where it fixes the enemy so that they cannot maneuver while our tank elements maneuver around to the flank and attack.

Other times, the situation will permit the two to move together. Other times the situation will be such that both will be in the fixed position, not the overwatch but the fixed position, and neither one will be maneuvering at the time, except the infantry itself, to try to create an assault breach.

So if people think that it is another tank, they are mistaken. And it is going to suffer the kind of defeat to its aluminum body that one would expect from an antitank weapon. But it can certainly outgun its counterpart, the BMP, on the other side.

I personally believe it is a myth that aluminum burns, which was one of the charges. The vaporific effect is of such a nature as not to be the cause of casualties. If in fact you hit that vehicle at a particular point on the vehicle and inside that point you happen to have your ammunition, you can expect some of that ammunition is going to explode.

But it is not a tank and those who seem to be most critical of it seem to judge it against its armor capability and against a backdrop of how much weaponry a tank can turn. But it was never intended to be that, and there are those who charge us with—and I say us because I was there—charge us with having indicated that we were to use the Bradley in a different style than we are talking about using it now.

I think the record will show that what I said about the utility of that Bradley in conjunction with the tank back in the days gone by, the late seventies, is no different from what we are saying today.

So accept it for what it is. If there are ways to improve the casualty producing elements within that vehicle, do it; if you can make the fire suppression system better, you ought to do that.

Senator WARNER. But do not lose sight of the original mission.

General ROGERS. Exactly.

BINARY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one technical question on chemicals because we are likely to be concerned with this on the floor?

Chairman GOLDWATER. Yes.

Senator WARNER. In establishing conditions for the production of binary chemical munitions, the Congress has required that the North Atlantic Council, NAC, formally adopt the U.S. Force goal for the modernization of the United States, proportional share of NATO's chemical deterrent with binary munitions.

Is the NAC the appropriate forum for the adoption of such a local goal? And, if not, what forum?

General ROGERS. Sir, it is not the proper forum. When France left the integrated military structure in 1966 but remained at the political level, the senior plenary body, the North Atlantic Council in which France sat, could no longer discuss military subjects. As a consequence, there was created the Defense Planning Committee [DPC], the committee of 15, excluding France. And it is the committee of the 15, the DPC, which takes cognizance of all military activities to include the Force Goals. The Force Goals will come to the DPC, after they have been forwarded from the major NATO commanders to the Military Committee and to the Defense Review Committee. The MC and DRC will recommend to the DPC in permanent session, to the Ambassadors, whether the Force Goals should be adopted or not adopted.

When the Force Goals are adopted by the DPC, then in the next ministerial meeting the ministers will note those Force Goals. The NAC is not the body but the DPC which considers Force Goals.

Senator WARNER. We should make that change.

General ROGERS. You should make that change; yes, sir.

SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE THREAT

Senator WARNER. A last question. There are reports in the press that differences exist within the Intelligence Committee about the seriousness of the Soviet chemical warfare threat.

Should we view the Soviets' use of chemical weapons selectively against key NATO targets, rather than across the entire front as a lessening of the threat?

General ROGERS. It is not a lessening of the threat from where I sit, Senator, because I am convinced that the Soviets intend to use chemical weapons when it is necessary to attain their objective. As I view it, if they were to attack conventionally and we had gotten the political authority to take advantage of the warning time to dig in our defensive position properly, we would fight extremely well at the General Defensive Position for as long as we could sustain ourselves with replacements for casualties, with ammunition and with materiel to replace that lost on the battlefield.

It is during that time when we would be fighting extremely well at the outset that I would anticipate that selectively against the General Defensive Position in any region within Allied Command Europe, that they would resort to chemical weapons in order to achieve their objective. In addition, the Warsaw Pact would use chemical weapons with persistent agents against our airfields,

against our command and control facilities, against our port facilities, and against our logistic facilities in our rear.

So it has not lessened my concern.

Senator WARNER. Admiral Baggett, would you care to join in responding to that question?

Admiral BAGGETT. I would concur totally with what General Rogers said, Senator; that the threat is that they have the correct mix of persistent and nonpersistent, and we do not, and we have no deterrent.

Senator WARNER. I thank the Chair and my colleague.

Chairman GOLDWATER. That was very, very interesting. I was glad you brought up the Bradley battle wagon because, as you know, we have organizations in this town both run by the Government and run by private people that can find fault with anything, I think, including the Bible.

Now, to me, the most dangerous word in warfare is flank, and once you can get on a fellow's flank, I don't care what he is driving, a battleship or a tank or a Bradley battle wagon or a bicycle; he is in trouble.

I have driven the Bradley wagon and I fired it, and I think it is a good weapon. The armor can be pierced, but you can pierce most any armor.

TURKEY

General, I would like to ask you about the southern flank of NATO and particularly on the military requirements of our most vital ally on the southern flank—Turkey.

It is my contention that the congressional practice of determining military assistance levels to Turkey for political rather than military reasons has left the southern flank of NATO dangerously vulnerable.

If I am right in that, what is your assessment of the most serious military deficiencies faced by the Turks and the impact of these deficiencies on the defense of NATO's southern flank?

General ROGERS. The most serious deficiency, Senator—well, at the outset let me say that I agree with you and what you have said. Turkey's strategic position is so important to us, to the Alliance. Second, she has the manpower to provide a large, well-trained and well-disciplined force. The most serious deficiency is the obsolete and obsolescent equipment that the Turks have which must be replaced by modern equipment if they are going to accomplish the mission we wish for them to accomplish.

From the studies that we have done at U.S. European Command in this area, we were convinced that they could absorb somewhere between $1 billion and $1½ billion of military aid assistance on an annual basis.

I have been encouraged since I have been at SHAPE to see the figure move from a little over $200 million up to a projected $800-plus million. But each year along comes the Greek lobby and says that for every dollar the United States gives to Turkey, you have got to give Greece 70 cents worth of assistance. It makes no sense at all. And so what happens? You end up with Turkey falling back down again to no higher than just over $700 million and, last year,

lower than that, and an adjustment upward of the Greek military assistance, economic assistance and other, just to get the 7-to-10 ratio.

I know of no one in this country who committed ourselves to a 7-to-10 ratio and where it ever came from beats me, Senator, but it makes no sense. And I certainly would encourage you in your endeavor to increase the amount of aid that we give to Turkey, and also to break it free from the 7-to-10 ratio. We also need to encourage the Germans who provide considerable assistance to Turkey. They do not need encouragement, in fact. They provide it on a regular basis.

I am very pleased that other nations, as they replace their aircraft with more modern aircraft, are making available to Turkey the older aircraft. And not only making aircraft available, but one nation, for example, providing a package of maintenance personnel and a package of spare parts as well. That is all for the good of the Alliance to do that.

That is a long answer to your question, Senator, but you sure got it right, I think.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I wanted to hear it from you because I agree with you. I think we have too many decisions made in this country for religious and political reasons than for our own advantage.

I just returned from a trip around the bottom part of the world and I was hurt, as an American, to hear country after country after country tell me, your country does not keep its word, only because a particular country I was in was looked upon with some disfavor by large groups of voters in this country who expressed themselves.

NATO AWACS

Admiral, I do not know if this is your question or not, but I remember when we were talking about the AWACS. It did not have much ability to pick up targets on the sea, and they were talking then about the British Neptune.

Do you find the two are comparable now?

Admiral BAGGETT. Well, Senator, we have the maritime radar field changes in the NATO AWACS and in some of the U.S. Air Force AWACS. The capability to look down and see maritime targets does exist but the NIMROD maritime radar for the United Kingdom, the British radar is still out there on the horizon.

The United Kingdon has not gotten that airplane yet, and it is one of these R&D problems that we castigate ourselves over. Others have the same problem with technology that we have in this country, and that radar system, that British competitor to AWACS, is not yet with us.

SOVIET SUBMARINES

Chairman GOLDWATER. This may be classified and if it is, just say so. I am very interested in the growing ability of the Soviet submarines to become more quiet.

Can you confine that to the propulsion system or the propeller or to the combination?

Admiral BAGGETT. Senator, it depends upon what frequencies you are talking about. The noise levels that are machinery-discrete generate different frequencies, and that is a function, and we have told the Soviet—what I am saying is not classified, I wish it were, because we have had it in the open literature so many times that it is available. You can probably go to the Library of Congress and check out the book. It is a function of rotating machinery, which in turn is a function of what frequency the electric power system in the submarine is. Every piece of rotating machinery that is not sound-isolated from the hull, in other words, a pump that has a direct metal-to-metal contact with the hull, generates its own noise, and the hull projects that noise. The way to get around that obviously is to isolate that machinery unit from that hull and render it quiet.

That takes a lot of space. It takes a lot of tender loving care in design and it takes a lot of maintenance by good sailors so they don't short-circuit that sound block that you have created with design.

If you have a pump that has a bad bearing in it, it generates an appreciably louder noise than a pump that does not have a bad bearing in it. What the Soviets have learned over time, because we pointed it out to them, is that you can do preventive maintenance and you can decrease your source level significantly. It does not take very sophisticated diagnostic equipment to make those determinations. Any major metropolitan medical center has diagnostic processing that could accomplish that task. Any good Indianapolis Speedway automobile designer has such a diagnostic set in his garage when he builds an engine. And so it is machinery noise and the ability to isolate the machinery noise from the hull. I will not make any conjectures on the Soviets' disregard in the past for sound quieting, but they were largely intent on speed and generating the power necessary to make high speeds with their submarines and they for years disregarded noise levels.

AMMUNITION

Chairman GOLDWATER. One more question. Do both of you have sufficient ammunition in all categories? I am not talking about normal caliber, but about some of the newer stuff.

General ROGERS. No, sir. I do not. The United States is better off in its ammunition stockage in Europe than almost any other nation within the alliance, but there are deficiencies in the U.S. inventory. Those deficiencies are primarily in what we call preferred ammunition, the more modern ammunition; in air-to-air missiles, for example, in surface-to-air missiles, in the very small caliber ammunition. So there are deficiencies. Some of those deficiencies are of such a nature that we categorize them as war-stoppers.

Not all that I mentioned, but some we do categorize war-stoppers because we just do not have sufficient to keep fighting. So the short answer is no for the reasons I indicated.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I know a number of years ago, maybe 5 or 6, I think the Air Force could have flown 2 or 2½ sorties and they would have been out of air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles.

Has that been improved?

General ROGERS. That has been improved, Senator, and I should also add to what I said previously, that in the FYDP at the outset there was going to be a considerable improvement by all the services, and each service has deficiencies here in the preferred ammunition.

But as the program was developed and has moved along, the amount that will be supplied during the FYDP period has been reduced. But all of this is recognized by the services, and they understand the importance of it. And within the priorities as they established them, they are taking steps to overcome those deficiencies.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Would your answer be about the same, Admiral?

Admiral BAGGETT. Yes, sir. I would say that there are shortages except for the level of effort munitions, that is, munitions used against numerous targets where you are delivery-limited, such as gun ammunition and iron bombs. Air-to-ground missiles which are not level of effort in this case, are the biggest shortages right now that we have. These threat weapons do not show a radical improvement, even in the FYDP that we have up to the year 1991. That is, level of effort weapons are better stocked than threat weapons.

In the FYDP we will get well, with level of effort weapons including sonobuoys, gun ammunition, the laser guided bombs, skippers, walleyes. But the threat weapons for stocks are not going to be there even with FYDP funding.

I think it is fair to say that that has not been due to the services not understanding the importance. I think it has been a combination of trying to balance the sustainability of force levels and those improvements in the future forces.

And as you well know, we have cut back on the growth in munitions expenditures to the point now that we are seeing that growth that had been 22 percent annually as a growth factor for sustainability of munitions, has been cut back to the point that it is 1 or 2 percent now.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I want to thank both of you gentlemen for coming here. You have given us a lot of help. As you might imagine, this is not going to be an easy job this year.

It seems that the longer we go between any kind of wars or danger of wars, the more convinced many members of the Congress become that we need no armament at all. And so there are a few of us left around here that think the best way to keep peace is to be strong. It gets harder every day, but we are sure going to try.

We have a number of questions which we will submit to be answered for the hearing record.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

SUSTAINABILITY VS MODERNIZATION

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, I note in your statement that you emphasize sustainability and its importance in warfighting. It is my understanding, however, that the services have reduced their requests for spares significantly in the fiscal year 1987 request. Would you comment on this in relationship to the shortages that you now face and as a policy of placing modernization ahead of sustainability?

General ROGERS. All Services reduced their requests for spares in the 1987 programs from the ones in fiscal year 1986. As a result none of the services will achieve

a [deleted] for prepositioned spares by the end of the 1991 FDP. Though the spares stocks increase, the program does not provide sufficient funds to meet the Defense Guidance objective [deleted].

The Defense Guidance is very specific in its direction to the services. Services must balance their support among the four pillars of conventional forces. These four pillars [deleted]. Whenever the proposed budget requires reductions to achieve an adjusted limit (whether for Gramm-Rudman compliance or for other causes), the historical record indicates Readiness and Sustainability programs are the primary candidates for immediate reductions. Those accounts offer great outlay reductions for a specific TOA cut and therefore have been a disproportionate share of any reduction during periods of declining resources. The fiscal year 1987 budget now before you represents a relatively balanced approach—overcoming a longstanding lack of emphasis on readiness, while providing increases in spares and other sustainability accounts. Although progress has been made, it is not yet the time for a dramatic shift of emphasis away from [deleted].

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, you have repeatedly brought up Special Operations Forces shortages in the areas of improved communications and infiltration and exfiltration aircraft before our Committee. What improvements in airlift have been deployed to Europe since you assumed command and do you have new lightweight communications equipment you need for these critical missions?

General ROGERS. There have been no improvements in Special Operations Forces (SOF) airlift deployed to the European theater since I assumed command in 1979. I do see infiltration improvements on the horizon with the procurement of the [deleted] however, the same is not true for an exfiltration capability. There remains a critical shortfall in viable exfiltration capability for [deleted].

As for communications equipment, [deleted].

SPETSNAZ OPERATIONS

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, last year I asked you about the threat of Soviet Special Purpose Forces, or SPETSNAZ, to our command and control apparatus and to our theater nuclear forces. You commented that they were already operating in Europe and that they could pose a significant problem. A recent article in Jane's Defence Weekly claims that these Soviet Forces have been operating in the vicinity of the Greenham Common cruise missile base since the base opened by penetrating the peace movement. Would you comment on this?

General ROGERS. The author of the article in Jane's is an Israeli citizen, [deleted] and married to a former Soviet citizen. He allegedly based his article on [deleted] known Soviet doctrine and personal conjecture in arriving at his conclusions. It is known that [deleted]. Bases or facilities associated with theater nuclear forces are [deleted] on this list of potential targets. The UK government has investigated the peace movement within that country, and [deleted]. At this point, we have no [deleted]. We believe it unlikely that the Soviets would [deleted] at this time. We are concerned, however, that the [deleted] to collect information that could be used [deleted]. It is for that reason that security forces [deleted].

BARRIER DEFENSE

Senator THURMOND. Has the idea of barrier defense in Europe gained any support?

General ROGERS. In the European Theater, barriers continue to be one important aspect of overall defense planning. The purpose of barrier planning is to integrate the use of both natural obstacles, such as rivers, and man-made obstacles, such as anti-tank ditches and minefields, with firepower and maneuver of forces to create the most effective defense possible. The barriers are not intended to stand alone as a defense. Detailed barrier planning takes place at the [deleted]. Plans for [deleted] are complete. Less detailed planning has been accomplished for [deleted]. Much of the development of barrier planning has taken place in Allied Command Europe's [deleted].

U.S. European Command supports the NATO barrier plans through U.S. Army Europe by [deleted]. U.S. forces are capable of fulfilling their NATO barrier tasking [deleted]. Lack of mechanization of combat engineer forces prevents them from keeping pace with modern mobile forces. Lack of protected equipment to operate in a high intensity combat environment reduces engineer effectiveness and may con-

tribute to heavy losses. Current mine laying techniques are time and labor intensive.

Several programs are underway that would contribute to the more effective employment of barriers in the event of war. These developments include a family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) to augment conventional barrier operations and reduce the time needed to complete barriers or fill breaches. Also included are an armored combat engineer (ACE) vehicle that would facilitate constructing barriers in combat, as well as the development of technology that would allow [deleted].

SUSTAINABILITY

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Baggett, would you comment on sustainability and its importance in your theater?

Admiral BAGGETT. Our capability to sustain combat operations may determine the outcome of a war or major contingency. Ordnance sustainability continues to be my number one readiness issue. Recent year congressional support has been instrumental in improved inventories. However, shortages—particularly in threat oriented munitions—will continue into the 1990s.

REDUCTION IN SPARES

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Baggett, does the large reduction in the request for spares this year concern you?

Admiral BAGGETT. I am very concerned about the substantial congressional reduction in 1986 funding for Air Force war readiness spares. The reduction will reduce the readiness and sustainability, and therefore the warfighting capability, of tactical aircraft which will be assigned to USCINCLANT.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

NATIONAL STRATEGY BRIEFING

Senator WARNER. General Rogers, I was interested in your written testimony and your discussion on strategy. I know that oftentimes our allies look in wonderment at the lack of a comprehensive and clear U.S. strategy and I am glad to see that you address it directly.

You may or may not be aware of legislation I have introduced, along with Chairman Goldwater and Senators Nunn, Lugar and Pell, which will provide an opportunity for the Administration to present a comprehensive discussion of our national strategy to a joint session of the Armed Services Committees and Foreign Relations Committees in both houses each year.

I believe our budget process should begin with the presentation of a national strategy. With defense budgets ranging around $300 billion impacting upon State Department budgets of over $12 billion, it is essential that Congress receive, at the very beginning of the budget process, a foundation documentation of our national strategy—a coordinated, comprehensive description of our national defense to deter aggression and implement our foreign policy. Hopefully, with this presentation of our national strategy, Congress will be better able to make reasoned and sound decisions on the programs which support it.

Because of your dealings with so many of our allies, I would be interested if you agree that such a proposal could be useful in articulating our national strategy to our allies.

General ROGERS. I agree that the linkage between the defense budget and strategic purpose is not as strong as it should be. However, I do not believe that better linkage is achievable without some changes to DOD's organizational alignment and without changes to the present allocation of responsibilities and the authority to fulfill these responsibilities. If changes can be implemented along the lines of those I provided this committee, then I agree that the congressional budget review process would benefit by a presentation of national defense strategy and its relationship to the DOD budget request. In this regard I am concerned over the suggestion by some that national defense strategy should be pegged to projections of economic growth, Federal revenues, GNP, or other estimates of the affordability of U.S. security. Instead, there must remain a single U.S. national defense strategy derived from U.S. interests and commitments, the threat thereto, and the consequences to the U.S. should we fail to secure any of the various interests. To the extent that a strategy derived in consideration of these factors is not affordable or achievable, then risk is incurred. This risk must then be apportioned among those interests for which the

consequences to the U.S. are least. To constrain the strategy author with fiscal estimates at the outset of his task will cause the strategist to ignore the process of prioritizing U.S. interest and assessing the consequences to the U.S. should deterrence fail. This then would result in strategy without value.

With regard to NATO perceptions, U.S. strategy and public policy statements must be in harmony. Better linkage between the defense budget and strategy will help in this regard.

SINCGARS RADIO

Senator WARNER. I understand that the Army will soon be fielding the new SINCGARS Radio. We have discussed before in this committee the interoperability problems between the U.S. SINCGARS tactical radio and the German equivalent radio. Can you give us an update on the current status of interoperability between our new SINCGARS and the German radio?

General ROGERS. It was not until 1984 that it became apparent that a [deleted] technical interoperability problem existed between the U.S. SINCGARS and the German Fuger Combat Net Radios. [deleted.] Since that time, there has been a continuous effort, at all command levels, to resolve this issue. The most recent and most successful has been the creation of the U.S./German Ad Hoc Combat Net Radio ECCM Interoperability Working Group. Their work has resulted in the formation of several alternative solutions. Collectively, these proposals have the potential of procedurally correcting this problem in the short term and obtaining technical interoperability in the far term while concurrently meeting all NATO connectivity requirements contained in STANAG 5048 and MC203/2. These recommendations include:

(a) The exchange of liaison teams with national equipment. This would entail U.S. and German units exchanging liaison teams equipped with national CNRs to meet those interoperability requirements contained in STANAG 5048.

(b) The establishment of CNR retransmission teams. This would involve the creation of relay stations operating in both the U.S. and German ECCM Modes by interconnecting SINCGARS and Fuger.

(c) The joint development of a new ECCM waveform for an interoperable follow-on system.

(d) The ratification of a STANAG establishing the new ECCM waveform as the NATO standard.

The recommendations of the working group were submitted to OJCS and MOD Germany in October 1985. Recently, this report was approved by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I with the caveat that consideration must be given to the availability of resources prior to implementation.

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS

Senator WARNER. The Army is in the process of organizing several new light infantry divisions. How does this type of division fit into your scheme of operations? Is it compatible with your war plans?

General ROGERS. Because of the NATO strategy of deterrence and the inherent requirement for a strong conventional defense with heavy forces (armored and mechanized) to counter the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, the light infantry division (LID) would normally be considered for later deployment to the European Theater during crisis and war. Employment of the LID would be situationally dependent. Reduced organic combat power and capability for sustained operations limits the LID's effective use to dense forest or urban areas in this theater.

This is currently compatible with both U.S. and NATO plans; however, NATO must fully examine U.S. force modernization options to determine how to best integrate the LIDs. Currently, light divisions are allocated within NATO war plans to capitalize on their characteristics and capabilities.

CINC'S COMMAND AND CONTROL INITIATIVES PROGRAM

Senator WARNER. As I understand it, the CINC's Command and Control Initiatives Program is a contingency fund for use of CINCs. It includes O&M, R&D, and Procurement funds for quick reaction, emergency requirements. What is your assessment of the value of this program?

General ROGERS. The CINC's Command and Control Initiatives Program (C^2IP) does include O&M, R&D, and Procurement funds. However, it is not a contingency fund for use in meeting quick reaction, emergency requirements, i.e., a CINC "slush" fund, to obtain equipment whenever required.

The funds are planned and budgeted annually for JCS approved USEUCOM projects which provide the capability to implement timely, low-cost (less the $300K), near-term improvements to the CINC's command and control (C^2) systems. Funds are used in discretionary manner, primarily to adapt and evolve C^2 systems to meet unique theater requirements arising from unforeseen situations and for which funding could not, under normal circumstances, be received from the Services through the normal and lengthy PPBS process. The program is necessary because the Services historically have not funded near-term low cost projects unique to unified commands.

Since the program began in 1980, at least two hundred small but critical projects have been funded, such as: UHF Satellite contingency communications systems which have been used in every EUCOM crisis (e.g., Lebanon, Chad, Achille Lauro, etc.); vital low cost secure communications links between theater CINCs; headquarters C^2 improvements; upgrade to CINC airborne C^2 communications capabilities; and enhanced communications capabilities for Special Operations Forces (SOF). The program has allowed the CINCs to obtain low cost, but needed high priority command and control systems without having to compete among the many large cost service programs in the development of service POMs. The CINC C^2 Initiative Program also allows the crucial ability to adapt rapidly to the changing C^2 environment where technological advancements often outpace the acquisition and PPBS process. In short, the program that HQ USEUCOM has established is a valuable, well managed program that has been able to capitalize on near term fixes to the CINC's C^2 system. The program has been particularly directed towards improvements in contingency communications to respond to growing numbers of terrorist related incidents in the EUCOM area of responsibility, which extends from Norway to the southern tip of Africa.

GROUND MOBILE FORCES (GMF)

Senator WARNER. The Army and Air Force are in the process of procuring Ground Mobile Forces (GMF), tactical satellite terminals which operate in the Super High Frequency (SHF) band. They have experienced some compatibility problems between their two separate systems. This problem has been addressed by this committee. The Navy has indicated they have no requirement for this system, although the Marine Corps is procuring several of them. Do you feel that the Navy should be considering procurement of some of these systems?

Admiral BAGGETT. The Army, Air Force and Marines are procuring Ground Mobile Forces (GMF), Tactical Super High Frequency (SHF) satellite terminals, that provide a multi-channel capability for forces ashore. The Navy does not have a requirement for these terminals, but I strongly believe a mobile terminal for the Navy that will interoperate with land-based forces is needed.

CINC C^2 INITIATIVE PROGRAM

Senator WARNER. As I understand it, the CINC's command and control initiatives program is a contingency fund for use of CINC's. It includes O&M, R&D and procurement funds for quick reaction, emergency requirements. What is your assessment of the value of this program?

Admiral BAGGETT. This is an extremely valuable program. The CINC C^2 Initiative Program has made it possible to complete a multitude of essential projects and upgrades which could not have been obtained otherwise.

In fiscal year 1985 we made nineteen low cost, but very significant Command and Control improvements in the Atlantic Command. The use of these contingency funds for SATCOM improvements to flagships solved one of the major interoperability problems experienced between the Navy, Army and Air Force during the rescue operations in Grenada. Seven projects are underway now using the fiscal year 1986 fund.

It is not a true contingency fund. The money is administered by the Defense Communications Agency; OSD, the Services, and JCS review each project for interoperability and effectiveness before it is initiated. We must satisfy all command and control policy requirements before the funds can be expended. The timely correction of emergent C^2 deficiencies will not be possible without the resources this program provides.

Obtaining vital C^2 upgrades through the normal acquisition process would not satisfy the urgency of the requirements. I request your continued support in maintaining this most important program. These are the only funds immediately available to the CINCs to solve emergent and critical C^2 problems.

AIR FORCE WAR READINESS SPARES

Senator WARNER. In your prepared testimony, you mention that only 40% of the fiscal year 1986 Air Force requirements for war readiness spares is funded. Just how will this shortfall impact on your command if this funding is not approved? What have you done about this problem?

Admiral BAGGETT. It will accordingly reduce the readiness and sustainability, and therefore the warfighting capability, of tactical aircraft which will be assigned to USCINCLANT. USCINCLANT has and will continue to support Air Force efforts to correct this deficiency. This cut in war readiness spares was made by the Congress in the fiscal year 1986 budget approval process in December, 1985. The problem is well identified and both the JCS and OSD are aware of the shortfall's impact.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR WILLIAM S. COHEN

ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON

Senator COHEN. Last year, the authorization act provided funds for the Air Force's anti-satellite weapon, which uses an F-15 to fire a miniature homing vehicle at low altitude satellites. But then the appropriations process nearly killed the ASAT. In your opinion as CINCLANT, what is the significance of an ASAT weapon for the United States? What would be the effect on your forces if we stop the current ASAT program?

Admiral BAGGETT. The military importance of space is inexorably increasing, and all warfare missions depend to some degree on the use and control of space for essential indications and warning, reconnaissance, command and control, navigation, and environmental data. Soviet current space capabilities include an ocean reconnaissance and targeting system (RORSAT, EORSAT, SALYUT), a global command and control network, a worldwide navigation system, and an anti-satellite system. The Soviets view space as an extension of terrestrial theaters of operation, an extension to be controlled and dominated. To counter the Soviets on earth, we must be capable of using space systems effectively and denying their use to the Soviets.

The Soviet military structure has two major components we must attack in wartime: [deleted].

Increasingly, the Soviets are investing in space-based communications satellites and sensors, many of which are flown in low-earth orbit and would be vulnerable to a weapon like the F-15-launched ASAT vehicle. Loss of the ASAT vehicle would deny us one option [deleted] in wartime. The Soviets [deleted] intend to destroy [deleted] to the extent possible. Having our own weapon would be a deterrent to Soviet use of their ASAT. They would know that we could respond in kind, [deleted].

AFFORDING FORCE STRUCTURE GOALS

Senator COHEN. As concern for the federal deficit increases, some are suggesting that we will not be able to afford the force structure goals which have been established, including the goal of fifteen carrier battlegroups. What would be the impact on your capabilities if we do not achieve and maintain our fifteen large deck carriers? What possibilities exist to substitute land-based aviation for carriers?

Admiral BAGGETT. In view of the continuing growth of the Soviet Navy, the impact of not achieving a 15 carrier force would substantially increase the level of risk which we face in a global war with the Soviet Union. Even with fifteen large deck carriers, we would be required to conduct our wartime operations in a sequential manner. The fifteen CVBG, 600-ship Navy is the minimum requirement.

To be effective as a deterrent and to be effective in war, should deterrence fail, our conventional forces must be balanced and capable of forward deployment. This requires both carrier battle groups and land-based aviation. To support national policy, protect U.S. interests, provide options, and control escalation of any crisis, carrier battle groups combine flexibility and capability across the entire range of crisis response, from peacetime presence to global war. They operate in international waters and do not require host nation approval. They have the capability to operate worldwide, carrying with them the support needed for sustained operations, and moving rapidly from one theater of operations to another in response to national requirements.

DDG-51

Senator COHEN. Fiscal year 1987 will be the second year of funding for procurement of the *Arleigh Burke* (DDG-51) class of guided missile destroyers. These ships

use a derivative of the Aegis radar now in use on *Ticonderoga* class cruisers. How high a priority would you place on funding these destroyers, which would be the second, third, and fourth ships of this class? How important is it to you that these ships include a capability to rearm and refuel ASW helicopters?

Admiral BAGGETT. The *Arleigh Burke* class, as the replacement for the aging DDG-2 and DDG-37 classes, is a crucial program if the Navy is to avoid block obsolescence in a substantial portion of the fleet's anti-air capability. In addition to operating with carrier battle groups, these ships will provide the primary anti-air coverage for surface action groups, amphibious task forces, and underway replenishment groups. Your full support of the procurement program as currently structured is recommended.

As a minimum, the DDG-51 helicopter facilities should include the capability to rearm and refuel helicopters. The concerns over the cost of the ship are recognized; however, the cost to provide these facilities will be more than offset by the enhanced helicopter employment options available to tactical commanders.

CAPABILITY OF U.S. SHIPPING

Senator COHEN. The U.S. flag merchant marine continues to decline. The Maritime Administration released figures in January which said the current fleet consisted of 597 vessels with a carrying capacity of about 24 million deadweight tons. This was a decrease from the previous year of 34 vessels and 2.9 million tons. On the other hand, the Navy has been adding ships to the ready reserve fleet. What concerns do you have, if any, about the capability of United States shipping—both commercial and military—to meet our sealift requirements in time of war or other emergency? What impact will any shortage of ships have on our ability to implement contingency warplans?

Admiral BAGGETT. I am greatly concerned about the decline in the U.S. Flag Merchant Marine, and it is likely that the decline will continue into the future. Currently, USCINCLANT apportioned Military Sealift Command ships are adequate to meet our requirements; however, as the inventory of United States flag shipping decreases, so will our apportionment in the Atlantic Command. The most drastic impact, and my principal concern, is a decreased ability to reinforce and resupply Europe and Atlantic Command forces.

SHORTAGE OF ORDNANCE

Senator COHEN. Last year, Admiral McDonald said that his number one deficiency was a shortage of ordnance. Is this also your position, one year later? In which areas do you have the greatest shortages of ordnance?

Admiral BAGGETT. Yes. Ordnance sustainability continues to be my number one readiness issue. Although recent year congressional support has resulted in improved inventories, shortages will continue into the 1990's. Our most critical shortages are in threat oriented weapons.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GARY HART

SUBMARINE BUILDING PROGRAMS

Senator HART. Admiral, on page 2 of your statement you lay heavy stress on Soviet submarine capabilities, including the fact that their submarine force outnumbers ours by three to one. In view of this fact, are you concerned about a possible reduction of the buy of SSN-688s in this year's budget from four to three?

Admiral BAGGETT. I am concerned about any reduction in submarine building programs. Such an action would be particularly disturbing in light of improvements in recent classes of Soviet attack submarines. They are closing the gap in submarine technology and a reduction in the Navy SSN program would exacerbate our numerical disadvantage.

The Navy has planned a building program to provide a total of 100 SSNs by the year 1990. To attain and maintain this level will require an average of more than three SSN starts each year. A reduction from four to three SSNs in this budget will not only delay attainment of the 100 SSNs but will also increase the risk of being unable to counter the greatly improved Soviet submarine force.

Senator HART. In view of the numerical imbalance in submarines, what would be the effect if the U.S. Navy had to engage the Soviet Navy without the support of the submarine forces of our NATO allies? Do you believe we could prevail alone?

Admiral BAGGETT. We rely heavily on the assistance of our allies, particularly their 14 SSNs. Without allied submarines, the margin of risk would be very much higher.

DEFENDING THE NORTHERN FLANK

Senator HART. Also on page 2, you discuss the effects of a defeat in the Norwegian Sea Campaign on our ability to defend Norway and Iceland and on the trans-Atlantic sea routes. What might be the effect of the losses we could suffer in such a defeat, especially submarine losses, on the remainder of the naval war?

Admiral BAGGETT. Iceland is the linchpin in the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic. Without Iceland, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to deny the movement of Soviet forces in to and out of the Atlantic and to thwart their Northern Fleet. Its importance is due primarily to the [deleted] the E-3A AWACS, and the maritime patrol aircraft operating from the base at Keflavik. The air threat to Iceland and the North Atlantic SLOCs can be effectively countered by the Iceland-based fighter-interceptors.

The outcome of a battle for control of the northern flank would crucially affect the lines of communication across the Atlantic. The loss of North Norway would reduce the risk to the Soviets of attacks against the Kola Peninsula, permit the use of advanced bases for the operation of Soviet fighter aircraft against allied maritime patrol aircraft in the Atlantic Ocean and Norwegian Sea, and permit Soviet strike aircraft to roam the skies above the Norwegian and North Seas and operate deeply into the Atlantic without inflight refueling. Soviet air bases in North Norway would allow the Warsaw Pact to provide long-range fighter support all the way to Iceland. This would make an airborne attack against Iceland, followed by an amphibious assault, feasible. It would also greatly reduce the risk to Soviet submarine and surface forces making sorties from the Kola to attack both alliance maritime forces in the Norwegian Sea and reinforcement and resupply shipping in the Atlantic. With North Norway in Soviet hands, the Norwegian Sea would become an extension of the Soviet inner defense zone.

In sum, if we lose the Norwegian Sea campaign, the United States and our NATO allies will be placed in an untenable position with respect to our ability to sustain combat operations on the European continent.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN GLENN

MUNITIONS SUSTAINABILITY

Senator GLENN. What is the current munitions sustainability in your theater, and how will the fiscal year 1987 five year defense plan improve your sustainability?

General ROGERS. The current munitions sustainability, based upon prepositioned war reserve stocks, varies by component command. The components' sustainability levels are: [deleted]. However, these rollups mask critical shortages of threat-oriented and new technology munitions.

Service POMs, as originally developed, provided for a gradual increase in munitions sustainability through the POM period. If the original POMs were followed, the theater sustainability would generally increase [deleted] each year, through the POM period. Final impact of cuts to original service positions is not yet apparent.

Senator GLENN. How much detail do you have of the munitions sustainability levels of component forces under your command?

General ROGERS. The component commands provide detailed war reserve stockage figures on current levels and estimates of inbound shipments for the next fiscal quarter to my staff. This gives my command full visibility into current component command stocks. I need, however, to have visibility beyond today and the near future. Under the direction of the DEPSECDEF the Department is examining ways of providing theater allocation data on service-wide munition procurement across the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). These data will enable me to address the most urgent readiness and sustainability needs of the theater across the same period for which the services program—the FYDP. I am optimistic that I'll be able to report to you next year on our theater allocation efforts.

Senator GLENN. How does the fiscal year 1987 5-year defense plan compare to the fiscal year 1986 plan in terms of munitions sustainability of your component forces?

General ROGERS. There are fewer dollars committed to war reserve ammunition procurement in the fiscal year 1987 5-year defense plan than there were in the fiscal year 1986 plan. The effect of this change varies by component command. In

general, the sustainability of all components improves, but at a slower pace than provided by the fiscal year 1986 plan.

Senator GLENN. At what point over the next five years will the component forces under your command have sufficient munitions stocks in theater to support your operations plan?

General ROGERS. By the end of the [deleted]. This assumes no program slippage.

COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY

Senator GLENN. What is the state of communications interoperability in your command at this moment?

General ROGERS. Interoperability can be achieved technically or procedurally. [deleted] This condition is equally valid when applied to either a joint or combined operational scenario. However, procedures have been developed and successfully employed to provide the communications connectivity necessary to meet operational requirements.

Examples of such alternatives include the use of the U.S. Defense Communications Systems (DCS), the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS) and the various National Postal Telephone and Telegraph (PTT) Systems as well as the implementation of JINTACCS, the exchange of liaison teams, the exchange of equipment and the use of interface devices. It should be noted, however, that technical communications interoperability, for the most part, is not a major problem when communicating over either landline or radio (Voice Frequency) in an unsecured mode. [deleted.]

Technical solutions have been found to meet specific critical operational needs such as the joint operations in support of Beirut. [deleted.]

Senator GLENN. Do you have sufficient secure communications links? (One of the lessons of Grenada was insufficiency of secure communications links.)

General ROGERS. [deleted.]

Senator GLENN. What communications interoperability problems do you have with allies you might work with in your theater?

General ROGERS. Although U.S. forces have been able to communicate with other nations during various NATO exercises, there still exist many interoperability shortfalls. [deleted]. Despite the fact that this issue has been well documented, resolution of interoperability difficulties has been blocked by economic and political factors. Specifically, many of the allied nations are now competing to have their nationally developed communications systems accepted as NATO standards, rather than accepting U.S. systems. Various programs have been implemented within the U.S. European Command to enhance interoperability with the allied nations. For example, the DCS Survivability Program has been initiated to provide increased capacity and survivability by using host nation Postal Telephone Telegraph (PTT) leased circuits. This enhanced capability will provide for increased connectivity with allied national communications systems.

Additionally, the ongoing Theater Mutual Support (TMS) Program will enable the U.S. Defense Communications System in Europe to be interconnected with the military communications systems of the NATO nations.

[Deleted] are continuing to resolve similar problems through the establishment [deleted].

ASW PROBLEMS

Senator GLENN. The magnitude of the Atlantic ASW problem posed by the growing Soviet submarine threat continues to escalate. With the recognition that projected CAPTOR deep water mines are substantially short of identified requirements, is it your opinion that adequate CAPTOR's are available to meet your assigned responsibilities, including mining of strategic choke points?

Admiral BAGGETT. No. Adequate numbers of CAPTOR are not now available in the Atlantic Command to meet wartime requirements. The existing Atlantic Command inventory is [deleted] that shortage will be filled by units currently in production. Because of affordability, this allocation is less than the Atlantic Command's requirement [deleted].

CAPTOR

Senator GLENN. Navy witnesses last year indicated that CAPTOR production was being allowed to lapse due to affordability despite CNO testimony that plans of the Unified Commanders required substantially more mines than were available in inventory or on order. Congress did provide funds to continue production. Now we

find once again that the Navy has not included funds in 1987 for the free world's only deep water mine. What are your options if adequate mining capability is not available?

Admiral BAGGETT. The shortage of CAPTOR will require the employment of other already scarce anti-submarine warfare forces to fill the coverage gaps created by the lack of adequate numbers of deep water minefields. Such force employment will result [deleted].

COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY

Senator GLENN. What is the state of communications interoperability in your command at this moment? Do you have sufficient secure communications links? (One of the lessons of Grenada was insufficiency of secure communications links.) What communications interoperability problems do you have with allies you might work with in your theater?

Admiral BAGGETT. The state of communications interoperability today is marginally satisfactory. However, there have been substantial improvements made since the Grenada rescue operation. There is now a more controlled introduction of crypto equipment, better distribution of crypto keying material, and some communications equipment has been modified to make it interoperable with other services. We are only marginally satisfactory because there are still communications equipments being designed that will not interoperate and we do not have joint service fielding plans for C3 equipments including crypto.

We have sufficient secure communications links to support tactical operations; however, secure communications links ashore are still inadequate. This was a problem during Grenada. Since then, the Services have purchased approximately 4500 additional secure voice systems, and this has corrected the most critical deficiencies.

With NATO forces there are several problems. First, in satellite communications: NATO does not have an Ultra-High-Frequency (UHF) satellite program; the Navy's primary satellite communications system is UHF. The United Kingdom is using a Super-High-Frequency (SHF) satellite system in their ships and it appears the remainder of NATO countries will follow. Second is the interoperability of crypto equipments. NATO members do not introduce as many different systems as we do. This problem is compounded by the phasing of the introduction of new crypto equipments; NATO introduction of new crypto equipments has historically lagged ours by several years. We are working closely with NATO to solve this problem. Another problem is one of common procedures. In message processing, we use one procedure and NATO uses another. The Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) formatted message system will be implemented by all U.S. forces later this year. However, NATO has not accepted the JINTACCS system, and it may be several years before they do so.

MUNITIONS SUSTAINABILITY

Senator GLENN. What is the current munitions sustainability in your theater, and how will the fiscal year 1987 five year defense plan improve your sustainability?

Admiral BAGGETT. Over the past five years we have made substantial progress in improving ordnance sustainability. We are now seeing munition deliveries which were funded in previous years. Although inventories are continuing to grow, shortages will exist in both level of effort and threat munitions into the 1990's. The fiscal year 1987 five year program, if funded, will continue our progress toward achieving ordnance objectives.

Senator GLENN. How much detail do you have of the munitions sustainability levels of component forces under your command?

Admiral BAGGETT. Munitions status, along with other key logistics areas, are periodically reported to USCINCLANT by the service components using the JCS S-ratings or substainability standards. This process also includes the capability to monitor the supportability of selected critical items.

Senator GLENN. How does the fiscal year 1987 five year defense plan compare to the fiscal year 1986 plan in terms of munitions substainability of your component forces?

Admiral BAGGETT. The net funding resources (post Gramm-Rudman reductions) in the fiscal year 1986 plan are not adequate to satisfy the munitions sustainability requirements of our component forces. If the fiscal year 1987 five year defense plan is fully funded, the munitions sustainability of the service components will be significantly improved, although it will still be in the early 1990's before required inventory objectives are achieved.

Senator GLENN. At what point over the next 5 years will the component forces under your command have sufficient munitions stocks in theater to support your operations plan?

Admiral BAGGETT. If the fiscal year 1987 five year defense plan for munitions procurement is maintained, we will achieve inventory objectives by [deleted].

Chairman GOLDWATER. We thank you both for coming. The meeting will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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